Philosophers of mind (from eliminative materialists to psychofunctionalists to interpretivists) generally assume that a normative ideal delimits which mental phenomena exist (though they disagree about how to characterize the ideal in question). This assumption is dubious. A comprehensive ontology of mind includes some mental phenomena that are neither (a) explanatorily fecund posits in any branch of cognitive science that aims to unveil the mechanistic structure of cognitive systems nor (b) ideal (nor even progressively closer to ideal) posits in any given (...) folk psychological practice. Indeed, one major function of scientific psychology has been (and will be) to introduce just such (normatively suboptimal but real) mental phenomena into folk psychological taxonomies. The development and public dissemination of IQ research over the course of the 20th century is a case in point. (shrink)

This article intervenes in recent formalist and ecocritical debates, drawing on the philosophy of Charles Darwin and Édouard Glissant to develop an ecopoetic theory of relational form. Gathering perspectives from ecocriticism and new materialism, literary criticism and comparative literature, the history and philosophy of science, postcolonial theory, critical race theory, and Black studies, it reads form as an interdisciplinary object that is part of the world, rather than an imposed feature of human language or perception. In this way, it produces (...) a relational theory of form that is not hylomorphic or defined through the relation between form and content but, rather, is defined by the relation between a content and extant and, so, an interaction of relation and repetition. Drawing on the history of ecological science, it further explores how forms combine, how they amplify and interfere with each other, and how they support relations of harm and care. Finally, it uses this ecopoetic theory of form to read the histories of racial violence and migration in Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” (1867) and Helen Oyeyemi’s White Is for Witching (2009). (shrink)

The mind and brain sciences influence how human beings understand one another. Histories of the concepts of repression, implicit bias, ADHD, IQ, and personhood reveal that scientific psychology has played a role, not just in shaping people's thinking about minds, but also (and thereby) in shaping minds themselves. These case studies may thus be seen as supporting the contentious thesis that science aids in the social construction of minds. Three considerations are relevant to determining how seriously we should take that (...) contention: (1) to what extent was it inevitable that socially sophisticated animals would come to describe minds in the ways that 21st century humans do?; (2) to what extent do human sociocognitive practices accurately describe the inherent structure of the mind?; (3) to what extent can historical stability in descriptions of minds be chalked up to the fact that people are accurately describing the structure of the mind? (shrink)

Introductory but opinionated essay on what (and why) minds are.

This article reconsiders the relationship between interpretivism about belief and normative standards. Interpretivists have traditionally taken beliefs to be fixed in relation to norms of interpretation. However, recent work by philosophers and psychologists reveals that human belief attribution practices are governed by a rich diversity of normative standards. Interpretivists thus face a dilemma: either give up on the idea that belief is constitutively normative or countenance a context-sensitive disjunction of norms that constitute belief. Either way, interpretivists should embrace the intersubjective (...) indeterminacy of belief. (shrink)

In Go Set a Watchman, Harper Lee reveals that American man of integrity Atticus Finch harbors deep-seated racist beliefs. Bob Ewell, Finch's nemesis in To Kill a Mockingbird, harbors the same beliefs. But the two men live out their shared racist beliefs in dramatically different fashions. This article argues that extant dispositionalist accounts of belief lack the tools to accommodate Finch and Ewell's divergent styles of believing. It then draws on literary and philosophical character studies to construct the required tools.

In this article, I explore how researchers’ metaphysical commitments can be conducive—or unconducive—to progress in animal cognition research. The methodological dictum known as Morgan’s Canon exhorts comparative psychologists to countenance the least mentalistic fair interpretation of animal actions. This exhortation has frequently been misread as a blanket condemnation of mentalistic interpretations of animal behaviors that could be interpreted behavioristically. But Morgan meant to demand only that researchers refrain from accepting default interpretations of (apparent) actions until other fair interpretations have been (...) duly considered. The Canon backfired largely because of Morgan’s background metaphysical commitment to a univocal, hierarchical, and anthropocentric account of cognitive architecture. I make the case that, going forward, comparative psychologists would do well to pair judicious use of Morgan’s Canon with an openness to the existence of non-humanlike animal minds comprising phenomena belonging to distinct cognitive and folk psychological ontologies. And I argue that this case gives us pragmatic reason to reconcile deep—e.g., psychofunctionalist—and superficial—e.g., dispositionalist—approaches to the metaphysics of belief. (shrink)

I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzysztof Poslajko objects that dispositionalism does just fine on its own and, moreover, is better off without interpretivism’s metaphysical baggage. I argue that Poslajko is wrong: in order to secure a principled criterion for individuating beliefs, dispositionalism must either collapse into psychofunctionalism (or some other non-superficial theory) or accept interpretivism’s hand in marriage.

Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as (...) patterns of living that contextualize behavior. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dilemma for interpretivism first posed by Alex Byrne. On the first horn of the dilemma, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to an ideal interpreter (and thus loses any connection with actual folk psychological practices). On the second horn, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to individuals’ judgements (and thus denies the possibility of error). I show that this is a false dilemma. By (...) taking a model-theoretic approach to folk psychology, and marrying interpretivism with dispositionalism, interpretivists can viably reject the notion of an ideal (or canonical) interpreter—and relativize attitudes to actual lay interpreters—without taking on board the unacceptable epistemological consequences of allowing that attitudes are judgement-dependent. (shrink)

Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states (...) of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former. Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems. (shrink)

A pluralistic approach to folk psychology must countenance the evaluative, regulatory, predictive, and explanatory roles played by attributions of intelligence in social practices across cultures. Building off of the work of the psychologist Robert Sternberg and the philosophers Gilbert Ryle and Daniel Dennett, I argue that a relativistic interpretivism best accounts for the many varieties of intelligence that emerge from folk discourse. To be intelligent is to be comparatively good at solving intellectual problems that an interpreter deems worth solving.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the level of gender bias in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals while exercising due care in the analysis of its arguments. I argue that while the GA theory is clearly sexist, the traditional interpretation fails to diagnose the problem correctly. The traditional interpretation focuses on three main sources of evidence: (1) Aristotle’s claim that the female is, as it were, a “disabled” (πεπηρωμένον) male; (2) the claim at GA IV.3, 767b6-8 that females are (...) a departure from the kind; and (3) Aristotle’s supposed claim at GA IV.3, 768a21-8 that the most ideal outcome of reproduction is a male offspring that perfectly resembles its father. I argue that each of these passages has either been misunderstood or misrepresented by commentators. In none of these places is Aristotle suggesting that females are imperfect members of the species or that they result from the failure to achieve some teleological goal. I defend the view that the GA does not see reproduction as occurring for the sake of producing males; rather, what sex an embryo happens to become is determined entirely by non-teleological forces operating through material necessity. This interpretation is consistent with Aristotle’s view in GA II.5 that females have the same soul as the male (741a7) as well as the argument in Metaphysics X.9 that sexual difference is not part of the species form but is an affection (πάθος) arising from the matter (1058b21-4). While the traditional interpretation has tended to exaggerate the level of sexism in Aristotle’s
developmental biology, the GA is by no means free of gender bias as some recent scholarship has claimed. In the final section of the paper I point to one passage where Aristotle clearly falls back on sexist assumptions in order to answer the difficult question, “Why are animals divided into sexes?”. I argue that this passage in particular poses a serious challenge
to anyone attempting to absolve Aristotle’s developmental biology of the charge of sexism. (shrink)

This book consolidates emerging research on Aristotle's science and ethics in order to explore the extent to which the concepts, methods, and practices he developed for scientific inquiry and explanation are used to investigate moral phenomena. Each chapter shows, in a different way, that Aristotle's ethics is much more like a science than it is typically represented. The upshot of this is twofold. First, uncovering the links between Aristotle's science and ethics promises to open up new and innovative directions for (...) research into his moral philosophy. Second, showing why Aristotle thinks ethics can never be fully assimilated to the model of science will help shed new light on his views about the limits of science. The volume thus promises to make a significant contribution to our understanding of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of Aristotle's ethics. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Aristotle’s views on natural kinds and the compatibility of pluralism and realism, a topic that has generated considerable interest among contemporary philosophers. I argue that, when it came to zoology, Aristotle denied that there is only one way of organizing the diversity of the living world into natural kinds that will yield a single, unified system of classification. Instead, living things can be grouped and regrouped into various cross-cutting kinds on the basis of objective similarities (...) and differences in ways that subserve the explanatory context. Since the explanatory aims of zoology are diverse and variegated, the kinds it recognizes must be equally diverse and variegated. At the same time, there are certain constraints on which kinds can be selected. And those constraints derive more from the causal structure of the world than from the proclivities of the classifier (hence the realism). This distinguishes Aristotle’s version of pluralistic realism from those contemporary versions (like Dupré’s “promiscuous realism”) that treat all or most classifications of a given domain as equally legitimate and not just a sub-set of kinds recognized by the science that studies it. By contrast, Aristotle privileges scientifically important kinds on the basis of their role in causal investigations. On this picture natural kinds are those kinds with the sort of causal structure that allows them to enter into scientific explanations. In the final section I argue that Aristotle’s zoology should remain of interest to philosophers and biologists alike insofar as it combines a pluralistic form of realism with a rank-free approach to classification. (shrink)

