A key source of support for the view that challenging people’s beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N (...) = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests. (shrink)

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical (...) view per se face significant independent moral objections. Yet despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular preventive detention, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s, taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health -quarantine model—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own. (shrink)

Free will skepticism maintains that what we do, and the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense—the sense that would make us truly deserving of praise and blame. In recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers have advanced and defended versions of free will skepticism, including Derk Pereboom (2001, 2014), Galen Strawson (2010), Neil Levy (2011), Bruce (...) Waller (2011, 2015), and myself (Caruso 2012, 2013, forthcoming). Critics, however, often complain that adopting such views would have dire consequences for ourselves, society, morality, meaning, and the law. They fear, for instance, that relinquishing belief in free will and basic desert moral responsibility would leave us unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior, increase anti-social conduct, and undermine meaning in life. -/- In response, free will skeptics argue that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe (see, e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014; Waller 2011, 2015; Caruso 2016, forthcoming). According to optimistic skeptics, prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be threatened. And although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, incapacitation and rehabilitation programs would still be justified (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014; Levy 2012; Caruso 2016; Pereboom and Caruso, forthcoming). In this paper, I attempt to extend this general optimism about the practical implications of free will skepticism to the question of creativity. -/- In Section I, I spell out the question of creativity and explain why it’s relevant to the problem of free will. In Section II, I identify three different conceptions of creativity and explain the practical concerns critics have with free will skepticism. In Section III, I distinguish between three different conceptions of moral responsibility and argue that at least two of them are consistent with free will skepticism. I further contend that forward-looking accounts of moral responsibility, which are perfectly consistent with free will skepticism, can justify calling agents to account for immoral behavior as well as providing encouragement for creative activities since these are important for moral and creative formation and development. I conclude in Section IV by arguing that relinquishing belief in free will and basic desert would not mean the death of creativity or our sense of achievement since important and realistic conceptions of both remain in place. (shrink)

This paper is about an asymmetry in the justification of praising and blaming behaviour which free will theorists should acknowledge even if they do not follow Wolf and Nelkin in holding that praise and blame have different control conditions. That is, even if praise and blame have the same control condition, we must have stronger reasons for believing that it is satisfied to treat someone as blameworthy than we require to treat someone as praiseworthy. Blaming behaviour which involves serious (...) harm can only be justified if the claim that the target of blame acted freely cannot be reasonably doubted. But harmless praise can be justified so long as the claim that the candidate for praise did not act freely can be reasonably doubted. Anyone who thinks a debate about whether someone acted freely is truth-conducive has to acknowledge that reasonable doubt is possible in both these cases. (shrink)

In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If (...) so, what role or function must it play? Are agents morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are carried out automatically or without conscious control or guidance? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that are the result of implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings of which they are unaware? What about the actions of somnambulists or cases of extreme sleepwalking where consciousness is largely absent? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is imperative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will. For example, do compatibilist reasons- responsive and deep self accounts require consciousness? If so, are they threatened by recent developments in the behavior, cognitive, and neurosciences? What about libertarian accounts of free will? What powers, if any, do they impart to consciousness and are they consistent with our best scientific theories about the world? In this survey piece, I will outline and assess several distinct views on the relationship between consciousness and free will. (shrink)

This chapter outlines six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it’s unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify it. It then sketches a novel non-retributive alternative called the public health-quarantine model. The core idea of the model is that the right to harm in self-defense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required for adequate protection. The model also (...) draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. It is argued that not only does the public health-quarantine model offer a stark contrast to retributivism, it also provides a more humane, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior, one that is superior to both retributivism and other leading non-retributive alternatives. (shrink)

An apparently increasing number of philosophers take free will skepticism to pose a serious challenge to some of our practices. This must seem odd to many—why should anyone think that free will skepticism is relevant for our practices, when nobody seems to think that other canonical forms of philosophical skepticism are relevant for our practices? Part of the explanation may be epistemic, but here I focus on a metaethical explanation. Free will skepticism is special because it is (...) compatible with ‘basic moral reasons’—moral reasons acknowledged by all mainstream ethicists—and other minds and induction skepticism are not. One example is our reason not to intentionally harm others. Practical seriousness about other minds and induction skepticism undermines this reason, but practical seriousness about free will skepticism only undermines a potential overrider of this reason, that is, the reason of retribution. (shrink)

In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up (...) the belief that we are morally responsible undermines many, and perhaps most, of the desert claims we are pretheoretically inclined to accept. But it does not undermine desert claims based on the sheer fact of personhood. Even in the absence of belief in moral responsibility, personhood-based desert claims require us to respect persons and their rights. So personhood-based desert claims can provide a substantial role for desert in free will skeptics' ethical theories. (shrink)

This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse which can be endorsed by free will skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about free will, but we can preserve some important ones which can do valuable work for free will skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws on a modified (...) Rawlsian original position in which we assume we are just as likely to be among the punished when the veil of ignorance is raised as we are to be among those protected by the institution of punishment. The justification of remorse presented here is care-based, and draws on the value of sympathizing with people we have wronged, which has a Kantian ground in the duty to take others’ ends as our own. (shrink)

As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism (...) and despair as some maintain or would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of belief in free will? In this chapter we consider the practical implications of free will skepticism and argue that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe. We argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for example, would not be threatened. On treatment of criminals, we argue that although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, preventive detention and rehabilitation programs would still be justified. While we will touch on all these issues below, our focus will be primarily on this last issue. -/- We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John-Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route—e.g., Al Mele (2009), Eddy Nahmias (2002, 2011), and Neil Levy (2005)—the second route to free will skepticism remains intact. In section II we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality, and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well-being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate an often destructive form of moral anger. In section III we argue that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy. We present and defend our own preferred model for dealing with dangerous criminals, an incapacitation account built on the right to self-protection analogous to the justification for quarantine (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014a; Caruso 2016a), and we respond to recent objections to it by Michael Corrado and John Lemos. (shrink)

What would be the consequence of embracing skepticism about free will and/or desert-based moral responsibility? What if we came to disbelieve in moral responsibility? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some maintain? Or perhaps increase anti-social behavior as some recent studies have suggested (Vohs and Schooler 2008; Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall 2009)? Or (...) would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of what Bruce Waller calls the “moral responsibility system” (2014, p. 4)? These questions are of profound pragmatic importance and should be of interest independent of the metaphysical debate over free will. As public proclamations of skepticism continue to rise, and as the mass media continues to run headlines announcing free will and moral responsibility are illusions, we need to ask what effects this will have on the general public and what the responsibility is of professionals. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide a justification of punishment which can be endorsed by free will skeptics, and which can also be defended against the "using persons as mere means" objection. Free will skeptics must reject retributivism, that is, the view that punishment is just because criminals deserve to suffer based on their actions. Retributivists often claim that theirs is the only justification on which punishment is constrained by desert, and suppose that non-retributive justifications must (...) therefore endorse treating the people punished as mere means to social ends. Retributivists typically presuppose a monolithic conception of desert: they assume that action-based desert is the only kind of desert. But there are also personhood-based desert claims, that is, desert claims which depend not on facts about our actions, but instead on the more abstract fact that we are persons. Since personhood-based desert claims do not depend on facts about our actions, they do not depend on moral responsibility, so free will skeptics can appeal to them just as well as retributivists. What people deserve based on the mere fact of their personhood is to be treated as they would rationally consent to be treated if all they had in view was the mere fact of their personhood. We can work out the implications of this view for punishment by developing a hypothetical consent justification in which we select principles of punishment in the Rawlsian original position, so long as we are careful not to smuggle in the retributivist assumption that it is under our control whether we end up as criminals or as law-abiding citizens once we raise the veil of ignorance. (shrink)

Discusses Eddy Nahmias' “Is Free Will an Illusion?”.

