Current treatments of cultural heritage as an object of moral concern (whether it be the heritage of mankind or of some particular group of people) have tended to treat it as a means to ensure human wellbeing: either as ‘cultural property’ or ‘cultural patrimony’, suggesting concomitant rights of possession and exclusion, or otherwise as something which, gaining its ethical significance from the roles it plays in people’s lives and the formation of their identities, is the beneficiary at most of indirect (...) moral obligations. In contrast, I argue that cultural heritage, as something whose existence can go well or badly, can itself qualify as a moral patient towards which we may have obligations which need not be accounted for in terms of subsequent benefits to human beings. Drawing inspiration from environmental ethics and suggesting that heritage, like an ecosystem, is a complex network of interrelations which invites a holistic understanding, I develop a framework for thinking about cultural heritage which shows how such a thing can feature in our ethical reflections as intrinsically worthy of respect in spite of its most obvious differences from the ‘natural’ world: the very human origins of cultural heritage and its involvement with human life in all its forms. As part of the development of this framework I consider the epistemic difficulties which arise when for all our holistic sophistication we do find ourselves in the predicament of having to judge the moral worth of some item of heritage, possibly someone else’s heritage and possibly something which we find ourselves disposed to value more because of than despite any mysteries surrounding it. I conclude by offering some tentative illustrations of how such a framework might operate in the practical course of normative moral reasoning about what should be done with items of cultural heritage. -/- [Erratum note: p. 30 conflates the Kumasi palace looting of 1874 with that of 1896.]. (shrink)

Effective altruism is a movement which aims to maximise good. Effective altruists are concerned with extreme poverty and many of them think that individuals have an obligation to donate to effective charities to alleviate extreme poverty. Their reasoning, which I will scrutinise, is as follows: -/- Premise 1. Extreme poverty is very bad. -/- Premise 2. If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to (...) do it. -/- Premise 3. Individuals ought to choose the effective option in preventing very bad things. -/- Premise 4. Donating to effective charities is one of the best ways to alleviate extreme poverty. -/- Conclusion. Individuals ought to donate to effective charities working towards extreme poverty alleviation where doing so does not require them to give up anything of moral significance. -/- I will scrutinise each of these premises in turn. -/- For Premise 1, I focus on hedonistic utilitarianism and criticise its outlook on extreme poverty. I claim that hedonistic utilitarianism might be problematic for effective altruism. -/- Premise 2 is Peter Singer's Weaker Principle of Sacrifice. I introduce several possible interpretations of it, and press several objections to it by stressing overpermissiveness, luck, and rights. I defend strengthening the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice without making it overdemanding. -/- I claim that Premise 3 can be attractive to both consequentialists and non-consequentialists. Nevertheless, by showing that effectiveness sometimes violates fairness, I propose a method which avoids always helping the greater number and always giving everyone equal chances of being helped, which is compatible with effective altruism. -/- Against Premise 4, I assess the systemic change objection, which states that effective altruism unjustifiably distracts individuals from systemic change. By considering risk and the moral standing of the future extremely poor, I claim that the systemic change objection is partially successful, but cannot undermine effective altruism. -/- After analysing all of these, I argue that individuals have an obligation to donate to effective charities to alleviate extreme poverty where doing so does not require them to give up anything of moral significance. (shrink)

Numerous scholars, philosophers, and experts in aesthetics have underscored the profound significance of a life enriched by the presence of beauty. Consequently, the appreciation of aesthetic experiences is considered pivotal for achieving self-discovery and self-transcendence (Howell et al. 2017). Despite theoretical prominence, limited qualitative research has been conducted on this topic. To address this gap in research, this study’s objective emphasized two questions guiding the inquiry; What is the role of aesthetic encounters in aiding self-realization or individuation? and, how do (...) these experiences foster self-transcendence? -/- A thematic analysis was performed on the online interviews conducted (N=25), and their results revealed seven themes pertaining to self-realization: a) Losing Yourself to Find Yourself; b) Relatability and Self-Reflection in Art; c) Identity as a Collection of Skills; d) Art as a Medium for Self-Expression and Acknowledgment; e) Aesthetic Genres and Taste as Identity; f) Belonging and Social Identity through Art; and g) Personal Interests and Choices in Artistic Consumption. Furthermore, seven themes for the second research question of self-transcendence were also discovered: a) Mother Nature’s Beauty; b) Intense, Passionate, and Overwhelming Experiences of Heightened Consciousness; c) Sacred Symbolism, Archetypal Imagery, and the Collective Unconscious; d) Collective Effervescence, Social Connection, and Shared Meaning; e) The ‘Profound’ Found in the Mundane; f) Feelings of Spiritual Elevation and Wellbeing; and g) Self-Referential Meaning-Making through Art. These findings evidenced the transformative potential of aesthetic experiences, shedding light on the facets of personal growth and meaning that individuals derive from such encounters. (shrink)

Among the many forms of artistic expression that characterize the digital era, remix occupies a rather central position. At the same time, however, the success of remix as an artistic practice raises several hard questions. What is original and what is derived? How can we sort out and make sense of questions concerning origination and derivation in situations where one thing is appropriated, reused, and repurposed for something else? What theory of moral and aesthetic value can accommodate and explain (...) these situations where authorship, authority, and origination are already distributed across a network of derivations, borrowings, and re-appropriated found objects? This paper develops a response to these questions, and it does so in three steps or movements. The first briefly introduces the concept of remix and the opportunities and challenges that this now wide-spread, content creation practice presents to existing models and theories of moral and aesthetic value. The second outlines the three elements of what I call “remixology”—a new axiology (or theory of moral and aesthetic value) that is designed to scale to these new opportunities and challenges. The third and final movement investigates the consequences of this proposal, demonstrating how remixology can be read backwards through time, providing us with some new perspectives on artistry and creativity in all human endeavors, and read forwards into the emerging challenges that have been made available by innovations in algorithmic content generation and computational creativity. (shrink)

Why is humour so hard to understand? Rather like attempts to explain how music can move us, attempts to explain why things are funny seem doomed from the outset. Discussions of humour typically distinguish three kinds of theory: the incongruity theory (we are amused by the incongruous), the relief theory (humour is an expression of relief in difficult situations) and the superiority theory (we laugh to express our sense of superiority over others). In the face of genuine humour, theories like (...) these can seem pedestrian and unconvincing. F.H. Buckley’s book is, unfortunately, no exception to this rule. Coming from the superiority camp, the book defends two theses about humour. (Professor Buckley’s own word is ‘laughter’, but it is clear that he is really interested in why we laugh rather than laughter itself.) The first is what he calls the ‘Positive’ thesis: that all humour is the expression of a sense of superiority over someone else, whom he names ‘the butt’. The second he calls the ‘Normative’ thesis: that those who laugh really are superior to the butt. (shrink)

P.F. Strawson’s (1962) “Freedom and Resentment” has provoked a wide range of responses, both positive and negative, and an equally wide range of interpretations. In particular, beginning with Gary Watson, some have seen Strawson as suggesting a point about the “order of explanation” concerning moral responsibility: it is not that it is appropriate to hold agents responsible because they are morally responsible, rather, it is ... well, something else. Such claims are often developed in different ways, but one thing (...) remains constant: they meant to be incompatible with libertarian theories of moral responsibility. The overarching theme of this paper is that extant developments of “the reversal” face a dilemma: in order to make the proposals plausibly anti-libertarian, they must be made to be implausible on other grounds. I canvas different attempts to articulate a “Strawsonian reversal”, and argue that none is fit for the purposes for which it is intended. I conclude by suggesting a way of clarifying the intended thesis: an analogy with the concept of funniness. The result: proponents of the “reversal” need to accept the difficult result that if we blamed small children, they would be blameworthy, or instead explain how their view escapes this result, while still being a view on which our blaming practices “fix the facts” of moral responsibility. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composite objects—objects with proper parts—do not exist. Nihilists generally paraphrase talk of composite objects F into talk of there being “xs arranged F-wise” . Recently several philosophers have argued that nihilism is defective insofar as nihilists are either unable to say what they mean by such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” or that nihilists are unable to employ such phrases without incurring significant costs, perhaps even undermining one of the chief motivations for (...) nihilism. In this paper I defend nihilism against these objections. A key theme of the paper is this: if nihilists need to employ such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” non-nihilists will need to do so as well. Accordingly, any costs incurred by the nihilist when she employs such phrases will be shared by everyone else. What’s more, such phrases are intelligible when employed by the nihilist, as well as when they are employed by the non-nihilist, insofar as analyses of such phrases will not essentially involve mereological concepts incompatible with nihilism. (shrink)

This paper defends the action-theory of the Will, according to which willing G is doing F (F≠G) in order to make G happen. In a nutshell, willing something is doing something else in order to bring about what we want. -/- I argue that only the action-theory can reconcile two essential features of the Will. (i) its EFFECTIVITY: willing is closer to acting than desiring. (ii) its FALLIBILITY: one might want something in vain. The action-theory of the will explains (...) EFFECTIVITY by claiming that each time one wants G, one accomplishes the action of doing F ( it is argued following Von Wright that every action has a result as a proper part, here F). And the action-theory explains FALLIBILITY by claiming that although willing G entails making some F happen –the result of the action of willing–, it does not entail that G –the intended consequence of our willing– will happen. -/- By contrast, behaviorist accounts of the will (which merely equate willing with an action) captures its EFFECTIVITY but loose its FALLIBILITY. And volitionist accounts (which introduce naked volitions lacking any essential results) capture the FALLIBILITY of the will, but loose its EFFECTIVITY. -/- I consider disjunctivist accounts of trying (such as O'Shaughnessy and Hornsby's ones) as an alternative way to reconcile EFFECTIVITY and FALLIBILITY. I argue that though the view manages to reconcile these two constraints, it does so only at the price of gerrymandering the concept of willing (or trying): failed tryings end up having nothing in common with successful ones. -/- I then address three objections to the action-theory of the will, to the effect (i) that not all actions have a result (ii) that total failures are possible (iii) that willing is more fundamental than acting. I argue in answer (i) that all actions have results (results which can be irrelevant to the production of the goal, or which can be merely mental images), (ii) that total failures do not correspond to acts of will, but to mere desires or wishes, and (iii) that given the possibility of basic actions, acting has to be more fundamental than willing (and trying). (shrink)

Why is there something rather than nothing? Apparently many people regard that question as a challenge to naturalism because they think it’s too fundamental or too sweeping for natural science to answer, even in principle. I argue, on the contrary, that the question has a simple and adequate naturalistic answer: ‘Because there are penguins.’ I then diagnose various confusions underlying the suspicion that the question can’t have such an answer and, more generally, that the question, or else some variant (...) of it, can’t have a naturalistic answer at all. (shrink)

A distinctive position in contemporary political philosophy is occupied by those who defend the principle of public justification. This principle states that the moral or political rules that govern our common life must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this article, I evaluate Gerald Gaus’s defence of this principle, which holds that it is presupposed by our moral reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. He argues, echoing P.F. Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, that these attitudes (...) are so deep a part of us that we are unable to rationally reject them. I examine and reject this defence of the principle. Considering the nature of our commitment to the moral reactive attitudes, I argue that those attitudes need not be grounded in a commitment to public justification. The availability of alternative grounds for these attitudes shows, contra Gaus, that we can rationally reject the principle of public justification while maintaining a wholehearted commitment to the reactive attitudes. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions (...) and argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