In this paper I address an important question in Aristotle’s biology, What are the causal mechanisms behind the transmission of biological form? Aristotle’s answer to this question, I argue, is found in Generation of Animals Book 4 in connection with his investigation into the phenomenon of inheritance. There we are told that an organism’s reproductive material contains a set of "movements" which are derived from the various "potentials" of its nature (the internal principle of change that initiates and controls development). (...) These movements, I suggest, function as specialized vehicles for communicating the parts of the parent’s heritable form during the act of reproduction. After exploring the details of this mechanism, I then take up Aristotle’s theory of inheritance proper. At the heart of the theory are three general principles (or 'laws') that govern the interactions between the maternal and paternal movements, the outcome of which determines the pattern of inheritance for the offspring. Although this paper is primarily aimed at providing a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s account of inheritance, the results of that analysis have implications for other areas of Aristotle’s biology. One of the most interesting of these is the question of whether Aristotle’s biology is anti-evolutionary (as traditionally assumed) or whether (as I argue) it leaves room for a theory of evolution by natural selection, even if Aristotle himself never took that step. (shrink)

Historically embryogenesis has been among the most philosophically intriguing phenomena. In this paper I focus on one aspect of biological development that was particularly perplexing to the ancients: self-organisation. For many ancients, the fact that an organism determines the important features of its own development required a special model for understanding how this was possible. This was especially true for Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius, who all looked to contemporary technology to supply that model. However, they did not all agree on (...) what kind of device should be used. In this paper I explore the way these ancients made use of technology as a model for the developing embryo. I argue that their different choices of device reveal fundamental differences in the way each thinker understood the nature of biological development itself. In the final section of the paper I challenge the traditional view (dating back to Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle) that the use of automata in GA can simply be read off from their use in the de motu. (shrink)

It has become somewhat of a platitude to call Aristotle the first epigenesist insofar as he thought form and structure emerged gradually from an unorganized, amorphous embryo. But modern biology now recognizes two senses of “epigenesis”. The first is this more familiar idea about the gradual emergence of form and structure, which is traditionally opposed to the idea of preformationism. But modern biologists also use “epigenesis” to emphasize the context-dependency of the process itself. Used in this sense development is not (...) simply the unfolding of a pre-determined sequence of changes specified in advance by the organism’s genotype. It is also sensitive to inputs from the internal and external environment, which help determine in real-time which of the many potential developmental pathways are actualized during the process. Within this paradigm developing embryos are viewed as dynamic and responsive systems that react to inputs from the internal and external environment ‘on the fly’. In this paper I argue that, while Aristotle was an epigenesist in the first sense, he would have rejected epigenesis in the more modern sense. First, Aristotle’s model of choice for a developing embryo is the automaton that executes a set of preset movements (GA 734b9-13, 741b7-15). The automatons he has in mind are not dynamic AI systems capable of modifying their behaviour on the fly in response to environmental cues but completely deterministic mechanisms whose movements are fixed by their original design. Second, given Aristotle’s views about the different kinds of causal powers there are, it looks like only intentional agents endowed with actual decision-making powers could be capable of the sort of plasticity at the core of a more dynamic epigenesis. For that kind of epigenesis requires powers for alternative outcomes, and Aristotle is explicit that such powers require rational desires (προαίρεσις) that control which of those alternatives to bring about. If I am right, then he could not have made sense of the idea of a developing embryo (as a non-intentional system) making adjustments to its phenotype on the fly in response to emerging problems and opportunities, given the conceptual resources available to him. (shrink)

