El alcance de la epojé y la posterior reducción ha sido siempre uno de los mayores terrenos de disputa de la fenomenologı́a. Este ensayo tiene la pretensión de reflexionar en torno a este elemento metodológico esencial a la luz del problema del acceso al mundo. ¿Se ha perdido algo, una vez llevada a cabo la reducción? La respuesta será negativa. Para ello, en la primera sección se presentará cómo más bien hay una reapropiación originaria del mundo a través de la (...) reducción. En la segunda sección se revisará la noción de Jan Patočka de mundo como totalidad pre-dada. En efecto, ambas permiten acercarse a la conclusión de que la reducción encamina hacia un renovado acceso al mundo sin dejar nada de este fuera, permitiendo ası́ que el mundo aparezca qua fenómeno. Esto significa, finalmente, que la reducción permite reconocer de modo originario la relación de nosotros con el mundo, sin entenderla como una mera relación entre dos cosas. (shrink)

The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. My (...) analysis leads us to qualify Kitcher and Strevens’s contention that a priority-based reward system is normatively desirable for science. (shrink)

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing (...) modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda. (shrink)

In ‘Excusing Mistakes of Law’, Gideon Yaffe sets out to ‘vindicate’ the claim ‘that mistakes of law never excuse’ by ‘identifying the truth that is groped for but not grasped by those who assert that ignorance of law is no excuse’. Yaffe does not offer a defence of the claim that mistakes of law never excuse. That claim, Yaffe argues, is false. Yaffe’s article is, rather, an effort to assess what plausible thought might be behind the idea that mistakes of (...) law often should not excuse. (Yaffe is interested in more than just the descriptive claim that in Anglo-American legal jurisdictions mistakes of law routinely do not, in fact, excuse.) More particularly, Yaffe is interested in what plausible normative justification there might be for this asymmetric pattern: -/- Asymmetry: False beliefs about non-legal facts often excuse, but false beliefs about the law rarely excuse. -/- Yaffe offers a complex argument in support of Asymmetry. This paper is organised around my reconstruction of Yaffe’s argument. I argue that Yaffe’s argument does not succeed, but that his argument provides a template for an argument that could succeed. (shrink)

A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig’s defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland’s philosophical (...) arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore and offer different hypotheses that could account for an adequate understanding of the duty to die and its relation to biopolitics from two neglected approaches. First, death will be analysed from a biopolitical perspective to understand the crucial role it has in biopower. Second, the focus lies on the two-folded implication that death has in biopower, for it could be either a defiance of it or the final sublimation of its control. Similarly, the next section (...) addresses the relations between death and neoliberalism from a biopolitical perspective, exploring the possibility of understanding the duty to die as resistance to economic mandates or, on the contrary, as the fulfilment of neoliberal interests. Finally, as a continuation of the relations between the duty to die and neo-liberalism, the paper analyses a similar two-folded view of the former from a psychopolitical perspective. (shrink)

This paper straightforwardly addresses one of the strongest, from an ethical perspective, objections presented to the duty to die, the one concerned with the lack of a normative theory to support it, offered by Seay in his paper Can there be a “duty to die” without a normative theory? The aim of the paper is to provide strong metaethical grounds to support the duty to die without the need of a moral normative theory. First, the definition and main argument for (...) the duty to die will be presented. Second, Seay’s objection will be described and clearly explained. Third, our metaphysical assumptions and a preliminary metaethical discussion will be offered to situate and understand the context. Finally, we will show how the duty to die can be integrated within the metaethical approach previously presented, defending that there is no need of a normative theory to provide good justification and strong ethical grounds for the duty to die, because they will have already been provided by our metaethical argument. (shrink)

The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the following questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which olfactory qualities are (...) attributed. In order to do this I develop an empirically adequate notion of olfactory object that is sensitive to the peculiarities of olfaction, and defend it against various objections. (shrink)

Euthanasia and the duty to die have both been thoroughly discussed in the field of bioethics as morally justifiable practices within medical healthcare contexts. The existence of a narrow connection between both could also be established, for people having a duty to die should be allowed to actively hasten their death by the active means offered by euthanasia. Choosing the right time to end one’s own life is a decisive factor to retain autonomy at the end of our lives. However, (...) there is no definitive consensus on why physicians should be the ones performing the medical procedure to end a person’s life. The moral problems arising from such assertion are not to be taken lightly, for medical tradition has long regarded the duty not to kill, not to actively end a patient’s life, as the core moral obligation that gives meaning to the medical profession. Our concern is to question the moral justifiability of the arguments offered by physicians not to actively help patients die. (shrink)

