In this paper, we deal with the computation of Lie derivatives, which are required, for example, in some numerical methods for the solution of differential equations. One common way for computing them is to use symbolic computation. Computer algebra software, however, might fail if the function is complicated, and cannot be even performed if an explicit formulation of the function is not available, but we have only an algorithm for its computation. An alternative way to address the problem is to (...) use automatic differentiation. In this case, we only need the implementation of the algorithm that evaluates the function in terms of its analytic expression in a programming language, but we cannot use this if we have only a compiled version of the function. In this paper, we present a novel approach for calculating the Lie derivative of a function, even in the case where its analytical expression is not available, that is based on the In finity Computer arithmetic. A comparison with symbolic and automatic differentiation shows the potentiality of the proposed technique. (shrink)

Il 2021 segna gli ottant’anni dalla nascita di Mario Perniola, uno dei massimi filosofi italiani del secondo dopoguerra. Questo volume raccoglie interventi che esplorano la sua opera mostrandone la fertilità e sottolineando al tempo stesso la prossimità delle sue idee con le principali sfide del nostro tempo. Dall’Italia al Brasile, passando per gli Stati Uniti, l’Irlanda, la Francia, il Belgio, il Messico e la Cina, gli autori si soffermano su temi che comprendono l’estetica, la politica, la teoria della comunicazione, i (...) queer studies, il pensiero rituale e religioso, la sessualità e la letteratura, restituendo la plurivocità e l’originalità di un filosofo di respiro internazionale e più che mai attuale. (shrink)

Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations, the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in clinical research and practice. We argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH utilizes rigorous and context-appropriate methodologies to analyze a wider range of first-person accounts of AVH (...) at 3 contextual levels: cultural, social, and historical; experiential; and biographical. We go on to show that there are significant potential benefits for voice hearers, clinicians, and researchers. These include informing the development and refinement of subtypes of hallucinations within and across diagnostic categories; “front-loading” research in cognitive neuroscience; and suggesting new possibilities for therapeutic intervention. In conclusion, we argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH can nourish the ethical core of scientific enquiry by challenging its interpretive paradigms, and offer voice hearers richer, potentially more empowering ways to make sense of their experiences. (shrink)

This is a protocol for a Cochrane Review (Intervention). The objectives are as follows: -/- The main aim of this review will be to assess the effects of changing practitioner empathy or patient expectations for all conditions. The main objective is to conduct a systematic review of randomised trials where the intervention involves manipulating either (a) practitioner empathy or (b) patient expectations, or (c) both.

New algorithms for the numerical solution of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) with initial condition are proposed. They are designed for work on a new kind of a supercomputer – the Infinity Computer, – that is able to deal numerically with finite, infinite and infinitesimal numbers. Due to this fact, the Infinity Computer allows one to calculate the exact derivatives of functions using infinitesimal values of the stepsize. As a consequence, the new methods described in this paper are able to work (...) with the exact values of the derivatives, instead of their approximations. (shrink)

We do not generally take the Hobbesian project to be one that encourages human flourishing. I will argue that it is; indeed, I will propose that Hobbes attempts the first modern project to provide for the possibility of the diversity of human flourishing in the civil state.

L’Intelligenza Artificiale Generativa (IAG) pone sfide inedite all’educazione universitaria. Dalla definizione dei contenuti alla valutazione delle prove e alla determinazione delle modalità di esame, questo nuovo e potente strumento inaugura una stagione di cambiamenti su cui è urgente riflettere. La tecnologia contribuisce da sempre a dare forma al lavoro didattico, il quale evolve anche alla luce delle opportunità e dei rischi che essa introduce. Come far sì che l’evoluzione stimolata dall’IAG sia felice, ovvero serva i valori e gli obiettivi della (...) didattica e delle persone che la vivono? Ne ho discusso con alcuni colleghi dell’Unità di Studi META del Politecnico di Milano – docenti impegnati a vario titolo in corsi di carattere filosofico e sociale rivolti a studenti di formazione tecnica. (shrink)

I argue that Malthus’s Essay on Population is more a treatise in applied ethics than the first treatise in demography. I argue also that, as an ethical work, it is a highly innovative one. The substitution of procreation for sex as the focus makes for a drastic change in the agenda. what had been basically lacking in the discussion up to Malthus’s time was a consideration of human beings’ own responsibility in the decision of procreating. This makes for a remarkable (...) change also in the approach, namely, the discussion becomes an examination of a well-identified issue, taking cause-effect relationships into account in order to assess possible lines of conduct in the light of some, widely shared and comparatively minimal, value judgements. This is more or less the approach of what is now called applied ethics, at least according to one of its accounts, or perhaps to the account shared by a vast majority of its practitioners. In a sense, both the subject matter, sexuality, was substituted with a more restricted issue, namely reproduction, and the traditional approach, moral doctrine, was substituted with a more modest approach, in Malthus’s own words, the “moral and political science”. Such a drastic transformation brought about a viable framework, for a discussion of ethical issues that were still unforeseen by Malthus, namely those having to do first with the technical feasibility of eugenics programs and secondly with the scientific discovery of genetics as a field of study but also of possible intervention. Malthus’s ethics had obviously enough nothing to say on those unforeseen issues in so far as it was meant to treat just the ‘quantitative’ dimension of procreation, that is, ‘how many’. Later discussions and controversies will arise around different dimensions, that is, not just ‘how many’ but also ‘how healthy, how strong, hoe empowered’, but what Malthus’s lesson could have taught and still can teach to partners defending opposite views in these controversies is that such issues may be framed in a way that possibly avoids unending controversy on incompatible ultimate principles once the strategy is turned upside down and a principle of responsibility becomes the overriding rule in the treatment of such ethical issues. -/- . (shrink)