Psychometric g—a statistical factor capturing intercorrelations between scores on different IQ tests—is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its cognitive/neural underpinnings. Psychometric g idealizes away from those aspects of cognitive/neural mechanisms that are not explanatory of the relevant variety of folk psychological intelligence, and it idealizes away from those varieties of folk psychological intelligence that are not generated by the relevant cognitive/neural substrate. In this manner, g constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of (...) the relationship between its two targets and, thereby, helps demystify the relationship between folk and scientific psychology. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Descartes’s method of doubt. It wields an examination of Descartes’s pedagogy—as exemplified by The Search for Truth as well as the Meditations—to make the case for the sincerity (as opposed to artificiality) of the doubts engendered by the First Meditation. Descartes was vigilant about balancing the need to use his method of doubt to achieve absolute certainty with the need to compensate for the various foibles of his scholastic and unschooled readers. Nevertheless, Descartes endeavored (...) to instill willful, context-independent, universal doubt across his readership. If all goes well, readers of the Meditations are like method actors; the Meditator is the character they are meant to bring to life, via the method of meditating on reasons for doubt. The article concludes with the suggestion that Descartes was the same kind of skeptic as the early Academic skeptics Arcesilaus and Carneades. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of optimality reasoning in Aristotle’s natural science. By “optimality reasoning” I mean reasoning that appeals to some conception of “what is best” in order to explain why things are the way they are. We are first introduced to this pattern of reasoning in the famous passage at Phaedo 97b8-98a2, where (Plato’s) Socrates invokes “what is best” as a cause (aitia) of things in nature. This passage can be seen as the intellectual ancestor of (...) Aristotle’s own principle, expressed by the famous dictum “nature does nothing in vain but always what is best for the substance from among the possibilities concerning each kind of animal” (Progression of Animals II, 704b12-18). The paper is focused around exploring three questions that arise in connection with Aristotle’s use of this optimality principle: (1) How do we understand the concept of “the best” at work in the principle? (2) How does Aristotle conceive of “the range of possibilities”? And, finally, (3) what role does optimality reasoning play in Aristotle’s natural science? Is it a special form of demonstration in which the optimality principle functions as one of its premises, or is it a heuristic device that helps uncover those causally relevant features of a natural substances that ultimately serve as middle terms in demonstrations? In the final section I return to the comparison between Plato and Aristotle and argue that, while both see the natural world as the product of an optimizing agent and while both see this assumption as licensing a pattern of reasoning that appeals to a certain conception of “the best”, they disagree fundamentally over what the optimization agent is and how it operates. Thus, despite their general agreement, it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle simply took over Plato’s use of optimality reasoning without significant modifications. (shrink)

Descartes held the following view of declarative memory: to remember is to reconstruct an idea that you intellectually recognize as a reconstruction. Descartes countenanced two overarching varieties of declarative memory. To have an intellectual memory is to intellectually reconstruct a universal idea that you recognize as a reconstruction, and to have a sensory memory is to neurophysiologically reconstruct a particular idea that you recognize as a reconstruction. Sensory remembering is thus a capacity of neither ghosts nor machines, but only of (...) human beings qua mind-body unions. This interpretation unifies Descartes’s various remarks (and conspicuous silences) about remembering, from the 1628 Rules for the Direction of the Mind through the suppressed-in-1633 Treatise of Man to the 1649 Passions of the Soul. It also rebuts a prevailing thesis in the current secondary literature—that Cartesian critters can remember—while incorporating the textual evidence for that thesis—Descartes’s detailed descriptions of the corporeal mechanisms that construct sensory memories. (shrink)

A general article discussing philosophical issues arising in connection with Aristotle's "Generation of Animals" (Chapter from Blackwell's Companion to Aristotle).

The intellectual history of evolutionary theory really does not begin in earnest until the late seventeenth/early eighteenth century. Prior to that, the idea that species might have evolved over time was not a serious possibility for most naturalists and philosophers. There is certainly no substantive debate in antiquity about evolution in the modern sense. There were really only two competing explanations for how living things came to have the parts they do: design or blind chance. Ancient Greek Atomism, for example, (...) taught that all composite bodies, including living things, are generated through the random collision of atoms as they rebel and move in the void. Plato and Aristotle both dismissed this possibility on the grounds that living things are too complex and too well-adapted to be products of chance. This eventually became the central premise in Galen’s own Argument from Design. That species forms might have gradually evolved over time by a process of natural selection was not seen as a plausible alternative. Of course, such a theory had been proposed by Empedocles in the fifth century BCE. But because his theory still relied heavily on chance, it was not taken seriously by any of the later ancient Greek or Roman thinkers. My aim in this paper is to investigate the reasons why evolutionary thinking failed to gain momentum in antiquity after its introduction by Empedocles. (shrink)

Devin Henry offers a comprehensive study of Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of substantial generation. In particular, he argues that, in Generation of Animals, Aristotle defends a view that Henry calls “reproductive hylomorphism” : an application of the hylomorphic model of substantial generation to the central case of the generation of animals. In this review, I explain Henry's view and offer some criticisms of his two-stage model of reproductive hylomorphism that distinguishes embryogenesis from morphogenesis.