FISIOLOGIA DO CICLO ESTRAL DOS ANIMAIS -/- Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido e IPA -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- O cio ou estro é a fase reprodutiva dos animais, onde as fêmeas apresentam receptividade sexual seguida de ovulação. Para tanto, é necessário entender a fisiologia do estro para a realização do manejo reprodutivo dos animais. Em geral, as fêmeas manifestam comportamentos fora do comum quando estão ciclando, tais comportamentos devem ser observados para que não percam o pico de ovulação (...) e, consequentemente, para que não perca o momento de monta ou inseminação para emprenhar o animal. Neste trabalho, o estudante compreenderá o ciclo estral identificando as diferenças entre as espécies domésticas, para considerá-las na manipulação do mesmo. -/- • _____INTRODUÇÃO -/- As fêmeas dos mamíferos domésticos apresentam, em sua vida reprodutiva, even-tos recorrentes conhecidos como ciclos estrais que se caracterizam por uma série de alte-rações ovarianas, genitais, endócrinas e comportamentais. Esses ciclos são o fundamento da reprodução e possuem a finalidade de que ocorra a ovulação de forma sincronizada com o acasalamento para conduzir a uma gestação. A compreensão deste é de suma im-portância para alcançar uma boa eficiência produtiva nas propriedades pecuárias; consi-derando que a oportunidade de gestar os animais se limita a períodos, em geral, muito curtos, que ocorrem em cada ciclo. Assim que as fêmeas atingem a puberdade, em bovinos entre 11 e 19 meses, inicia-se a apresentação dos ciclos estrais, o que geralmente indica o início da receptividade sexual, também chamada de "estro" ou "cio", por ser a fase mais fácil de reconhecer devido ao qual a fêmea busca, atrai e aceita a montaria do macho. Todavia, para uma melhor eficiência reprodutiva, as fêmeas que apresentarem o primeiro cio não devem ser colocadas à disposição do macho ou da IA, uma vez que ela ainda não possui o aporte e a condição corporal ideal para conseguir gestar; logo para serem colocadas à reprodução devem estar ao terceiro estro ou possuir entre 60 a 70% do seu peso vivo adulto. Depois da receptividade ocorre um período em que a fêmea não atrai nem aceita o macho. Assim, um ciclo estral é definido como o período entre um estro e o seguinte. Quando durante o ciclo estral ocorre uma cópula fértil, as fêmeas passam a uma fase de anestro fisiológico, causado pela gestação, em que cessa o ciclo estral e passam a não apresentarem atividade sexual. Nas espécies sazonais (cabras, éguas e ovelhas), a manifestação dos ciclos estrais também é limitada pela época do ano em que as fêmeas apresentam um anestro sazonal. Essas espécies sazonais ou estacionais apresentam cio durante a época em que os dias apresentam a presença de luz por mais tempo; isto é, dias mais longos. Deve-se considerar que a ciclicidade feminina pode ser alterada por eventos patológicos como processos infecciosos, persistência do corpo lúteo, desnutrição e estresse, entre outros. -/- • _____CONTROLE ENDÓCRINO DO CICLO ESTRAL -/- As mudanças ovarianas, genitais e comportamentais que ocorrem ao longo dos ciclos estrais são controladas pelo sistema endócrino e são o resultado de uma complexa interação entre hipotálamo, hipófise, ovário e útero. Vários hormônios participam desse processo, dos quais serão descritos a importância e a participação dos mais relevantes (figura 1). -/- Figura 1: Interação hormonal do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-gonodal. No lado esquerdo, com linhas contínuas, os principais hormônios são exemplificados quando há um folículo pré-ovulatório. No lado direito, com linhas pontilhadas, os hormônios envolvidos são mostrados quando a estrutura ovariana predominante é o corpo lúteo. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. A Kisspeptina é um peptídeo hipotalâmico que tem sido denominado regulador central, pois os neurônios que a produzem recebem informações do meio ambiente e do próprio corpo, o que indica o momento ideal para a reprodução. Além de modular a secreção de GnRH durante o ciclo estral, esse hormônio controla tanto o início da puberdade quanto da estacionalidade reprodutiva. Além disso, é inibido durante a lactação, bloqueando a atividade reprodutiva das fêmeas nessa fase. Os neurônios produtores de Kisspeptina possuem receptores de estradiol, que os regulam para modular a liberação tônica e cíclica de GnRH, controlando assim a secreção de gonadotrofina; além disso, foi sugerida a participação de outros hormônios neurotransmissores e neuropeptídios na modulação da secreção de GnRH. Entre eles estão os estimuladores: norepinefrina, serotonina, aminoácidos excitatórios (principal-mente glutamato) e neurotensina. Atuando como inibidores: GABA e opioides endógenos (principalmente o β-endorfina). O GnRH é um neuropeptídio hipotalâmico que estimula a produção e liberação de LH, de forma que um pulso de LH é sempre precedido por um pulso de GnRH. Os estrogênios foliculares têm, por outro lado, um efeito de feedback positivo com o LH, aumentando a produção de GnRH pelo centro cíclico e a formação de seus receptores nos gonadotrópicos da hipófise. Como resultado, a maturação dos folículos ovarianos é alcançada e os picos pré-ovulatórios de estradiol e LH são alcançados. No centro tônico da secreção de GnRH, os estrogênios inibem a liberação desse hormônio quando os animais estão na vida pré-púbere ou nos estágios de anestro, e a sensibilidade a esse feedback negativo diminui durante os estágios reprodutivos. No sentido estrito, a liberação de FSH pelos gonadotrópicos hipofisários não requer a presença do GnRH, que participa antecipadamente do estímulo de sua síntese; o FSH é considerado, então, um hormônio secretado constitutivamente, ou seja, constantemente, a menos que haja um estímulo inibitório. Este estímulo inibitório existe graças aos estrogênios e à inibina, que são produzidos pelos folículos em desenvolvi-mento, especialmente pelo folículo dominante. A progesterona é um hormônio esteroide produzido pelo corpo lúteo (CL) que inibe a secreção de LH. Isso é realizado tanto indiretamente por meio da inibição da secreção de GnRH no nível hipotalâmico, quanto por ação direta no nível da hipófise, uma vez que bloqueia a formação de receptores de GnRH nos gonadotropos. Assim, diminui a frequência dos pulsos de LH, que é mantida em níveis basais capazes de participar da formação e manutenção do corpo lúteo, mas incapaz de causar ovulação. Na vaca, o papel do LH na manutenção do corpo lúteo é controverso, uma vez que alguns autores propõem que apenas o hormônio do crescimento participe para esse fim, pois a administração de inibidores de GnRH quando há corpo lúteo funcional não afeta a secreção de progesterona. Se a fertilização não for alcançada com sucesso, eventualmente o corpo lúteo deve ser destruído por apoptose (processo conhecido como luteólise), para permitir a ocorrência de um novo ciclo estral. Nesse caso, os hormônios participantes são a ocitocina, produzida inicialmente no nível central e posteriormente pelo CL; e a prostaglandina F2alfa (PGF2α), secretada pelo endométrio uterino ao final do diestro; entre ambos os hormônios estabelecerão um mecanismo de feedback positivo até que se complete a luteólise. -/- • _____FREQUÊNCIA DE APRESENTAÇÃO DOS CICLOS ESTRAIS -/- As espécies são classificadas de acordo com a frequência com que apresentam seus ciclos estrais em um dos três grupos existentes (figura 2). -/- Figura 2: classificação das espécies domésticas de acordo com a frequência de apresentação de seus ciclos estrais ao longo do ano. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Tabela 1: tipo e duração do ciclo estral de diferentes espécies Monoéstricas -/- São as espécies que apresentam um único ciclo estral, uma ou duas vezes ao ano, que culmina com um período de anestro, que faz parte do mesmo ciclo. Em geral, a fase de receptividade sexual dessas espécies é muito longa para garantir a fecundação. Dentro desta classificação está a família Canidae, que inclui cães domésticos, lobos e raposas. Os cães domésticos são capazes de se reproduzir em qualquer época do ano, portanto, não são considerados sazonais; apesar disso, observou-se que o estro tende a ocorrer com mais frequência no final do inverno ou início da primavera. Como exceção, a raça de cães Basenji é considerada sazonal, pois eles sempre têm seus ciclos férteis no outono. -/- Poliéstricas estacionais ou sazonais -/- São espécies que para garantir que seus filhotes nasçam na época do ano mais favorável à sua sobrevivência, apresentam uma série de ciclos estrais durante uma estação limitada do ano (figura 3). No final desta estação, os animais entram em anestro sazonal, que termina com o início da próxima estação reprodutiva. Dentro deste grupo estão as espécies que se reproduzem nas épocas do ano em que está aumentando a quantidade de horas-luz por dia ou fotoperíodo crescente (primavera-verão), como equinos e gatos; o último mostra a atividade ovariana entre janeiro e setembro (ou até outubro) nas zonas temperadas. Há outro grupo de espécies que se reproduzem em períodos de fotoperíodo decrescente (outono-inverno), entre as quais estão ovinos e caprinos. -/- Figura 3: classificação das espécies domésticas, de acordo com a estacionalidade de sua reprodutiva. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. Poliéstricas contínuas -/- As espécies deste grupo são caracterizadas por ciclos estrais durante todo o ano. Dentro desta classificação estão bovinos e suínos. -/- • _____ETAPAS DO CICLO ESTRAL -/- Do ponto de vista das estruturas ovarianas predominantes, o ciclo estral se divide em duas fases: a fase folicular, na qual os folículos ovarianos se desenvolvem e amadurecem, além da ovulação; nas espécies poliéstricas, esta fase começa com a regressão do corpo lúteo do ciclo anterior. A outra é conhecida como fase lútea e refere-se às etapas do ciclo em que o corpo lúteo se forma e tem sua maior funcionalidade. Cada uma dessas fases pode ser dividida em etapas de proestro e estro (fase folicular); e metaestro e diestro (fase lútea) (figura 4). Algumas espécies, adicionalmente, podem apresentar períodos de anestro e interestro, como parte de seus ciclos estrais (figura 4). -/- Figura 4: etapas dos ciclos estrais dos animais domésticos. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Fase folicular -/- É identificada porque os hormônios ovarianos predominantes são os estrogênios (produzidos pelos folículos em crescimento), que desencadeiam o comportamento sexual e fazem com que o aparelho reprodutor passe por algumas adaptações para atrair o macho, preparar-se para a cópula e facilitar o transporte dos gametas. O proestro começa quando as concentrações de progesterona do ciclo anterior baixem para níveis basais devido à regressão do CL; e termina quando o comportamento de receptividade sexual começa. É caracterizado pelo crescimento do folículo dominante da última onda folicular do ciclo anterior; portanto, sua duração depende do grau de desenvolvimento em que o folículo se encontra no momento da luteólise. Nesse estágio, aumenta-se a produção de estradiol e inibina secretada pelo folículo ou folículos que iniciaram seu desenvolvimento durante o final do período de diestro. As concentrações de FSH diminuem no início do proestro; entretanto, eles começam a aumentar à medida que o estro se aproxima. O LH, devido ao efeito do estradiol, passa a aumentar sua frequência de secreção e diminuir a amplitude de seus pulsos, o que acentua a produção de andrógenos pelas células da teca e a capacidade de aromatização das células da granulosa, com o consequente aumento na produção de estradiol. O aumento do estradiol desencadeia a apresentação comportamental do estro que também é conhecido como estágio de cio, calor ou receptividade sexual, uma vez que representa o único período em que a fêmea procura ativamente o macho e aceita a montagem e a cópula. O comportamento sexual pode variar em intensidade entre diferentes espécies. Durante a fase de estro, o(s) folículo(s) em desenvolvimento no ovário adquirem sua maturidade e tamanho pré-ovulatório (figura 5), atingindo as concentrações máximas de estradiol. Um feedback positivo é então exercido entre o estradiol, GnRH e LH, para que ocorra o pico de LH pré-ovulatório que será responsável pela ovulação. -/- Figura 5: folículos ovarianos de porcas. Esquerda: pequenos folículos, estágio de proestro. À direita: folículos pré-ovulatórios, estágio de estro. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- O estro é a fase do ciclo em que ocorre a ovulação em espécies domésticas, com exceção dos bovinos que ovulam durante o metaestro inicial. A ovulação, por outro lado, manifesta-se espontaneamente na maioria das espécies domésticas, com exceção dos felinos, leporídeos e camelídeos, nos quais a cópula deve ocorrer para induzi-la, por isso são conhecidos como espécies de ovulação induzida (figura 6). Nessas espécies, a cópula provoca um reflexo nervoso que atua no nível hipotalâmico para induzir a liberação de GnRH e, portanto, o pico pré-ovulatório de LH. Existem outras espécies em que a cópula não estimula a ovulação, mas é necessária para induzir a formação do CL (figura 6). Dentro dessas espécies estão ratos e camundongos. -/- Figura 6: classificação das espécies domésticas, segundo a espontaneidade da ovulação e a formação do corpo lúteo. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Em caninos, deve-se considerar que, embora tradicionalmente se diga que a ovulação ocorre dois dias após o início do estro, ela pode ocorrer mais tarde, em alguns casos ocorrendo próximo ao final do estro. Em geral, durante a fase folicular, o útero tem maior suprimento e as glândulas endometriais entram em fase proliferativa, aumentando seu tamanho. Isso faz com que o útero fique mais tônico, ou seja, mais firme, exceto no caso de éguas e carnívoros nos quais os estrogênios fazem com que o útero se encontre com edema e sem tonalidade, enquanto a cérvix aparece relaxada durante o estro. Além disso, o aumento do suprimento de sangue causa hiperemia e congestão do epitélio vaginal e vulvar (figura 7). Para permitir a passagem do esperma, a cérvix se abre e a produção de um muco cervical muito fluido, cristalino e abundante é aumentada; o útero e o oviduto aumentam suas contrações. Nessa última ação participam as prostaglandinas contidas no plasma seminal (PGF₂α e PGE). Na vagina, o número de camadas de células do epitélio começa a aumentar e as células da superfície tornam-se cornificadas. No caso da cadela, a situação hormonal durante a fase folicular é completamente diferente do resto das espécies domésticas (figura 8), uma vez que há altas concentrações de estrógenos durante o proestro, que atingem seu nível máximo 24 a 48 h antes de seu término; ao mesmo tempo, os folículos iniciam sua luteinização, antes de serem ovulados. Essa situação provoca a liberação de progesterona, que começa a aumentar suas concen-trações; à medida que aumenta, as concentrações de estradiol começam a cair. Assim, o estro começa quando os níveis de progesterona atingem uma concentração de cerca de 1 ng/ml. O pico de LH ocorre durante a transição do proestro para o estro e a ovulação ocorre 48 a 60 horas depois; processo que pode se estender de 24 a 96 h. Os níveis de progesterona aumentam após o início do estro, de modo que antes da ovulação estão entre 2 e 4 ng/ml, enquanto as concentrações entre 5 e 10 ng/ml estão relacionadas ao tempo de ovulação. Uma vez que as concentrações de estradiol caem abaixo de 15 pg/ml, o estro é encerrado (figura 8). -/- Figura 7: comparação da aparência vulvar em porcas. O círculo azul indica a vulva de uma porca que não está em estro, enquanto um círculo vermelho mostra uma vulva apresentando hiperemia e edema característicos da fase de estro. Fonte: Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- As altas concentrações de estradiol no proestro são responsáveis pela atração da fêmea pelo macho a partir desta fase, porém, não apresentará comportamento receptivo até o início da fase de estro. Deve-se levar em consideração que algumas cadelas podem não aceitar o macho, apesar de estarem endócrinamente na fase de estro, o que pode ser atribuído às condições de manejo, aos comportamentos adquiridos ou às características hierárquicas, ou ainda a distúrbios relacionados a endocrinologia da reprodução (anorma-lidades hormonais e/ou baixas concentrações de hormônios). No caso das éguas, não há menção à fase de proestro e os eventos que ocorreriam nessa fase estão englobados no estro, que tradicionalmente será denominado fase folicular ou simplesmente estro (figura 9). -/- Figura 8: Endocrinologia do ciclo estral da cadela. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Figura 9: duração das etapas do ciclo estral das éguas. A ovulação ocorre nos últimos 2 dias da fase de estro. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Fase lútea -/- Durante essa fase, o esteroide ovariano predominante é a progesterona, cujo objetivo é manter a gravidez se a fertilização for bem-sucedida. Para isso, os estrogênios pré-ovulatórios favorecem a formação de receptores de progesterona uterina, então a presença da progesterona faz com que as glândulas endometriais entrem em sua fase secretora e iniciem a produção de histiotrofo ou leite uterino, para nutrir o produto que poderia estar potencialmente presente. Já na fase lútea, ocorre redução das concentrações de estrogênio, o que causa diminuição do tônus uterino, hiperemia e edema vulvar. Por fim, a cérvix se fecha e o muco cervical torna-se espesso, pegajoso, opaco e menos abundante, de modo a isolar o útero por fora, evitando a entrada de microrganismos que poderiam comprometer a possível gravidez. O metaestro começa quando a fêmea deixa de aceitar a montaria do macho e termina quando há um CL funcional bem estabelecido. Este estágio corresponde ao período de transição entre a dominância estrogênica e o aumento das concentrações de progesterona. Nesse estágio, as concentrações de FSH são aumentadas pela queda repentina de estradiol e inibina após a ovulação, o que permite o recrutamento da primeira onda folicular. Nesta fase, o ovário contém o corpo hemorrágico, a partir do qual se desenvolverá o CL (figura 10). O corpo hemorrágico tem meia-vida muito curta, pois as células que compõem suas paredes iniciam sua luteinização imediatamente após ou mesmo antes da ovulação. -/- Figura 10: ovários bovinos. Corpo hemorrágico (CH); folículos (F) e corpo lúteo (CL). -/- O diestro, por sua vez, constitui a etapa mais longa do ciclo estral e é caracterizado por um CL que se encontra em sua atividade secretora máxima. Somente no final dessa fase, e se não houver fecundação, o CL sofre luteólise; caso contrário, o CL é mantido de forma a preservar a gestação, prolongando um estado fisiológico semelhante ao do diestro. A imagem 11 esquematiza o ciclo estral da vaca, eventos ovarianos e endócrinos, bem como a duração das etapas do ciclo estral. Nessa fase, a progesterona atinge suas concentrações máximas e exerce efeito negativo na liberação de LH, pois inibe a formação de receptores de GnRH nos gonadotropos hipofisários, bem como a secreção de GnRH pelo hipotálamo. Além disso, observam-se aumentos repetidos da secreção de FSH com o consequente aumento do desenvolvimento folicular e das concentrações plasmáticas de estradiol e inibina. No entanto, os folículos que começam seu desenvolvimento, não conseguem completar sua maturação e sofrem regressão (ondas foliculares). A égua é a única fêmea doméstica que pode ovular naturalmente durante a fase lútea, com uma incidência de ovulação de 10-25% nesta fase. Figura 11: etapas, estruturas ovarianas e endocrinologia do ciclo estral da vaca. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- No final do diestro, os estrogênios sensibilizam o endométrio, de modo que as células epiteliais formam os receptores de ocitocina. Após uma primeira secreção de ocitocina da neurohipófise e secreções subsequentes originadas do corpo lúteo, um mecanismo de feedback positivo é iniciado para a secreção de PGF2α. O papel da PGF2α é destruir o CL quando não houver fertilização. Deve-se considerar que para o útero ser capaz de produzir PGF2α deve haver um período prévio de exposição à progesterona, durante o qual aumenta o conteúdo de precursores das prostaglandinas no endométrio, como o ácido araquidônico (ácido graxo C20H32O2). O anestro é considerado como um período de inatividade reprodutiva, mesmo quando continua havendo atividade hormonal e desenvolvimento folicular, uma vez que o estímulo é insuficiente para que ocorra a maturação folicular e a ovulação. Ao longo desta fase não haverá alterações comportamentais ou morfológicas nas fêmeas. Nas espécies estacionais ou sazonais, o anestro é muito importante, pois limita a estação reprodutiva de forma que os partos ocorram na época do ano que pode ser mais favorável para a sobrevivência dos filhotes. Em espécies poliéstricas contínuas, o anestro aparecerá em casos de processos fisiológicos como gestação ou amamentação, ou devido a condições patológicas que interrompem a ciclicidade. Em caninos, o anestro é considerado mais uma fase do ciclo estral (figura 12), e é o estágio de transição entre o diestro de um ciclo e o proestro do próximo; na verdade, o anestro é a fase mais longa do ciclo nessa espécie, pois pode durar de 4 a 10 meses, dependendo do indivíduo. Em algumas espécies de animais domésticos, o anestro pode ocorrer pós-parto. O interestro é uma fase de repouso entre as ondas foliculares e é característica do ciclo estral de espécies cuja ovulação é induzida, como os felinos e camelídeos, por exemplo, a lhama e a alpaca. Ao longo desta fase, não há comportamento sexual. Sua apresentação se deve ao fato de a monta não ter ocorrido ou de não ter sido capaz de induzir a ovulação, de modo que os folículos ovarianos regridem, dando origem a um novo recrutamento folicular. No caso dos felinos, foi relatado que até 50% das cópulas simples são insuficientes para causar ovulação. -/- Figura 12: etapas do ciclo estral da cadela. A ovulação ocorre dois dias após o início do cio. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- • _DURAÇÃO DOS CICLOS ESTRAIS E PARTICULARIDADES POR ESPÉCIE -/- As variações na duração do ciclo estral e as fases presentes entre as diferentes espécies domésticas são indicadas na tabela 2. Em particular, existe uma grande variação entre os indivíduos dependendo da duração das fases do ciclo estral em caninos e felinos, sendo difícil precisar sua duração, já que no caso da cadela o anestro é parte integrante do ciclo; na gata, a duração do ciclo anovulatório é diferente daquele em que ocorreu a ovulação. Assim, em um ciclo anovulatório, a gata pode manifestar períodos de estro de sete dias em média, seguidos de 2 a 19 dias sem estro (período denominado interestro), que são continuados com outro período de estro. Quando ocorre a ovulação e não é fértil, surge uma fase lútea de 35 a 37 dias e às vezes demora mais 35 dias para o animal apresentar um novo estro. Em cadelas, não há estágio de metaestro propriamente dito, pois a ovulação ocorre no início do estro, de forma que, ao término do comportamento sexual, os corpos lúteos já estão formados. Da mesma forma, as gatas não apresentam este estágio, portanto, se ocorrer ovulação, a fase de estro é imediatamente seguida pela fase diestro (figura 13). Figura 13: etapas e endocrinologia do ciclo estral da gata. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Tabela 2: Duração do ciclo estral e suas fases nas diferentes espécies domésticas Espécie Ciclo (dias) Proestro (dias) Estro Metaestro (dias) Diestro (dias) Interestro (dias) Anestro Bovina 21 (17-24) 2 a 3 8-18 h 3 a 5 12 a 14 - Pós-parto (vacas de leite) Lactacional (vacas de corte) Ovina 17 (13-19) 2 24-36 h 2 a 3 12 - Estacional Caprina 21 2 a 3 36 h (24-48) 3 a 5 8 a 15 - Estacional Suína 21 (17-25) 2 24-72 h 2 14 - Lactacional Equina 21 (15-26) - 4-7 d - 14 a 15 - Estacional Canina - 9 (3-20) 9 d (3-20) - 63 ± 5 em gestantes 70 a 80 em vazias - 4 a 10 meses Felina - 1 a 2 7 d (2-19) - 35 a 37 8 (2-19) Estacional (30-90 d) Onde: d = dias. h = horas. -/- O ciclo estral das éguas é dividido apenas em duas fases, folicular e lútea; às vezes também conhecido como estro e diestro, respectivamente (figura 14). No caso de bovinos, a ovulação ocorre durante a fase de metaestro, entre quatro e 16 horas após o término do estro, ou de 30 a 36 horas após o início do estro (figura 15). Uma vez que a ovulação ocorre, e como consequência da queda repentina nas concentrações de estradiol, algumas vacas podem ter uma secreção vulvar sanguinolenta (figura 16). -/- Figura 14: endocrinologia do ciclo estral da égua. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Figura 15: duração das etapas do ciclo estral das vacas. A ovulação ocorre no metaestro ou de 4 a 16 horas depois do término do cio. Fonte: RANGEL, 2018. -/- Figura 16: secreção vulvar sanguinolenta em vaca no estágio de metaestro • ___DESENVOLVIMENTO FOLICULAR -/- Embora o desenvolvimento folicular que leva à ovulação ocorra na fase folicular do ciclo estral e desempenhe um papel essencial no controle do ciclo, durante a fase lútea também ocorre o desenvolvimento folicular, mas os folículos não conseguem realizar sua maturação final e ovulação; mesmo em animais pré-púberes e em animais em anestro, há crescimento folicular. Por isso o desenvolvimento folicular é considerado um processo constante e dinâmico. As fêmeas têm certo número de folículos e ovócitos desde o nascimento, que em geral excede consideravelmente o número de oócitos que serão ovulados ao longo de suas vidas. Aproximadamente 90% dos folículos ovarianos começam a crescer, mas não ovulam e regridem, fato conhecido como atresia folicular. Estima-se que a atresia ocorra em qualquer época de desenvolvimento, mas é mais comum nos estágios dependentes de gonadotrofinas. A razão pela qual as ondas foliculares se desenvolvem durante a fase lútea, culminando na atresia, é que a progesterona produzida pelo corpo lúteo inibe a pulsação de LH. Assim, os folículos dominantes não obtêm suprimento suficiente desse hormônio para completar seu crescimento e ovular, causando sua regressão. Quando os folículos sofrem atresia, cessa a produção de estradiol e inibina, retomando a secreção de FSH, iniciando um novo recrutamento folicular. No final do período de diestro, quando as concentrações de progesterona começam a diminuir devido à luteólise, os estrogênios foliculares estimulam a secreção de LH, que fornece suporte suficiente para o crescimento e maturação dos folículos até que a ovulação seja desencadeada. -/- • ___OVULAÇÃO -/- A ovulação ocorre graças a um processo de remodelação, adelgaçamento e ruptura da parede folicular ao nível do estigma, que é uma área de tecido desprovida de vascularização, que se forma na superfície do folículo ovulatório (figura 17). Nas espécies domésticas, o folículo pode se desenvolver e ovular em qualquer parte da superfície do ovário, com exceção dos equinos, nos quais, devido à conformação anatômica característica do ovário desta espécie, a ovulação sempre ocorre ao nível da fossa de ovulação. O pico de LH que precede a ovulação estimula a síntese e a liberação local de PGE₂ e PGF₂α, bem como o início da produção de progesterona pelas células foliculares. Junto com o pico pré-ovulatório de LH, ocorre aumento da quantidade de fluido folicular, graças ao aumento da permeabilidade vascular da teca (ação estimulada em conjunto com a PGE₂) e ao aumento do suprimento sanguíneo no período pré-ovulatório; entretanto, a pressão intrafolicular não aumenta porque a parede do folículo está distendida. -/- Figura 17: ruptura do estigma folicular durante o processo de ovulação. Fonte: Internet. -/- A ovulação começa com um enfraquecimento da parede folicular, porque a PGF₂α causa a liberação de enzimas lisossomais das células da granulosa do folículo pré-ovulatório. O aumento local da progesterona faz com que as células da teca interna sintetizem colagenase, uma enzima que cliva as cadeias de colágeno do tecido conjuntivo, enfraquecendo a túnica albugínea que constitui a parede folicular. À medida que a parede enfraquece, forma o estigma - projeção avascular - na região apical, o que indica que a ovulação está se aproximando. O estigma é o local onde o folículo se rompe, permitindo a liberação do oócito, que sai envolto pelas células da coroa irradiada e acompanhado pelo fluido contido no antro folicular. -/- • ___CORPO LÚTEO -/- Após a ovulação, as células que permanecem na cavidade folicular desenvolvem um CL, que é considerado uma glândula temporária; sua função essencial é a produção hormonal e só está presente durante o diestro, na gestação e em algumas patologias como a piometra. A luteinização, ou formação do CL, é mediada principalmente pelo LH; no entanto, outros hormônios também estão envolvidos, como o hormônio do crescimento (GH). Assim, o tratamento com GH em animais hipofisectomizados foi encontrado para restaurar a função normal do CL; enquanto em espécies como roedores e caninos, a formação do CL é induzida e mantida pela prolactina, hormônio que não participa com essa finalidade no caso dos ruminantes. Durante a luteinização, os remanescentes das células da granulosa se diferenciam em grandes células lúteas, que são capazes de secretar progesterona continuamente (basal), e possuem grânulos secretores responsáveis pela produção e liberação de ocitocina e relaxina, esta última durante a gestação de algumas espécies. Enquanto as células da teca formam as pequenas células lúteas, que não secretam ocitocina e produzem progesterona em resposta ao LH (tônico). O corpo lúteo é, finalmente, constituído de células luteais grandes e pequenas, fibroblastos, células mioides, células endoteliais e células do sistema imunológico. Outro fator importante para o processo de luteinização é a formação de uma rede vascular, essencial para aumentar o fluxo sanguíneo para o CL. A referida formação vascular é mediada principalmente por dois fatores, fator de crescimento de fibroblastos (FGF), que no estágio inicial do desenvolvimento lúteo estimula a proliferação de células endoteliais pela ação de LH, e fator de crescimento endotélio-vascular (VEGF) que promove a invasão de células endoteliais para a camada de células da granulosa e a organização e manutenção da microvasculatura do CL. A luteólise é um processo essencial para retomar a ciclicidade das fêmeas. Sucede ao final do diestro quando não ocorre a fecundação e consiste na desintegração funcional e estrutural do CL. O primeiro refere-se à queda nas concentrações de progesterona, enquanto o segundo abrange a regressão anatômica da estrutura lútea e a recuperação do tamanho normal do ovário. A desintegração funcional, com a consequente queda nas concentrações de progesterona, ocorre antes que a regressão estrutural seja observada. Caso ocorra a gestação, a vida do CL é prolongada, visto que existem mecanismos que o resgatam de sua regressão. Durante o diestro, a progesterona produzida pelo CL bloqueia inicialmente a ação do estradiol e da ocitocina. Para esse último, causa uma redução no número de receptores de ocitocina endometrial, modificando sua estrutura. Desta forma, não é possível estabelecer um feedback positivo entre a ocitocina e a PGF₂α, que será responsável pela luteólise. No entanto, à medida que o diestro progride, a progesterona esgota seus próprios receptores, de modo que, no final desse estágio, ela perde a capacidade de inibir os receptores de ocitocina. O estradiol ativa, então, o centro de geração de pulso de ocitocina no hipotálamo e começa a induzir o endométrio tanto a formação de seus próprios receptores como os da ocitocina. A ocitocina e o estradiol trabalham juntos para aumentar a atividade e a concentração das enzimas envolvidas na síntese de PGF2α: a fosfolipase (enzima responsável pela liberação de ácido araquidônico de fosfolipídios da membrana celular) e a prostaglandina sintetase (enzima responsável pela transformação do ácido araquidônico em prostaglandina). Dessa forma, a ocitocina hipotalâmica, liberada de forma pulsátil pela neurohipófise, estimula inicialmente a síntese e secreção de PGF2α através do endométrio. A PGF2α possui receptores em grandes células do CL, que aumentam seu número à medida que o ciclo estral progride. Assim, quando a PGF2α endometrial atinge o ovário provoca a liberação de ocitocina lútea, desencadeando um mecanismo local de feedback positivo, que agindo no endométrio aumenta a secreção de PGF2α. Este circuito continua até que se alcance uma frequência de pulsos de PGF2α de aproximadamente cinco pulsos em 24 h, uma frequência que é capaz de desencadear a luteólise. Em equinos, o CL não produz ocitocina; no entanto, as células endometriais os produzem, então a secreção por PGF2α depende do estímulo da ocitocina que vem desta última fonte e da hipófise. Ressalte-se que o CL deve atingir certo grau de maturidade para que possa ser receptivo à ação da PGF2α. Isso é conseguido através da formação de receptores para a PGF2α e desenvolvendo a capacidade de expressar a prostaglandina sintetase, de modo que o CL requer para produzir PGF2α na forma autócrina para atingir a lise. As células endoteliais e as células imunes, típicas do CL, também intervêm no processo de luteólise estrutural. As células endoteliais secretam proteína quimiotática de monócitos (MCP-1), para recrutar macrófagos que migram através do epitélio vascular que foi sensibilizado pela PGF2α. Os macrófagos ativados secretam o fator necrose tumoral alfa (TNFα) que atua sobre as células do corpo lúteo causando apoptose celular. A PGF2α também participa da luteólise funcional, inibindo a síntese de progesterona e reduzindo a síntese e fosforilação da proteína responsável pelo transporte de colesterol para a mitocôndria (StAR). Além disso, a PGF2α induz a produção de endotelina-1 (ET1) pelas células endoteliais encontradas no corpo lúteo, as quais contribuem para uma redução na síntese de progesterona. -/- • ___FATORES QUE AFETAM O CICLO ESTRAL -/- A apresentação dos ciclos estrais é natural e impreterível; no entanto pode ser afetada por fatores ambientais como o fotoperíodo, e fatores específicos do indivíduo como a sociabilidade e amamentação, além dos fatores de manejo como a nutrição e, consequentemente, o ECC das fêmeas e a endocrinologia (hormônios). Todos esses fatores serão explicados a seguir. -/- Fotoperíodo -/- O fotoperíodo é determinado pelo número de horas de luz do dia ao longo do ano e é considerado um dos fatores ambientais mais consistentes e repetíveis. A quantidade diária de horas-luz tem maior efeito nas espécies sazonais para determinar o início da atividade reprodutiva. No entanto, em espécies poliéstricas contínuas, variações anuais na ciclicidade também podem ser observadas, um exemplo disso é a acentuada sazonalidade nos nascimentos de búfalos e zebuínos. Da mesma forma, o momento em que uma bezerra ou leitão nasce afeta a idade em que atinge a puberdade, e a explicação para isso é que o fotoperíodo a que estão expostos impacta seu desenvolvimento. Assim, observou-se que uma maior quantidade de horas de luz do dia (suplementação de quatro horas por dia por cerca de dois meses) pode adiantar o início da puberdade em novilhas. -/- Amamentação -/- Em espécies como suínos e bovinos de corte, o anestro pós-parto é mantido pelo estímulo que a prole exerce sobre a mãe no momento da amamentação. Dessa forma, sob esses estímulos a fêmea deixará de apresentar cio enquanto estiver alimentando as crias (figura 18). Na ação de amamentação, pensa-se que participa o reconhecimento filial, onde intervêm a visão, o olfato e a audição. A verdade é que a participação de estímulos táteis é questionável, visto que foram realizados estudos nos quais a denervação da glândula mamária não antecipou o reinício da ciclicidade em fêmeas que amamentavam seus filhotes. O mecanismo pelo qual a amamentação afeta a atividade reprodutiva está relacionado a um aumento da sensibilidade do hipotálamo ao efeito inibitório do estradiol. Nisso intervêm os fatores como os opioides (endorfinas, encefalinas e dinorfinas) e os glicocorticoides. -/- Figura 18: na esquerda porca amamentando seus filhotes e a direita vaca com o bezerro no pé. -/- Nutrição -/- A função reprodutiva depende da existência de um consumo de energia superior ao necessário para manter as funções fisiológicas essenciais do corpo e as funções de produção, como termorregulação, locomoção, crescimento, manutenção celular ou lactação. Considera-se que o efeito da nutrição na atividade reprodutiva é maior nas fêmeas do que nos machos, devido a uma maior demanda de energia exigida pelas fêmeas para manter uma gestação do começo ao fim (figura 19). Quando o consumo de energia é insuficiente, a função reprodutiva é bloqueada para não comprometer as funções vitais. Desta forma, os animais pré-púberes que sofreram deficiências nutricionais durante o seu crescimento apresentam um atraso no início da sua atividade reprodutiva. Assim, existem sinais metabólicos ao nível do sistema nervoso central, como o IGF-I e a leptina, que indicam ao organismo o grau de desenvolvimento somático do indivíduo. Animais adultos que já iniciaram sua atividade reprodutiva também podem ser afetados pela nutrição, de forma que sua ciclicidade pode ser interrompida por perdas de peso corporal igual ou superior a 20%. Da mesma forma, o reinício da atividade ovariana pós-parto é retardado quando as fêmeas estão submetidas a dietas deficientes em proteínas, energia, minerais etc. -/- Figura 19: comparação das condições corporais em vacas leiteiras. À esquerda: uma vaca com uma condição corporal adequada, que está ciclando normalmente. À direita: vaca em péssimo estado corporal e, portanto, em anestro. -/- As deficiências nutricionais de energia e proteína não afetam diretamente os níveis circulantes de FSH em animais intactos, mas o efeito da desnutrição pode ser mascarado por feedback negativo dos hormônios ováricos sobre a secreção de FSH, uma vez que os animais ovariectomizados com uma boa condição corporal têm maiores concentrações de FSH que os de condição corporal pobre. Em contraste, a secreção de LH é altamente sensível a deficiências nutricionais e a mudanças na condição corporal. O diâmetro do folículo dominante é reduzido quando os animais estão a perder peso, o que se correlaciona com uma diminuição na produção de estradiol, o que diminui a secreção de LH e consequentemente é evitada a maturação folicular terminal e a ovulação, o que os animais entrarem em anestro. No pós-parto, a ciclicidade se recupera quando as concentrações basal e média de LH, bem como a sua frequência de secreção aumenta para exceder o nadir do balanço energético (este último é atingido quando o fornecimento de energia está no ponto mínimo e está excedido pelas exigências de mantença do organismo). O ECC possui relação direta com as taxas reprodutivas dos animais. Em bovinos um ECC ideal é entre 3,5 e 4,5 para o período reprodutivo. Com relação do ECC sobre o estro, estima-se que num rebanho de 100 vacas com ECC 2,5 cerca de 47 entram em cio, e dessas apenas 27 conseguem conceber. Por outro lado, no mesmo rebanho de 100 vacas, mas com ECC igual a 3, cerca de 62 vacas entram em cio normalmente e dessas 40 conseguem engravidar. Já com um ECC 3,5, 68 vacas entram em estro normalmente e dessas 46 conseguem engravidar. -/- Efeitos independentes de gonadotropinas -/- A importância das gonadotropinas no crescimento e maturação folicular já foi revisada neste trabalho; também deve ser mencionado que, além das gonadotropinas, existem outros fatores que podem intervir na regulação do desenvolvimento folicular e da ciclicidade. Um exemplo do anterior é o flushing: manejo nutricional que consiste na suplementação de uma fonte energética de rápida absorção, em que o aumento do número de folículos em desenvolvimento tem inicialmente um controle independente do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-gonodal e é mediado por fatores que participam do controle do metabolismo energético do animal, que estão intimamente relacionados às mudanças nutricionais. Esses fatores incluem insulina, fator de crescimento semelhante à insulina I (IGF-I) e hormônio do crescimento (GH). O IGF-I é secretado principalmente pelo fígado em resposta à estimulação do GH e é creditado na regulação de muitas das ações do GH, portanto, quando o GH é administrado, as concentrações de insulina e IGF-I estão aumentadas e um aumento no número de folículos ovarianos é observado em suínos, bovinos, caprinos e ovinos. O IGF-I, da mesma forma, modula a secreção de GH por um efeito de feedback negativo, de modo que no início do pós-parto, quando o animal está em balanço energético negativo, as concentrações de insulina e IGF-I diminuem, enquanto as de GH aumentam. A insulina e o IGF-I estimulam a proliferação e esteroidogênese das células da granulosa e da teca no folículo. Outro fator que interfere na manifestação da atividade reprodutiva é a quantidade de gordura corporal. -/- Fatores sociais (sociabilidade) -/- Existem diferentes interações sociais que são capazes de modificar o início da atividade reprodutiva durante o período de transição para a puberdade ou para a estação reprodutiva, ou ainda de sincronização e manifestação dos ciclos estrais. Entre os fatores sociais o efeito fêmea-fêmea foi bem documentado em pequenos ruminantes, onde a introdução de fêmeas ciclando (em cio) a um grupo de fêmeas em anestro estacional adianta a estação reprodutiva induzindo e sincronizando a ovulação. Quando as porcas pré-púberes, por outro lado, são alojadas em pequenos grupos de dois ou três animais, o início da puberdade é retardado em comparação com indivíduos alojados em grupos maiores. A bioestimulação das fêmeas através do contato com um macho é conhecida como efeito macho (figura 20). Foi determinado que imediatamente após a introdução do macho se inicia o desenvolvimento e maturação folicular como uma resposta a um aumento na secreção de LH. Esse efeito será explicado em próximos trabalhos de minha autoria. -/- Estresse -/- Em vários estudos, foi demonstrado que o estresse pode bloquear a ciclicidade, devido ao aumento nas concentrações de corticosteroides ou opioides que causam redução na resposta da hipófise ao GnRH. Alojamentos inadequados, um ambiente social adverso e deficiências no manejo são considerados condições estressantes. -/- Figura 20: efeito do macho sobre as fêmeas (suínos). -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AURICH, Christine. Reproductive cycles of horses. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 220-228, 2011. AISEN, Eduardo G. Reprodução ovina e caprina. MedVet, 2008. BARTLEWSKI, Pawel M.; BABY, Tanya E.; GIFFIN, Jennifer L. Reproductive cycles in sheep. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 259-268, 2011. BEARDEN, Henry Joe et al. Reproducción animal aplicada. México: Manual Moderno, 1982. CHRISTIANSEN, I. J. Reprodução no cão e no gato. São Paulo: Manole, 1988. CONCANNON, Patrick W. Reproductive cycles of the domestic bitch. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 200-210, 2011. COLAZO, Marcos Germán; MAPLETOFT, Reuben. Fisiología del ciclo estral bovino. Ciencia Veterinaria, v. 16, n. 2, p. 31-46, 2017. CUPPS, Perry T. (Ed.). Reproduction in domestic animals. Elsevier, 1991. . Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. . Fisiologia do Estro e do Serviço na Reprodução Bovina. DERIVAUX, Jules; BARNABÉ, Renato Campanarut. Reprodução dos animais domésticos. Acribia, 1980. DUKES, Henry Hugh; SWENSON, Melvin J.; REECE, William O. Dukes fisiologia dos animais domésticos. Editora Guanabara Koogan, 1996. FATET, Alice; PELLICER-RUBIO, Maria-Teresa; LEBOEUF, Bernard. Reproductive cycle of goats. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 211-219, 2011. FERREIRA, A. de M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Minas Gerais–Brasil, p. 422, 2010. FORDE, N. et al. Oestrous cycles in Bos taurus cattle. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 163-169, 2011. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HIDALGO, Galina et al. Reproducción de animales domésticos. México: Limusa, 2008. HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. MCKINNON, Angus O. et al. (Ed.). Equine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2011. MEIDAN, R. et al. Intraovarian regulation of luteolysis. JOURNAL OF REPRODUCTION AND FERTILITY-SUPPLEMENT-, p. 217-228, 1999. NETT, T. M. et al. Pituitary receptors for GnRH and estradiol, and pituitary content of gonadotropins in beef cows. I. Changes during the estrous cycle. Domestic Animal Endocrinology, v. 4, n. 2, p. 123-132, 1987. NISWENDER, Gordon D. et al. Mechanisms controlling the function and life span of the corpus luteum. Physiological reviews, v. 80, n. 1, p. 1-29, 2000. NORMAN, Anthony W.; LITWACK, Gerald. Hormones. Academic Press, 1997. PATTERSON, David J. et al. Control of estrus and ovulation in beef heifers. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 29, n. 3, p. 591-617, 2013. PLANT, Tony M.; ZELEZNIK, Anthony J. (Ed.). Knobil and Neill's physiology of reproduction. New York: Academic Press, 2014. RANGEL, L. Ciclo estral. In. PORTA, L. R.; MEDRANO, J. H. H. Fisiología reproductiva de los animales domésticos. Cidade do México: FMVZ-UNAM, 2018. REKAWIECKI, R. et al. Regulation of progesterone synthesis and action in bovine corpus luteum. J Physiol Pharmacol, v. 59, n. suppl 9, p. 75-89, 2008. REYNOLDS, L. P.; REDMER, D. A. Growth and development of the corpus luteum. JOURNAL OF REPRODUCTION AND FERTILITY-SUPPLEMENT-, p. 181-191, 1999. RIPPE, Christian A. El ciclo estral. In: Dairy Cattle Reproduction Conference. 2009. p. 111-116. SANGHA, G. K.; SHARMA, R. K.; GURAYA, S. S. Biology of corpus luteum in small ruminants. Small Ruminant Research, v. 43, n. 1, p. 53-64, 2002. SARTORI, R.; BARROS, C. M. Reproductive cycles in Bos indicus cattle. Animal Reproduction Science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 244-250, 2011. SENGER, Phillip L. et al. Pathways to pregnancy and parturition. Current Conceptions, Inc., 1615 NE Eastgate Blvd., 1997. SMITH, Matthew J.; JENNES, Lothar. Neural signals that regulate GnRH neurones directly during the oestrous cycle. Reproduction (Cambridge, England), v. 122, n. 1, p. 1-10, 2001. SOEDE, N. M.; LANGENDIJK, P.; KEMP, B. Reproductive cycles in pigs. Animal reproduction science, v. 124, n. 3-4, p. 251-258, 2011. WEBB, R. et al. Mechanisms regulating follicular development and selection of the dominant follicle. REPRODUCTION-CAMBRIDGE-SUPPLEMENT-, p. 71-90, 2003. WHITTEMORE, Colin et al. The science and practice of pig production. Blackwell Science Ltd, 1998. -/- FIXAÇÃO DO ASSUNTO -/- 1. Disserte sobre o papel do eixo hipotálamo-hipófise-gonadal sobre o ciclo estral dos animais domésticos. -/- 2. Qual a importância do controle endócrino para a apresentação do estro? -/- 3. De acordo com a frequência do ciclo estral, como se classificam as vacas, porcas, éguas, gatas, cadelas, cabras e ovelhas? -/- 4. Defina e diferencia monoéstricas e poliéstricas. -/- 5. Um produtor possui fêmeas em primeiro cio, e deseja introduzi-las na vida reprodutiva. Explique por que não é ideal utilizar fêmeas em primeiro cio na vida reprodutiva? -/- 6. Quais são as etapas do ciclo estral? -/- 7. Defina e diferencia fase folicular e fase lútea. -/- 8. Defina e diferencie os tipos de ovulação e formação do corpo lúteo nas espécies domésticas? -/- 9. Quais os eventos ocorrem durante as fases proestro, estro, metaestro, diestro e inter-estro. -/- 10. Explique por que a égua possui ciclo diferente da vaca? -/- 11. Disserte e diferencie a endocrinologia do ciclo estral da cadela, da égua, da gata e da vaca? -/- 12. Fale sobre o desenvolvimento folicular durante o ciclo estral. -/- 13. Disserte sobre a ovulação das fêmeas domésticas. -/- 14. Defina e diferencie luteinização e luteólise. -/- 15. Disserte sobre os principais fatores que afetam a apresentação e manifestação do ciclo estral. -/- 16. Qual o papel da nutrição e do ECC sobre o ciclo estral? -/- 17. Defina e diferencie efeito fêmea-fêmea e efeito macho sobre a apresentação do estro nas fêmeas. -/- 18. Um produtor de ruminantes possui um rebanho de 10 bezerras, 10 cabritas e 10 cordeiras, todas com 1 mês de idade. Elabore um projeto reprodutivo para que essas fêmeas tenham seu primeiro parto após ciclos estrais normais e sem complicações. -/- Leve em consideração os fatores de idade ao primeiro cio ou a puberdade que é diferente entre as espécies, bem como aos fatores que podem afetar a manifestação do cio. (shrink)