Free will skepticism is radical in its core claim that free will is illusory. Criminal law, however, appears to presuppose that persons are free and hence, morally responsible for their actions. So, if free will skepticism is true, our current practices that hold people to account for their wrongs appears unjustified–even immoral. This paper will challenge the free will skeptic’s core claim that free will does not exist and defend current practices of moral (...) responsibility by offering (and defending) a Frankfurtian-compatibilist approach to the topics of free will and determinism. (shrink)

Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...) to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished. A number of sentencing guidelines in the U.S. have adopted desert as their distributive principle, and it is increasingly given deference in the “purposes” section of state criminal codes, where it can be the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code’s provisions. Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the Model Penal Code so as to set desert as the official dominate principle for sentencing. And courts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety of contexts, as with the Supreme Court’s enthroning retributivism as the “primary justification for the death penalty.” While retributivism provides one of the main sources of justification for punishment within the criminal justice system, there are good philosophical and practical reasons for rejecting it. One such reason is that it is unclear that agents truly deserve to suffer for the wrongs they have done in the sense required by retributivism. In the first section, I explore the retributivist justification of punishment and explain why it is inconsistent with free will skepticism. In the second section, I then argue that even if one is not convinced by the arguments for free will skepticism, there remains a strong epistemic argument against causing harm on retributivist grounds that undermines both libertarian and compatibilist attempts to justify it. I maintain that this argument provides sufficient reason for rejecting the retributive justification of criminal punishment. I conclude in the third section by briefly sketching my public health-quarantine model, a non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. I argue that the model is not only consistent with free will skepticism and the epistemic argument against retributivism, it also provides the most justified, humane, and effective way of dealing with criminal behavior. (shrink)

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical (...) view per se face significant independent moral objections (Pereboom 2014: 153). Despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2013, 2014), taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health-quarantine model (Caruso 2016, 2017a)—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own since it prioritizes prevention and social justice. -/- In Section 1, I begin by (very) briefly summarizing my arguments against free will and basic desert moral responsibility. In Section 2, I then introduce and defend my public health-quarantine model, which is a non-retributive alternative to criminal punishment that prioritizes prevention and social justice. In Sections 3 and 4, I take up and respond to two general objections to the public health-quarantine model. Since objections by Michael Corrado (2016), John Lemos (2016), Saul Smilanksy (2011, 2017), and Victor Tadros (2017) have been addressed in detail elsewhere (see Pereboom 2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018), I will here focus on objections that have not yet been addressed. In particular, I will respond to concerns about proportionality, human dignity, and victims’ rights. I will argue that each of these concerns can be met and that in the end the public health-quarantine model offers a superior alternative to retributive punishment and other non-retributive accounts. (shrink)

Here, I review work from three lines of research in cognitive science often taken to threaten free will and moral responsibility. This work concerns conscious deciding, the experience of acting, and the role of largely unnoticed situational influences on behavior. Whether this work in fact threatens free will and moral responsibility depends on how we ought to interpret it, and depends as well on the nature of free and responsible behavior. I discuss different ways this (...) work has been interpreted and argue that though work on conscious deciding and the experience of acting presents no real threat, work on situational influences is more difficult to dismiss. This work may present a real threat, and it may require us to revise our commonsense understanding of free and responsible behavior. But this work may also present ways to augment free and responsible behavior. Determining whether and how advancing science threatens, enhances, or simply describes free will is an ongoing task for scientists and philosophers alike. (shrink)

In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most (...) ardent supporters of moral responsibility acknowledge that the arguments in its favor are far from conclusive; and some of the least confident concerning the arguments for moral responsibility—such as Van Inwagen—are most confident of the truth of moral responsibility. Thus, argues Waller, whatever the verdict on the strength of philosophical arguments for moral responsibility, it is clear that belief in moral responsibility—whether among philosophers or the folk—is based on something other than philosophical reasons. -/- He goes on to argue that there are several sources for the strong belief in moral responsibility, but the following four are particularly influential: First, moral responsibility is based in a powerful “strike back” emotion that we share with other animals. Second, there is a deep-rooted “belief in a just world”—a belief that, according to Waller, most philosophers reject when they consciously consider it, but which has a deep nonconscious influence on what we regard as just treatment and which provides subtle (but mistaken) support for belief in moral responsibility. Third, there is a pervasive moral responsibility system—extending over criminal justice as well as “common sense”—that makes the truth of moral responsibility seem obvious, and makes challenges to moral responsibility seem incoherent. Finally, there is the enormous confidence we have in the power of reason, which mistakenly leads us to believe that our conscious, rational, and critically reflective selves are constantly guiding our behavior in accordance with our deep values. -/- In these comments, I would like to discuss the many points of agreement I have with Waller, providing along the way additional fuel for his skeptical fire (i.e., his moral responsibility skepticism and his skeptical analysis of the source of our strong belief in moral responsibility). I will also discuss, however, my one main point of disagreement—i.e., his desire to preserve the conception of free will. Waller believes free will can “flourish” in the absence of moral responsibility (see Ch.8), while I maintain they that the variety of free will that is of central philosophical and practical importance is the sort required for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense of moral responsibility is set apart by the notion of basic desert and is purely backward-looking and non-consequentialist (see Pereboom 2001, 2014; Caruso and Morris, forthcoming). Understood this way, the sort of free will at issue in the historical debate is a kind of power or ability an agent must possess in order to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, or treatments in response to decisions or actions that the agent performed or failed to perform. (shrink)

Free will skepticism is the view that people never truly deserve to be praised, blamed, or punished for what they do. One challenge free will skeptics face is to explain how criminality could be dealt with given their skepticism. This paper critically examines the prospects of implementing legal changes concerning crime and punishment derived from the free will skeptical views developed by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso. One central aspect of the changes their views require is a (...) concern for reducing the severity of current forms of punishment. The paper considers two strategies for pursuing such a reduction. By taking into account evidence from the psychology of belief in free will and desire to punish, it is argued that a strategy aiming at a reduction of people’s natural desire to punish criminals can be successful if capable of providing alternatives to current forms of punishment satisfying three properties: they must be less harmful than current forms of punishment, more effective in preventing crime, and incompatible with current forms of punishment. (shrink)

There are a number of important links and similarities between public health and safety. In this extended essay, Gregg D. Caruso defends and expands his public health-quarantine model, which is a non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. In developing his account, he explores the relationship between public health and safety, focusing on how social inequalities and systemic injustices affect health outcomes and crime rates, how poverty affects brain (...) development, how offenders often have pre-existing medical conditions (especially mental health issues), how involvement in the criminal justice system itself can lead to or worsen health and cognitive problems, how treatment and rehabilitation methods can best be employed to reduce recidivism and reintegrate offenders back into society, and how a public health approach could be successfully applied within the criminal justice system. Caruso's approach draws on research from the health sciences, social sciences, public policy, law, psychiatry, medical ethics, neuroscience, and philosophy, and he delivers a set of ethically defensible and practically workable proposals for implementing the public health-quarantine model. The essay begins by discussing recent empirical findings in psychology, neuroscience, and the social sciences that provide us with an increased understanding of the social and neurological determinants of health and criminal behavior. It then turns to Caruso's public health-quarantine model and argues that the model provides the most justified, humane, and effective approach for addressing criminal behavior. Caruso concludes by proposing a capability approach to social justice grounded in six key features of human well-being. He argues that we cannot successfully address concerns over public health and safety without simultaneously addressing issues of social justice—including the social determinants of health (SDH) and the social determinants of criminal behavior (SDCB)—and he recommends eight general policy proposals consistent with his model. (shrink)