In this case discussion, Barnhill and Devine collect and present a significant amount of recent research on the various reasons why people struggle to succeed in weight loss programmes. Specifically, the authors focus on what they call ‘behavioural weight loss interventions’, which are ‘research, clinical or public health efforts to promote individual healthy eating and physical activity behaviours’. As defined, this is a very broad category of interventions and presumably includes all kinds of dieting and weight loss programmes or promotion (...) efforts short of private or independently chosen programmes. The authors argue, in a nutshell, that these clinical, research, and public health interventions have low efficacy, and while they may have some health or other benefits, the balance of evidence presented shows that they harm people in multiple ways. (shrink)

Când densitatea corpului devine suficient de mare, relativitatea generală prezice formarea unei găuri negre. Stelele neutronice de circa 1,4 mase solare și găurile negre sunt starea finală pentru evoluția stelelor masive. De obicei o gaură neagră într-o galaxie a jucat un rol important în formarea acesteia și a structurilor cosmice aferente. Astfel de corpuri oferă un mecanism eficient pentru emisia de radiații electromagnetice și formarea de microquasari. Accreția poate duce la jeturi relativiste. Relativitatea generală permite modelarea acestor fenomene, confirmate prin (...) observații. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18088.93441. (shrink)

Virușii coabitează de cca. 300 milioane de ani cu oamenii. Uneori, virușii pot infecta oamenii pe scară largă. Dar, cum a fost posibilă actuala pandemie? Încălzirea globală determină fenomene meteorologice extreme care au dus la o creștere a bolilor infecțioase. Noul climat poate susține vectori epidemiologici pentru perioade mai lungi de timp, creând condiții mai favorabile replicării și apariția de noi vectori. În cazul bolilor infecțioase emergente, se consideră că există o graniță peste care s-a sărit deja. Virușii au, în (...) mod normal, o zonă nativă („rezervorul” lor), din care nu ar trebui să fie împinși afară. Se creează astfel o intimitate periculoasă, cu „puncte fierbinți” care includ locații precum piețele, care devin adevărate focare de epidemii. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.16634.11202. (shrink)

Automatizarea şi informatizarea nu mai reprezintă astăzi un simplu deziderat pentru bibliotecile româneşti. Dimpotrivă, ele sunt o realitate ce, pe zi ce trece, prinde contururi mai extinse, devenind mediul nostru cotidian. Cu cât ne sunt însă mai "apropiate" cu atât mai mult ele devin şi o sursă de sfidări şi de confruntare. Cu ce anume ne confruntă însă - în primul rând şi în esenţă - automatizarea şi informatizarea, în general, şi cea a activităţii de informare, în special? Ca (...) orice întrebare pusă în mod serios şi aceasta trebuie să fie însă mai întâi lămurită cu privire la structura şi natura ei proprie. Ceea ce - din punct de vedere structural - ne izbeşte din capul locului la această întrebare este faptul că, în structura ei este cuprins deopotrivă şi în mod explicit şi cel care ridică întrebarea. Astfel spus, în ea, noi înşine suntem aceia care, aflaţi în faţa unei confruntări, ne întrebăm despre noi înşine. Apoi: în şi prin această întrebare, însăşi sarcina cu care ne confruntăm - adică automatizarea şi informatizarea - devine şi ea dizlocată din toposul său pur destinai şi se eliberează pentru întâlnirea unei sfidări organice. (shrink)

În studiul Laviniei Marin, Universitatea şi problema proprietăţii intelectuale, este discutată problema actuală a tipului de universitate pe care îl presupune noua economie a cunoaşterii. Pornind de la interesul pentru cuantificarea performanţelor universităţilor şi stabilirea de ierarhii, autoarea ajunge la unele teme epistemologice privind reportul dintre cunoaşterea teoretică şi cunoaşterea practică şi cel dintre cunoaşterea explicită şi cunoaşterea tacită într-o societate în care însăşi cunoaşterea devine un capital, iar inovarea este modul în care se realizează performanţă.