This paper attempts to explain what a protest is by using the resources of speech-act theory. First, we distinguish the object, redress, and means of a protest. This provided a way to think of atomic acts of protest as having dual communicative aspects, viz., a negative evaluation of the object and a connected prescription of redress. Second, we use Austin’s notion of a felicity condition to further characterize the dual communicative aspects of protest. This allows us to distinguish protest (...) from some other speech acts which also involve a negative evaluation of some object and a connected prescription of redress. Finally, we turn to Kukla and Lance’s idea of a normative functionalist analysis of speech acts to advance the view that protests are a complex speech act constituted by dual input normative statuses and dual output normative statuses. (shrink)

Review of Felice C. Frankel's "The visual elements—design: a handbook for communicating science and engineering.".

Like other epistemic activities, inquiry seems to be governed by norms. Some have argued that one such norm forbids us from believing the answer to a question and inquiring into it at the same time. But another, hither-to neglected norm seems to permit just this sort of cognitive arrangement when we seek to confirm what we currently believe. In this paper, I suggest that both norms are plausible and that the conflict between them constitutes a puzzle. Drawing on the (...) class='Hi'>felicity conditions of confirmation requests and the biased interrogatives used to perform them, I argue that the puzzle is genuine. I conclude by considering a response to the puzzle that has implications for the debate regarding the relationship between credences and beliefs. (shrink)

This paper sets out the felicity conditions for metalinguistic proposals, a type of directive illocutionary act. It discusses the relevance of metalinguistic proposals and other metalinguistic directives for understanding both small- and large-scale linguistic engineering projects, essentially contested concepts, metalinguistic provocations, and the methodology of ordinary language philosophy. Metalinguistic proposals are compared with other types of linguistic interventions, including metalinguistic negotiation, conceptual engineering, lexical warfare, and ameliorative projects.

This paper presents a novel account of focal stress and pitch contour in English dialogue. We argue that one should analyse and treat focus and pitch contour jointly, since (i) some pragmatic interpretations vary with contour (e.g., whether an utterance accepts or rejects; or whether it implicates a positive or negative answer); and (ii) there are utterances with identical prosodic focus that in the same context are infelicitous with one contour, but felicitous with another. We offer an account of two (...) distinct pitch contours that predicts the correct felicity judgements and implicatures, outclassing other models in empirical coverage or formality. Prosodic focus triggers a presupposition, where what is presupposed and how the presupposition is resolved depends on prosodic contour. If resolving the presupposition entails the proffered content, then the proffered content is uninteresting and hence the utterance is in-felicitous. Otherwise, resolving the presupposition may lead to an implicature. We regiment this account in SDRT. (shrink)

In non‐literal uses of language, the content an utterance communicates differs from its literal truth conditions. Loose talk is one example of non‐literal language use (amongst many others). For example, what a loose utterance of (1) communicates differs from what it literally expresses: (1) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock. Loose talk is interesting (or so I will argue). It has certain distinctive features which raise important questions about the connection between literal and non‐literal language use. This paper aims to (i.) (...) introduce a range of novel data demonstrating certain overlooked features of loose talk, and (ii.) develop a new theory of the phenomenon which accounts for these data. In particular, this theory is motivated by the need to explain minimal pairs such as (2)-(3): (2) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock, but she did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly. (3) ?? Lena did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly, but she arrived at 9 o'clock. (2) and (3) agree in their truth conditions. Yet they differ in felicity. As such, they constitute a problem for any account which hopes to predict the acceptability of the loose use of a sentence from its truth conditions and the context of utterance alone. Instead, it will be argued, to explain loose talk phenomena we must posit an additional layer of meaning outstripping truth conditions. This layer of meaning is shown to exhibit a range of properties, all of which point to its being semantically encoded. Thus, if correct, the theory provides a new example of how semantic meaning must extend beyond literal, truth‐conditional content. (shrink)

Presuppositions are pragmatically considered as the conditions of the felicity of a speech act, or discourse move; however, the decision of setting the conditions of a move, which the hearer needs to accept in order to continue the dialogue, can be thought of as a speech act of a kind. The act of presupposing depends on specific conditions and in particular on the possibility of the hearer to reconstruct and accept the propositional content. These pragmatic conditions lead to epistemic (...) considerations: How can the speaker know that the hearer can reconstruct and accept a presupposition? A possible answer can be found in an argumentative approach grounded on the notion of presumptive reasoning. On this perspective, by presupposing the speaker advances a tentative conclusion about what the hearer may accept, hold, or know proceeding from factual, linguistic, and epistemic rules of presumption. (shrink)

Any good theory of knowledge ascriptions should explain and predict our judgments about their felicity. I argue that any such explanation must take into account a distinction between three ways of using knowledge ascriptions: to suggest acceptance of the embedded proposition, to explain or predict a subject's behavior or attitudes, or to understand the relation of knowledge as such. The contextual effects on our judgments about felicity systematically differ between these three types of uses. Using such a distinction (...) is, in principle, open to both contextualist and pragmatic invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions. However, there are some implications pertaining to the use of the “method of cases” in the debate about knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