While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic argument (...) in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)

En Argentina existió una poderosa influencia de origen francés que modificó profundamente las tácticas militares y la ideología del Ejército entre 1957 y 1963. Estas teorías extranjeras importadas al Cono Sur, tuvieron como origen los aprendizajes obtenidos por el Ejército francés en las guerras de Argelia e Indochina. A partir de tales experiencias, los oficiales franceses desarrollaron técnicas de combate contra la entonces novedosa ‘guerra de guerrillas’ de los grupos rebeldes, que fueron enseñadas posteriormente a los militares argentinos. Esta enseñanza (...) incluía importantes elementos de carácter doctrinario, como la idea de la guerra global contra el comunismo, la noción de enemigo interno, y la convicción de que sus acciones, incluido el uso de tortura como técnica de obtención de información, estaban justificadas por la búsqueda del bien mayor de la nación. Esta ideología influyó profundamente en el Ejército argentino y es posible notar su rastro en el radical proceder que tuvieron los cuerpos militares durante el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem por finalidade analisar, a partir do livro V da obra Ethica Nicomachea, se a justiça poderia ser tomada como um meio que irá auxiliar os cidadãos a desenvolver plenamente as suas virtudes. Buscar-se-á fundamentar que é através da justiça que os bons cidadãos seriam formados, bem como o bom caráter seria cultivado. Analisar-se-á, também, ainda que minimamente, o que Aristóteles entende de fato por justiça, de que o justo seria dar a cada um o que lhe (...) é devido, o que merece, haja vista que essa afirmação traz consigo um peso muito grande, pois nos faz indagar sobre o que seria o devido de cada indivíduo, bem como quais seriam as bases relevantes do mérito. Isto é, se o justo é dar a cada um o que lhe é devido, cabe a nós nos perguntarmos de que forma e critério seria usado na distribuição. De certa forma, ao raciocinarmos sobre justiça e direitos, consequentemente temos de raciocinar sobre a finalidade, o objetivo, o telos das atividades que circundam a vida social na Pólis. Buscar-se-á discutir sobre os temas apresentados, porém não se tem por finalidade propor medidas para pôr um fim na discussão. (shrink)

The radical evil. Notes on the revolt of masses. In his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant speaks about a radical evil present in the human being, a tendency to place before the desire with regard to the rational duty, which is impossible to tear up by the roots from the human nature. In The revolt of the masses, Ortega also speaks about an evil that is anyway present in the so called mass-man, in each one of us, (...) and that is not to eradicate. The aim of this paper is to read the book of Ortega y Gasset in dialogue with Kant. (shrink)

This article is a commentary of the section 5.552 of the Tractatus, about the “experience” that is necessary to understand logic, from the point of view of the so called continental philosophy. In this commentary are tackled some questions: what is exactly this “experience”?; what does mean that logic is a speculative image of the world?; how are the relations between logic and metaphysics (the two components of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein)? All these questions lead us to the conception of (...) philosophy present in the Tractatus and to the role, so important, the two following problems play in this book: the reflection on the philosophical method and the transcendental character of being. Just for this it is necessary to take it seriously the opposition between speaking of something and speaking about something, employed in the final section and so clear in German as habitually mistranslated. (shrink)

El concepto de desarrollo humano del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) surge en 1990 como una crítica a la consideración de la economía como el fin último de los esfuerzos del desarrollo. En la visión del PNUD, la economía es considerada un fin relativo, es decir, un fin y un medio para el desarrollo humano. Al considerar, por su parte, el fin del desarrollo humano, este es identificado con el ensanchamiento de las opciones y libertades de (...) que gozan los individuos. En este sentido, este concepto de desarrollo humano hace alusión a una práctica política más que a un entendimiento ético-ontológico del ser humano, evitando referirse a desarrollo humano entendido como un desarrollo del ser humano. Este artículo explora los antecedentes del concepto del desarrollo humano del PNUD y los fines que consideran estos enfoques previos. Se observa que la consideración subjetivista del PNUD proviene de la teoría de Amartya Sen, quien queda sujeto a la crítica objetivista de Martha Nussbaum al no considera un fin objetivo para los asuntos humanos, crítica que puede de igual manera aplicarse al concepto de desarrollo humano del PNUD. (shrink)