Research has uncovered consistent gender differences in attitudes toward gay men, with women expressing less prejudice than men (Herek, 2003). Attitudes toward lesbians generally show a similar pattern, but to a weaker extent. The present work demonstrated that motivation to respond without prejudice importantly contributes to these divergent attitudes. Study 1 revealed that women evince higher internal motivation to respond without prejudice (IMS, Plant & Devine, 1998) than do men and that this difference partially mediates the relationship between gender and (...) attitudes toward gay men. The second study replicated this finding and demonstrated that IMS mediates the relationship between gender and attitudes toward lesbians. Study 2 further revealed that gender-role variables contribute to the observed gender differences in motivation to respond without prejudice. These findings provide new insights into the nature of sexual prejudice and for the first time point to possible antecedents of variation in motivation to respond without prejudice. (shrink)

Aceasta nu este o carte de matematică, ci una despre matematică, care se adresează elevului sau studentului, dar şi dascălului său, cu un scop cât se poate de practic, anume acela de a iniţia şi netezi calea către înţelegerea completă a matematicii predate în şcoală. Tradiţia predării matematicii într-o abordare preponderent procedural-formală a avut ca efect o viziune deformată a elevilor asupra matematicii, ca fiind ceva strict formal, instrumental şi calculatoriu. Pierzând contactul cu baza conceptuală a matematicii, elevii dezvoltă pe (...) parcurs o "anxietate matematică" şi renunţă la a mai căuta înţelegerea matematicii, care devine "duşmanul tradiţional" din şcoală. Această lucrare şi-a propus materializarea rezultatelor cercetărilor inter- şi trans-disciplinare având ca obiect înţelegerea matematicii, care au concluzionat că domeniile care au potenţialul de a contribui în acest fel la educaţia matematicii, unificând abordările procedurală şi conceptuală, sunt epistemologia şi filosofia matematicii şi ştiinţei, precum şi fundamentele şi istoria matematicii. Aceste rezultate susţin teza că teama de matematică poate fi înlăturată prin abordarea conceptuală, iar un elev cu o bună înţelegere conceptuală va fi un rezolvitor de probleme mai bun. Autorul a identificat acele zone şi concepte aparţinând acestor discipline, care pot fi adaptate şi prelucrate în vederea familiarizării elevului sau studentului cu acest tip de cunoştinţe, care să însoţească conţinutul tradiţional al matematicii şcolare. Lucrarea a fost astfel organizată încât să contureze cititorului o imagine unificatoare asupra complexităţii naturii matematicii, precum şi o perspectivă conceptuală necesară, în final, înţelegerii de tip holistic a matematicii şcolare. Autorul vorbeşte despre matematică, pentru a convinge că a înţelege matematica înseamnă mai întâi să o înţelegem ca întreg, dar şi ca parte a unui întreg. Natura matematicii, conceptele sale primare (cum ar fi numerele şi mulţimile), structurile, limbajul, metodele, rolurile şi aplicabilitatea matematicii, sunt prezentate în conţinutul lor esenţial, iar explicarea conceptelor non-matematice este făcută într-un limbaj accesibil, însoţită de multe exemple relevante. Cartea este o unitate didactică concepută să reprezinte punctul de plecare şi un ghid de orientare către dobândirea înţelegerii de tip holistic a matematicii (pentru elev sau student) şi (pentru dascăl) către o predare de tip epistemic-conceptual, în care înţelegerea conceptuală este la fel de importantă ca antrenarea abilităţilor procedural-aplicative. (shrink)

Most of the people say, Tagore’s ‘Shesher Kabita’ is the story of Amit Roy. The question arise, who is this Amit Roy? Is Rabindranath Tagore’s Shesher Kabita’ realy a just story of Amit Roy? We know, this Amit Roy and his revolutionary theory of devine love is note of admiration till now. There has been a lot of debate regarding its acceptability of new theory of love. As a male character, so far priority was given to Amit Roy, whether the (...) similar importance was given to female characters? The present paper attempts to explore the answer of these questions and review the novel with analyzing various characters. (shrink)

Internetul a schimbat complet modul nostru de viață, fiind considerat unul dintre cele mai benefice progrese tehnologice ale secolului XXI. Totul se vinde și se cumpără acum pe Internet, inclusiv distracția. Internetul face lumea mai mică, pentru că am putea comanda sau comercializa orice în întreaga lume. Și în această societate virtuală suntem cu toții comentatori, editori și creatori. Îți poți imagina cum ar fi viața acum fără Internet? Închide ochii pentru un minut și gândește-te la cum a fost viața (...) înainte de Internet. Pentru unii, Internetul este ocazia ideală de a scăpa de realitate, în timp ce pentru alții este cea mai bună oportunitate de a socializa și a se împrieteni cu persoane din toată lumea. Poveștile personale devin publice; problemele locale devin globale. -/- ISSN 2821 – 8469, ISSN – L 2821 – 8469, DOI: 10.58679/IT34520. (shrink)