How to think a unique and determinative turn in analytic philosophy of mind? To answer this question this article first presents an attempt to render clear that analytic phenomenology, by contrast with conceptions of phenomenology of the XXth century, beneficially dispenses with several methodological and conceptual assumptions that were assumed to be compulsory, as phenomenological reduction, a notion of synthesis, and a philosophical notion of the a priori. It then presents some eventual difficulties to the achievement of a phenomenological turn (...) within analytic philosophy, which are, the neglect of historicity, abstractionism, the acknowledgement of the place of language in our lives, and solipsism. It finally presents several demands that concern the felicity of contemporary analytic phenomenologies, namely, anti-abstractionism, fallibilism, attention to polyadic relations, and the integration of ecological and decolonial concerns of our cultures. (shrink)

In this paper, I transcend the abstract engagement of J. L. Austin's Speech Acts theory and explore their sociopolitical advantages, using the Nigerian social space as my primary experimental field. Nigerian social space is quite hierarchical and progresses along apparently asymmetrical lines of social relationship (in most cases). This in turn, accentuates some sort of power dynamics. In every communication, there is an implicit reinforcement of the social fabric as well as the power dynamic, either through one person's percep6of the (...) social status of the other or, of one's emphasis of power dynamic over the other. Austin's theory comes to the fore as a very laudable framework to map this interesting sociological facts. This work then, offers a philosophical contribution to an otherwise, sociological/anthropological fact. My job in this paper, is to explore a sociopolitical negotiation of Austin's theory in a multiethnic nation-state as Nigeria where hierarchy and power dynamics are heavily emphasized. This paper thus highlights the importance of the perlocutionary acts and the felicity conditions, and also accentuates their implications for social interactions and power dynamics in the Nigerian social space. (shrink)

The papers of this special issue are the outcome of a two-­‐day conference entitled “The Second-­‐Person Standpoint in Law and Morality,” that took place at the University of Vienna in March 2013 and was organized by the ERC Advanced Research Grant “Distortions of Normativity.” -/- The aim of the conference was to explore and discuss Stephen Darwall’s innovative and influential second-­‐personal account of foundational moral concepts such as „obligation“, „responsibility“, and „rights“, as developed in his book The Second-­‐Person Standpoint: Morality, (...) Respect, and Accountability (Harvard University Press 2006) and further elaborated in Morality, Authority and Law: Essays in Second-­‐Personal Ethics I and Honor, History, and Relationships: Essays in Second-­‐Personal Ethics II (both Oxford University Press 2013). -/- With the second-­‐person standpoint Darwall refers to the unique conceptual normative space that practical deliberators and agents occupy when they address claims and demands to one another (and to themselves). The very first sentence of Darwall’s examination of the second-­‐personal conceptual paradigm summarizes the gist of the argument succinctly when he claims that “the second-­‐person standpoint [is] the perspective that you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another’s conduct and will.” (Darwall 2006, 3) The Second-­‐Person Standpoint reminds us that this perspective has been ignored for much too long and that it better take centre stage in any philosophical analysis of moral phenomena, in order to yield a satisfying account of morality as a social institution. The negative part of Darwall’s strategy is to show that neither a purely first-­‐personal approach (represented by Kant and contemporary Kantians), nor a third-­‐personal state-­‐of-­‐affairs-­‐perspective (represented by most varieties of contemporary consequentialism) are capable of accounting for the categorical bindingness characteristic of moral obligation. The latter feat can only be accomplished, and this is the positive part of Darwall’s argument, when those second-­‐ personal normative “felicity conditions” and conceptual presuppositions are acknowledged and spelled out that are already presupposed in every instance of issuing (putatively valid) claims and demands. It is especially second-­‐personal competence and second-­‐personal authority that are the bedrock of these normative conceptual presuppositions, without which engaging in any meaningful address would be impossible. Kantians and utilitarians alike have neglected this critical dimension of the normative landscape. -/- In addition to working out an original conception of moral obligation, the first eight chapters of The Second-­‐Person Standpoint articulate this fundamental insight with respect to a variety of traditional projects in ethical theory such as developing accounts of moral responsibility, rights, dignity, and autonomy. In this context, special emphasis is to be awarded, on the one hand, to Darwall’s refreshing second-­‐personal interpretation of Strawson’s influential account of reactive attitudes and moral responsibility and, on the other, to his historically well-­‐informed reconstruction of Samuel Pufendorf’s often neglected version of an enlightened theistic voluntarism concerning moral authority. Darwall dedicates the second part of The Second-­‐Person Standpoint to the urgent question: how should one respond to the sceptical challenge that expresses utter indifference to the second-­‐person standpoint, including all its multifarious normative presuppositions and implications? What commits us to all this? It is at this point that Darwall, firstly, refines his criticisms of the Kantian, first-­‐personal, paradigm of normativity and emphasizes that only if one already incorporates the second-­‐personal conceptual apparatus into a Kantian analysis of moral obligation is the latter going to yield a convincing account. Secondly, and this certainly is one of the highlights of Darwall’s theory, the Second-­‐Person Standpoint employs themes from Fichte’s philosophy of right in order to strengthen the case for the inescapability of taking up the second-­‐person standpoint of moral obligation. In his contribution for this special issue Darwall further develops his diagnosis that Fichte’s thought offers in many respects a more promising, since more second-­‐personal, foundation of morality than, for example, Kant’s. -/- By now, the impact of Darwall’s second-­‐person standpoint theory has far transcended the confines of contemporary debates on moral obligation. Darwall has put to use the second-­‐personal apparatus to critical engagements with Joseph Raz’s theory of legal authority and Derek Parfit’s convergence arguments for his recent Triple Theory of moral wrongness. The constant theme that unifies all these diverse applications remains the one so impressively presented in The Second-­‐Person Standpoint: without paying attention to the “interdefinable” and “irreducible” circle of (four) foundational second-­‐ personal concepts (valid demand, practical authority, second-­‐personal reason, and accountability), neither superior epistemic status (Raz) nor the identification of optimific states of affairs (Parfit) are potent enough sources to generate anything close to the authority relationships that underlie the idea involved in obligating ourselves and one another. Given all of the above, it comes as no surprise that Darwall reserves his strongest sympathies for a specific ethical theory, namely contractualism. Our commitment to equal basic second-­‐personal authority, that Darwall arrives at through his Fichtean rectification of the Kantian project, leads him to the endorsement of a contractualist paradigm in the spirit of broadly Rawls and Scanlon. -/- . (shrink)

