Globally, languages are disappearing at an unprecedented rate. To establish successful strategic options on how to protect the language's survival, members of linguistic communities must be knowledgeable of the reasons for language extinction or endangerment. This paper discusses how the number of people who speak Pangasinan, which is the eighth most common language in the Philippines, is decreasing over time and how this is affecting the language. It gives an outline of the Pangasinan language's current vitality and covers the Philippines' (...) language policy history. It also considers a situation in which globalization may provide unexpected chances for language revitalization. This study seeks to serve as a springboard for future research and aids teachers and other relevant educational personnel in identifying, comprehending, assessing, and implementing appropriate language-endangerment remedies. The authors also provide suggestions for future research based on their findings. (shrink)

This article offers an argument of genocide denial as an injustice perpetrated not only against direct victims and survivors of genocide, but also against future members of the victim group. In particular, I argue that in cases of persistent and systematic denial, i.e. denialism, it perpetrates an epistemic injustice against them: testimonial oppression. First, I offer an account of testimonial oppression and introduce Kristie Dotson’s notion of testimonial smothering as one form of testimonial oppression, a mechanism of coerced silencing particularly (...) pertinent to genocide denialism. Secondly, I turn to the epistemology of genocide denialism and, using the example of Turkey’s denialism of the Armenian genocide, show how it presents what Linda Martín Alcoff calls a substantive practice of ignorance. Thirdly, I apply these considerations to individual practices of genocide denial and analyse the particular characteristics of testimony on genocide, the speaker vulnerabilities involved and the conditions under which hearers will reliably fail to meet the dependencies of a speaker testifying to genocide. Finally, I explore the harms that testimonial oppression perpetrates on members of the victim group, insofar as it systematically deprives them of epistemic recognition. (shrink)

The main purpose of the study is to understand the mathematical problem-solving strategies among student teachers. This study used both quantitative and qualitative type of research. Aside from the semi-structured interviews, data were gathered through participant's actual mathematical problem-solving outputs and the videotaped interviews. Findings revealed that the problem-solving strategies among student teachers in the Problem-Solving subject are cognitive, metacognitive and other strategies. The cognitive strategies used by the student teachers are rehearsal, elaboration, and organization. The metacognitive strategies are critical (...) thinking and self-regulation. Other strategies are overlapping the cognitive and metacognitive strategies. These are prediction/orientation, planning, monitoring, and evaluating. The findings also suggest a significant influence of the strategies to the academic performance of the student teachers. (shrink)

The intuitive view that memories are characterized by a feeling of pastness, perceptions by a feeling of presence, while imagination lacks either faces challenges from two sides. Some researchers complain that the “feeling of pastness” is either unclear, irrelevant or isn’t a real feature. Others point out that there are cases of memory without the feeling of pastness, perception without presence, and other cross-cutting cases. Here we argue that the feeling of pastness is indeed a real, useful feature, and although (...) this feeling does not define memory ontologically, it is a characteristic marker which helps us easily categorise a mental state first-personally. We outline several cognitive features that underlie this experience, including the feeling of past accessibility, ergonomic significance, immersion, objectivity and mental strength. Our account is distinctly phenomenal, rather than doxastic, although our web of beliefs may contribute to this experience. (shrink)

I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although rejection of the first claim of the received view, that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, is implausible, I evaluate (...) in more detail the second assumption of the received view, that dream reports are generally accurate. I then propose a “narrative fabrication” view of dreams as an alternative to the received view. Dream reports are often confabulated or fabricated because of poor memory, bizarre dream content, and cognitive deficits. It is well documented that narratives can be altered between initial rapid eye movement sleep awakenings and subsequent reports. I argue that we have reason to suspect that initial reports are prone to inaccuracy. Experiments demonstrate that subjects rationalize strange elements in narratives, leaving out supernatural or bizarre components when reporting waking memories of stories. Inaccuracies in dream reports are exacerbated by rapid memory loss and bizarre dream content. Waking memory is a process of reconstruction and blending of elements, but unlike waking memory, we cannot reality-test for dream memories. Dream experiences involve imaginative elements, and dream content cannot be verified with external evidence. Some dreams may involve wake-like higher cognitive functions, such as lucid dreams. Such dreams are more likely to elicit accurate reports than cognitively deficient dreams. However, dream reports are generally less accurate than waking reports. I then propose methods which could verify the narrative fabrication view, and argue that although the theory cannot be tested with current methods, new techniques and technologies may be able to do so in the future. -/- . (shrink)