The immediate aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features of an alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to sources of resistance to the compatibilist program based on considerations of fate and luck. The approach taken relies on distinguishing carefully between issues of skepticism and pessimism as they arise in this context. A compatibilism that is properly responsive to concerns about fate and luck is committed to what I describe as free will pessimism, which is to (...) be distinguished from free will skepticism. Free will skepticism is the view that our vulnerability to conditions of fate and luck serve to discredit our view of ourselves as free and responsible agents. Free will pessimism rejects free will scepticism, since the basis of its pessimism rests with the assumption that we are free and responsible agents who are, nevertheless, subject to fate and luck in this aspect of our lives. According to free will pessimism, all the major parties and positions in the free will debate, including that of skepticism, are modes of evasion and distortion regarding our human predicament in respect of agency and moral life. (shrink)

Debate on free will with Christian List, Gregg Caruso, and Cory Clark. The exchange is focused on Christian List's book Why Free Will Is Real.

In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft (...) compatibilism.” It then turns to a more wide‐ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Free Will provides a through statement of the major grounds for skepticism about the reality of free will and moral responsibility. The author identifies and explains the sort of control that is associated with personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with causal determinism. In so doing, out view of ourselves as morally responsible agents is protected against the disturbing changes posed by science and religion.

The Limits of Free Will presents influential articles by Paul Russell concerning free will and moral responsibility. The problems arising in this field of philosophy, which are deeply rooted in the history of the subject, are also intimately related to a wide range of other fields, such as law and criminology, moral psychology, theology, and, more recently, neuroscience. These articles were written and published over a period of three decades, although most have appeared in the past (...) decade. Among the topics covered: the challenge of skepticism; moral sentiment and moral capacity; necessity and the metaphysics of causation; practical reason; free will and art; fatalism and the limits of agency; moral luck, and our metaphysical attitudes of optimism and pessimism. (shrink)

The immediate aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features of an alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to sources of resistance to the compatibilist program based on considerations of fate and luck. The approach taken relies on distinguishing carefully between issues of skepticism and pessimism as they arise in this context. A compatibilism that is properly responsive to concerns about fate and luck is committed to what I describe as free will pessimism, which is to (...) be distinguished from free will skepticism. Free will skepticism is the view that our vulnerability to conditions of fate and luck serve to discredit our view of ourselves as free and responsible agents. Free will pessimism rejects free will scepticism, since the basis of its pessimism rests with the assumption that we are free and responsible agents who are, nevertheless, subject to fate and luck in this aspect of our lives. According to free will pessimism, all the major parties and positions in the free will debate, including that of skepticism, are modes of evasion and distortion regarding our human predicament in respect of agency and moral life. (shrink)

Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...) to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished. A number of sentencing guidelines in the U.S. have adopted desert as their distributive principle, and it is increasingly given deference in the “purposes” section of state criminal codes, where it can be the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code’s provisions. Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the Model Penal Code so as to set desert as the official dominate principle for sentencing. And courts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety of contexts, as with the Supreme Court’s enthroning retributivism as the “primary justification for the death penalty.” While retributivism provides one of the main sources of justification for punishment within the criminal justice system, there are good philosophical and practical reasons for rejecting it. One such reason is that it is unclear that agents truly deserve to suffer for the wrongs they have done in the sense required by retributivism. In the first section, I explore the retributivist justification of punishment and explain why it is inconsistent with free will skepticism. In the second section, I then argue that even if one is not convinced by the arguments for free will skepticism, there remains a strong epistemic argument against causing harm on retributivist grounds that undermines both libertarian and compatibilist attempts to justify it. I maintain that this argument provides sufficient reason for rejecting the retributive justification of criminal punishment. I conclude in the third section by briefly sketching my public health-quarantine model, a non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. I argue that the model is not only consistent with free will skepticism and the epistemic argument against retributivism, it also provides the most justified, humane, and effective way of dealing with criminal behavior. (shrink)

This collection provides a selection of the most essential contributions to the contemporary free will debate. Among the issues discussed and debated are skepticism and naturalism, alternate possibilities, the consequence argument, libertarian metaphysics, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, neuroscience and free will, and experimental philosophy.

Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will. Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions are (...) causally determined and develops a forward-looking theory of moral responsibility con- sistent with free will skepticism. A significant contribution to the field, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life is destined to become a classic and is essential reading for anyone interested in free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

If you start taking courses in contemporary cognitive science, you will soon encounter a particular picture of the human mind. This picture says that the mind is a lot like a computer. Specifically, the mind is made up of certain states and certain processes. These states and processes interact, in accordance with certain general rules, to generate specific behaviors. If you want to know how those states and processes got there in the first place, the only answer is that they (...) arose through the interaction of other states and processes, which arose from others... until, ultimately, the chain goes back to factors in our genes and our environment. Hence, one can explain human behavior just by positing a collection of mental states and psychological processes and discussing the ways in which these states and processes interact. This picture of the mind sometimes leaves people feeling deeply uncomfortable. They find themselves thinking something like: 'If the mind actually does work like that, it seems like we could never truly be morally responsible for anything we did. After all, we would never be free to choose any behavior other than the one we actually performed. Our behaviors would just follow inevitably from certain facts about the configuration of the states and processes within us.' Many philosophers think that this sort of discomfort is fundamentally confused or wrongheaded. They think that the confusion here can be cleared up just by saying something like: 'Wait! It doesn't make any sense to say that the interaction of these states and processes is preventing you from controlling your own life. The thing you are forgetting is that the interaction of these states and processes – this whole complex system described by cognitive science – is simply you. So when you learn that these states and processes control your behavior, all you are learning is that you are controlling your behavior. There is no reason at all to see these discoveries as a threat to your freedom or responsibility.'2 Philosophers may regard this argument as a powerful one, perhaps even irrefutable.. (shrink)

Some have argued that advances in the science of human decision-making, particularly research on automaticity and unconscious priming, would ultimately thwart our commonsense understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Do people interpret this research as a threat to their self-understanding as free and responsible agents? We approached this question by seeing how feelings of surprise mediate the relationship between personal sense of control and third-personal attributions of free will and responsibility. Across three studies (N = (...) 1,516) we found that people with a greater sense of personal control were more surprised at the results of experiments showing effects of unconscious priming on moral behavior. Surprise differentially mediated the relationship between personal control and attributions of free will and responsibility: people attributed less free will and more responsibility as they were more surprised. This suggests that people exhibit defensive thinking with respect to responsibility, but not free will. (shrink)