Like Bennett's account of ‘even’, my analysis incorporates the following plausible and widespread intuitions. (a) The word ‘even’ does not make a truth-functional difference; it makes a difference only in conventional implicature. In particular, ‘even’ functions neither as a universal quantifier, nor a most or many quantifier. The only quantified statement that ‘Even A is F’ implies is the existential claim ‘There is an x (namely, A) that is F’, but this implication is nothing more than what the Equivalence Thesis (...) already demands. (b) ‘Even’ is epistemic in character, implying some type of unexpectedness, surprise, or unlikelihood. Moreover, despite Kay's arguments to the contrary, this implication is part of the meaning of ‘even’. (c) ‘Even’ is a scalar term, since unexpectedness comes in degrees. And, finally, (d) the felicity of an ‘even’-sentence S requires that S* be sufficiently surprising in comparison to its true neighbors. However,pace Bennett, being more surprising than just one true neighbor will not suffice. At the same time, being more surprising than all true neighbors is unnecessary. Suffice it that S* is more surprising than most true neighbors. (shrink)

Several philosophers have recently claimed that if a proposition is cancellable from an uttered sentence then that proposition is not entailed by that uttered sentence. The claim should be a familiar one. It has become a standard device in the philosopher's tool-kit. I argue that this claim is false. There is a kind of entailment—which I call “modal entailment”—that is context-sensitive and, because of this, cancellable. So cancellability does not show that a proposition is not entailed by an uttered sentence. (...) I close the paper by describing an implication this has for a disagreement between J. L. Austin and Grice concerning the relation between felicity and truth. (shrink)

Various data from communication that does not occur face-to-face are taken to be problematic for Kaplan’s account of indexical expressions, as is the case with the so-called answering machine paradox. One fix, developed by Sidelle (1991) and Briciu (2018), is the remote utterance view: recording artifacts are means by which speakers perform utterances at a distance, just as by means of other artifacts agents performs other types of actions at a distance. This view has faced an important objection, namely that (...) remote utterances lead to Moorean paradoxes. In this paper, I defend the remote utterance view against this objection and further develop the view. I argue that worries about Moorean paradoxes can easily be dispelled if we take into consideration the artifactual nature of recording devices, their materiality, and the communicative affordances they bring about. In the first section, we’ll present the answering machine paradox and give a brief overview of the remote utterance view. The second section presents the objection against the view, while the third gives a detailed rejoinder to the objection. Answering this objection is important also because it allows us to explore some underdeveloped aspects of the remote utterance view. First, I will discuss how the theorist calibrates her model with the data she seeks to explain and predict. Secondly, I will argue that speech acts performed via recording devices have different felicity conditions than their oral counterparts. I conclude with a short discussion of some semantic and pragmatic consequences of the view. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas ha dedicato più di trent’anni dei suoi studi alle scienze sociali al fine di definire, attraverso la ricostruzione delle tradizioni di pensiero in esse presenti, un quadro teorico di riferimento che orienti i programmi della ricerca storico-sociale. Al pari dei grandi classici del pensiero sociologico, egli ha cercato di affrontare i “problemi della società nel suo insieme” esplicitando gli assunti, i metodi e gli obiettivi della teoria sociale come presupposto indispensabile per un’indagine che ampli i confini disciplinari della (...) sociologia, da un lato, alla riflessione filosofica, dall’altro alla ricerca storiografica. Nel lungo itinerario della sua formazione scientifica questo programma rappresenta il filo conduttore nell’analisi dei “sistemi culturali”, dei “sistemi sociali”, dei “sistemi della personalità” e, soprattutto, nella “teoria dell’evoluzione sociale”, dalla ricostruzione delle condizioni necessarie alla genesi antropologica delle forme socio-culturali di vita – l’“ominizzazione” – sino all’esame della logica e della dinamica di sviluppo delle “formazioni sociali” che egli suddivide in primitive, tradizionali, moderne e contemporanee. Nella Postfazione all’edizione italiana di Profili politico-filosofici (2000), una raccolta che contiene scritti di quarantacinque anni di studi (1953-1998), Leonardo Ceppa sottolinea i due aspetti essenziali dell’opera di Habermas: “la coerenza teorica” e il “carattere assimilatorio”. Habermas non è un pensatore “rivoluzionario” ma un “riformista” che, ricorrendo a un’immagine ingegneristica, all’isolamento del “pensiero che scava fossati” preferisce “costruire ponti” tra i campi del sapere. Questa ricerca si segnala per il tentativo di recepire criticamente le acquisizioni specialistiche delle scienze sociali e della filosofia finalizzando questa tensione apprenditiva alla costruzione di un quadro generale. Nato dai nostri colloqui seminariali, di cui mantiene la forma dialogica dei “turni di parola”, il presente volume focalizza lo sguardo sulle società contemporanee – ripercorrendone la struttura, le sfide presenti e gli scenari futuri – e sulla funzione sociale della sociologia. Ne scaturisce un’indagine di fenomeni fondamentali per comprendere le trasformazioni della modernità: la modernizzazione, il capitalismo organizzato, lo stato sociale, la democrazia politica, la diversità culturale, l’opinione pubblica nell’epoca dei media, la globalizzazione, la crisi ecologica, le disuguaglianze mondiali, i conflitti nazionalistici, il terrorismo islamico, la secolarizzazione, l’ingegneria genetica, l’integrazione europea e la politica mondiale. Nel riordinare i temi sociologici da lui proposti abbiamo cercato di sistemare l’analisi delle società contemporanee a un livello che non si accomodi sul piano dei commenti troppo facili che gli intellettuali, i politici e la gente comune amano fare sull’attualità e che, mantenendo una visione d’insieme sull’opera, chiarisca il testo e i suoi punti ciechi. Il volume si propone come uno strumento di lavoro che accompagni a una lettura critica. Sullo sfondo rimane la domanda se Habermas riesca davvero a conseguire, nei suoi itinerari attraverso la “storia delle idee”, la coerenza logica e la profondità d’indagine necessarie a “sistematizzare” le ricerche delle scienze sociali. Alcune perplessità avvalorate dal confronto con i testi e con la letteratura critica ci hanno suggerito di riservare ai problemi metodologici uno studio specifico che chiarisca il concetto di “scienza ricostruttiva” e ne illustri le applicazioni nell’ambito delle teorie della riproduzione culturale, della socializzazione e dell’evoluzione delle formazioni sociali – uno studio le cui linee sono solo anticipate nell’Introduzione. Il programma di ricerca e la sua recezione critica, relativamente agli assunti della teoria dell’evoluzione sociale. Riprendendo una felice espressione di Karl Popper, ci auguriamo di aver raggiunto la chiarezza argomentativa e la semplicità linguistica dovuta al lettore, confidando nella “cooperazione amichevole-ostile di molti scienziati”. (shrink)