Genocide remembrance is a complex epistemological/ethical achievement, whereby survivors and descendants give meaning to the past in the quest for both personal-historical and social-historical truth. This paper offers an argument of epistemic injustice specifically as it occurs in relation to practices of (individual and collective) genocide remembrance. In particular, I argue that under conditions of genocide denialism, understood as collective genocide misremembrance and memory distortion, genocide survivors and descendants are confronted with hermeneutical oppression. Drawing on Sue Campbell’s relational, reconstructive account (...) of remembering, I argue that genocide denialism involves disrespectful challenges to memory, which systematically misrecognize rememberers. Adopting the case of Turkey’s denialism of the Armenian genocide, I discuss two interrelated mechanisms through which this can happen: i) through the systematic portrayal of survivors and descendants as vicious rememberers, and ii) through distortions of the very concept of ‘genocide’. Based on this, I show how hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are crucially interrelated when it comes to “contested” memories of historical injustice and the biographical testimony it gives rise to. (shrink)

In this introduction to the special issue ‘Epistemic Injustice and Collective Wrongdoing,’ we show how the eight contributions examine the collective dimensions of epistemic injustice. First, we contextualize the articles within theories of epistemic injustice. Second, we provide an overview of the eight articles by highlighting three central topics addressed by them: i) the effects of epistemic injustice and collective wrongdoing, ii) the underlying epistemic structures in collective wrongdoing, unjust relations and unjust societies, and iii) the remedies and strategies of (...) resistance to epistemic injustice. We close by pointing to connections and issues that may motivate further research. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the (...) main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two kinds, the paper turns to the question of the normativity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that, even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on the one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other. (shrink)

A single mother is a person who is accountable for raising their children alone because they do not have a husband or live-in partner. Single mothers claim to have no co-parenting relationships at all, comparing single parents to those who are married, cohabiting, or without children, single parents experience the worst work-life balance. A single parent may feel overwhelmed by the demands of juggling child care, a career, paying bills, and maintaining household responsibilities. Single-parent households frequently deal with several extra (...) obligations and possible complications that other families would not. The study also emphasizes the difficulties and coping mechanisms faced by contractual single parents as well as their lived experiences. The study's findings, which were based on an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, were as follows: (1) Work-life balance can be difficult for single parents. They struggle to keep their jobs while taking care of their family because they are the only ones in charge of the children. (2) Single contractual mothers face particular difficulties due to a lack of resources for basic expenses. (3) Contractual single women lean on their kids, the good people in their lives, and their faith in God to get through problems. (shrink)

This article was developed as part of the forthcoming special issue on "Reparations" for the Journal of Social Philosophy and was accepted (with minor revisions) by the guest editors Christina Nick and Susan Stark in November 2021. The special issue article is available online open access for early view. -/- Abstract: The United Nations Commission on Human Rights acknowledges the Right to Know as part of state obligations to combat impunity and thereby protect and promote human rights in the aftermath (...) of “serious crimes under international law”. In light of such an institutionally acknowledged epistemic right of victims, this paper explores the normative foundations of the idea of epistemic reparation in the aftermath of genocide. I argue that such epistemic reparation requires not only fulfilment of the informational needs of victims, survivors and descendants, including access to knowledge about the violations. By taking into account epistemic injuries, which are part and parcel of genocide, it ought to also re-establish victims’ epistemic standing. This is because genocide is enabled, justified and even prescribed through a genocidal epistemology involving the propagation of falsehoods and misinformation about social reality as well as abuses of epistemic authority and epistemic authoritarianism. Hence, epistemic reparation ought to correct the dysfunctional epistemic practices that underlie and sustain a genocidal epistemology. It thereby provides victims, survivors and descendants with epistemic recognition that has been systematically withdrawn from them, making epistemic reparation a crucial element of restorative justice. (shrink)