It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is also the creator of the universe, where the latter claim includes at least the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo, i.e., without the use of pre-existing materials. Call this tripartite component of classical theism the classical view of creation. (...) In this paper, I offer a new argument against classical theism. In particular, I argue that creation ex nihilo is prima facie impossible, and that since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is constitutive of classical theism, classical theism is false. (shrink)

Felipe Gonzalez and Victoria Camps on the Catalan independent.

Neste trabalho, investigo a possibilidade de compatibilidade entre o pessimismo filosófico e a compreensão da morte como um mal para quem morre. Por pessimismo filosófico, compreendo a doutrina filosófica que mantém como tese fundamental que a não-existência é preferível à existência, de modo que o pessimismo é tomado como a filosofia de que a vida não vale a pena ser vivida. Por mal da morte, me refiro à compreensão da morte como um dano para o indivíduo que morre, cujo pressuposto (...) em diferentes abordagens contemporâneas é o de que a morte só é um mal no caso de continuar existindo ser preferível a deixar de existir. Desse modo, o problema discutido é a aparente incompatibilidade entre a tese de que a não-existência é preferível à existência e a tese de que continuar existindo é preferível a deixar de existir. Busco demonstrar que essa (in)compatibilidade depende do modo como fundamentamos o pessimismo filosófico. Para tanto, examino dois argumentos para o pessimismo filosófico e suas implicações para o mal da morte: o argumento a priori de Arthur Schopenhauer e o argumento da assimetria de David Benatar. Concluo que o primeiro desses argumentos nos leva para a conclusão de que a morte não é um mal, mas que o segundo argumento compatibiliza o pessimismo filosófico e a compreensão da morte como um mal para quem morre. (shrink)

The logos question, one of the most important among the subjects that traverse the Plato's Sophist, has in fact some different aspects: the criticism of father Parmenides' logos, that is unable to speak about the not-being, but also about the being; the relations between logos and its cognates, phantasia, doxa and dianoia; the logos’ complex structure, that is a compound with onoma and rema; the difference between naming and saying, two distinct but inseparable actions; the logical and ontological conditions that (...) make possible to say the truth, or to lie or simply to joke; the necessity of a most flexible logos that allows us to speak about the not-being, and about the being, but at the same time is a logos dangerously similar to the sophist’ one; finally, the identity between the power to produce “spoken images” and the very power to speak. The aim of the present article is giving a systematical view of the matter that grasps all these faces. (shrink)

Una interpretación aristotélica del concepto de desarrollo humano propone como fin último del desarrollo la eudaimonía o felicidad, esto es, la plena realización de la capacidad eudemónica en el alma humana. Para esto se requiere del desarrollo de sus partes racional e irracional, lo que demanda como medios una ética y una dianoética del desarrollo, referidos a los modos de ser de las respectivas partes del alma. La interacción entre ambas partes genera siempre un ciclo virtuoso, existiendo la posibilidad de (...) influencias externas a través de la educación, la costumbre, la economía, la legislación y la política. -/- An Aristotelian approach of the concept of human development proposes eudaimonía or happiness as the ultimate goal of development, that is, the full realization of the eudemonic capacity in the human soul. For this, the development of its rational and irrational parts is required, which in turn requires an ethics and dianoethics of development as means, referring to the characters of the respective parts of the soul. The interaction between both parts always generates a virtuous cycle, with the possibility of external influences through education, custom, economics, legislation and politics. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as principais abordagens em que a psicologia social clássica norte-americana teorizou sobre o preconceito racial, o racismo e o antirracismo e, a partir delas, trazer os estudos críticos da branquitude como possibilidades para superar os limites identificados nessa corrente, que ora apresenta um indivíduo fora da estrutura, ora a estrutura sem indivíduos. Para isto, neste artigo definimos três abordagens propostas pela psicologia social norte-americana: teste de associação implícita (Greenwald & Banaji 2013); teoria do contato (...) intergrupal e racismo aversivo (Pettigrew 1997, Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986); e emoções específicas (Leach et al., 2002). A partir daí mostramos como os estudos críticos da branquitude se apresentam como uma síntese entre essas duas posições opostas, que oscilam entre o indivíduo e a estrutura. Nesta perspectiva, a estrutura se manifesta na própria experiência subjetiva do indivíduo, que se torna capaz de identificá-la em seu próprio campo experiencial. (shrink)