Estonian doesn't have a definite article. Instead, bare singular noun phrases can unambiguously bear either a definite interpretation or an indefinite interpretation. This paper argues that the pragmatic principles governing the felicitous use of three English articles ("a", "the" and "another"), described by A Grønn and KJ Sæbø (2012, 'A, the, another: A game of same and different' Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21, 75-95) can also account for the conditions under which a bare singular noun phrase in Estonian (...) bears a definite or instead an indefinite interpretation. The two languages use the same pragmatic principles to determine the definiteness interpretation of a noun phrase. The difference is just that in English (where definiteness meanings have been lexicalized) these pragmatic principles govern the felicity of article use, whereas in Estonian they govern the interpretation of a bare singular noun phrase. (shrink)

This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psychological realities of war. Building on J.L. Mackie’s notion of an ‘ethics of fantasy’ – a morality reduced to lip-service and incapable of action-guiding – I argue that a view based on a flawed view of either human agency or the environment in which it is exercised is doomed to practical irrelevance. In rejecting patriotism and advancing a highly individualistic view of war, Fabre relies upon a highly (...) flawed view of human agency, ignoring the psychological mechanism of depersonalisation essential to large-scale cooperation and the practice of war. In Part I, I offer an initial account of what an ‘ethics of fantasy’ is and offer one major reason why certain moralities fail as practical guidance. In Part II, I contrast Fabre’s moral cosmopolitanism with ancient cosmopolitanism; I focus on her rejection of patriotism and other identity-based forms of partiality. In Part III, I summarise key findings, mostly in social psychology, on how large-scale social cooperation is achieved. I highlight the central role of depersonalisation and its felicity conditions. In Part IV, I argue that Fabre’s view faces a dilemma. Either her cosmopolitanism is compatible with identity-based partiality, or it is not. If not, then she does not even have a view of war given that large-scale cooperation requires it. If her view is compatible, then she needs a functional replacement for patriotism. I conclude by showing that the alternatives fail to satisfy the felicity conditions of depersonalisation which war requires. (shrink)

[...] I will only investigate [Austin's] claims as challenges to present-day model theoretic semantics. My main point will be to draw a sharp line between the semantic and pragmatic aspects of performatives and thereby discover a gap in Austin’s treatment. This will in my view naturally lead to the proposal in Section 2, that is, to treating performatives as denoting changes in intensional models. The rest of Section 2 will be concerned with the status of felicity conditions and a (...) tentative extension of Montague’s PTQ. (shrink)