To what extent do I have a sense of agency over my thoughts while I dream? The sense of agency in dreams can alter in a variety of interesting ways distinct from normal, waking experience. In fact, dreams show many similarities to the experiences of individuals with schizophrenia. In this paper I analyze these alterations with a focus on distinguishing between reduced sense of agency and other cognitive features such as metacognition, confabulation and attention. I argue that some dream reports (...) demonstrate two interesting commonalities with schizophrenia: thought insertion (TI) and auditory hallucination (AH). This line of research has the potential to further our understanding of TI and AH in schizophrenia through the analysis of similar experience in a different conscious state. Through the analysis of dream reports, I found that although TI and AH both occur in dreams, TI is very rare. This is an interesting result since TI is common in patients with schizophrenia. I propose two speculative lines of explanation for the rarity of TI in dreams: first, the cognitive differences between the symptoms of schizophrenia and dreams, and second, the problem of dream reporting conditions. Dream reporting conditions are particularly important, as without controls, reports can be vague. Analysis of dream reports reveals that it is often unclear whether 'hearing voices' indicates sound phenomenology or thought phenomenology. I propose that dream reports could be disambiguated given the right experimental conditions and I suggest how this could be achieved in future experimental research. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the special issue "Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust" for the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.

When we dream, we feel emotions in response to objects and events that exist only in the dream. One key question is whether these emotions can be said to be “essentially unfitting”, that is, always inappropriate to the evoking scenario. However, how we evaluate dream emotions for fittingness may depend on the model of dreams we adopt: the imagination or the hallucination model. If fittingness requires a match between emotion and evaluative properties of objects or events, it is prima facie (...) plausible that dream emotions could fail to fit under the imagination model because it is unfitting to have an emotion toward an object we do not believe to be real. Under the hallucination model, dream emotions could be unfitting because their objects do not exist but we believe them to be real. More nuance, however, is required. By comparing dream emotions with the emotions we experience while imagining, engaging with fiction, and hallucinating, we conclude that although there are compelling arguments in support of the claim that dream emotions are essentially unfitting, these arguments are not entirely convincing, and it is more plausible that particular dream emotions can be assessed for fittingness under either model of dreaming. (shrink)

After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement and not the (...) perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists. (shrink)

Dieser inter- und multidisziplinäre Band bietet einen Querschnitt durch die wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem über hundert Jahre zurückliegenden Armenier-Genozid, der bis heute von den türkischen Nachfolgeregierungen offiziell geleugnet wird. Beiträge aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen weisen auf spezifische Probleme hin, die mit der Aufarbeitung dieses Genozids zusammenhängen: Beginnend mit einem (rechts-)historischen Teil über das Verbrechen sowie dessen zeitgenössische Bewertung, hin zu den direkten und indirekten psychologischen Folgen des Verbrechens bis heute, sowie moralphilosophische und rechtliche Fragestellungen in Bezug auf die Leugnung des Genozids.

Hvad der sker i vores sovende hjerner, kan være et mareridt at tyde for en drømmeforsker. Og vi er desværre elendige til at huske det, når vi vågner. Heldigvis kan teknologien hjælpe med at løfte sløret for, hvad der foregår, mens vi ligger og trækker torsk i land. Nogle drømme er dybt bizarre. Andre fører til Nobelpriser. Og så er der dem, som bare er pinlige. De sidste vil vi nødig sende i en hjernescanner. Ifølge Melanie Gillespie Rosen, lysvågen (...) filosof ved Aarhus Universitet, handler de fleste drømme om noget så søvndyssende som arbejde. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a metasemantics for relaxed moral realism. More precisely, I argue that relaxed realists should be inferentialists about meaning and explain that the role of evaluative moral vocabulary is to organise and structure language exit transitions, much as the role of theoretical vocabulary is to organise and structure language entry transitions.

The literature acknowledges a distinction between immoral, amoral and moral management. This paper makes a case for the employee (at any level) as a moral agent, even though the paper begins by highlighting a body of evidence which suggests that individual moral agency is sacrificed at work and is compromised in deference to other pressures. This leads to a discussion about the notion of discretion and an examination of a separate, contrary body of literature which indicates that some individuals in (...) corporations may use their discretion to behave in a socially entrepreneurial manner. My underlying assumption is that CSR isn’t solely driven by economics and that it may also be championed as a result of a personal morality, inspired by employees’ own socially oriented personal values. A conceptual framework is put forward and it is suggested that individuals may be categorized as Active or Frustrated Corporate Social Entrepreneurs; Conformists or Apathetics, distinguished by their individualistic or collectivist personal values. In a discussion of the nature of values, this paper highlights how values may act as drivers of our behavior and pays particular attention to the values of the entrepreneur, thereby linking the existing debate on moral agency with the field of corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will (...) argue. (shrink)

Reply to Ronald de Sousa and Douglas W. Heinrichs.