-/- Solving the Problem of Free Will: A Universal Formula for Societal Balance -/- Introduction -/- For thousands of years, philosophers, scientists, and scholars have debated the concept of free will without arriving at a definitive solution. The persistent societal problems we witness today—wars, poverty, crime, overpopulation—are deeply rooted in ignorance, particularly about how natural laws govern human decision-making. This essay presents a universal formula that solves the problem of free will by aligning decision-making processes with the (...) universal law of balance found in nature. This solution, if implemented through a holistic educational system, can fundamentally transform societies by eliminating the ignorance that leads to human suffering. -/- The Root of Societal Problems: Ignorance -/- Ignorance is the foundation of nearly all societal problems. Misunderstanding natural laws and disregarding the principles of balance result in poor decision-making, whether on an individual, societal, or global level. Decisions based on misinformation, false beliefs, unproven theories, or emotional biases create imbalances that manifest as societal issues. -/- Examples of Ignorance-Driven Problems: -/- 1. Wars: Wars often arise from misunderstandings, territorial greed, ideological conflicts, and the inability to find peaceful solutions. The ignorance of the law of balance—where equilibrium between differing interests is possible—leads to destruction, suffering, and loss of life. -/- 2. Poverty and Crime: Poverty is frequently the result of systemic imbalances in wealth distribution. Ignorance about how societal resources should be distributed equitably to maintain stability leads to widespread deprivation. Crime similarly stems from a lack of understanding regarding personal responsibility and societal interdependence. -/- 3. Overpopulation: In many countries, overpopulation results from the misconception that growth is inherently good. However, natural systems always maintain balance. Unregulated population growth places immense pressure on resources, leading to poverty, environmental degradation, and societal instability. -/- The Universal Formula: Three Fundamental Laws of Nature -/- This universal formula, derived from observable natural phenomena, consists of three interconnected laws: -/- 1. The Law of Karma (Cause and Effect) Every decision and action produces corresponding consequences. In nature, defective systems—whether mechanical, biological, or societal—inevitably fail. Human societies must recognize that decisions based on ignorance create systemic problems. -/- 2. The Law of Balance Nature operates through balance. From ecosystems to societal structures, stability requires equilibrium. Societal issues like poverty and crime reflect imbalances caused by ignorance of this law. -/- 3. The Law of Homeostasis Homeostasis maintains internal stability despite external changes. Societies must develop adaptive yet balanced policies to ensure long-term well-being. -/- These laws reveal that human free will is not arbitrary but governed by predictable patterns. Conscious decisions, whether individual or collective, operate like feedback loops responding to external and internal stimuli while adhering to natural laws. -/- The Role of the Educational System -/- To address ignorance effectively, societies must adopt a holistic educational system that integrates these universal laws into foundational curricula. Current education often overlooks the principles that govern human behavior and societal balance. The new system should prioritize critical thinking, scientific literacy, and moral responsibility. -/- Key Objectives of a Holistic Educational System: -/- 1. Eliminate Ignorance: Equip students with a deep understanding of natural laws and their role in decision-making. -/- 2. Promote Critical Thinking: Teach students to question information, identify biases, and recognize the long-term impacts of decisions. -/- 3. Prepare Responsible Future Generations: Produce a high-quality generation of future parents who understand the importance of balance in raising children, managing resources, and contributing to societal stability. -/- Example: Incorporating environmental science with lessons on population dynamics can help students grasp why unchecked population growth leads to resource scarcity and societal challenges. Lessons in psychology, combined with discussions about collective decision-making, can illustrate the importance of balanced, informed leadership. -/- The Misconception of Unlimited Growth -/- One of the most damaging misconceptions societies face today is the belief in continuous economic and population growth. In nature, growth is always regulated by available resources. Societies that ignore this principle face environmental destruction, social unrest, and economic instability. -/- Example: Countries experiencing rapid population growth often encounter overcrowded cities, unemployment, and resource depletion. By understanding the law of balance, policymakers can implement sustainable growth strategies, ensuring resources meet population needs without compromising long-term stability. -/- The Feedback Mechanism of Conscious Minds -/- Human decision-making, both individually and collectively, operates as a feedback mechanism. Minds continuously exchange information, influencing one another’s decisions. This interaction follows natural laws, ensuring that any deviation from balance triggers societal disruptions. -/- Example: When misinformation spreads through social media, collective decisions become skewed. Understanding the feedback mechanism can help societies implement educational strategies that foster discernment and rational decision-making. -/- The Need for’Global Collaboration -/- The successful implementation of this universal formula requires global collaboration. International organizations like the United Nations and the World Economic Forum, along with educational institutions worldwide, must prioritize the integration of these natural laws into educational frameworks. -/- Example: The Philippines, facing governance challenges and population pressures, could significantly benefit from such an educational overhaul. Similarly, China’s “whole-process people’s democracy” could incorporate these principles to enhance holistic governance strategies. -/- The Role of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) -/- AGI, when developed with a complete sensor system, can apply the universal formula to predict and address societal problems. Programming AGI to follow these natural laws will ensure its decisions align with human well-being and societal stability. -/- Conclusion -/- Solving the problem of free will is not an abstract philosophical pursuit but a practical necessity for societal stability. Ignorance of the natural laws governing decision-making has perpetuated human suffering for centuries. The universal formula, grounded in the principles of karma, balance, and homeostasis, offers a concrete, actionable solution. By implementing this understanding through a holistic educational system, we can eliminate the root causes of wars, poverty, crime, and overpopulation. The time to act is now—before ignorance further destabilizes the delicate balance upon which our future depends. -/- . (shrink)

Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 219) follows quite closely in the steps of his Living Without Free Will (2001). Pereboom argues for “hard incompatibilism” in both – the thesis that regardless of whether determinism is true, the kind of free will required for desert-entailing moral responsibility is unlikely to exist. In Free Will…, however, he pays more attention to issues other than moral responsibility. This, (...) I think, is a great strength of the book. It has furthermore been suggested that Free Will… differs from Living… in being less radical; that Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism has softened up over the years. I believe this view is mistaken. It is true that Free Will… contains several passages where Pereboom writes that he is happy to take on board important elements of moral responsibility theories usually labelled “compatibilist”. However, Living… never states the contrary position. Living, rather, has a different focus – on other sceptical views, and how they differ from Pereboom’s own. (shrink)

There are few who would deny that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) ranks among the most significant contributions to modern moral philosophy. Although any number of essays have been devoted to it, Pamela Hieronymi’s 'Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals' is the first book-length study. The aim of Hieronymi’s study is to show that Strawson’s “central argument” has been “underestimated and misunderstood.” Hieronymi interprets this argument in terms of what she describes as Strawson’s “social naturalism”. Understood (...) this way, Hieronymi maintains, “the argument is powerful”. In what follows I argue that while Hieronymi’s discussion is stimulating and provides valuable insights into “Freedom and Resentment,” neither the interpretation advanced nor the social naturalist position that it describes is convincing. (shrink)

Both the genetic endowment we have been equipped with, and the environment we had to be born and raised in, were not – and never are – for us to choose; both are pure luck, a random ticket in this enormously inventive cosmic lottery of existence. If it is luck that has makes us the persons we are, and since our decisions and choices depend largely on the kind of persons we are, it seems that everything we do or fail (...) to do may only be attributed to luck. This paper focuses on criminal behavior, with special emphasis on Tarde’s and Lombroso’s views, to discuss free will and agency, and their interplay with moral luck, that is, the fixed boundaries set by our nature and the circumstances that surround us. (shrink)