În interpretarea gravitației cuantice canonice, gravitația apare ca o pseudoforță geometrică, este redusă la geometria spațio-temporală și devine un simplu efect al curburii spațiu-timpului. Relativitatea generală asociază gravitația cu spațiu-timpul, dar tipul de asociere nu este fixat. În locul interpretării geometrice se poate folosi interpretarea câmpului (geometria spațiu-timp este redusă la un câmp gravitațional, respectiv metrica, considerată drept "doar un alt câmp") sau interpretarea egalitară (o identificare conceptuală a gravitației și spațiu-timpului în relativitatea generală. ). Aceste interpretări alternative reduc diferențele (...) conceptuale dintre relativitatea generală și celelalte teorii ale câmpului. 10.13140/RG.2.2.23557.91365 . (shrink)

Programele de cercetare permit dezvoltarea unor teorii mai complexe. Termenii pot fi aplicați atât la teorii individuale cât și la programe. În cazul în care se aplică teoriilor din cadrul unui program de cercetare, consider că acestea devin la rândul lor programe de cercetare, pe care le putem numi subprograme de cercetare. Spre deosebire de revoluțiile științifice ale lui Kuhn, Lakatos a presupus că existența simultană a mai multor programe de cercetare este norma. Știința se confruntă în prezent cu (...) o astfel de situație inedită: două teorii incompatibile, dar ambele acceptate de comunitatea științifică descriu aceeași realitate în două moduri diferite. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11153.28005. (shrink)

Singularitățile gravitaționale în relativitatea generală sunt locații în spațiu-timp unde câmpul gravitațional devine infinit. Curburile invariabile scalare ale spațiu-timpului includ o măsură a densității materiei. Unii fizicieni și filosofi consideră că, deoarece densitatea materiei tinde spre infinit în singularitate, legile spațiu-timpului nu mai sunt valabile acolo. O singularitățile gravitațională aproape unanim acceptată în astrofizică și cosmologie, ca cea mai timpurie stare a universului, este Big Bang. Nici în acest caz legile cunoscute ale fizicii nu mai sunt valabile. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27271.75681.