Recent debate about the error theory has taken a ‘formal turn’. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the error theory should be rejected because of its difficulties in providing a convincing formal account of the logic and semantics of moral claims. On the other hand, there are those who claim that such formal objections fail, maintaining that arguments against the error theory must be of a substantive rather than a formal kind. In this paper, we argue (...) that formal objections to the error theory cannot be eschewed but must be met head-on. (shrink)

Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...) Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion.. (shrink)

The Pomodoro technique is a timed-based strategy used in fighting procrastination and found to increase academic performance. However, its effect on academic learning in a synchronous remote learning modality has yet to be investigated. The study used a mixed triangulation semiexperimental design using a whole sample (N=46), following all ethical equivalence procedures. The genetics concept mastery of the students was tested using a researcher-made test. ANCOVA results revealed that students taught using Pomodoro yielded significantly better concept mastery in genetics than (...) the lecture method. This study contributes to the evaluation of one science teaching strategy compatible with remote learning modality. (shrink)

As with all other moral realists, so-called relaxed moral realists believe that there are moral truths. Unlike metaphysical moral realists, they do not take themselves to be defending a substantively metaphysical position when espousing this view, but to be putting forward a moral thesis from within moral discourse. In this paper, I employ minimalism about truth to examine whether or not there is a semantic analysis of the claim ‘There are moral truths’ which can support this moral interpretation of one (...) of moral realism’s key theses. My results are both discouraging and encouraging: Whilst I will argue that the claim ‘There are moral truths’ cannot be shown to be both moral and capable of demarcating relaxed realism from irrealism on the basis of a convincing semantic analysis that would be compatible with relaxed commitments, the moral interpretation of moral realism can be secured by modifying our understanding of what distinguishes relaxed realism from error-theoretic irrealism. Yet, we will see that this moral interpretation of moral realism does not ‘tumble out’ of the semantics provided for its central claims. Rather, hard work needs to be done before we can fully relax. (shrink)

This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the (...) situation of animals is similar. I first review some of the reasons why people are resistant to the idea that animals might have rights. I then explain Kant’s conception of natural rights. I challenge the idea that duties of aid and duties of kindness to animals fit the traditional category of “imperfect duties” and argue that they are instead cases of “imperfect right.” I explain how you can hold a right against a group, and why it is legitimate to conceive of humanity as such a group. I then argue that Kant’s account of the foundation of property rights is grounded in a conception of the common possession of the Earth that grounds a right to aid and the rights of animals to be treated in ways that are consistent with their good. Finally, I return to the objections to the idea that animals have rights and offer some responses to them. (shrink)

According to recent suggestions within the global pragmatism discussion, metaethical debate must be fundamentally re-framed. Instead of carving out metaethical differences in representational terms, it has been argued that metaethics should be given an inferentialist footing. In this paper, I put inferentialist metaethics to the test by subjecting it to the following two criteria for success: Inferentialist metaethicists must be able to save the metaethical differences between moral realism and expressivism, and do so in a way that employs understandings of (...) these metaethical accounts which would be acceptable to moral realists or expressivists who endorse an inferentialist theory of meaning. Two results follow from my discussion. The first concerns inferentialist metaethics more narrowly, casting doubts on inferentialists’ ability to fulfil the two criteria for success by showing that proposed metaethical demarcation attempts either meet the first criterion but violate the second, or pass the second criterion but fail the first. The second upshot pertains to the global pragmatism debate more widely, pressing the point that inferentialists have not as yet provided a convincing account of ontological commitment. (shrink)

One difficulty in understanding recent debates is that not only have many terms been used to refer to weakness of will – “akrasia” and “incontinence” have often been used as synonyms of “weakness of will” – but quite different phenomena have been discussed in the literature. This is why the present entry starts with taxonomic considerations. The second section turns to the question of whether it is possible to freely and intentionally act against one’s better judgment.

Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a promising account (...) of emotions, namely the Perceptual Theory of Emotions, which emphasises the analogies between emotions and sensory perceptual experiences. The second section considers a worry about whether concepts such as admirable are really evaluative. It is maintained that even though the arguments used to show that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative can be transposed to affective concepts, these arguments can be resisted. So there is no need to abandon the intuitive claim that affective concepts are inherently evaluative. (shrink)

Access to surrogacy is often cast in the language of rights. Here, I examine what form such a right could take. I distinguish between surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation, and surrogacy as a contractual right. I find the first interpretation implausible: it would give rise to claims against the state that no state can fulfil, namely the provision of sufficient surrogates to satisfy the need. Instead, I argue that the right to surrogacy can only be plausibly understood as (...) a contractual right. I then investigate two different sets of harms that are often employed to argue against such a contractual interpretation of the right to surrogacy: harm to women's interests in a gendered society, and harm to the sense of self of the surrogate. I assess both of these through the analytical lens of vulnerability. I find neither of them to be convincing arguments against surrogacy contracts. In conclusion, I agree that surrogacy contracts should be carefully regulated, but I disagree with those who call for prohibition of the right to surrogacy as a contractual right. (shrink)

The difficulty of the students in Statistics and Probability subject, and the pedagogical approaches used by the teachers, were the challenges encountered by both students and teachers due to the restrictions during the CoViD-19 pandemic. Hence, this study aimed to determine the pedagogical approaches used in teaching statistics and probability during the pandemic. The study used a qualitative approach, particularly document analysis. The main source of the data was the module in statistics and probability specifically the learning activity sheets in (...) the third quarter because this is the most convenient approach that can be used by the teachers during the pandemic. The pedagogical approaches were identified and validated by three inter-raters. Based on the findings, communication, and study skills, technology-aided instruction, problem-based learning, manipulatives, modules, models and multiple representations, and direct instruction were the identified pedagogical approaches used in the statistics and probability module. However, the effectiveness of the delivery of these approaches cannot be measured because the modality was limited to a modular approach. The teachers were able to use different pedagogical approaches, however, cooperative learning was not used because the CoViD-19pandemic restricted interactions between the teacher and students or students with their classmates. (shrink)

L'empiètement pragmatique ("pragmatic encroachment" en anglais) est une théorie épistémologique récente, allant à contre-courant des thèses traditionnelles selon lesquelles savoir est une affaire purement épistémique : comprenez par-là que les notions épistémiques telles que la connaissance, la justification ou la rationalité des croyances dépendent uniquement de leur relation à la vérité. Dans un chapitre intitulé "Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value" (2009) Pascal Engel discute des rapports qu'il existe entre l'empiètement pragmatique et la question de la valeur de la connaissance. Dans (...) la présentation qu'il fait de l'empiètement pragmatique comme thèse et phénomène, il explique : "[l'empiètement pragmatique] ressemble à une forme de pragmatisme, bien qu'il ne soit pas clair en quel sens cette thèse ressemble aux formes plus traditionnelles de pragmatisme" . Dans la note de bas de page qui suit cette phrase, il ajoute : "je n'examinerais pas comment la thèse de "l'empiètement pragmatique" est liée à ces formes plus traditionnelles de pragmatisme". Ces deux mentions des rapports entre l'empiètement pragmatique et le pragmatisme suggèrent que Engel soupçonne l'empiètement pragmatique d'être une forme de pragmatisme. Dans cet article, j'examinerais plus précisément cette idée et argumenterais en faveur du fait que, contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait croire, l'empiètement pragmatique n'est pas forcément une thèse pragmatiste au sens où l'entend Engel. (shrink)

Numerous agricultural wastes are impractically discarded every day, and one of these is rice bran. This study investigated the production of a biodegradable straw made of cassava starch and powdered rice bran. It aimed to determine the effectiveness of the different treatments of Cassava Starch-Rice Bran in terms of water resistance, tensile strength, and biodegradability. An experimental design was used in conducting the study. There were three treatments made in making CSRB straws: the first, with more rice bran; the second, (...) with the same cassava starch and rice bran ratio; and the third, with more cassava starch. These treatments produced three replicates each. The straws were placed in a dehydrating machine for 24 hours at a temperature of 60° Celsius. The straws were then coated with beeswax after being removed from their respective molders. The CSRB straws were found to be water resistant due to the beeswax coating applied, although it had a weak tensile strength even with the presence of beeswax. The rate of biodegradability of the CSRB straw was fast due to it being made up of organic materials. The results revealed that straws made from Cassava Starch and Powdered Rice Bran are effective in terms of water resistance and biodegradability. (shrink)