It is common in psychiatry and other sciences to describe an individual or a type of individual in terms of its disposition to manifest specific effects in a particular range of circumstances. According to one understanding, dispositions are statistical regularities of an individual or type of individual in specific circumstances. According to another understanding, dispositions are properties of individuals in virtue of which such regularities hold. This entry considers a number of ways of making each of these senses of disposition (...) more precise while discussing a number of dangers lurking in careless use of the concept of a disposition. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview and critical discussion of cosmological arguments for theism, with special focus on the Kalam argument and arguments from contingency.

I argue that modal epistemology should pay more attention to questions about the structure and function of modal thought. We can treat these questions from synchronic and diachronic angles. From a synchronic perspective, I consider whether a general argument for the epistemic support of modal though can be made on the basis of modal thoughs’s indispensability for what Enoch and Schechter (2008) call rationally required epistemic projects. After formulating the argument, I defend it from various objections. I also examine the (...) possibility of considering the indispensability of modal thought in terms of its components. Finally, I argue that we also need to approach these issues from a diachronic perspective, and I sketch how to approach this task. (shrink)

The temporality of human action is very peculiar: different from the cosmic time and even paradoxical, inasmuch as it is really a circular time. The aim of this essay is to study this circularity in the sphere of human activity through the relations between the notions of potency and habit in the Aristotelian Ethics, among others structural conditions of the action. These structural conditions are explored by Aristotle as those which make possible to judge the actions.

Desde os tempos mais remotos, busca-se por equilíbrio entre o delito e a punição. Este artigo estabelece uma relação entre o conceito de Justiça em Aristóteles e a proporcionalidade em matéria penal. Para melhor compreensão do tema, inicia-se o estudo pelos principais pontos da obra Ética a Nicômaco, especialmente o Livro V, que trata da Justiça. A partir de então, aborda-se o princípio da proporcionalidade e a forma pela qual os conceitos de Aristóteles influenciaram a concepção desse princípio. Ato contínuo, (...) investiga-se a realidade atual do sistema carcerário, sendo avaliadas as estatísticas produzidas pelos órgãos competentes. Por conseguinte, enfatiza-se o Estado de Coisas Inconstitucional para verificar a questão penitenciária à luz da decisão da Suprema Corte brasileira na ADPF n. 347/DF. Ao final, pondera-se acerca da forma pela qual se pune no Brasil para investigar se suas premissas respeitam ou não as balizas do conceito de Justiça aristotélico e o princípio da proporcionalidade. Para o desenvolvimento desta pesquisa, utilizou-se o método qualitativo, por meio da leitura de obras que obedecem ao eixo temático exposto nos objetivos e que permitem o fichamento do repertório selecionado. Além de ter sido analisada juriprudência, foram coletados dados do censo penitenciário. Finalmente, articulou-se o material consultado com as estatísticas do sistema prisional. Concluiu-se nesta pesquisa que o Poder Executivo é omisso e ineficiente para garantir os direitos dos encarcerados, não obstante todo o avanço normativo sobre o tema. Como se não bastasse, na prática forense brasileira a proporcionalidade não é mais que mera previsão abstrata. (shrink)

Eshel Ben-Jacob’s manuscript entitled ‘Bacterial wisdom, Gödel’s theorem and creative genomic webs’ summarizes decades of work demonstrating adaptive mutagenesis in bacterial genomes. Bacterial genomes, each an essential part of a Kantian whole that is a single bacterium, are thus not independent of the environment as sensed; and a single bacterium is therefore a semiotic entity. Ben-Jacob suggests this but errs in 1) assigning autonomy to the genome, and 2) analogizing through computation without making clear whether he is doing so for (...) illustrative purposes or making committed ontological propositions. We reinterpret adaptive mutagenesis and related phenomena in ways both metaphysically rigorous and revealing. We conclude that bacteria are much farther removed from the ‘self-organizing’ world of inanimate process than from the Peircian world of signs; and a critical reappraisal of existing knowledge can enhance our understanding of selfhood, semiosis, and the roots of subjective experience. (shrink)