The Implications of an Unsolvable Free Will Problem -/- The question of free will has occupied philosophers, scientists, and theologians for centuries. At its core, the free will problem asks whether human beings possess genuine freedom in their decisions or whether their actions are predetermined by natural laws, genetics, and environmental factors. While some argue that the solution to this problem is within reach, others suggest that it might remain unsolved indefinitely. If the free will problem (...) is never solved, it could have significant implications for our understanding of human nature, morality, law, and societal development. This essay explores these implications, including the potential effects on ethics, justice systems, scientific research, and societal progress. -/- 1. Ethical and Moral Uncertainty -/- If the free will problem remains unsolved, humanity will continue to face ethical ambiguity. Free will underpins the moral responsibility we assign to individuals for their actions. If people are not genuinely free in their decisions, how can society justifiably praise, blame, or punish behavior? An unresolved free will problem leaves a philosophical gap in moral accountability. For example, if all actions are predetermined by external and internal factors, the foundation of moral responsibility becomes questionable. Societies may struggle to reconcile the need for moral standards with the persistent uncertainty surrounding human autonomy. -/- Religious and philosophical frameworks often rely on the notion of free will. Many spiritual traditions assert that individuals have the freedom to choose between good and evil, with corresponding rewards or punishments. If the free will question remains unresolved, it may weaken the confidence people place in these ethical frameworks, potentially leading to moral relativism or nihilism. -/- 2. Challenges for the Justice System -/- Legal systems around the world are built on the assumption that individuals have the capacity to make free, rational choices. If the free will problem is never solved, this foundation may weaken. Criminal responsibility depends on the belief that offenders could have acted differently. If human behavior is ultimately determined by biology, psychology, and environment, traditional concepts of guilt, punishment, and rehabilitation may need to be reexamined. -/- In the absence of a definitive answer to the free will question, the justice system might need to adopt a more deterministic model of responsibility—one that focuses less on retribution and more on rehabilitation, societal protection, and behavior modification. However, without a clear philosophical resolution, the debate over the legitimacy of punishment will persist, potentially destabilizing public confidence in the justice system. -/- 3. Scientific and Technological Stagnation -/- The free will problem also intersects with neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence (AI). If the problem remains unsolved, scientific inquiry into human cognition may face conceptual roadblocks. Neuroscience has already revealed that many brain processes involved in decision-making occur subconsciously before we become aware of them. However, this does not definitively prove or disprove free will. -/- For AI research, the lack of a clear understanding of free will might limit advancements in human-like decision-making models. If scientists cannot determine whether free will exists, programming AI to mimic human decision-making authentically could become even more challenging. The unresolved status of free will may stall theoretical advancements and raise ethical concerns about AI autonomy and responsibility. -/- 4. Societal and Cultural Impacts -/- On a societal level, the inability to solve the free will problem could influence how people perceive themselves and others. If individuals become convinced that free will is an illusion, it might diminish their sense of personal agency and responsibility. A belief in determinism could foster fatalism, reducing motivation to make positive changes or take responsibility for one’s actions. -/- Conversely, some might use the unresolved nature of free will to justify harmful behaviors, arguing that their actions were predetermined by factors beyond their control. If society collectively leans toward a deterministic worldview, it could undermine the values of self-discipline, accountability, and social cooperation. -/- Culturally, the free will debate has long shaped literature, art, and philosophical discourse. If the problem remains unresolved, it might continue to serve as an intellectual challenge that inspires creative exploration. Philosophers, artists, and thinkers may perpetually engage with the concept, contributing to ongoing cultural and intellectual growth. -/- 5. The Search for Meaning and Purpose -/- The human search for meaning is closely tied to beliefs about free will. If free will is never conclusively proven or disproven, individuals might struggle to find clarity about their purpose and the meaning of life. Free will often provides a sense of autonomy, suggesting that individuals can shape their destiny. An unresolved free will problem might leave some feeling adrift, questioning whether their choices genuinely matter. -/- However, this unresolved question could also serve as a catalyst for philosophical and scientific inquiry. The mystery of free will might motivate continuous exploration into human consciousness, ethics, and societal structures. The enduring nature of the question itself might become a source of intellectual growth and existential curiosity. -/- Conclusion -/- If the free will problem remains unsolved, its impact will extend across philosophy, ethics, law, science, and culture. Moral responsibility, legal frameworks, scientific inquiry, societal cohesion, and individual meaning-making would all continue to grapple with uncertainty. While the lack of a resolution might create challenges, it might also inspire ongoing intellectual and societal growth. Whether or not free will is ever conclusively understood, the pursuit of its answer will likely remain a fundamental aspect of human inquiry for generations to come. -/- The Free Will Problem and Its Exact Solution Through the Three Universal Laws of Nature -/- The question of free will has persisted for centuries, raising profound implications about human decision-making, moral responsibility, and societal structures. Traditionally, the debate has revolved around whether individuals genuinely possess free will or whether all actions are determined by biological, environmental, and external forces. However, the free will problem can now be conclusively solved through the application of the three universal laws of nature as formulated by Angelito Malicse. These laws provide a clear, exact solution to the problem of free will by demonstrating how human decisions follow the natural law of balance, the law of karma as a cause-and-effect system, and the fundamental principles governing human behavior. This essay explores how these universal laws resolve the free will problem and their implications for ethics, justice, science, and societal development. -/- 1. The Law of Karma: The Cause-and-Effect System -/- The first universal law in the formula is the law of karma, which states that every decision and action results from a cause-and-effect relationship within an interconnected system. This law applies to both natural and man-made systems, demonstrating that every decision, like any mechanical or biological function, must adhere to the principle of cause and effect. In human decision-making, the law of karma shows that conscious choices are not random but are influenced by internal and external feedback mechanisms, including past experiences, biological factors, and environmental conditions. -/- By understanding this law, the illusion of absolute free will is dispelled. Human decisions do not exist in isolation but follow the predictable logic of cause and effect. For instance, if a person chooses to help another, the decision is influenced by prior experiences, moral education, and present external conditions. Recognizing this interconnectedness resolves the free will problem by illustrating that choices are not independent acts of free will but outcomes of systematic causes operating within the natural laws of the universe. -/- 2. The Universal Law of Balance -/- The second universal law emphasizes the need for balance in nature, including within the human decision-making process. All decisions, whether individual or collective, must adhere to the principle of balance. Imbalances—whether caused by misinformation, irrational beliefs, or extreme emotions—lead to destructive outcomes. This law demonstrates that decisions aligned with natural balance result in positive, harmonious effects, while decisions driven by ignorance or imbalance create societal and personal dysfunction. -/- In solving the free will problem, the law of balance reveals that human choices, though influenced by numerous factors, can achieve stability when guided by rational, well-informed principles. Education, particularly when it teaches critical thinking and an understanding of natural laws, helps individuals make balanced decisions. Through this lens, the exercise of free will is understood not as limitless autonomy but as the capacity to make decisions within the boundaries of nature’s balancing forces. -/- 3. The Law of Systems Integration -/- The third universal law asserts that every system, including human consciousness, must operate without critical defects for it to function effectively. Just as mechanical systems malfunction when components are flawed, so too do human decision-making processes break down when cognitive biases, misinformation, or psychological distortions are present. -/- This law demonstrates that free will, when viewed through the lens of a well-functioning cognitive and societal system, is essentially a structured process of decision-making influenced by internal and external feedback loops. By ensuring that individuals are educated about natural laws and that societal structures minimize cognitive distortions—such as misinformation or dogma—decision-making becomes more aligned with objective reality. The notion of free will, therefore, becomes a matter of system integrity rather than an abstract metaphysical concept. -/- Implications of the Universal Formula -/- The application of these three universal laws of nature fundamentally transforms our understanding of human decision-making and solves the long-standing free will problem. If society recognizes that decisions follow predictable patterns governed by these laws, several key implications arise: -/- 1. Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Moral responsibility does not disappear when free will is redefined; it becomes clearer. Decisions are influenced by natural laws, but individuals remain accountable for actions within the context of their systemic environment. Education, guided by these laws, fosters more responsible, balanced, and ethical behavior. -/- 2. Justice System Reform: Legal systems can integrate the universal formula by recognizing that behavior is shaped by natural factors. Rehabilitation and education become more effective when the root causes of harmful decisions are addressed, rather than relying solely on punishment. -/- 3. Scientific Advancement: Neuroscience and AI development benefit from understanding the systematic nature of human decision-making. Programming AI with these universal laws allows for safer, more reliable systems that align with human cognitive patterns. -/- 4. Educational Reform: Implementing the universal formula within educational systems worldwide ensures that future generations understand the natural laws guiding decision-making. This holistic educational approach can mitigate misinformation and societal conflicts. -/- 5. Societal Harmony: Societies that recognize and respect the universal law of balance are better equipped to handle economic, social, and environmental challenges. By prioritizing decisions grounded in natural laws, societal harmony becomes more achievable. -/- Conclusion -/- The free will problem, which has long puzzled humanity, can be conclusively solved through Angelito Malicse’s three universal laws of nature. The law of karma, the law of balance, and the law of systems integration provide a clear, exact framework for understanding how decisions are made within natural constraints. Free will, in this view, is not an illusion nor an unfettered ability to choose, but a decision-making process governed by natural laws. Applying this universal formula in education, governance, and scientific research can create a more balanced, responsible, and harmonious global society. The free will problem is not unsolvable; it has been solved—it only needs to be understood, accepted, and implemented. -/- . (shrink)