Much thought has been devoted to how metaethical disagreement between moral realism and expressivism can be saved once minimalism starts creeping. Very little thought has been given to how creeping minimalism affects error-theories’ disagreement with their metaethical competitors. The reason for this omission, I suspect, is found in the belief that whilst locating distinctive moral realist and expressivist positions within a minimalist landscape poses a severe challenge, no such difficulties are encountered when differentiating error-theories from moral realism and expressivism. In (...) the first part of this paper, I show that this belief is mistaken: Insofar as moral realists and error-theorists are still taken to disagree, creeping minimalism renders their disagreement moral, but makes these positions metaethically indistinguishable. In the second part of the paper, I present a modified inferentialist solution to the problem of creeping minimalism which seeks to put error-theories back on the metaethical map. Yet, this too comes at a cost, in that it significantly modifies our interpretation of error-theories. Whichever way we turn, then, creeping minimalism not only forces us to re-phrase metaethical positions in a way that is compatible with minimalism, but also requires us to change our very understanding of these positions. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...) relation between emotions and wellbeing is much less strong than is commonly thought. (shrink)

This study investigated the effectiveness of utilizing induced magnetism on the seed germination of radish (Raphanussativus) in terms of growth rate, growth speed, shoot growth, and overall development. This study utilized two groups that consisted of an experimental group where induced magnetism was present one control group where there was an absence of induced magnetism in the seed germination of Radish (Raphanus sativus). Moreover, this study aimed to determine the significant difference between the two in terms growth rate, growth speed, (...) shoot growth, and overall development. Both groups had the same amount of radish (Raphanus sativus) seeds planted in a rectangular wooden container with the same amount of measurement and soil content. This study used an experimental research design by utilizing the functions of an Electromagnetic Induction Device (EID) comprised of a 12v motor battery, light bulb, coiled wire, and switch. The EID was turned on for 10 minutes every day where the electric volts generated by the 12v motor battery were transported through the coiled wire and distributed to the metallic iron screen surrounding the area of the experimental group. The data gathered during the 12-day observation of the growth of radish (Raphanus sativus) were tabulated, analyzed, and evaluated using mean tests, standard deviation, and T-test. Based on the result and analyses of the gathered data, it was found that the experimental group, the one with the presence of induced magnetism, surpassed the control group in terms of growth speed, shoot growth, and overall seed development. However, it was also revealed that in terms of growth rate, there is no significant difference between the control group and experimental group. Therefore, the utilization of Induced Magnetism on the seed germination of radish (Raphanus sativus) is effective in terms of growth speed, shoot growth, and overall development. (shrink)

Ascribing moral responsibility in collective action cases is notoriously difficult. After all, if my individual actions make no difference with regard to the prevention of climate change, the alleviation of poverty, or the outcome of national elections, why ought I to stop driving, donate money, or cast my vote? Neither consequentialist nor non-consequentialist moral theories have straightforward responses ready at hand. In this contribution, I present a new suggestion which, based on thoughts about causal overdetermination along the lines of Mackie’s (...) INUS account, aims to show that causally overdetermined collective action cases are morally arbitrary in a way that makes it possible to ascribe moral responsibility even if individual actions make no difference. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge the argument that if we take health to be a meta-capability, we will be able to address the vulnerabilities that characterize human life. Instead, I argue that some vulnerabilities, like that attached to being a patient, can not be successfully addressed.