"Over three years of study and fellowship, sixteen Muslim, Jewish, and Christian scholars sought to answer one question: “Do our three scriptures unite or divide us?” They offer their answers in this book: sixteen essays on how certain ways of reading scripture may draw us apart and other ways may draw us, together, into the source that each tradition calls peace. Reading scriptural sources in the classical and medieval traditions, the authors examine how each tradition addresses the “other” within its (...) tradition and without, how all three traditions attend to poverty as a societal and spiritual condition, and what it means to read scripture while facing the challenges of modernity. Ochs and Johnson have assembled a unique approach to inter-religious scholarship and a rare look at scriptural study as a pathway to peace. “Scriptural reasoning, the growing practice of Jews, Christians, and Muslims reading their scriptures together, makes good academic and common sense in a time of crisis. This ground-breaking book, the outcome of an imaginative 3-year experiment by the Princeton Center of Theological Inquiry, shows scholars and thinkers of the Abrahamic traditions going deeper into the traditions and into their contemporary situation. The result is something new, wise, and relevant… full of promise for the future. Where else can one find testimonies to Jews, Christians, and Muslims coming together not only in study, thinking, and wisdom-seeking but also in play, joy, and friendship?”--David F. Ford, Regius Professor of Divinity, University of Cambridge and Director, Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme". (shrink)