Morphic Resonance and the Spread of the Universal Formula for Free Will -/- Introduction -/- The challenge of implementing a universal formula for free will, based on the law of balance in nature, requires a mechanism that allows societies to naturally adopt and internalize its principles. One such mechanism may exist in morphic resonance, a concept proposed by Rupert Sheldrake. Morphic resonance suggests that patterns of thought, behavior, and structure become easier to replicate once they have been established (...) in a collective field of memory. -/- If this phenomenon applies to human decision-making and knowledge transmission, then the universal law of balance can spread more rapidly once a critical mass of individuals fully understands and applies it. This essay explores how morphic resonance can be harnessed to accelerate the adoption of the universal formula, ensuring that societies, leadership, education, and artificial intelligence (AI) naturally align with balance-based decision-making. -/- Understanding Morphic Resonance in Relation to the Universal Formula -/- Morphic resonance proposes that once a new behavior, skill, or knowledge is established within a group, it creates a morphic field that allows others to access and adopt the same pattern more easily. This idea aligns with the universal formula for free will, which states that all human decisions must conform to natural equilibrium to prevent instability, suffering, and disorder. -/- In this context, morphic resonance serves as an invisible feedback mechanism that reinforces balance-based thinking across societies. Once a significant number of people consistently apply the universal law of balance, it could lead to a self-reinforcing shift in collective decision-making, making it easier for others to adopt without requiring direct instruction. -/- The role of Morphic Resonance in Strengthening the Universal Formula -/- To ensure the widespread adoption of the universal formula, it is essential to establish a strong morphic field of balance-based decision-making. This requires an integrated approach combining education, leadership, AI, and mass media. -/- 1. Education as the Foundation of Morphic Resonance -/- Education is the primary vehicle for embedding balance-based decision-making into society. -/- Early Childhood Learning: Teaching children about natural balance, cause and effect, and systems thinking ensures that the universal formula becomes an instinctive part of their cognitive framework. -/- Critical Thinking Development: Encouraging students to apply rational analysis and evidence-based reasoning reinforces the habit of making balanced decisions. -/- Standardized Global Curriculum: If multiple nations implement a harmonized educational approach focused on natural balance, it could strengthen the morphic field, making it easier for future generations to intuitively grasp and apply the universal formula. -/- 2. Leadership and Governance as Catalysts of Resonance -/- Leaders play a crucial role in establishing decision-making norms that influence entire populations. -/- Governments must integrate balance-based policies that align with the universal formula, ensuring stability in economic, social, and environmental domains. -/- Leaders must undergo training in natural balance principles, reinforcing their ability to make rational, ethical, and sustainable decisions. -/- A coalition of balance-driven global leaders can create a powerful morphic resonance effect, allowing other nations to subconsciously recognize and adopt similar governance strategies. -/- 3. AI as an Amplifier of Morphic Fields -/- Artificial Intelligence (AI), particularly AGI (Artificial General Intelligence), has the potential to reinforce and spread the universal formula more effectively than human-led efforts alone. -/- AI systems programmed with balance-based decision-making will naturally guide policies, governance, and education in ways that amplify the morphic resonance effect. -/- AGI as a self-learning system can observe global patterns and autonomously promote equilibrium, ensuring that human civilization remains aligned with natural laws. -/- AI-assisted educational platforms can enhance the learning process by personalizing instruction on balance-based thinking, making it more intuitive for students to grasp and apply the universal formula. -/- 4. Mass Media and Cultural Influence in Strengthening the Field -/- To create a strong morphic field of balance, continuous exposure to balance-based thinking through media and culture is necessary. -/- Books, documentaries, podcasts, and social media campaigns can reinforce balance-based decision-making, making it a widely recognized concept. -/- Repetition of key principles in public discourse ensures that the universal formula becomes ingrained in collective consciousness. -/- Technological tools, such as virtual reality and AI-driven education, can create immersive experiences that allow individuals to engage deeply with the universal law of balance, further strengthening its resonance. -/- Achieving a Critical Mass for Morphic Resonance Activation -/- For morphic resonance to fully activate the global adoption of the universal formula, a critical percentage of individuals, institutions, and AI systems must consistently apply its principles. Once this tipping point is reached: -/- The concept of natural balance becomes self-perpetuating, influencing new generations without requiring intensive instruction. -/- Governments, economies, and institutions naturally shift toward balance-based policies. -/- Humanity instinctively aligns with the natural laws of decision-making, minimizing suffering, instability, and systemic errors. -/- Implications for the Future -/- If morphic resonance is successfully leveraged to spread the universal formula, it could lead to a new era of human civilization characterized by: -/- Sustainable governance and economic systems based on natural equilibrium. -/- A society where ethical decision-making is the norm, reducing corruption, conflict, and social instability. -/- The development of AI systems that reinforce balance-based logic, preventing technological risks associated with unchecked AI decision-making. -/- This transformation would not only impact individual behavior but also the collective consciousness of humanity, leading to a self-sustaining cycle of rational, ethical, and sustainable decision-making. -/- Conclusion -/- By integrating morphic resonance into the strategy for spreading the universal formula for free will, it becomes possible to accelerate its global adoption without solely relying on traditional education and policymaking. Once a critical mass of individuals, leaders, and AI systems adopt balance-based thinking, the morphic field of natural balance will allow future generations to intuitively align with these principles. -/- This ensures that the universal law of balance in nature is not just a theoretical framework but a living reality, guiding humanity, AI, and governance toward a stable, rational, and harmonious future. Through education, leadership, AI, and mass communication, the universal formula can become a self-reinforcing global shift, ensuring sustainability, wisdom, and long-term societal balance. -/- . (shrink)