This introduction to the edited volume on "Testimonial Injustice and Trust" provides (a) a brief overview of the philosophical debate on the notion of ‘testimonial injustice’ and (b) a summary of the 18 chapters constituting this volume. The contributions are divided into four thematic sections. These are (I) Rethinking Testimonial Injustice, (II) Testimonial Injustice and the Question of Trust, (III) The Public Spheres of Testimonial Injustice, and (IV) Testimonial Injustice and Public Health. The contributions criticize, complement, or expand on Fricker’s (...) central case of testimonial injustice and the proposed virtue of testimonial justice, thereby contributing to its better understanding and extending its scope. Moreover, through the application of theories of epistemic injustice, and testimonial injustice in particular, to new real-world cases and contexts, they seek to render our theories and concepts more robust and valuable. (shrink)

This article revisits, analyzes and critiques Bruce Chatwin’s 1987 bestseller, The Songlines,1 more than three decades after its publication. In Songlines, the book primarily responsible for his posthumous celebrity, Chatwin set out to explore the essence of Central and Western Desert Aboriginal Australians’ philosophical beliefs. For many readers globally, Songlines is regarded as a—if not the—definitive entry into the epistemological basis, religion, cosmology and lifeways of classical Western and Central Desert Aboriginal people. It is argued that Chatwin’s fuzzy, ill-defined use (...) of the word-concept “songlines”2 has had the effect of generating more heat than light. Chatwin’s failure to recognize the economic imperative underpinning Australian desert people’s walking praxis is problematic: his own treks through foreign lands were underpropped by socioeconomic privilege. Chatwin’s ethnocentric idée fixe regarding the primacy of “walking” and “nomadism,” central to his Songlines thématique, well and truly preceded his visits to Central Australia. Walking, proclaimed Chatwin, is an elemental part of “Man’s” innate nature. It is argued that this unwavering, preconceived, essentialist belief was a self-serving construal justifying Chatwin’s own “nomadic” adventures of identity. Is it thus reasonable to regard Chatwin as a “rogue author,” an unreliable narrator? And if so, does this matter? Of greatest concern is the book’s continuing majority acceptance as a measured, accurate account of Aboriginal belief systems. With respect to Aboriginal desert people and the barely disguised individuals depicted in Songlines, is Chatwin’s book a “rogue text,” constituting an act of epistemic violence, consistent with Spivak’s usage of that term? (shrink)

Most of those who hold that emotions involve appraisals also accept that the content of emotions is nonconceptual. The main motivation for nonconceptulism regarding emotions is that it accounts for the difference between emotions and evaluative judgements. This paper argues that if one assumes a broadly Fregean account of concepts, there are good reasons to accept that emotions have nonconceptual contents. All the main arguments for nonconceptualism regarding sensory perception easily transpose to the case of emotions. The paper ends by (...) responding to two important objections: firstly, that nonconceptualism rules out the possibility that emotions justify evaluative judgements and secondly, that nonconceptualism cannot account for the fact that some emotions have conceptually articulated cognitive bases. (shrink)

The movement of people across borders is one of the most pressing issues of our time. Yet it is still unclear how migration should be regulated to be fair to the sending societies, the host societies and the individual migrant. What is at issue? Are we discussing migration from an ethical or from a political philosophical perspective, or both? Are we discussing migration from a global justice perspective or social justice perspective? Do we consider political legitimacy and democratic self-determination as (...) part of our analysis? How should we balance demands of justice in immigration compared to those of emigration? (shrink)

Gilabert argues that the humanist conception of duties of global justice and the principle of cosmopolitan justifiability will lead us to accept an egalitarian definition of individual autonomy. Gilabert further argues that realizing conditions of individual autonomy can serve as the cut-off point to duties of global justice. I investigate his idea of autonomy, arguing that in order to make sense of this claim, we need a concept of autonomy. I propose 4 possible definitions of autonomy, none of which seem (...) to necessitate Gilabert’s duties of egalitarian global justice. Instead, I propose that he may have in mind Autonomy 5, which requires that individuals have access to a maximum number of options and not simply a sufficient range of options to choose from. I criticize this premise as too demanding in the global world characterized by fundamental inequality. Second, I argue that if we were to endorse the preconditions for Autonomy 5, we would have to accept that Gilabert’s theory of global justice doesn’t provide for a cut-off point of duties of global justice. (shrink)