Descartes argued that the passions of the soul were immediately felt in the body, as the animal spirits, affected by the movement of the pineal gland, spread through the body. In Leibniz the effect of emotions in the body is a different question as he did not allow the direct interaction between the mind and the body, although maintaining a psychophysical parallelism between them. -/- In general, he avoids discussing emotions in bodily terms, saying that general inclinations, passions, pleasures and (...) pains belong only to the mind or to the soul (NE II, xxi, §72). He is also keen to point out that our passions derive mostly from our bodies. However, like Spinoza (Ethics III, prop. XI, Scholium) he thought that some emotions such as joy can produce pleasures which can be described also in bodily terms. For example, in a short memoir Felicity he says that music can be a pleasure for the ears and symmetry can be a pleasure for the eyes. These more intellectual emotions are actions in the sense that they represent perfection emanating from their source, the absolutely perfect being, that is, God. The feeling of perfection may produce a state of well-being which concerns both the soul and the body. -/- In my paper I will trace instances of Leibniz’s remarks on how these kind of emotions affect the body. I will also discuss the different ways the body gives rise to passions in the soul. My primary source is Nouveaux essais, book II, chapter xx and xxi, but I will also discuss various other writings by Leibniz. (shrink)

I review José Medina's The Epistemology of Protest: Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance, and raise some questions about the felicity, legitimacy and civility of protest.

La educación es siempre, por su misma naturaleza, transformadora. Transforma vidas, transforma realidades, transforma culturas y civilizaciones y todo ello a partir del hecho básico inicial de que dicha transformación comienza por ser la de sus propios actores: educadores y educandos. Es válida, en relación con ello, la afirmación del filósofo Gadamer (2000) acerca de que “educar es educarse”, pues en la educación “de lo que se trata –dice el autor, parafraseando a Hegel-- es de que el hombre acceda él (...) mismo a su morada”: acceder a la morada en el mundo es para la persona abrir el camino a ese espacio en el que se siente bien, donde es feliz. Desde esta perspectiva, el ejercicio de educarse es, para educadores y estudiantes en primer término pero con proyección a la sociedad entera, un ejercicio compartido de diálogo, involucramiento y enriquecimiento mutuo mediante el cual asumen el desafío de impulsar sus vidas hacia la plenitud personal, en armonía con la construcción de felicidad social. En tiempos en los que predominan formas de educación orientadas al éxito, a ser competitivo y poseer habilidades avanzadas para interactuar con las máquinas, o bien –en algunas perspectivas psicológicas-- solamente para adaptarse y no sufrir, según Gadamer (2000) “si lo que uno quiere es educarse y formarse, es de fuerzas humanas de lo que se trata y sólo si lo conseguimos sobreviviremos indemnes a la tecnología y al ser de la máquina” (p. 48) o, agregaríamos, a la ilusión de refugiarnos en islas de bienestar individual que nos aíslan de la comunidad y del entorno. Esas fuerzas humanas de las que habla el filósofo son las que pueden impulsar una educación basada en la capacidad de aprender a ser felices a lo largo de toda la vida. (shrink)

In ‘Other Minds’, J.L. Austin advances a parallel between saying ‘I know’ and saying ‘I promise’: much as you are ‘prohibited’, he says, from saying ‘I promise I will, but I may fail’, you are also ‘prohibited’ from saying ‘I know it is so, but I may be wrong’. This treatment of ‘I know’ has been derided for nearly sixty years: while saying ‘I promise’ amounts to performing the act of promising, Austin seems to miss the fact that saying ‘I (...) know’ fails to constitute a performance of the act of knowing. In this paper, I advance a defense of Austin’s position. I diagnose the principal objections to Austin’s account as stemming from detractors’ failure to acknowledge: (1) that Austin never characterizes ‘I know’ as a pure performative; (2) that saying ‘I know p’, unlike simply knowing p, occurs in specific interpersonal contexts in which others rely on our knowledge claims; (3) Austin’s considered account of the felicity conditions of performative utterance; (4) Austin’s ultimate repudiation of the performative/constative distinction. I conclude that Austin’s treatment of ‘I know’ rests on a more general commitment to the intrinsically normative nature of ordinary language. (shrink)

Sometimes we say that pleasure is distinct form joy, happiness, or good mood. Some other times we say the joy, happiness or good mood are types of pleasure. This suggests the existence of two concepts of pleasure: one specific, the other generic. According to the specific concept, pleasure is one type of positive affects among others. Pleasure is to be distinguished from joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, elation, jubilation; happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being; enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, (...) delectation, enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill; satisfaction, gratification, pride, triumph; good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness; relief (or at least from some of these concepts). According to the generic concept of pleasure, a pleasure is any of these positive affects. Joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, elation, jubilation, happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being, enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, delectation, enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill, satisfaction, gratification, pride, triumph, good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness, relief and pleasure in the specific sense are all species of pleasures. In this thesis, I shall focus on the generic concept of pleasure, in order to address the question “what is the property of pleasantness common to all positive affects?” In order to address this question nevertheless, one need to have at least rough grip on pleasure in the specific sense and on what distinguishes it from other positive affects. I shall therefore start by hinting at the problem of the definition of the specific concept of pleasure. (shrink)

In assessing the veridicality of utterances, we normally seem to assess the satisfaction of conditions that the speaker had been concerned to get right in making the utterance. However, the debate about assessor-relativism about epistemic modals, predicates of taste, gradable adjectives and conditionals has been largely driven by cases in which seemingly felicitous assessments of utterances are insensitive to aspects of the context of utterance that were highly relevant to the speaker’s choice of words. In this paper, we offer an (...) explanation of why certain locutions invite insensitive assessments, focusing primarily on ’tasty’ and ’might’. We spell out some reasons why felicitous insensitive assessments are puzzling and argue briefly that recent attempts to accommodate such assessments (including attempts by John MacFarlane, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies) all fail to provide more than hints at a solution to the puzzle. In the main part of the paper, we develop an account of felicitous insensitive assessments by identifying a number of pragmatic factors that influence the felicity of assessments. Before closing, we argue that the role of these factors extend beyond cases considered in the debate about assessor-relativism and fit comfortably with standard contextualist analyses of the relevant locutions. (shrink)