This paper aims to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of being in Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going to suggest a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s pollachos legetai both to remind the similarities of the two structures and to reach a consistent view of Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when Plato (...) says that something both is and is not, he is applying difference on being which is interpreted here as saying, borrowing Aristotle’s terminology, 'is is (esti) in different senses'. I hope this paper can show how Pollachos Esti can bring forth not only a new approach to Plato’s ontology in Sophist and Republic but also a different approach to being in general. -/- Keywords Plato; being; difference; image; pollachos esti; pollachos legetai 1. Being, Not-Being and Difference The three dialogues where the notion of "difference" attaches to the notion of being, namely Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus,and specifically the first two we try to discuss here. In these dialogues, Plato is going to achieve a new and revolutionary understanding of being which is not anymore based on the notion of "same" as it was before in Greek ontology. It was his discovery, I think, that the notion of being in the Greek ontology is attached to the notion of the "same" and it is because of this attachment that there have always been many problems understanding being especially after Parmenides. That being has always been relying on the "same" can be found out from the way most of the Presocratics understood it. It was based on such a relationship between being and "same" that a later Ionian, Heraclitus of Ephesus, rejected Being by rejecting its sameness: unable to be the same, being cannot be being anymore but becoming. Heraclitus’ criticism of his predecessors’ understanding of being was due to his discovery that what they call being is not the same but different in every moment. The relation of being and sameness reaches to its highest point in Parmenides. What Plato does in using the "difference" is nothing but the establishment of a creative relation between being and "difference". In this new relation, although he is in agreement with Heraclitus that being is not the same but different, he does not do it by use of becoming. He disagrees, on the other hand, with Parmenides that such a relation between being and difference leads to not being. At Parmenides 142b5-6 it is said that if One is, it is not possible for it to be without partaking (μετέχειν) of being (οὐσίας), which leads to the distinction of being and one: -/- So there would be also the being of the one (ἡ οὐσία του̑ ἑνὸς) which is not the same (ταὐτὸν) as the one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be its being, nor the one would partake of it. (142b7-c1) -/- The fact that what is (ἔστι) signifies (σημαῖνον) is other (ἀλλο) than what One signifies (c4-5), is being taken as a reason for their distinction. The conclusion is that when we say 'one is', we speak of two different things, one partaking of the other (c5-7). Having repeated these arguments of the otherness of being and one at 143a-b, Parmenides says that the cause of this otherness can be neither Being nor One but "difference": -/- So if being is something different (ἕτερον) and one something different (ἕτερον), it is not by being one that the one is different from being nor by its being being that being is other than one, but they are different from each other (ἕτερα ἀλλήλων) by difference (τῷ ἑτερῳ) and otherness (ἄλλῳ). (143b3-6) -/- The fifth hypothesis, 'one is not' (160b5ff.) is also linked with the notion of difference. When we say about two things, largeness and smallness, that they are not, it is clear that we are talking about not being of different (ἕτερον) things (160c2-4). When it is said that something is not, besides the fact that there must be knowledge of that thing, we can say that it entails also its difference: 'difference in kind pertains to it in addition to knowledge' (160d8). Parmenides explains the reason as such: -/- For someone doesn’t speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says that the one is different from the others, but of that thing’s own difference in kind. (160e1-2) -/- Although the theory of being as "difference" is not fulfilled yet, an exact look at what occurs in Sophist can make us sure that this was the launching step for "difference" to get its deserved role in Plato’s ontology. The notion of the "difference" is not yet well-functioned in Parmenides because we can see that being is still attached to the same: -/- For that which is the same is being (ὄν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ταὐτόν) (162d2-3). -/- The notion of difference in Sophist is the key element based on which a new understanding of being is presented and the problem of not being is somehow resolved. The friends of Forms, the Stranger says, are those who distinguish between being and becoming (248a7-8) and believe that we deal with the latter with our body and through perception while with the former, the real being (ὄντως οὐσίαν) with our soul and through reasoning (a10-11). Being is then bound with the "same" by adding: -/- You say that being always stays the same and in the same state (ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν) but becoming varies from one time to another (δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως). (248a12-13) -/- That the theory of the relation of being and capacity (247d8f., 248c4-5) matches more with becoming than with being (248c7-9) must be rejected because being is also the subject of knowledge which is kind of doing something (248d-e). It does, however, confirm that 'both that which changes and also change have to be admitted as existing things (ὄντα) (249b2-3). I believe that this is what Socrates would incline to do at Theaetetus 180e-181a, that is, putting a fight between two parties of Parmenidean being and Heraclitean becoming and then escaping. The solution is that becoming is itself a kind of being and we ought to accept what changes as being. This is what must be done by a philosopher, namely, to refuse both the claim that 'everything is at rest' and that 'being changes in every way' and beg, like a child, for both and say being (τὸὄν) is both the unchanging and that which changes (249c10-d4). This kind of begging for both is obviously under the attack of contradiction (249e-250b). For both and each of rest and change similarly are (250a11-12) but it cannot be said either that both of them change or both of them rest, being must be considered as a third thing both of the rest and change associate with (250b7-10). The conclusion is that 'being is not both change and rest but different (ἕτερον) from them instead' (c3-4). The notion of difference helps Plato to take being departed from both rest and change because it was their sophisticated relation with being that made the opposition of being and becoming. Plato is now trying to separate being from rest and, thus, from "same" by "difference". Such a crucial change is great enough to need a 'fearless' decision (256d5-6). The possibility of being of not being is resulted (d11-12) comes as the answer to the question 'so it’s clear that change is not being and also is being (ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν) since it partakes in being?' (d8-9). It is then by the notion of difference that becoming is considered as that which both is and is not. This coincidence of being and not being about change is apparently similar to Socrates’ paradoxical statement at Republic 477a about what both is and is not. -/- Introduction The Republic 476-477 has always been a matter of controversy mainly about two interwoven points. The first problem is the meaning of being here; that whether what he has in mind is a veridical, existential or propositional sense of being. The second problem is his distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion which seems to lead, some believe, to the Two Worlds (TW) theory. The crucial point in Republic is that what is considered between knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) and ignorance (α͗γνοιας), namely opinion, must have a different object that leads Socrates to draw the distinction of knowledge and opinion between their objects. The problem of understanding being in the fifth book of the Republic is that when it is said that the Form of F is F but a particular participating in F, both is and is not F, it sounds too bizarre and unacceptable. It cannot be imaginable how a thing can be existent and non-existent at the same time. At the first sight, the only solution seems to be the degrees of existence which is called by Annas (1981, 197) a 'childish fallacy' and a 'silly argument'. Kirwan (1974, 118) thinks that Republic V does not attribute 'any doctrine about existence' to Plato and Kahn (1966, 250) claims that the most fundamental value of einai when used alone (without predicate) is not "to exist" but "to be so", "to be the case" or "to be true". The problems of understanding being in Republic and Sophist besides the difficulties of the existential reading led scholars to the other senses of being, mostly related to the well-known Aristotelian distinctions between different senses of being. In the predicative reading, Annas, for example, refers this difference to the qualified and unqualified application. Whereas the Form of F is unqualifiedly F, a particular instance of F can be F only qualifiedly (1981, 221). Vlastos’ well-known substitution of 'degrees of reality' for 'degrees of being/existence' must be categorized as a predicative reading. Kahn thinks that the basic sense of being for Plato is 'something like propositional structure, involving both predication and truth claims, together with existence for the subject of predication' (2013, 96). Believing that the complete-incomplete distinction terminology is misleading about Plato, he thinks that semantic functions are only second-order uses of the verb and it is the predicative or incomplete function which is fundamental. Suggesting a veridical reading, Fine (2003, 70 ff) thinks that while both existential and predicative readings separate the objects of knowledge and belief, it is only her reading which does not force such separation of the objects and thus does not imply TW. Stokes (1998, 266) thinks that though Fine is right saying that Plato does not endorse TW in book V, she is wrong in rejecting existential in favor of the veridical reading. The reception of existential reading can be seen more obviously in Calvert who thinks, in agreement with Runciman, that 'it would be safer to say that Plato’s gradational ontology is probably not entirely free from degrees of existence' (1970, 46). At Sophist 254d-e Plato singles out five most important kinds (or Forms!?) in which the same (ταὐτὸν) and difference (θάτερον) are regarded besides being, rest and change. They are, therefore, neither the same nor the difference but share in both (b3). Being (τὸ ὄν) cannot be the same also because if they 'do not signify distinct things' both change and rest will have the same label when we say they are (255b11-c1). We have then four distinct kinds, being, change, rest and same, none of them is the other. The case of difference is more complicated. When the stranger wants to assess the relation of being and difference, he can say simply neither that they are distinct nor that they are not. He has to make an important distinction inside being to get able to draw the relation of being and difference: -/- But I think you'll admit that some of the things that are (τῶν ὄντων) are said (λέγεσθαι) by themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) but some [are said] always referring to (πρὸς) other things (ἄλλα) (255b12-13) -/- The difference is always said referring to other things (τὸδέγ’ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον) (255d1). It pervades all kinds because each of them should be different from the others and is so due to the difference and not its own nature (253e3f.) After asserting that change is different from being and therefore both is and is not (256d), the difference is described as what makes all the other kinds not be, by making each different from being. Given that all of them are by being, this association of being and difference is the cause of their being and not-being at the same time, the issue that its version at RepublicV made all those controversies we discussed above: -/- So in the case of change and all the kinds, not being necessarily is (Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀναγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν). Τhat’s because as applied to all of them, the nature of the difference (ἡ θατέρον φύσις) makes each of them not be by making it different from being. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are not in the same way. And conversely [we’re also going to be right if we say] that they are because they partake in being. (Sophist 256d11-e3) -/- Plato’s new construction of five distinct kinds and the role he gives to thedifference among them is aimed to resolve the old problem of understanding being which has always been annoying from the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Both the ontological status of becoming and that of not being were, in Plato’s mind, based on the absolute domination of the notion of the Same over being. Now, not only becoming is understandable as being but also not being which is not the contrary of being anymore but only different (ἕτερον) (257b3-4). Though I agree partly with Frede that the account of not being which is needed for false statements is more complicated than just saying, as Cropsey (1995, 101) says, that Plato is substituting 'X is not Y' with 'X is different from Y', I totally disagree with him that when we say X is not beautiful, Plato could not have thought that it is not a matter of its being different from beautiful because 'it would be different from beauty even if it were beautiful by participation in beauty' (1992, 411). Conversely, as we will discuss, it is exactly the relation of the beautiful thing, X, and the beautiful itself, in which X shares that is to be solved by the notion of not being as difference. Though it is beautiful because of sharing in beauty, X is not beautiful because it is different from beautiful itself. What the difference is to do is to show how something can both be and not be the same thing. The difference is what makes one thing both be and not be a certain other thing. This equips the difference with the ability to explain a certain thing’s not-being when it is. Thanks to the notion of difference, it is now possible to explain not only not being but also the simultaneous being and not being of a thing: 'What we call "not-beautiful" is the thing that ἕτερόν ἐστιν from nothing other than του̑ καλου̑ φύσεως' (257d10-11). The result is that not beautiful happens to be (συμβέβηκεν εἶναι) one single thing among kinds of beings (τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους) and at the same time set over against one of the beings (πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν) (257e2-4) and thus be something that happens to be not beautiful (εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν); a being set over against being (ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν ἀντίθεσις) (e6-7). Neither the beautiful is more a being (μα̑λλον ... ἐστι τῶν ὄντων) nor not beautiful less (e9-10) and thus both the contraries similarly are (ὁμοίως εἶναι) (258a1). This conclusion, it is emphasized again (a7-9), owes to θατέρου φύσις now turned out as being. Therefore, each of the many things that are of the nature of the difference and set over each other in being (τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις) is being as being itself is being (αὐτοῦ τοῦὄν τοςοὐσία ἐστιν) and not less. They are different from, and not the contrary of, each other (a11-b3). This is exactly τὸμὴὄν, the subject of the inquiry (b6-7). Hence, not being has its own nature (b10) and is one εἶδοςamong the many things that are (b9-c3). Such far departing from Parmenides’ ontological principle is done on the basis of the nature of the difference. It was the discovery of such a notion that made the stranger brave enough to say that not being is each part of the nature of the difference that is set over against being (258d7-e3, cf. 260b7-8). That the relation of being and difference is difference is the key element of the new ontology. The difference is, only because of its sharing in being, but it is not that which it shares in but different from it (259a6-8). Not being is exactly based on this difference: ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὄν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν (a8-b1). 2. Difference and the Being of a Copy We discussed above that the sense of being of particulars in Republic V made so many debates that whether being is there used in an existential sense or not. Particulars in Republic are regarded as images in the allegories of Line and Cave. The being of an image/copy makes, thus, the same problem. Plato’s analogy of original -copy for the relation of Forms and their particulars in Republic has obviously a different attitude to being. The main question is that what is the ontological status of a copy in respect of its original? Are there two kinds of being, 'real being' versus 'being' as Ketchum says (1980, 140) or only one kind? What is the difference of being in an original and its copy? Is it a matter of degrees of being or reality as some commentators have suggested? Is it a matter of being relational? By reducing the ontological issue to an epistemological one, Vlastos’ suggestion of degrees of reality in an article with the same name does neither, I think, pay attention to the problem nor resolve it. He agrees that Plato never speaks of "degrees" or "grades" of reality (1998, 219). What allows him to entitle it as such are some of Plato’s words in Republic as well as Plato’s words in some other dialogues (1998, 219). When Plato states that the Forms only can completely, purely or perfectly be real he means, Vlastos says, they are cognitively reliable (1998, 229); an obvious reduction of the issue to an epistemological one. He thinks that when in Republic we are being said that a particular’s being F is less pure than its Form, it is because it is not exclusively F, but it is and is not F and this being adulterated by contrary characters is the reason of our confused and uncertain understanding of it (1998, 222). Ketchum rightly criticizes Vlastos’ doctrine in its disparting from ontology thinking that 'to understand Plato’s talk of being as talk of reality is to obscure the close relation that exists between "being" and the verb "to be"' (1980, 213). He thinks, therefore, that οὐσία must be understοοd as being rather than reality, τὸὄν as "that which is" and not "that which is real" and … (ibid). His conclusion is that degrees of reality cannot interpret Plato correctly and we must accept degrees of being. Allen believes that a 'purely epistemic' reading of the passage in Republic is patently at odds with Plato’s text (1961, 325). He thinks that not only degrees of reality but also degrees of reality must be maintained (1998, 67). What Cooper suggests gets close to this paper’s solution: -/- Plato does not I think wish to suggest that existence is a matter of degree in the way in which being pleasant or painful is a matter of degree. Rather there are different grades of ontological status. (1986, 241) -/- A more ontological solution for the problem of understanding the being of a copy and its relation with the being of its original is suggested by the theory of copy as a relational entity. Based on this interpretation, 'the very being of a reflection is relational, wholly dependent upon what is other than itself: the original…' (Allen, 1998, 62). As relational entities, particulars have no independent ontological status; they are purely relational entities which derive their whole character and existence from Forms (ibid, 67). Although these relational entities are and have a kind of existence, we must also say that 'they do not have existence in the way that Forms, things which are fully real, do' (ibid). Allen (1961, 331) extends his theory to Phaedo where it is said that particulars are deficient (74d5-7, 75a2-3, 75b4-8), 'wish' to be like (74d10) or desire to be of its nature (75a2); an extension that, like F.C. white (1977, 200), I cannot admit. He correctly states that Plato did not start out with a doctrine of particulars as images and semblances but come to such a view after Phaedo, or perhaps after Republic V (1977, 202). Though we may not agree with him about Republic V, if we have to consider its last pages also, we must agree with him that not only the ontology of Phaedo but also that of Republic II-V (except the last pages of the latter book) are somehow different from (but at the same time appealing to) the ontology of original-copy which should exclusively assign to Sophist, Timaeus and RepublicVI-VII besides the last pages of book V. The answer to the problem of Plato’s sense of being in RepublicV can be reached only if we read Republic V based on and as following Sophist. We can find out his meaning of that which both is and is not only by the ontological status he assigns to a copy in Sophist. The kind of being of a copy in Sophist reveals as Plato’s key for the lock of the problem of not being. Let’s see how the ontological status of a copy is the critical point of Plato’s ontology. In the earlier pages of Sophist, we are still in the same situation about not being. To think that that which is not is is called a rash assumption (237a3-4) and Parmenides’ principle of the impossibility of being of not being is still at work (a8-9). At 237c1-4, the problem of "not being" is noticed in a new way which shows some kinds of a more realistic position to the problem of not being. Nevertheless, not being is still unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable and unformulable in speech (238c10). Soon after mentioning that it is difficult even to refuse not being (238d), the solution to the problem appears: the being of a copy (εἴδωλον) (239d). A copy is, says Theaetetus, something that is made referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν) but still is 'another such thing (ἕτεροντοιου̑τον)' (240a8). Nevertheless, this 'another such thing' cannot be another such real or true thing. In answer to the question of the Stranger that if this 'another such thing' is the true thing (240a9), Theaetetus answers: οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ’ ἐοικὸςμὲν (240b2). A copy’s being 'another such thing' does not mean another true thing but only a resemblance of it. Not only is not a copy another true thing besides the original, but it is the opposite of the true thing (b5) because only its original is the thing genuinely and being a copy is being the thing only untruly. The word ἐοικὸς is opposed to ὄντως ὄν in the next line (240b7): 'So you are saying that that which is like (ἐοικὸς) is not really that which is (οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὄν)'. But still a copy 'is in a way (ἔστι γε μήν πως)' (b9). While it is not really what it is its resemblance, it has its own being and reality because it really is a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως) (b11). The Stranger asks: -/- So it is not really what is (οὐκ ὄν ἄρα [οὐκ] ὄντως ἐστὶν) but it really is what we call a likeness (ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα)? (b12-13) -/- This is Plato’s innovative ontological solution to the problem of not being. Theaetetus’ answer confirms this: 'Maybe that which is not is woven together with that which is' (c1-2). Therefore, a copy neither is what really is nor is not-being but only is what in a way is. Thanks to the ontological status of a copy, the third status intermediate between being and not being is brought forth. The essence of an image, in Kohnke’s words, does not consist 'solely in the negation of what is genuine and has real being' because otherwise 'it would be an ὄντως οὐκ ὄν,essentially and really a not being' (1957, 37). The characteristics of a copy can be summed up as folows: i) A copy is a copy by referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν). ii) A copy is different from that of which it is a copy (ἕτερον). iii) A copy is not itself a true thing (ἀληθινόν) as that of which it is a copy but only that which is like it (ἐοικὸς). iv) It is not really that which really is (ὄντως ὄν) but only really a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως). The conclusion is that: v) A copy in a way (πως) is that means it both is and in not, the product of interweaving being with not being. This leads to the refutation of father Parmenides’ principle, accepting that 'that which is not somehow is (τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι)' and 'that which is, somehow is not (τό ὄν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι) (241d5-7). Besides copies and likenesses (εἰκόνων), we have also imitations (μιμημάτων) and appearances (φαντασμάτων) as the subjects of this new kind of being and thus false belief (241e3). In Timaeus, the world of becoming which cannot correctly be called and thus we have to call it "what is such" (τὸ τοιου̑τον) (49e5) or "what is altogether such" (τὸ διἀ παντὸς τοιου̑τον) (e6-7), consists solely of imitations (μιμημάτα) (50c5) which are identifiable only by the things that they are their imitations. The word τοιου̑τον which had been used to determine the situation of a copy in respect of its original, now becomes the definition of the world of becoming in which everything is an image of another thing, a Being, that stays always the same and is different and separated from its image. Cherniss, in my view rightly, draws attention to the very important point about the ontological status of an image that can at the same time be considered a criticism of the relational theory. What we are being said in Timaeus, he thinks,cannot be explained by saying that an image is not self-related and making its being relational. What is crucial about an image is that it 'stands for something, refers to something, means something and this meaning the image has not independently as its own but only in reference to something else apart from it' (1998, 296). This function finds its best explanation in the theory we are to suggest in the following. 3. πολλαχῶς ἔστι The best way to understand the ontological status of an image in Plato is to see first how his most clever pupil, Aristotle, resolved the same problem that Plato brought his theory of image for its sake. Aristotle’s theory of pollachos legetai is a brilliant and, at the same time, deviated version of Plato’s theory that is able, however, to help us read Plato in a better way. We discuss Aristotle’s theory to reach to a full understanding of Plato’s theory because it is, firstly, constructed in Aristotle in a more clear way and, secondly, it can also be taken as an evidence that our reading of Plato is legitimate. The phrase τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, a so much repeated phrase in Aristotle’s works, is his resolution for some of the ontological problems of his predecessors all treating being as if it has only one sense. Aristotle is right in his criticism of the philosophical tradition specially Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato since all did presuppose only one sense for being and his theory is, thus, a creative and revolutionary solution for many problems that all the past philosophers were stuck in. But it is at the same time somehow a borrowed theory. As we will discuss, both the structure of the doctrine and the problems it tries to resolve are the same as Plato’s doctrine (and even is comparable in its phraseology) though it is in Aristotle, as can be expected, a more clear and better structured doctrine. 1) Associated with the theory of pros hen and the theory of substance, the theory of several senses of being provides a structure which, I insist, is the best guide to understand Plato’s theory of Being in Sophist, Timeaus and Republic. a) Although the theory of pollachos legetai is not necessarily based on the theory of pros hen, they become tightly interdependent about being: -/- Being is said in many ways/senses (τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς) but by reference to one (πρὸς ἕν) [way/sense] and one kind of nature (μίαν τινὰ φύσιν). (Metaphysics 1003a33-34) -/- The doctrine of pros hen which is Aristotle’s initiative third alternative besides the homonymous and synonymous application of words, is primarily a linguistic theory that tries to provide a new theory to explain the different implementations of the same word. The pros hen implementation of being is to provide an alternative for the theory of the synonymous (in Plato: homonymous) implementation of being which says being is said in one sense (kath hen) (1060b 32-33). That both the pros hen and the kath hen implementation of a word has one thing (hen) as what is common, makes them in opposition to the homonymous implementation which does not consider anything in common. Whereas both pros hen and kath hen assume a common nature, with which all the implementations of the word have some kind of relation, their difference is that while kath hen takes all the implementations of the word as the same with the common nature, pros hen makes them different. Substance is called πρῶτον ὄν because it is said to be primarily: -/- For as is (τὸ ἔστιν) is predicated of all things, not however in the same way (οὐχ ὁμοίως) but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary way. So too τὸτί ἐστιν belongs simply (ἁπλῶς) to substance but in a limited sense (πῶς) to the others [other categories] (1030a21-23). -/- The word ἁπλῶς standing against κατὰ συμβεβηκός tries to make substance different from the accidents. When we are being said that τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, it means that only the substance that is simply (ἁπλῶς) the ἕν, the common nature, τὸὄν. When we use the word 'being' about a substance, the being is said differently from when we use 'being' about an accident. The distinction between the substance and the other categories is a distinction between what simply is said to be and what only with reference to (pros) the substance is said to be. The doctrine of pros hen, changing kath hen to pros hen in respect of to on, makes a distinction that wants to show that while there is a kind of implementing the word being that is simply being, there is another kind which is called being only by reference to that which is simply being. In the doctrine of pros hen it is not so that all the things that are said to be are only by reference to a common one thing, but that while one thing is called being because it is that thing itself, the other things are called so without being that thing itself but only by referring to it. At the very beginning of book Γ, it is said that: -/- Being is said in many senses but all refer to one arche. Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, others because they are a process towards substances or destructions or privations or qualities of substances … (1003b5-9, cf. 1028a18-20) -/- Substance is what really is said to be and all other things that are said to be are said only in favor of it. This difference of substance from all other senses of being is what is, I believe, primarily aimed in Aristotle’s interrelated theories of pollachos legetai,pros hen and the theory of substance. b) The difference of the implementation of being in the case of substance and the accidents goes so deep that while substance is considered as the real being, the accidents are almost not being. An accident is a mere name (Metaphysics 1026b13-14) and is obviously akin to not being (b21). Aristotle adds that Plato was 'in a sense not wrong' saying that sophists deal with not being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) because the arguments of sophists are, above all, about the accidental (1026b13-16). At the beginning of book , he says about quality and quantity (which look to be more of a being than other accidents) that they are not existent (οὐδ̕ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν) in an unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς) (1069a21-22). The two above-mentioned points, Aristotle’s (a) interwoven theories of pollachos legetai, pros hen and the theory of substance and (b) taking accidents almost as not being, comparedwith substance, brings forth a structure that I shall call Pollachos Legetai (with capital first letters). What is of the highest importance in this structure for me is the difference of substance from accidents and the kind of relation which is settled between them. There is a substance that without any qualification is said to be and the accidents that are said to be only by reference (pros) to it. Adding Aristotle’s point about accidents that they are nearly not being to this relation and difference, we can obviously see how much this structure is close to Plato’s original-copy ontology. We spoke of the relation of being and difference in Plato’s model and the way Plato construes the being of a copy. A copy is a copy only by referring to (pros) a model; it is different from (ἕτερον) that of which it is a copy; it is not itself a true thing as its model and not really that which is (ὄντως ὄν) but only is in a way (πῶς). If we behold the difference of substance and accident in the context of the theory of pollachos legetai and pros hen, we can observe its fundamental similarity with Plato’s original-copy theory in its structure. Allen draws attention to the fact that the relation between Forms and particulars in Plato’s original-copy model is 'something intermediate between univocity and full equivocity' (1998, 70, n. 24) and the same as what Aristotle calls it pros hen (ibid). What made us compare the two structures was not, of course, the complete similarity of two structures (we have to agree with many possible differences of the two theories) but exactly the specific relation between an original and its copy on the one hand, and a substance and its accident on the other hand. As substance and accident do not share a common character and the substance -accident model hints that they stand in a certain relation, there is no common character between the original and copy in Plato’s model as well. Furthermore, their similarity is not confined to their structure only; they are also aimed to solve the same problem. The central point of the theory is that all the predecessors took being in one sense and this was their weakness point. Besides the mentioned above passages about the relation of pollachos legetai and presocratics’, as well as Plato’s, ontology, the relation of the theory with the problem of not being is clear in several passages. In Metaphysics, it is said: 'Being is then said in many senses… It is for this reason that we say even of not being that it is not being' (1003b5-10). Discussing the accidental sense of being, Aristotle points that it is in the accidental way that we say, for example, that not-white is because that of which it is an accident is (1017a18-19, cf. 1069a22-24). We mentioned that he thought Plato was right saying that sophistic deals with not being because sophistic deals with accidental, which is somehow not being (1026b14-16). Plato turned sophistic not-being to what both is and is not and Aristotle to what accidentally is said to be. What helps Aristotle to resolve the problem of not being is his distinction between ἁπλῶς and κατὰ σθμβεβηκός. Aristotle’s "qua" (ᾕ) which is directly linked with his distinction between καθ’ αὑτο λέγεται and κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγεται, is used to resolve the old problem of coming to be out of not being (Physics 191b4-10). He strictly asserts that his predecessors could not solve the problem because they failed to observe the distinction of "qua itself" from "qua another thing" (b10-13). He then continues: -/- We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said simply (ἁπλως) to come from not being (μὴὄντος). But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may come to be from not being in an accidental way (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). For from privation which ὅ ἐστι καθ’ αὑτο μὴ ὄν, nothing can become. (Phy. 191b13-16, cf. b19-25) . (shrink)