Despite the widespread use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why the capacity to experience moral intuitions evolved in humans. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. Drawing lessons from this analysis, we propose a novel account of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic, and evolutionary features. Moral intuitions are composed of two elements: an evaluative mental state and a (...) feeling of rightness (FOR). We illustrate the phenomenology of the FOR with examples of non-moral and moral cases, and provide a biological and mechanistic account: the emergence of human reasoning capacities created a need for the co-evolution of a psychological system producing the feeling of rightness (the FORs). This system is triggered when we experience conflicting evaluations. The FORs renders evaluations resulting from rational deliberation less compelling than the evaluations produced by simple evolved systems. It thus facilitates optimal decision-making, preventing excessive interference by rational deliberation. Our account sheds light on why moral intuitions are so frequently experienced and why they are so compelling and resistant to argument. In addition, the account fuels interesting speculations about common metaethical intuitions. (shrink)

Episodic memory (memories of the personal past) and prospecting the future (anticipating events) are often described as mental time travel (MTT). While most use this description metaphorically, we argue that episodic memory may allow for MTT in at least some robust sense. While episodic memory experiences may not allow us to literally travel through time, they do afford genuine awareness of past-perceived events. This is in contrast to an alternative view on which episodic memory experiences present past-perceived events as mere (...) intentional contents. Hence, episodic memory is a way of coming into experiential contact with, or being again aware of, what happened in the past. We argue that episodic memory experiences depend on a causal-informational link with the past events being remembered, and that, assuming direct realism about episodic memory experiences, this link suffices for genuine awareness. Since there is no such link in future prospection, a similar argument cannot be used to show that it also affords genuine awareness of future events. Constructivist views of memory might challenge the idea of memory as genuine awareness of remembered events. We explain how our view is consistent with both constructivist and anti-causalist conceptions of memory. There is still room for an interpretation of episodic memory as enabling genuine awareness of past events, even if it involves reconstruction. (shrink)

Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...) combined with sentimentalism, and we suggest that a plausible account, which we call ‘sentimental realism’, and according to which evaluative judgements are closely related to emotions, can be developped. (shrink)

This study aimed to construct structural equation model of students’ competence in mathematics through selected students profile variables. The structural model revealed interesting influence of the profile variables to the competency in mathematics. It can be conveyed that better mother’s work status, higher educational level expected to complete, more confident and did not repeat kinder, have better competency in mathematics. The four variables that directly influenced the competence variables were also influenced with other profile variables such as family background. The (...) family background and confidence level consistently had the highest total effect and indirect effect to the competence in mathematics. Hence, this model can serve as a guide in making programs in the classroom or curriculum in mathematics. (shrink)

Metaethics is traditionally understood as a non-moral discipline that examines moral judgements from a standpoint outside of ethics. This orthodox understanding has recently come under pressure from anti-Archimedeans, such as Ronald Dworkin and Matthew Kramer, who proclaim that rather than assessing morality from an external perspective, metaethical theses are themselves substantive moral claims. In this paper, I scrutinise this anti-Archimedean challenge as applied to the metaethical position of expressivism. More precisely, I examine the claim that expressivists do not avoid moral (...) commitments when accounting for moral thought, but instead presuppose them; they do not look at ethics from the outside, but operate from within ethics. This paper defends the non-moral status of expressivism against anti-Archimedeanism by rejecting a new anti-Archimedean challenge which, on the basis of Hume’s Law, aims to exploit expressivist explanations of supervenience in order to show that expressivism is a substantive moral position. (shrink)

Metacognition-related studies do often give focus on the regulation or experience components but little on the knowledge component. In particular and especially within the Philippine context, not much focus is given with regards to a clear and coherent academic framework that fortifies the metacognitive strategy knowledge in mathematical problem solving amongst students. Using an evolved grounded theory, the purpose of this study is to look closely into the metacognitive strategy knowledge of preservice teacher education students. Twenty-three students participated and initial (...) data were collected using the prepared problem solving test. Subsequently, interviews were conducted to supplement the initial data. Pandit’s grounded theory methodology and the constant comparison method were used to analyze the data collected. Findings revealed an emerging three-phased categorization of metacognitive strategy knowledge thru problem solving: preparatory, production, and evaluation. The multi-distinct yet related categorization were neither linear nor just cyclic in nature but is experienced and underwent by problem solvers with varying degree of creativity and flexibility depending on the problem at hand, beliefs, attitudes, and learning style. The findings shed some light on the distinct role of metacognitive strategy knowledge and some ensuing factors during authentic problem solving. (shrink)