L'etica, secondo Wittgenstein, ha a che fare con la mostrazione di un modo di vivere, inteso vuoi come disposizione complessiva del soggetto, vuoi come "habitus". In questo libro, Marta Cassina ripercorre le forme di questa mostrazione nell'opera del filosofo, argomentando, in primo luogo, che il modo di vivere indicato nel "Tractatus" come il contrassegno indicibile della vita giusta e felice debba essere compreso, man mano che il pensiero di Wittgenstein matura, come un "fare" e un uso condiviso della vita; che (...) questo uso, inoltre, possa essere letto nelle sue implicazioni teoretiche e nella maniera della sua genesi attraverso le "lenti" della credenza religiosa e della grammatica del voto di fede. (shrink)

John Searle’s Speech Act Theory enumerates necessary and sufficient conditions for a non-defective act of promising in producing sincere promises. This paper seeks to demonstrate the conjunctive insufficiency of the foregoing conditions due to the inadequacy of the sincerity condition to guarantee predicated acts being fulfillable. Being the definitive condition which contains the psychological state distinct in promises as illocutionary acts, that is the expression of intention (S intends to A), I purport that not all sincere promises are non-defective. To (...) motivate this, I shall explicate Searle’s conception of full blown explicit promises as his basic qualification for the application of the above conditions, and set the line as to how explicit is ‘explicit’? As a response to this insufficiency, I shall propose a condition, as part and parcel of the Propositional Content Clause, that makes up Searle’s felicity conditions for promises, which requires explicitness of the form: “A is fulfillable if A is explicit in form”. A is explicit if and only if 1) A is literal in form, where A can have either 1 basic or multiple meanings, and 2) The meaning of A, whether basic or multiple, with respect to its context is directly stated in the sentence uttered. I call this the Discharge Condition. (shrink)

Los teóricos de la democracia dejaron de lado la pregunta de quién legalmente forma parte del "pueblo" autorizado, pregunta que atraviesa a todas las teoría de la democracia y continuamente vivifica la práctica democrática. Determinar quién constituye el pueblo es un dilema inabordable e incluso imposible de responder democráticamente; no es una pregunta que el pueblo mismo pueda decidir procedimentalmente porque la propia premisa subvierte las premisas de su resolución. Esta paradoja del mandato popular revela que el pueblo para ser (...) mejor comprendido como una demanda política, como un proceso de subjetivación, surge y se desarrolla en distintos contextos democráticos. En Estados Unidos el disputado poder para hablar en beneficio del pueblo deriva de un excedente constitutivo heredado de la era revolucionaria, a partir del hecho de que desde la Revolución el pueblo ha sido por vez primera encarnado por la representación y como exceso de cualquier forma de representación. La autoridad posrevolucionaria del vox populi deriva de esa continuamente reiterada pero nunca realizada referencia a la soberanía del pueblo a partir de la representación, legitimidad a partir de la ley, espíritu a partir de la letra, la palabra a través de la palabra. Este ensayo examina la emergencia histórica de este exceso de democracia en el período revolucionario, y cómo este habilita a una subsecuente historia de "momentos constituyentes", momentos cuando subautorizados -radicales, entidades autocreadas-, se apoderan del manto de la autoridad, cambiando las reglas de la autoridad en ese proceso. Estos pequeños dramas de reclamos de autoridad política para hablar en nombre del pueblo son felices, aun cuando explícitamente rompan con los procedimientos o reglas estatuidas para representar la voz popular. -/- Momentos constituyentes: paradojas y poder popular en los Estados Unidos de América posrevolucionarios [traducción], Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política, N°15, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires, Octubre 2012, pp. 49-74. ISSN: 0329-3092. Introducción de “Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America”, de Jason Frank [Ed.: Duke University Press Books, enero de 2010. ISBN-10: 0822346753; ISBN-13: 978-0822346753]. (shrink)