Predication is a lingual relation. We have this relation when a term is said (λέγεται) of another term. This simple definition, however, is not Aristotle’s own definition. In fact, he does not define predication but attaches his almost in a new field used word κατηγορεῖσθαι to λέγεται. In a predication, something is said of another thing, or, more simply, we have ‘something of something’ (ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς). (PsA. , A, 22, 83b17-18) Therefore, a relation in which two terms are posited (...) to each other in a way that one is said (predicated) of the other is a predication. The term of which the other term is said is called a subject (ὑποκειμένον) and the other, which is said about the subject, is called the predicate. Thus, in a predication the predicate is predicated of the subject; given that being predicated is almost as the same as being said. The relation between being said and being predicated is so close that ‘if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.’ (Cat., 5, 2a19-26) This, however, is true only about the second genera and not the accidents. a) Nature of relation in predication What is Aristotle’s theory about the nature of the relation in a predication? How does he fundamentally understand this relation? Phil Corkum distinguishes between predication logic and traditional term logic and argues that the relation between subject and predicate in Aristotle is of the latter kind. While in predicate logic, subjects and predicates have distinct roles, they have the same role in traditional term logic. In predication logic, subjects refer, but predicates characterize. Thereupon, a sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. In traditional term logic, both subjects and predicates refer and a sentences expresses a truth if both name one and the same thing. He concludes that Aristotle ‘problematically conflates prediction and identity claims’ because while he thinks both subjects and predicates refer, he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and the predicate name one and the same thing. Based on this, Corkum believes that Aristotle’s core semantic is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution, which is a mereological interpretation: ‘All men are mortal’ is true just in case the mereological sum of humans is part of the mereological sum of mortals. b) Aristotle’s theory of predication: one or two theories? Frank Lewis finds an inconsistent gap between the theory of predication in the Categories and that in the later books of the Metaphysics VII, 6. So too Joan Kung, Terry Irwin, Daniel Graham. c) Distinction of ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ Owen enumerates the texts in which Aristotle’s distinction between ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ is asserted: OI. 11b38-12a17; To., 127b1-4; Cat. 1a20-b9; 2a11-14; 2a27-b6; 2b15-17; 3a7-32; 9b22-24 d) Predication in Aristotle and the standard ‘S is P’ Marie De Rijk Lambertus thinks that the ‘S is P’ pattern is misleading when it comes to express predication in Aristotle. In his view, ‘The Aristotelian procedure should be described in terms of appositively assigning an attribute (κατηγορούμενον) to a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), rather than ascribing a predicate to a subject by means of a copula…. The comment should be considered an attribute which is said to fall to a substrate, without understanding this procedure in terms of sentence predication.’ e) Aristotle’s predication: bipartite or tripartite? It is a difficulty to make Aristotle’s theories of name-verb predication and tripartite predication consistent. The reason is that tripartite is not consistant with his name-verb structure based on which he says that the predicate term is the ‘verb.’ (20a31; 20b1-2; 16a13-5) The problem is that in a tripartite form like ‘Socrates is white’ we cannot take ‘is white’ as the verb because, based on Aristotle himself, no part of a verb can be significant itself. (16b6-7) However, his assertions about the equivalences between the two structures (OI. 12, 21b9-10; PrA. 51b13-16; Met., 1017b22-30) must mean that they are not inconsistent in his own view. Thus, as Allen Bāck points, ‘Aristotle seems to think that he has a single, consistent theory.’ The sense of saying or speaking as the root sense of rhema makes the relation between predication (saying something of something) and verb more interesting. The use of rhema in the sense of a long expression approves this. In Plato’s work (399ac) where Socrates claims that the name anthropos derives from anthron ha opopen (‘he who examines what he has seen’) we have an onoma from, or in place of, a rhema. 1) Subject The subject (ὑποκειμένον) is that of which another term is said or predicated. Aristotle’s own definition is of a much more philosophical value: ‘By subject I mean that which is expressed by an affirmative term (λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ κάταφάσει δηλούμενον).’ (Met., K, 1067b18) Throughout Aristotle’s work, three kinds of subjects can be found: possible, prime and absolute subject. a) Possible subject Those things that can take the position of a subject in a predication we call possible subjects, no matter they can or cannot take the position of predicate in any predication. All terms except the ultimate predicates are possible subjects because they can take the position of subject. b) Prime subject Those that in any predication can only take the position of a subject and not the position of a predicate are prime subjects. (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2; Met., Z, 1028b36-1029a1) This is the truest sense of subject and belongs only to substances. (Met., Z, 1029a1-2) In fact, ‘that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated’ is a substance. (Met., Z, 1029a7-9) In Categories, besides primary substances (Cat., 2, 1b3-6), individual qualities are also said not to be able to be said of anything else. (Cat., 2, 1a23-29) Aristotle’s examples are a certain ‘knowledge-of-grammar’ (τὶς γράμματικὴ) and ‘an individual white’ (τὸ τὶ λευκὸν). Thus, although substances are indeed in the truest sense individuals and, thereby, in the truest sense primary subjects, other individuals can take the position of subject as well. c) Absolute subject While substances are prime subjects of all other things, there is still something of which substances can be predicated and this predication is not an accidental predication: matter. (Met., Z, 1029a21-24) This predication is, indeed, the predication of a ‘form or this’ on matter and material substance. (Met., Θ, 1049a34-36) The only thing that is absolutely a subject, therefore, and can be a predicate is prime matter (πρώτη ὓλη). (Met., Θ, 1049a24-27) d) Subject and substance The most important thing in being a substance is being a subject: ‘It is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.’ (Cat., 5, 2b15-17) And what is nearer to this position is more a substance as a species is more a substance than a genus.’ (Cat., 5, 2b7-8) e) Primary versus accidental subject A subject is a primary subject in a predication when the predicate is predicated of it as itself. In such a case, the subject is the subject of the predicate qua itself and not qua something else. A subject, on the one hand, is an accidental subject when it is not the primary subject of the predicate that is predicated on it. It means that a subject is an accidental subject when the predicate is predicated of it not qua itself but qua something else. An accidental subject is, therefore, anything other than a substance. 2) Predicate as universal It is evident from our discussion of kinds of subjects that except matter, primary substances (if we ignore both accidental predication and cases of absolute subjects) and other individuals, everything else can take the position of a predicate. Since primary substances are individuals, it results that everything except matter and individuals are capable to take the position of predicate. The immediate consequence of this is that the predicate must be a universal. When individuals cannot take the position of predicate, this position cannot be taken by any particular. Therefore, only universals can be predicated of others. Moreover, albeit universals can be a simple subject (for another universal), they are not prime subjects. The closeness of universal and predicate is to the extent that Aristotle differentiates universal from subject. (Met., Θ, 1049a27-30) 3) Categories or classes of predicates Aristotle distinguishes ten highest classes into one of which each predicate must necessarily fall: substance (or what a thing is), quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. (Cat., 4, 1b25-27; To., I, 9, 103b20- ; PsA., A, 22, 83b13-23) The substance counted among predicates must refer to secondary and not primary substances not only because Aristotle insists that primary substances cannot be predicated but also from his own examples of the category of substance: man and animal. (To., I, 9, 103b25) However, if a predicate be asserted of itself or its genus be asserted of it, the predicate signifies substance or what is; but if ‘one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind,’ it signifies one of the other nines. (To., I, 9, 103b30) These categories are so comprehensive that no predicate can remain outside them so that even non-being has as many senses as categories. (Met., M, 1089a26-30) a) That whether Aristotle’s categories are merely linguistic or fundamentally ontological is a so much controversial dispute. Some like G. E. R. Lloyd believe that ‘categories are primarily intended as a classification of reality … rather than of the signifying terms themselves.’ b) Although Aristotle’s categories have been historically regarded as a classification of predications, there are some recent commentators like Jonathan Barnes that think it is classifying predicates and not predications. 4) Kinds of predicates In his introduction of Categories, as J. W. Thorp truly points out , Aristotle distinguishes between the category of substance and the other categories using μὲν ... δὲ construction. This construction illustrates that beside tenfold classification of categories, there is an even more crucial differentiation between two kinds of predicates: substance or what is on the one hand and the other nine ones on the other hand: the distinction between what is predicated of the subject as what it is and what is predicated of it as an accident. Therefore, we have three kinds of classification - a twofold, a fourfold and a tenfold-complicatedly classifying the same thing, viz. the predicate. Predicates can be divided also to four kinds: property, definition, genus and accident. (To., I, 4, 101b11-20) A property is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and does not signify its essence. A definition is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and signifies its essence. It is a genus if it is not predicated convertibly and is contained in the definition of its subject. And it is an accident if it is neither convertible nor contained in the definition of its subject. (To., I, 8, ^103b3) All of these four kinds are among categories. (To., I, 9, 103b20) It seems that there might be some kind of relation between the twofold and the fourfold distinction: whereas genus and definition are predicated as what it is, accidents are not so predicated. There seems to be some rules that determine to each of these four kinds each predicate belongs. At To., IV, 123b30ff. Aristotle asserts: ‘If B has a contrary and A does not, then B does not belong to A as its genus.’ There is a dispute around per se accidents (τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα) (Topics., 102a18) whether they must be regarded as either of the four kinds or as a fifth kind. Barnes (1970) argued that they ‘do not fit at all neatly into the fourfold classification.’ He argues that based on the definition of accidents at A, 5, 102b4-5, they must be accidents but based on another definition, A, 5, 102b6-7, they cannot be accidents. He also defends the view that they are not properties. Barnes concludes: ‘This shows that the two definitions are not equivalent, and hence that the ‘predicables’ are not well-defined.’ Demetris J. Hadgopoulos defends the view that the two definitions of accidents are equivalent and per se accidents are properties. 5) Five types of predications We have five kinds of predications based on our division of subjects and our discussion of predicates: simple, primary (itself divided to substantial and accident), accidental (itself divided to primary and secondary), aoincidental and absolute predication. a) Simple predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of either a particular or a universal subject. This sense of predication includes all other senses except the first kind of accidental predication. b) Primary predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of a primary subject, namely a substance. A primary predication is of two kinds: i) Substantial predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is part of, or is included in, the definition of the subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the definition or the genus or the species or the diferentia of the subject. It is this predication that Aristotle calls a unity: ‘A statement may be called a unity … because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject.’ (PsA., B, 10, 93b35-37) It is only substantial predicates that can be predicated of each other: ‘Predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b18-19) Aristotle defines a substantial predication also in another way. A predication in which a higher genus is predicated on a lower genus, species, a substance or an individual, (or a species is predicated on an individual) is a substantial predication. Therefore, a substantial predication is a predication in a series that has individuals on one of its ends and a general category on its other end. In fact, only substantial predicates can be predicated of one another. (PsA., A, 22, 83b17-19) This series cannot be an infinite series because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) -/- ii) Accident predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is not part of, or is not included in, the definition of its subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the property or the accident of the subject. c) Accidental predication. This is a predication in which the subject is not a primary subject and its predicate is a substance. This predication is of two kinds: i) Primary accidental predication. This is a predication in which an accident is predicated of substance. Such a predication can go ad infinitum, which is inferable from Aristotle’s assertion that the secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum. ii) Secondary accidental predication. It is a predication in which an accident is predicated of another accident. Such a predication, Aristotle asserts, cannot go ad infinitum because even more than two accidents cannot be combined. Now what is the meaning of Aristotle’s assertion that we cannot continue this ad infinitum? Does it mean that we cannot continue the predication ‘The musician is white’ and say ‘The white is Athenian?’ But why not? Or maybe he means that by adding any predication, we are still in a condition of predicating two accidents of a substance on each other. -/- As primary subjects, substances can also take the position of predicate though not essentially but accidentally. In propositions like ‘the white is a log’ or ‘That big thing is a log’ we observe substance taking the position of predicate but this is only accidentally: ‘When I affirm ‘the white is a log,’ I mean that something which happens to be white is a log- not that white is the subject in which log inheres (οὐχ ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ ξύλῳ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι), for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log (οὔτε λευκὸν ὄν οὔθ᾿ ὃπερ λευκόν τι ἐγἐνετο ξύλον), and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally.’ (PsA., 22, 83a3-9) Aristotle compares this accidental use of substance in the position of predicate with the substantial use of it in the place of a subject: ‘On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white,’ I do not mean that something else, which happens to be a log, is white (οὐχ ὃτι ἓτερόν τί ἐστι λευκόν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμβέβηκε ξύλῳ εἶναι), (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘The man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on the contrary, log is here the subject- the subject which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else.’ (PsA., 22, 83a8-14) Aristotle asks us not to call propositions like ‘The white is a log’ a predication at all or at least call them accidental predication instead of simple (ἁπλως) predication. (PsA., A, 22, 83a14-17) An accidental predication, in which we have a substance in the place of predicate, is different from an essential predication in that while the subject of an accidental predication is said to be the predicate not by itself but as something different with which it coincides, the subject of an essential predicate is said to be the predicate by itself and not because it is something else: ‘Since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially and not accidentally- not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man,’ which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one subject. Therefore, there are terms such as are essentially subjects of predicates. (PsA., A, 19, 81a24-29) This capability of ‘non-essentially and only accidentally’ being a subject does belong, in fact, to all sensible things. (PsA., A, 27a32-36) d) Coincidental predication. this is a predication in which none of the subject and predicate are a substance or an individual. In this predication, one of the accidents of a substance or individual is predicated of one of the other accidentals of the same substance or individual. For example, when it is said that ‘The white is musical,’ there is an individual, say Socrates, for which both of white and musical are accidents. e) Absolute predication. This is a predication in which a form or a substance is predicated of a matter or a material substance. Some commentators like Loux and Lewis regarded this predication as close to accident predication, both based on inherence. As R.M. Dancy points out, these predications make Aristotle’s theory of predication immanentist: not only accident predications are explained by the immanence of accidents in substances, some of the substantial predications, which were not explained in Categories, are also explained by the immanence of form in matter. It is interesting that in this kind of predication, it is the predicate and not the subject, which is in the strictest sense substance. As the central books of Metaphysics claim, the form is the substance. Thus, in this predication, substance gets away from the sense of ὑποκείμενον. Corkum mentiones 68a19 as the only instance where Aristotle explicitly claims that a term may be predicated of itself, a passage that is, in Corkum’s view, problematic. 6) Demonstrable predicates Those predicates are demonstrable that are so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of their subjects (ἔτι δ᾿ ἄλλος, εἰ ὧν πρότερα ἄττα κατηγορεῖται). (PsA., A, 22, 83b32-34) 7) Series of predications Since it is possible for a predicate to be itself the subject of another predication, we can have a series of predications in which the predicate of a predication is the subject of the next predication. This series has the following features: a) It has a limit (in number) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) on the side of subjects: there are subjects that cannot themselves be predicated (PsA., A, 27, 43a39-41), which are, as we noted, prime subjects: particulars, i.e. prime substances and other individuals. (PsA., A, 19-22) Aristotle calls them ultimate (ὓστατον). (PsA., 21, 82a36-b1) b) It has a limit (in number of kinds) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) also on the side of predicates: there must be predicates that cannot be subjects. (PsA., A, 19-22; PsA., A, 27, 43a36-39) Aristotle calls them primary (πρῶτον). (PsA., A, 21, 82b1-4) These are the highest categories or the highest genera of categories. (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) c) The series has an escalating shape from mere subjects at its downside to mere predicates at its upside. It is Aristotle himself whos uses the words up and down in this sense. (e.g. PsA., A, 22, 83b2-3) d) The predications that lie between lowest and highest ones must be finite in number. (PsA., A, 19-22 especially: 20, 82a21-35) These have subjects and predicates, each capable of both of the roles of being subject and being predicated. A result of this fitness is that neither demonstration can go to infinity nor everything is demonstrable, the two points Aristotle always insist on. e) The upward side includes the more universal ones and the downward the more particular ones. (PsA., 20, 82a21-23) f) It follows from the above features that ‘neither the ascending nor the descending series of predications … are infinite.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b24-25) g) Reciprocation and convertibility. Except in case of terms (i.e. subjects and predicates) that are at each of the ends of series of predications, namely ultimates and primaries, it is possible to reciprocate (ἀντιστρέφειν) terms and convert the predication. (PsA., A, 19, 82a15-20) h) Antipredication. Antipredication means that in a predication (S is P), the subject becomes the predicate of its predicate (P is S) in the same category its predicate was predicated on it. For example, if P is in the category of quality, antipredication means that S be predicated of P in the category of quality. In other words, P is a quality of S and S is a quality of P. Aristotle rejects this. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-b3) i) Self-predication versus other-predication. Aristotle distinguishes between a predication in which a term is said of itself and a predication in which a term is said of another. (Phy., Δ, 2, 209a31-33) j) Predicablity (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2): 1) Primary substances and individuals are not predicable. 2) Secondary substances are of two kinds: genus and species i) Genus is predicable able both of the species and of the individuals. ii) Species is predicable of the individual. 3) Differentiae are predicable both of the species and of the individuals. 8) Predication as classification a) Richard Patterson believes that Aristotle’s so repeated construction using hoper (estin A hoper B) in Topics (120a23 sq., 122b19, 26sq., 123a, 124a18, 125a29, 126a21, 128a35. Also in Posterior Analytics (83a24-30) (Brunschwig’s list. ‘expresses the fact that A is a kind of B (esti A B tis), that A is a species of the genus B.’ 9) Universal predication Aristotle defines universal predication (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι) as such: ‘wherever no instance of the subject (τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμέμνου) can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.’ (PrA., A, 24b27-29) In this predication, the subject is included in another as in a whole (ἐν ὃλῳ εἶναι) and the predicate is predicated of all of the subject (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι). (PrA., A, 24b26-27) Attach another discussion we had about ἐν ὃλῳ here. 10) Quantity of predication A predication, truly stated, has a quantity, which is the number of objects under the name of the subject of which the predicate is predicated. The quantity of subject can be stated in four ways: a. Indefinite: when the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject without any mark to show to haw many of the particulars under the name of the subject it does or does not belong. E.g. ‘Man is white’; ‘Man is not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a20; OI., I, 7, 17b8-12) b. Universal quantity: When the predicate belongs to all or none of the subject. E.g. ‘Every man is animal’; ‘No man is animal.’ (PrA., A, 24a18-19; OI., I, 7, 17b5-6) The contrary of a predication of a universal quality is a predication of a universal quality. E.g. the contrary of ‘Every man is white’ is ‘No man is white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b20-23) c. Particular quantity: When the predicate belongs (or does not belong) to some of the subject. E.g. ‘Some men are white’; ‘Some men are not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a19-20) d. Single quantity: when the subject is a proper name of only one object. E.g. ‘Socrates is white’; ‘Socrates is not white.’ The contrary of this predication is of a single quantity: ‘Socrates is not white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b38-18a4) 11) Convertibility of predication. Some predications are convertible, that is, it is possible to change the place of subject and predicate in a true proposition so that the converted proposition remains true. This is supposed to mean that given the truth of a predication, the truth of the converted predication is inferable. The convert form of a predication depends on its quantity. a. Indefinite quantity: This predication has no strictly true convert because its quantity is not stated. b. Universal quantity: It can be converted in two ways: i) A negative universal can be converted to a negative universal in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘No pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘No good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a5-8 and a14-19) ii) An affirmative universal can be converted to an affirmative particular in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘Every pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a7-9) c. Particular quantity: If it is negative, it cannot be converted but if it is affirmative, it can be converted to an affirmative predication with particular quantity. E.g. ‘Some pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a10-13 and a20-24) d. Single quantity: It cannot be converted. 12) Characteristics of relations between subject and predicate 1. A predicate is of a wider range than its subject. It is based on this fact that Aristotle: a) Prevents individuals to be predicate because there is nothing of which an individual be of a wider range. In other words, it is due to the fact that since an individual is only ‘one particular’ thing and, thus, cannot be of a wider extent than anything that Aristotle prevents them of being a predicate. Matthews, however, thinks we cannot use Socrates, a substance and an individual, in the place of predicate and say it of Socrates because ‘Socrates does not classify Socrates: it names him.’ b) Prevents differentia, species and things under species to be predicated of genus. (To., Z, 6, 144a27-) c) Prevents the species and the things under it to be predicated of the differentia. (To., Z, 6, 144b1-4) d) Also about the effect because it is wider than its subject. (PsA., B, 17, 99a) e) Each attribute is wider than every individual it is predicated on, though several attributes, collectively considered, might not be wider but exactly the substance of a thing. (PsA., B, 13, 96a32-b1) 2. The predicate of a predicate of a subject will be predicated of the subject too: ‘whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject too.’ (Cat., 3, 1b10-15) In fact, it is due to its predication of the subject that it is predicated of its predicate. (Cat., 5, 2a36-b1) Moreover, what is not predicated of the predicate of a subject cannot be predicated of it as well. (PrA., A, 27, 43b22-27) Thus, what, for example, is not predicated of animal, cannot be predicated of man. 3. The predicate of a subject can be predicated of its predicates as well. (Cat., 5, 3a1-6) For example, you call the individual man grammatical and, thence, you call both a man and an animal grammatical. Nonetheless, the predicate of a subject belongs to it more properly than to its higher predicates. (PrA., A, 27, 43a27-32) 4. It is only the subject that can be distributed and not the predicate. (PrA., A, 27, 43b16-22; OI, I, 7, 17b12-16) Therefore, we can say e.g. ‘Every man is animal’ but we cannot say ‘Every man is every animal.’ 5. It is the reason of the relation between subjects and predicates, that is the reason of predication, which is the subject of inquiry. (Met., Z, 1041a20-24) In other words, since it is a meaningless inquiry to ask why a thing is itself (Met., Z, 1041a14-15), the only remaining meaningful inquiry is to ask why something is something else, i.e. to ask about the reason of predication. 6. A subject cannot categorize its predicate in the same category in which it is categorized by it. If e.g. A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A. Therefore, there is no reciprocation in the same category. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-39) 13) Characteristics of series of predications 1. A series of secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum for not even more than two terms can be comnbined. For an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. (Met., Γ, 1007b1-4) 2. Infinite series cannot be traversed in thought. (PsA., A, 22, 83b6-7) 3. The predications of genera on each other must be ended and cannot go to infinity because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) Therefore, a series of predication of genera on each other must be limited on both sides. There must be an upward limit in general categories as well as a downward limit in individual because they cannot be predicated of others. Whatever lies between these limits can both be predicated of others and others be predicated of them. (PrA., A, 27, 43a36-43) 4. The order of predicates matters: it makes a difference whether the series be ABC or BAC. (PsA., B, 13, 96b25-32) . (shrink)