The Exact Solution to the Free Will Problem: The Three Universal Laws of Nature -/- The problem of free will has persisted for thousands of years, captivating philosophers, scientists, theologians, and scholars across generations. The fundamental question has always been whether human beings truly have the freedom to make decisions or whether all actions are predetermined by external forces such as biology, environment, and societal influence. Traditional philosophical and scientific frameworks have struggled to provide a definitive answer. However, (...) this long-standing intellectual puzzle can now be conclusively solved through the application of Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, which consists of three fundamental laws of nature. These laws— the law of karma, the law of balance, and the law of systems integration—demonstrate how human decision-making follows natural, predictable patterns governed by universal principles. By understanding and applying these laws, we can definitively resolve the free will problem and transform the way we approach morality, justice, science, and societal development. -/- The Enduring Mystery of Free Will -/- The free will problem arises from the tension between two opposing perspectives: determinism and libertarian free will. Determinism argues that every human decision is the Inevita”le result of preceding causes, governed by the immutable laws of nature. In contrast, libertarian free will claims that individuals possess genuine autonomy in making choices. The lack of consensus between these positions has led to confusion in fields ranging from ethics to neuroscience. If this problem remains unsolved, humanity risks ethical uncertainty, legal inconsistency, scientific stagnation, and societal discord. -/- Without a clear understanding of free will, moral responsibility becomes ambiguous. If individuals are merely products of deterministic forces, how can we hold them accountable for their actions? Similarly, justice systems, predicated on the notion of personal responsibility, might face challenges in maintaining fairness and consistency. Scientifically, unresolved questions about free will could hinder progress in fields like psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. Socially, the absence of a solution might foster fatalism, diminishing people’s sense of agency and responsibility. -/- However, these concerns are no longer insurmountable. Angelito Malicse’s universal formula offers a clear, exact solution to the free will problem by demonstrating that human decisions follow natural, law-governed patterns. The three universal laws of nature provide the key to understanding decision-making as a systematic process rather than a metaphysical abstraction. -/- The First Law: The Law of Karma (Cause and Effect in Systems) -/- The first of the three universal laws is the law of karma, which extends beyond its traditional spiritual context to encompass the fundamental principle of cause and effect within any system. According to this law, all human decisions are outcomes of interconnected causes within biological, psychological, and social systems. Just as a machine functions only when its components work in accordance with mechanical principles, human decision-making follows natural patterns driven by internal and external causes. -/- For instance, when an individual decides to act with kindness, this decision does not emerge from an isolated act of free will. Instead, it results from accumulated experiences, moral teachings, biological predispositions, and environmental factors. The decision is part of a complex cause-and-effect chain that can be analyzed and understood within the framework of natural laws. -/- The law of karma demonstrates that human actions are neither random nor wholly autonomous. They are systematic responses to the internal and external stimuli interacting with the mind. Therefore, free will is not a supernatural or metaphysical phenomenon but a natural process governed by the principle of cause and effect. -/- The Second Law: The Universal Law of Balance -/- The second law in the universal formula is the law of balance, which states that all natural systems, including human consciousness, strive for equilibrium. This principle is observable in physical phenomena such as thermodynamics and ecological systems, but it also applies to human decision-making. Every decision seeks to restore or maintain a certain internal and external balance. -/- When individuals are exposed to misinformation, cognitive dissonance, or emotional disturbances, this balance is disrupted, leading to irrational or harmful decisions. For example, societal problems such as overpopulation, economic inequality, and environmental degradation often stem from decisions that violate the law of balance. Ignorance of this law results in societal imbalances that manifest as conflict, suffering, and systemic dysfunction. -/- In the context of free will, the law of balance reveals that decisions are influenced by the mind’s constant effort to restore equilibrium. When individuals are educated to understand this principle, they become more capable of making rational, well-informed decisions aligned with natural balance. The apparent freedom in decision-making is, therefore, a reflection of the mind’s adaptive response to external and internal conditions, not a mysterious, ungoverned phenomenon. -/- The Third Law: The Law of Systems Integration -/- The third universal law, the law of systems integration, explains that for any decision-making process to function correctly, the underlying system must be free of critical errors or distortions. Just as a computer cannot operate properly if its software is corrupted, human decisions become flawed when misinformation, irrational beliefs, or cognitive biases infiltrate the mental system. -/- Human decision-making does not occur in isolation; it is part of an integrated system involving sensory input, memory, reasoning, and external environmental feedback. If any component of this system is compromised, decisions will deviate from rational, balanced outcomes. For example, societies that rely heavily on dogma or misinformation struggle to make sound collective decisions, resulting in persistent social and economic problems. -/- By understanding the law of systems integration, we recognize that the integrity of decisions depends on the quality and accuracy of the information being processed. Free will, therefore, is not a matter of pure autonomy but a system-dependent phenomenon that requires reliable, unbiased inputs and well-functioning cognitive processes. -/- The Resolution of the Free Will Problem -/- The application of these three universal laws of nature provides the exact solution to the free will problem. Human decisions are neither random nor unbounded acts of personal freedom; they are outcomes of natural processes governed by cause and effect, the drive for balance, and the need for system integrity. Free will, as traditionally conceived, is an illusion rooted in a misunderstanding of these underlying natural laws. -/- By accepting the universal formula, society can move beyond the philosophical deadlock that has hindered intellectual and practical progress for centuries. This formula does not negate human responsibility; instead, it clarifies it by illustrating how decisions follow natural patterns that can be understood, predicted, and influenced through education, societal reforms, and scientific advancements. -/- Implications for Ethics, Justice, Science, and Society -/- The exact resolution of the free will problem through the universal formula has profound implications across multiple domains: -/- 1. Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Ethical frameworks must shift from abstract notions of free will to a system-based understanding of decision-making. Moral responsibility remains intact but is grounded in the recognition that actions result from natural causes. Education should focus on teaching individuals how to align their decisions with the law of balance, promoting rational, ethical behavior. -/- 2. Justice System Reform: Legal systems traditionally assume that individuals act with free will. The universal formula shows that actions stem from natural causes and systemic factors. Justice systems must, therefore, prioritize rehabilitation, education, and preventive measures rather than retribution. Understanding the natural laws of decision-making helps create more effective and fair legal practices. -/- 3. Scientific Advancement and AI Development: The universal formula offers a solid foundation for research in neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence. By programming AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) to adhere to these natural laws, future AI systems can make more reliable, human-like decisions while avoiding cognitive distortions and biases. -/- 4. Educational Reforms: Education systems worldwide must integrate the universal formula to teach students about the natural laws governing human behavior. A holistic, science-based curriculum that emphasizes cause and effect, balance, and systems integration can combat misinformation, dogmatic thinking, and societal discord. -/- 5. Societal Progress and Global Harmony: Societies that understand and apply these universal laws can address complex challenges like overpopulation, environmental degradation, and social inequality. Decisions based on natural balance, rather than short-term economic or ideological gains, lead to sustainable, harmonious development. -/- Conclusion -/- The free will problem, once deemed an unsolvable philosophical puzzle, can be definitively resolved through Angelito Malicse’s three universal laws of nature. The law of karma reveals that decisions follow cause-and-effect relationships; the law of balance shows that choices aim to restore or maintain equilibrium; and the law of systems integration demonstrates the importance of accurate, unbiased information in decision-making. Together, these laws provide an exact, scientific explanation of human behavior, eliminating the need for metaphysical assumptions about free will. -/- By understanding and applying these natural laws, humanity can foster a more rational, ethical, and balanced society. This formula is not a theory—it is a complete, exact solution grounded in observable natural principles. The challenge now lies in implementing these insights within educational, legal, and societal frameworks to address the root causes of human suffering and societal dysfunction. The free will problem is solved; the task ahead is to ensure that this understanding becomes part of our collective knowledge and practice. -/- . (shrink)