This article analyzes the epistemological legitimation of mathematics in natural philosophy in the seventeenth century. In the Renaissance it was claimed that mathematics does not meet the Aristotelian criteria of scientificity, and that it did not explain the efficient and final causes. So, its critics, inspired by the Aristotelian tradition, rejected the first attempts to mathematize natural philosophy. The epistemological conditions involved in the debate are examined on the scientific nature of mathematics and its relevance to natural philosophy. A historiographical (...) tour of the mathematization of nature is made to provide new weighing elements with respect to a historically and philosophically more conceptual characterization of the emergence of modern science. (shrink)

The primary aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether considerations about a priori domains and abstract objects favor atheism over theism.

In this paper, we address the moral justification problem concerning the use of age as a criterion for the allocation of scarce life-saving medical resources. We present and discuss four justifications that stand out in philosophical literature: efficiency, sufficiency, egalitarian, and prioritarian. We aim to demonstrate that all these justifications are unsatisfactory since they entail counterintuitive implications in cases involving fetuses and newborns. We then suggest another justification for the relevance of age based on the Time-Relative Interest Account of the (...) harm of death. Finally, we evaluate an objection that could limit the scope of the defended justification, leading us to draw a distinction between justification of harm and strict justification of harm. (shrink)

The necessity of a continuous creation by God, the need of a creation that is prolonged in the time, is an important issue in the Metaphysics of Descartes; for the being of the human conscience is not so persistent and so strong as the being of a really substance. The Cartesian cogito raises the problem of the weakness of this needy being: the distance between what is in each case thought, which is not temporal, and the thinking itself, which is (...) in the time. Descartes has very interesting observations about this theme. (shrink)

Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reflection, there is a large area of disagreement and debate about the nature and value of “reflective scrutiny” and the role of “second-order states” in everyday life. This problem has been discussed in a vast and heterogeneous literature about topics such as epistemic injustice, epistemic norms, agency, understanding, meta-cognition etc. However, there is not yet any extensive and interdisciplinary work, specifically focused on the topic of the epistemic value of reflection. This (...) volume is one of the first attempts aimed at providing an innovative contribution, an exchange between philosophy, epistemology and psychology about the place and value of reflection in everyday life. -/- Our goal in the next sections is not to offer an exhaustive overview of recent work on epistemic reflection, nor to mimic all of the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. We will try to highlight some topics that have motivated a new resumption of this field and, with that, drawing on chapters from this volume where relevant. -/- Two elements defined the scope and content of this volume, on the one hand, the crucial contribution of Ernest Sosa, whose works provide original and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary epistemology in setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the nature and value of knowledge, giving a central place to reflection. On the other hand, the recent developments of cultural psychology, in the version of the “Aalborg approach”, reconsider the object and scope of psychological sciences, stressing that “[h]uman conduct is purposeful”. (shrink)