It is natural to oppose morality and self-interest; it is customary also to oppose morality to interests as such, an inclination encouraged by Kantian tradition. However, if “interest” is understood simply as what moves a person to do this rather than that, then – if persons ever actually are good and do what is right – there must be moral interests. Bradley, in posing the “Why should I be moral?” question, raises Kant-inspired objections to the possibility of moral interests qua (...) particular, conditional causes. The paper argues that these objections can be met if (a) one distinguishes between what makes something right and what makes something right happen, and (b) doing what is right is intrinsic to a person’s interests and not merely a means to ulterior ends. The requisite completeness of rational morality is shown to exclude pluralistic approaches. Given rational monism, people can find intrinsic advantage in morality’s justifiability, cooperativeness and communality. (shrink)

The realist belief in robustly attitude-independent evaluative truths – more specifically, moral truths – is challenged by Sharon Street’s essay “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”. We know the content of human normative beliefs and attitudes has been profoundly influenced by a Darwinian natural selection process that favors adaptivity. But if simple adaptivity can explain the content of our evaluative beliefs, any connection they might have with abstract moral truth would seem to be purely coincidental. She continues the (...) skeptical attack in “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It”, concentrating on the intuitionist realism of Ronald Dworkin. The latter sees the issue fundamentally as a holistic choice between moral objectivity and the genocide-countenancing consequences of abandoning objective standards. Street counters that, because of realism’s skeptical difficulties, Dworkin’s Choice (as I call it) actually works in favor of her Euthyphronic antirealism. I will argue that she misrepresents the realist’s skeptical challenge, and that clarifying the character of that challenge renders the case for normative realism much more appealing. Indeed, I claim that Street fails to exclude the genuine possibility of a rational basis for moral truth. (shrink)

I briefly chart the position Einstein came to on nuclear weapons. Then I defend that position against Matchett's idea that Einstein behaved as a pop scientist and intervened ignorantly on an issue of wider concern.