"Una Pedagogía del Nosotros" pretende mostrar la esencia de la educación como punto de encuentro, compatible con todas las cosmovisiones. La pedagogía del nosotros invita a habitar la educación con originalidad, pero con un criterio más allá de la propia originalidad. Se trata de tener sensibilidad ante el peligro de manipulación, pero también ante el peligro de no educar, por temor a manipular. Los grandes problemas de la Humanidad no se producen por conflictos y crisis, sino por el egocentrismo. Las (...) dificultades, errores, debilidades, conflictos y crisis son humanos, y cuando se gestionan con nosicentrismo, suponen una oportunidad para crecer, pero si se gestionan con egocentrismo, no solo no se resuelven, sino que se agravan, y si se logra un equilibrio de egocentrismos que aporte apariencia de paz, en el fondo, no hay autorrealización porque los sujetos no están sabiendo madurar; simplemente viven para aplacar a su egocentrismo. El nosicentrismo es la maduración original de sí más allá de sí, que tiende a la autorrealización apoteósica entregándose al nosotros-maduro. Para que las comunidades sean vivencias de “nosotros” felices, es primordial que los sujetos se dispongan de forma nosicéntrica en cuerpo, mente y apertura. Cultivando el carácter, desarrollando las competencias y madurando la sensibilidad. De este modo, la unidad de sujetos forma un nosotros-maduro donde cada sí-mismo es más sí-mismo desplegándose hacia fuera, colaborando, sirviendo o dándose sin devorar y sin dejarse devorar. Es un salir para dar o darse, de modo que el sujeto se hace grande haciendo grandes a los demás y se enriquece interiormente, enriqueciendo lo otro. Cuando los sujetos desde su egocentrismo forman un nosotros, en realidad es un falso-nosotros. La educación apertural, libera del falsos-nosotros, cicatriza la originalidad y la despliega por medio de una pedagogía del nosotros-maduro. ¿Y cómo se educa la apertura? Aportando motivos por los que vale la pena abrirse, madurando la conciencia y capacitando al sujeto para una libertad consciente. El sentido es clave para dar, para darse y para saber a quién vale la pena darse por entero, por qué y para qué. ¿Y cómo descubrir el sentido de darse por entero? La clave está en enseñar a cada sujeto a mirar hacia su propio sentido original, que se encuentra en su conciencia. Y así es como realmente uno se hace original y creativo. La educación apertural no es un forzar hacia fuera “porque es bueno”, sino invitar a buscar hacia dentro para reconocerse en su origen y desplegar el sí-mismo original. Pero el sí-mismo no podrá ser plenamente sí-mismo sin el tú, así que será una educación de comunidad, comenzando por la familia. Desde esta interpretación, la acción educativa tiene mucho de acompañar a cada sujeto en la aventura de conocerse a sí mismo, descubrir su propia originalidad y disponerle para que la despliegue con sensibilidad y empatía. No se tratará de imponer desde fuera, sino invitar a sacar; ayudar a crecer. Desde la pedagogía del nosotros se busca el entendimiento de todas las cosmovisiones y de ellas entre sí, para ayudarnos a madurar y habitar en un nosotros-maduro. Así, se considera que lo más práctico es ir al fondo: ¿Cuál es el fin último de la educación? ¿Cuál es la esencia de la autorrealización máxima a la que puede aspirar un sujeto? Para sintetizar la respuesta, se tomará el concepto “apoteosis” del griego apothéōsis “deificación”, “divinización”, “endiosar”. Según cada cosmovisión, la apoteosis supone “estar en la gloria”, disfrutando del máximo bien, al que cada cual aspirará, según sus prioridades vitales: Placer, Poder, Sentido u Originalidad (se explica en el libro). Sea como fuere la cosmovisión del sujeto, el “tú” endiosa, pero es la propia conciencia la que está llamando a ser “dios” y si no se encuentra en el camino de la apoteosis, siente una especie de vacío interior, como que algo no va bien. No termina de vivir colmado; ni cuando prospera con actividades exitosas, ni en una situación general de bienestar, ni en una actitud vital de servicio a los demás, nada colma. La apoteosis es la máxima autorrealización de un sujeto en el “nosotros” o la mejor realización de la Humanidad como “nosotros total”. La educación apoteósica consiste en ayudar a descubrir o redescubrir, en conciencia, el sabor de las alegrías originales de la vida. La pedagogía del nosotros no plantea ninguna fórmula absoluta para educar ni para vivir. Sencillamente se considera el vivir humano como un vivir-con, que sorprende con descubrimientos constantes. Desde la Pedagogía del nosotros todas las instituciones intermedias: familia, escuela, etc., y la sociedad en su conjunto, contribuyen a la educación de cada sujeto, más o menos egocéntrico y más o menos abierto a la aventura de habitar la vida con mayor conciencia. La Pedagogía del nosotros invita a cada sujeto a que apueste toda su existencia a la exploración y experimentación de lo auténtico. Cada sujeto solo puede crecer y desarrollarse, una vez que ha aprendido a vivir en relación con los demás, a reconocer las posibilidades del espacio entre sus “nosotros”. El medio fundamental es el diálogo al que se ha llamado amor, que es lo que sucede cuando dos sujetos comparten en conciencia, algo o todo de sus vidas al mismo tiempo. Dice Antoine de Saint-Exúpery: "amor no es mirarse el uno al otro, sino mirar los dos en la misma dirección". Este compartir en conciencia es convivir en realidad. Dice Buber: "Toda vida real es reunión" y la sociedad, la familia y la escuela tienen la llave para reunirnos y enseñarnos a dialogar. Solo se vive la vida real, la vida auténtica desde la originalidad compartida, cohabitada. Ahí es donde los sujetos pueden ser más sí mismos, creativos y auténticamente felices. (shrink)

Il termine “eclisse” (o eclissi) rimanda al fenomeno astronomico dell’oscuramento della luna o del sole. La stessa parola nel linguaggio figurato indica l’offuscamento o la scomparsa definitiva di una personalità, di un movimento o perfino di un’intera epoca. In questo tempo pandemico assistiamo all’eclisse di molte (pseudo) certezze, a cominciare dall’inviolabilità della sfera personale. Si tratta di una definitiva scomparsa oppure di un occultamento solo temporaneo? Quando la pandemia sarà passata, tornerà tutto come prima? L’eclisse non è un fenomeno permanente: (...) il sole o la luna, dopo essere caduti nell’ombra, poi ritornano visibili e la vita prosegue normalmente. “Eclisse”, quindi, è un termine che in relazione alla pandemia lascia aperto un cospicuo spazio di riflessione giocato proprio sulla sua ambiguità, sul suo essere un tempo sospeso o l’ultimo atto di un tempo felice. (shrink)