Na década de 1980, um programa de pesquisa se popularizou no campo da filosofia e psicologia das emoções. Esse programa, denominado construcionismo social, afirmava que emoções eram produtos de fatores sociais e não poderiam ser compreendidas em um vocabulário adaptacionista. No entanto, ao longo do tempo essas teorias perderam grande parte de sua força e popularidade, e praticamente desapareceram da filosofia das emoções contemporânea. O objetivo do presente artigo será diagnosticar esse predicamento, e perguntar se o construcionismo social ainda poderia (...) ser uma via teórica interessante para o estudo das emoções. Para isso, iremos clarificar o significado da metáfora da “construção” e examinar algumas das principais teorias construcionistas de emoções. Embora nossas conclusões sejam negativas em relação ao rótulo da construção social, elas podem ainda assim trazer algum alívio para aqueles que se simpatizam com suas pretensões teóricas, prescrições metodológicas e foco de análise. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es dar cuenta de lo que en la discusión filosófica latinoamericana se ha entendido en las últimas décadas por “filosofía indígena”. Para este fin, se realiza un metaanálisis a partir de una revisión sistemática de los artículos académicos que mencionan categorías conceptuales vinculadas a aspectos noéticos de lo indígena, considerando una base de datos compuesta por las revistas latinoamericanas indexadas al catálogo SCOPUS en el área de filosofía. Teniendo en cuenta el material contenido en 42 (...) revistas académicas entre 1984 y 2023, se observó que un total de 142 artículos mencionan al menos una vez conceptos como conocimiento/saber indígena, cosmovisión indígena, pensamiento indígena, filosofía/sabiduría indígena, y valores indígenas, u otras denominaciones similares. A partir de esta sistematización, el trabajo presenta una propuesta de ordenamiento de las categorías asociadas a lo indígena señalando los principales desafíos conceptuales que reviste la propuesta de una filosofía indígena latinoamericana. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. One wonders, for example, how philosophers could come to think that justified true belief isn’t knowledge, that reference isn’t determined by an expression’s associated description, or that moral responsibility doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise, without the use of thought experiments. But even if thought experiments play an integral role in philosophical methodology, their legitimacy is at least initially puzzling: one would think that significant knowledge of (...) the world requires extensive empirical investigation. But since thought experiments are done from the armchair, how can they tell us about the world? -/- A standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments provides an answer to this question, and in a way that fits naturally with a standard picture of the nature of the facts philosophers investigate: Philosophers are about the business of investigating the essences of things and kinds. But a thing’s essential and accidental properties are modal properties. Thus, one can discern a thing’s essence by discovering its modal profile. But if so, then thought experiments are naturally suited as tools for the armchair philosopher. For thought experiments shed light on modal facts. Therefore, since philosophers investigate essences, facts about essence are modal facts, and the thought experiment is one of the few tools they have for discerning such facts, thought experiments play a legitimate and indispensable role in philosophical methodology. In my dissertation, I argue that the standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments is inadequate, and sketch a more promising account. -/- First, I argue that our knowledge of possibility is restricted to the relatively humdrum. And if so, then since the standard account ties the utility of thought experiments to our knowledge of possibility, too many thought experiments will be ruled out as useless, which raises serious concerns about the significance, and perhaps even the legitimacy, of armchair philosophy. Thus, there is pressure for armchair philosophers to reject the standard account. -/- Second, I sketch an alternative picture of the nature of facts philosophers investigate – one that’s more fine-grained than the standard modal-profile picture. Relatedly, I sketch a correspondingly fine-grained semantics for claims about such facts. This alternative picture underwrites the legitimacy of a hitherto underappreciated sort of thought experiment, which I call the non-modal thought experiment. Such thought experiments shed light on facts about the world that are more fine-grained than what can be discerned by merely examining their modal profiles. I argue that non-modal thought experiments often succeed at just the points where the more familiar modal thought experiments fail, and thus that the two are naturally suited to complement one another in the philosopher’s practice. -/- Finally, I exploit the points mentioned above to sketch an account of the variety and utility of thought experiments that’s much more nuanced than that of the standard account. I then illustrate some of its virtues by indicating its ability to account for a wide range of epistemically forceful thought experiments – both humdrum and exotic –, and by demonstrating how it can be used to make progress in debates that have reached a stalemate due to conflicting modal intuitions. -/- . (shrink)

A tradução a seguir tem como pretensão demonstrar o modo como Gaston Berger (1896-1960) em seu texto Husserl et Hume, promove uma articulação entre a fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl e o empirismo de David Hume. No texto, o autor apresenta a maneira como a fenomenologia ao valorizar a experiência (tendo-a como imprescindível) se aproxima da filosofia de Hume, e ao tratá-la como insuficiente por si mesma, acaba por estabelecer uma estreita relação com o idealismo transcendental kantiano. O fato é que (...) por mais que Husserl acredite ter superado a imediaticidade dos fatos empíricos vindo a construir um novo sistema de idealismo transcendental, a sua fenomenologia jamais deixou de clara fazer referência a Hume. (shrink)