Odată cu creșterea volumului de date pe Internet, în media socială, cloud computing, dispozitive mobile și date guvernamentale, Big Data devine în același timp o amenințare și o oportunitate în ceea ce privește gestionarea și utilizarea acestor date, menținând în același timp drepturile persoanelor implicate. În fiecare zi, folosim și generăm tone de date, alimentând bazele de date ale agențiilor guvernamentale, companiilor private și chiar cetățenilor privați. Beneficiem în multe feluri de existența și utilizarea Big Data, dar trebuie să ne (...) amintim de asemenea că „nu există nimic gratuit”. Există riscuri în utilizarea Big Data, un fel de parte întunecată. Schimbările de piață pot fi obținute prin utilizarea Big Data: în timp ce acestea pot fi pozitive pentru cineva, ele pot dăuna altcuiva. Riscurile potențiale provin și de la agențiile publice. Este clar că datele mari pot aduce beneficii cetățenilor și companiilor, dar trebuie să fie echilibrate de o conștientizare sporită a „părții întunecate” a Big Data în exploatarea noilor capacități și oportunități pe care le oferă tuturor . -/- CUPRINS -/- 1. Big Data - Definiție - Caracteristici - Clasificarea datelor mari - Arhitectura - Tehnologii - Oportunități - Provocări - Critici - - Criticile paradigmei Big Data - - Criticile modelului "V" - - Criticile de noutate - - Criticile execuției Big Data - 1.1 Viața datelor mari - - Nașterea - - Copilăria - - - Educație - - - Divertisment - - Adolescența - - - Servicii online - - - Comunicații mobile - - - Servicii de streaming - - Adulți tineri - - - Căutarea de locuri de muncă - - - Servicii bancare și asigurări - - - Utilități - - - Dating online și pornografie - - Vârsta medie - - - Servicii de sănătate - - - Aplicații pentru îngrijire și aplicații pentru sănătate și fitness - - - Căutarea de locuri de muncă - - - Dating online - - Bătrânețea - - - Îngrijirea sănătății - - Moartea - 1.2 Aplicații - - Guvern - - Dezvoltare internațională - - Fabrici - - Sănătate - - Educaţie - - Mass-media - - Asigurare - - Internetul obiectelor (IoT) - - Tehnologia informației - 1.3 Studii de caz - - Guvern - - - China - - - India - - - Israel - - - Regatul Unit - - - Statele Unite ale Americii - - Cu amănuntul - - Ştiinţă - - Sport - - Tehnologie - - Activități de cercetare - - - Prelevarea de date mari - 1.4 Agenda europeană privind societatea digitală - - Cadrul juridic - - Peisajul opiniei părților interesate - 1.5 GDPR - - Etapele procesării datelor personale - - Principiile procesării datelor - - Politica de confidențialitate și transparența - - Scopurile procesării datelor - - Confidențialitate prin design și implicită - - - Paradoxul (legal) al Big Data - - Domeniul teritorial al GDPR - - Definirea datelor mari, a datelor personale și a datelor anonime - - Etapele procesării datelor cu caracter personal - - Principii de prelucrare a datelor - - Politica de confidențialitate și Transparența - - Scopuri de prelucrare a datelor - - Confidențialitate prin design și confidențialitate în mod implicit - - Paradoxul (legal) al datelor mari 2. Analiza Big Data - 2.1 Analitica - - Analitica vs. analiză - - Aplicații ale analiticii - - - Optimizarea marketingului - - - Analiza oamenilor - - - Analiza portofoliului - - - Analitica riscurilor - - - Analitica digitală - - - Analitica securității - - - Analitica software-ului - - Provocări - - Riscuri - 2.2 Analitica predictivă - - Definiție - - Procesul de analitica predictivă - - Tipuri - - - Modele predictive - - - Modele descriptive - - - Modele de decizie - - Aplicații - - - Managementul relațiilor cu clienții analitic (CRM) - - - Protecția copilului - - - Sisteme de suport decizional clinic - - - Analiticile colecțiilor - - - Vânzări încrucișate - - - Retenția clienților - - - Marketing direct - - - Detectarea fraudelor - - - Prezicerea rezultatelor deciziilor legale - - - Previziuni privind portofoliul, produsele sau economia - - - Managementul riscului de proiect - - - Acceptanța (Underwriting) - - Tehnologia și influențele big data - - Tehnici analitice - - - Tehnici de regresie - - - - Model de regresie liniară - - - - Modele de alegere discretă - - - - Regresie logistică - - - - Regresie logistică multinomială - - - - Regresie probit - - - - Logit versus probit - - - - Modele pentru serii de timp - - - - Analiza supraviețuirii sau a duratei - - - - Arborele de clasificare și regresie (CART) - - - - Funcții spline adaptive de regresie multivariate - - - Tehnici de învățare automată - - - - Rețele neuronale - - - - Perceptron multistrat (MLP) - - - - Funcții radiale de bază - - - - Mașini cu vectori de suport - - - - Bayesiene naive - - - - Vecinul k-cel mai apropiat - - - - Modelarea predictivă geospațială - - Instrumente - - - PMML - - Critici - 2.3 Analitica prescriptivă - - Istorie - 2.4 Studiul critic al datelor - - Perspective critice - - Abordare: Pragmatismul și etica discursului 3. Etica Big Data - Datele personale ale copiilor - Rolul instituțiilor - - State naționale - - Bănci - Articole relevante de știri despre etica datelor - Legislație relevantă privind etica datelor - 3.1 Principii ale eticii Big Data - - Etica în cercetare - - Conștientizarea - - Consimţământul - - Controlul - - Transparența - - Încrederea - - Proprietatea - - Supravegherea și securitatea - - Identitatea digitală - - Realitatea ajustată - - De-anonimizarea - - Inegalitatea digitală - - Confidențialitatea - - Financiar - - - Cât de mult merită datele? - - Deschidere - 3.2 Probleme etice în cercetare - - Etica cercetării pentru cercetarea socială - - Principalele aspecte etice ale cercetării sociale - - - Intimitate - - - Consimțământ informat - - - De-identificarea - - - Inegalitate – Diviziune digitală - - Integritatea cercetării - - Probleme emergente - - Aviz legal - 3.3 Aspecte filosofice - 3.4 10 reguli de bază în lucrul cu Big Data - - Concluzie Referințe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . 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