This paper presents a novel argument for compatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are compatible. Drawing on principles from quantum mechanics, specifically the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the concept of superposition, the paper proposes an analogy between the behavior of particles at the quantum level and the choices made by free agents. It argues that just as particles exist in a field of possibilities until observed, actions exist in a field of possibilities until a decision is (...) made. The deterministic aspect comes from the natural laws that govern the behavior of particles (and, by extension, our actions), while the free will aspect is represented by the field of possibilities from which we can choose. The paper further explores the implications of this perspective for our understanding of moral responsibility and the nature of reality. It concludes by suggesting that our collective observations and choices contribute to the creation of our shared reality, underscoring the interconnectedness of all beings. (shrink)

Perhaps no one has written more extensively, more deeply, and more insightfully about determinism and freedom than Ted Honderich. His influence and legacy with regard to the problem of free will—or the determinism problem, as he prefers to frame it—looms large. In these comments I would like to focus on three main aspects of Honderich ’s work: his defense of determinism and its consequences for origination and moral responsibility; his concern that the truth of determinism threatens and restricts, (...) but does not eliminate, our life-hopes; and his attack on the traditional justifications for punishment. In many ways, I see my own defense of free will skepticism as the natural successor to Honderich ’s work. There are, however, some small differences between us. My goal in this paper is to clarify our areas of agreement and disagreement and to acknowledge my enormous debt to Ted. If I can also move him toward my own more optimistic brand of free will skepticism that would be great too. (shrink)

Philosophers often consider problems of free will and moral luck in isolation from one another, but both are about control and moral responsibility. One problem of free will concerns the difficult task of specifying the kind of control over our actions that is necessary and sufficient to act freely. One problem of moral luck refers to the puzzling task of explaining whether and how people can be morally responsible for actions permeated by factors beyond their (...) control. This chapter explicates and assesses skeptical, compatibilist, and libertarian approaches to moral luck. First, I argue that what makes the above problems of free will and moral luck distinct is largely their emphasis on different kinds of luck. Second, I describe and evaluate skeptical arguments from constitutive and circumstantial luck that it is impossible to act freely. Third, I explicate and assess various support and implication relationships between various kinds of compatibilism and libertarianism, on the one hand, and causal, constitutive, circumstantial, and resultant moral luck, on the other. (shrink)

In this study, we conducted large-scale experiments with novel descriptions of determinism. Our goal was to investigate the effects of desires for punishment and comprehension errors on people’s intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in deterministic scenarios. Previous research has acknowledged the influence of these factors, but their total effect has not been revealed. Using a large-scale survey of Japanese participants, we found that the failure to understand causal determination (intrusion) has limited effects relative to other factors (...) and that the conflation of determinism and epiphenomenalism (bypassing) has a significant influence, even when controlling for other variables. This leads to the increased prevalence of incompatibilist responses. Furthermore, our results demonstrated a close association between the attribution of free will/responsibility and retributive desire. While further research is needed to establish the causal relationship between these factors, this association is consistent with Cory Clark and colleagues' study that increased desire contributes to increased compatibilist responses and their claim that a definitive intuition about free will may be elusive. (shrink)

No one is responsible for their conduct because free will is an illusion, say some skeptics. Even when it seems that we have several options, we only have one. Hence, says the free will skeptic, we should reform our practices which involve responsibility attributions, such as punishment and blame. How seriously should we take this doctrine? Is it one that we could live by? One thorn in the side of the skeptic concerns deliberation. When we deliberate about what (...) to do—what film to go see, whom to befriend, which doctrine to follow—we must presume that our options are open to us. But then, every time that skeptics deliberate, they presume something which is incompatible with their doctrine, i.e. that they have several options. In a word, skeptics cannot deliberate qua skeptics. Some philosophers have responded that deliberators don’t have to presume that their options are open; they only have to presume that their choice will be efficacious. I argue that this proposal uses resources which, if they are available and successful, can be employed to refute skepticism. The upshot is that free will skeptics are pushing for a doctrine that is either false or in tension with deliberation. (shrink)

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, (...) we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data. (shrink)

This concluding chapter of FREEDOM AND MORAL SENTIMENT (OUP 1995) provides a qualified defense of Hume's naturalistic approach to the problem of free will and moral responsibility. A particularly important theme is the contrast between Hume's naturalistic approach and the “rationalistic” approach associated with classical compatibilism. Whereas the rationalistic approach proceeds as an a priori, conceptual investigation into the nature and conditions of moral responsibility, the naturalistic approach is committed to an empirically oriented (i.e., psychologically informed) (...) examination of these issues – giving particular prominence to the role of moral sentiment in understanding moral life and the place of justificatory issues as they arise within it. Whereas the rationalistic approach leads us into intractable difficulties and moral skepticism, the naturalistic approach makes real progress on this subject. On a more critical note, however, I also argue that, despite its strengths, Hume's theory of moral responsibility has significant weaknesses in the areas of moral virtue, moral capacity, and moral freedom. -/- . (shrink)

Throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century, the free-will debate was largely concerned with the question of what kind of freedom was required for moral responsibility and whether the kind of freedom required was compatible with the thesis of determinism. This issue was itself addressed primarily with reference to the question of how freedom is related to alternative possibilities and what the relevant analysis of “could have done otherwise” comes to. The discussion of these topics (...) made little advance on the basic strategies and positions already developed and defended on either side of the compatibilist/incompatibilist divide in the preceding two centuries. When P. F. Strawson’s published his seminal article “Freedom and Resentment” in 1962 the dynamics of this debate were fundamentally altered. This is true both in respect of Strawson’s general methodology, which demands a more empirically informed approach, and in terms of his core conceptual framework, which identifies a different set of considerations and issues at the heart of this debate. In particular, whereas the traditional or classical debate focused on the problem of (moral) freedom, Strawson directed his attention to the role of moral sentiments or “reactive attitudes” as the key to understanding and resolving the core problems lying at the heart of this debate. This essay is devoted to a critical assessment of Strawson’s project and an analysis of the current debate concerning its prospects. (shrink)

Asymmetry theories about free will and moral responsibility are a recent development in the long history of the free will debate. Kant commentators have not yet explored the possibility of an asymmetrical reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom, and that is my goal here. By "free will", I mean the sort of control we would need to be morally responsible for our actions. Kant's term for it is "transcendental freedom", and he refers to the attribution of (...) moral responsibility as "imputation". By "Kant's theory of freedom", I mean not only his theory of transcendental freedom and imputation, but also the various ways in which he draws on these ideas in his moral theory. (shrink)