Aristotle's General Definition of the Syllogism may be taken as consisting of two parts: the Inferential Conditions and the Final Clause. Although this distinction is well known, traditional interpretations neglect the Final Clause and its influence on syllogistic. Instead, the aforementioned tradition focuses on the Inferential Conditions only. We intend to show that this neglect has severe consequences not just on syllogistic but on the whole exegesis of Aristotle's Prior Analytics I. Due to these consequences, our objective is to analyse (...) the General Definition's Final Clause and its consequences on syllogistic. We propose a reading of the Final Clause as an additional criterion for distinguishing some arguments as properly syllogistic ones and as a main theme which connects all parts of the Prior Analytics I into one coherent piece of work. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende explorar a máxima contida em Os irmãos Karamázov (se não há Deus, tudo é permitido?) à luz do pensamento de Immanuel Kant. Para tanto, se vale do pensamento de Dostoiévski apenas na medida em que ele serve como auxílio na apresentação da ideia de Deus e de sua relação com a posição do ateu. Tendo em vista a filosofia kantiana, buscamos não apenas a apresentação dessa ideia, mas também sua relação com o ato moral e com (...) a própria condição desse ato. Isso, portanto, resultará em Kant, uma resposta duplamente negativa à pergunta que reflete a posição ateísta de Ivan Karamazov. Pois Kant ao distinguir o ato moral por dever e conforme o dever, defende que recorrer a algo externo à razão (Deus) constituiria uma vontade meramente heterônoma. Portanto, o ato moral por excelência ocorre quando a ação é realizada de um modo unicamente guiado pela razão, com base num interesse puro, e isso conduz, por sua vez, à reprovação por parte de Kant da referida máxima presente na obra de Dostoiévski. (shrink)

During the first half of the twentieth century, many philosophers of memory opposed the postulation of memory traces based on the claim that a satisfactory account of remembering need not include references to causal processes involved in recollection. However, in 1966, an influential paper by Martin and Deutscher showed that causal claims are indeed necessary for a proper account of remembering. This, however, did not settle the issue, as in 1977 Malcolm argued that even if one were to buy Martin (...) and Deutscher’s argument for causal claims, we still don’t need to postulate the existence of memory traces. This paper reconstructs the dialectic between realists and anti-realists about memory traces, suggesting that ultimately realists’ arguments amount to inferences to the best explanation. I then argue that Malcolm’s anti-realist strategy consists in the suggestion that causal explanations that do not invoke memory traces are at least as good as those that do. But then, Malcolm, I argue that there are a large number of memory phenomena for which explanations that do not postulate the existence of memory traces are definitively worse than explanations that do postulate them. Next, I offer a causal model based on an interventionist framework to illustrate when memory traces can help to explain memory phenomena and proceed to substantiate the model with details coming from extant findings in the neuroscience of memory. (shrink)

En este trabajo pretendemos dar cuenta de cómo los criterios de delimitación entre el conocimiento animal y el conocimiento humano en la epistemología contemporánea no son adecuados para agotar la complejidad epistemológica del fenómeno. Buscamos, así, establecer una tercera vía de interpretación, proponiendo una taxonomía de niveles que satisfaga las necesidades de clasificación del conocimiento animal sin dejar de lado la particularidad propia del conocimiento humano, a saber, la reflexividad. De esta manera, se pretende reinterpretar cómo ha sido concebido el (...) conocimiento animal en la epistemología contemporánea para reconstruir, a partir de las posturas mencionadas, una vía alternativa que dé cuenta, adecuadamente, de las particularidades del conocimiento animal en relación con el conocimiento humano. (shrink)

In the philosophy of memory there is a tension between a preservationist and a constructivist view of memory reflected in the debate between causalism and simulationism. Causalism is not only committed to the claim that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the remembered event and the content represented at retrieval but also that such connection is possible because of a content-preserving memory trace. Simulationism, by contrast, rejects the need for an appropriate causal condition and, thereby, makes the appeal (...) to memory traces unnecessary. In this paper I argue that while the are strong conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to support a constructivist view of memory, the empirical evidence also suggest that the initial formulation of simulationism needs to be revised. In particular, I argue, first, that simulationism’s commitment to a single cognitive system for mental time travel is likely wrong, and second, that simulationism cannot get rid of memory traces altogether, as they are still explanatorily indispensable when it comes to explaining a large number of memory-related phenomena. At the end, I end up suggesting a way of thinking about memory traces that, I think, is compatible with simulationism and a constructivist view of memory. If the view I put forth is on the right track, then an updated version of simulationism can help to dispel the dichotomy between causalism and simulationism as a false one. (shrink)