It is generally supposed that borderline cases account for the tolerance of vague terms, yet cannot themselves be sharply bounded, leading to infinite levels of higher order vagueness. This higher order vagueness subverts any formal effort to make language precise. However, it is possible to show that tolerance must diminish at higher orders. The attempt to derive it from indiscriminability founders on a simple empirical test, and we learn instead that there is no limit to how small higher order tolerance (...) may become. That means there is no limit to how precisely we may draw the boundaries of borderline cases, thus forestalling any requirement for higher order vagueness. (shrink)

The argument that follows has a certain air of prestidigitation about it. I attempt to show that, given a couple of innocent-seeming suppositions, it is possible to derive a positive and complete theory of normative ethics from the Humean maxim "You can't get ought from is." This seems, of course, absurd. If the reasoning isn't completely unhinged, you may be sure, the trick has to lie in those "innocent-seeming" props. And, in fact, you are right. But every argument has to (...) begin somewhere, and, however questionable, those suppositions just don't seem to harbor serious normative import. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions do not always clearly distinguish two different forms of vagueness. Sometimes focus is on the imprecision of predicates, and sometimes the indefiniteness of statements. The two are intimately related, of course. A predicate is imprecise if there are instances to which it neither definitely applies nor definitely does not apply, instances of which it is neither definitely true nor definitely false. However, indefinite statements will occur in everyday discourse only if speakers in fact apply imprecise predicates to such (...) indefinite instances. (What makes an instance indefinite is, it should be clear, predicate-relative.) The basic issue in the present inquiry is whether this indefiniteness ever really occurs; the basic question is, Why should it ever occur? (shrink)

Is 'vague' vague? Is the meaning of 'true' vague? Is higher-order vagueness unavoidable? Is it possible to say precisely what it is to say something precisely? These questions, deeply interrelated and of fundamental importance to logic and semantics, have been addressed recently by Achille Varzi in articles focused on an ingenius attempt by Roy Sorensen ("An Argument for the Vagueness of 'Vague'") to demonstrate that 'vague' is vague.

Sharon Street’s 2006 article “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” challenges the epistemological pretensions of the moral realist, of the nonnaturalist in particular. Given that “Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes” – why should one suppose such attitudes and concomitant beliefs would track an independent moral reality? Especially since, on a nonnaturalist view, moral truth is causally inert. I abstract a logical skeleton of Street’s argument and, with its aid, (...) focus on problematic assumptions regarding the (a)causality of moral truth. It emerges that there are acquired causal powers that compensate for the intrinsic impotence of moral truth, as well as two distinct levels at which truth-tracking might occur. I argue that while evolution’s selective forces do not track moral truth, that does not imply individual organisms could not have evolved that capability. -/- . (shrink)

These reflections are an attempt to get to the heart of the "reason is the slave of the passions" debate. The whole point of deliberation is to arrive at a choice. What factors persons find to be choice-relevant is a purely empirical matter. This has significant consequences for the views of Hume, Williams, Nagel, Parfit and Korsgaard regarding practical reason.

Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our (...) intuitions; it does not require us to acknowledge that life is a harm, or that a world devoid of life is a good thing; and it is easy to see why it does not have any pro-mortalist implications. (shrink)

This study aimed to assess the sensory attributes and general acceptability of steamed meat of broiler chickens fed with non-fermented (control) and fermented diets. The study used water, water + coco vinegar, and water + RPL8+AKE probiotic as fermenting causal agents. A total of thirty (30) breast carcass (steamed at 100oC for 10-15 minutes) samples per treatment at five grams (5g) per sample were utilized for evaluation. A group of thirty trained taste panelists composed of Food Technology students assessed the (...) sensory attributes using the quality score and Hedonic scale sheets. Descriptive statistics were used in the sensory evaluation, and analysis of variance (ANOVA), and multiple comparison test using Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) test was used to compare the treatment means of the sensory attributes of the steamed meat samples in terms of skin color, flesh color, aroma, texture, taste, and general acceptability. The rating scores on skin colors (p-value=0.050), and texture (p-value=0.013) of steamed meat of broiler chickens fed with non-fermented and fermented diets were significantly different at a 5% level. Results revealed that the fermented diets have improved the broilers' skin colors (yellowish cream) and improved the texture quality of meat (moderately firm). Based on ANOVA, there is no significant difference observed in the descriptive scores in relation to flesh color (p-value=0.171), aroma (p-value=0.621), taste (p-value=0.723) and general acceptability (p-value=0.491). However, the steamed carcass of broiler-fed fermented diets (coco vinegar and probiotic) is slightly preferred based on ranks. Hence, fermented diets can modify the meat quality of broilers to meet consumers’ expectations. (shrink)

Citation: Braun G, Hellwig MK, Byrnes WM (2007) Global Climate Change and Catholic Responsibility: Facts and Faith Response. Journal of Catholic Social Thought 4(2): 373-401. Abstract: The scientific evidence is now overwhelming that human activity is causing the Earth’s atmosphere to grow hotter, which is leading to global climate change. If current rates of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue, it is predicted that there will be dramatic changes, including flooding, more intense heat waves and storms, and an increase in disease. (...) Indigenous peoples and the poor will be most severely affected, as will Earth’s wild animals and plants, a quarter of which could become extinct in fifty years. We urgently need to switch to renewable (non-GHG emitting) energy sources, and try to live in a simpler, more sustainable way. In this article, a renewable energy expert, a biochemist, and a theologian have come together to describe the situation in which we find ourselves, and present ideas for a solution that incorporates Catholic social teaching. (shrink)

Water is a finite resource held in common by the community yet coveted by individuals and special interests. The water management field is filled with disputes about water allocation, rights, and pollution. Environmental ethics is a basis for equitable water policy making in Delaware. The resource allocation dilemma is examined in relation to conflicting objectives imposed by a market economy between individual self-interests and community environmental well being. Two forms of water law are practiced in the USA—eastern riparianrights and western (...) prior appropriation. Both forms seek an ethical balance to resolve conflicts and protect individual water rights while protecting downstream users (the common good). Delaware Valley case studies discuss how environmental ethics can help the water policy specialist make difficult decisions during conflicts. Surveys polls indicate that 81 percent have values supportive of a balance between the economy and environment, or pro-environment, indicating that an environmental ethic is central to decisions concerning water policy. (shrink)

Theories of self-defence tend to invest heavily in ‘liability justifications’: if the Attacker is liable to have defensive violence deployed against him by the Defender, then he will not be wronged by such violence, and selfdefence becomes, as a result, morally unproblematic. This paper contends that liability justifications are overrated. The deeper contribution to an explanation of why defensive permissions exist is made by the Defender’s non-liability. Drawing on both canonical cases of self-defence, featuring Culpable Attackers, and more penumbral cases (...) of self-defence, involving Non-Responsible Threats, a case is assembled for the ‘Non-Liability First Account’ of self-defence. (shrink)

One Rawlsian response to G. A. Cohen’s criticisms of justice as fairness which Cohen canvasses, and then dismisses, is the 'Freedom Objection'. It comes in two versions. The 'First Version' asserts that there is an unresolved trilemma among the three principles of equality, Pareto-optimality, and freedom of occupational choice, while the 'Second Version' imputes to Rawls’s theory a concern to protect occupational freedom over equality of condition. This article is mainly concerned with advancing three claims. First, the 'ethical solution' Cohen (...) advances against the First Version of the Freedom Objection does not grant a fair hearing to the Freedom Objection. Second, the distinction Cohen presses between the legal and moral right of occupational choice in his response to the Second Version cannot save him from worries about Stalinist coercion. Third, Cohen’s response to the First Version of the Freedom Objection is actually in tension with his response to the Second Version of the Freedom Objection. (shrink)

The question “Why should I be moral?” has long haunted normative ethics. How one answers it depends critically upon one’s understanding of morality, self-interest, and the relation between them. Stephen Finlay, in “Too Much Morality”, challenges the conventional interpretation of morality in terms of mutual fellowship, offering instead the “radical” view that it demands complete altruistic self-abnegation: the abandonment of one’s own interests in favor of those of any “anonymous” other. He ameliorates this with the proviso that there is no (...) rational basis for morality’s presumption of precedence, leaving it up to each person to decide when and whether they prefer self-interested concerns to more stringent moral requirements. I counter Finlay’s radical altruism with fair egalitarianism, a more congenial interpretation of moral normativity that repudiates self-abnegation and holds instead that ceteris paribus everybody’s interests are equal. As a result, supererogation and moral sainthood become more intelligible, and the choice between self-interest and morality becomes one between different decision procedures, the particular advantage of morality being others compatible results. (shrink)

This article examines how a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics can truly avoid an anthropocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation where the environment is at stake. It argues that a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics capable of avoiding the pitfall of an anthropocentric bias can only conceive of the ultimate good—from which virtues are defined—in reference to an ecological self. Such a self implies that the natural environment is not simply a condition for human flourishing, or something that complements it by (...) adding the proper good of animals, organisms or ecosystems. Fulfilment is not that of a human self, but that of an ecological self: the natural environment or nature is not an external but an internal good. Therefore, the virtues or character traits that such an ecological self must nurture and develop leads us ultimately to distinguish—without opposing them—three different forms of virtue ethics applied to the environment, depending on whether it is anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric and whether nature is considered extrinsically or intrinsically. Such distinctions are also crucial to determine how we conceive of the political community and the collective goals that virtuous citizens assign to it (for instance, to preserve biodiversity, to tackle climate change, and so on). (shrink)

This is a letter from an amateur philosopher to Alex Byrne expressing perplexity on reading Byrne's chapter in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, "Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities" (2009). A version of the theory of indirect perception is described using several analogies and one autobiographical episode. It is described as a realization that occurred historically and may occur to individuals, supplanting default naive realism. Byrne's readings of various philosophers' accounts of sensory qualities are then contrasted with (...) an interpretation consistent with the adduced theory of indirect perception. The difficulty of imagining the view from the opposite side of the direct/indirect perception divide is remarked upon. (shrink)

This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...) possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence. (shrink)

There are Humeans and unHumeans, disagreeing as to the validity of the Treatise’s ideas regarding practical reason, but not as to their importance. The basic argument here is that the enduring irresolution of their Hume centric debates has been fostered by what can be called the fallacy of normative monism, i.e. a failure to distinguish between two different kinds of normativity: empirical vs. rational. Humeans take the empirical normativity of personal desire to constitute the only real kind, while unHumeans insist (...) that only the objective rationality associated with categorical morality can provide reliable normative guidance. In turn, the failure to recognize the dual nature of normativity has helped engender motivational obscurantism: as essentially causal notions, motive and motivation obscure the rational processes that lie at the heart of deliberation and choice. Once it is realized that normativity takes two different forms, each with its own distinctive role, it becomes possible to mediate if not mitigate the differences between Humeans and unHumeans. Choice will be the key to understanding practical reasoning, and its analysis will provide the basis for a belief/desire model that upends conventional wisdom regarding motivation and desire. (shrink)

There is currently debate between deflationists and anti-deflationists about the ontology of persisting objects. Some deflationists think that disputes between, for example, four-dimensionalists (e.g. Ted Sider and David Lewis) and quasi-nihilists (e.g. Peter Van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks) are merely verbal disputes. Anti-deflationists deny this. Eli Hirsch is a deflationist who maintains that many ontological disputes are merely verbal. Theodore Sider maintains that the disputes are not merely verbal. Hirsch and Sider are thus engaged in a metaontological dispute. In this (...) paper, I argue that Hirsch's metaontological dispute with Sider is, by Hirsch's own lights, itself merely verbal. I conclude that the mere verbalness of his metaontological dispute with Sider suggests that Hirsch's account of what makes a dispute merely verbal may be problematic. (shrink)

The word ‘equality’ often requires disambiguation, which is provided by context or by an explicit modifier. For each sort of magnitude, there is at least one sense of ‘equals’ with its correlated senses of ‘is greater than’ and ‘is less than’. Given any two magnitudes of the same sort—two line segments, two plane figures, two solids, two time intervals, two temperature intervals, two amounts of money in a single currency, and the like—the one equals the other or the one is (...) greater than the other or the one is greater than the other [sc. in appropriate correlated senses of ‘equals’, ‘is greater than’ and ‘is less than’]. In case there are two or more appropriate senses of ‘equals’, the one intended is often indicated by an adverb. For example, one plane figure may be said to be equal in area to another and, in certain cases, one plane figure may be said to be equal in length to another. Each sense of ‘equality’ is tied to a specific domain and is therefore non-logical. Notice that in every cases ‘equality’ is definable in terms of ‘is greater than’ and also in terms of ‘is less than’ both of which are routinely considered domain specific, non-logical. The word ‘identity’ in the logical sense does not require disambiguation. Moreover, it is not correlated ‘is greater than’ and ‘is less than’. If it is not the case that a certain designated triangle is [sc. is identical to] an otherwise designated triangle, it is not necessary for the one to be greater than or less than the other. Moreover, if two magnitudes are equal then a unit of measure can be chosen and, no matter what unit is chosen, each magnitude is the same multiple of the unit that the other is. But identity does not require units. In this regard, congruence is like identity and unlike equality. In arithmetic, the logical concept of identity is coextensive with the arithmetic concept of equality. The logical concept of identity admits of an analytically adequate definition in terms of logical concepts: given any number x and any number y, x is y iff x has every property that y has. The arithmetical concept of equality admits of an analytically adequate definition in terms of arithmetical concepts: given any number x and any number y, x equals y iff x is neither less than nor greater than y. As Aristotle told us and as Frege retold us, just because one relation is coextensive with another is no reason to conclude that they are one. (shrink)

I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting (...) to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents. (shrink)

This essay responds to the thoughtful essays on the Order of Public Reason (OPR) by Elvio Baccarini, Giulia Bistagnino and Nenad Miscevic. All three essays interrogate OPR’s understanding of moral theory - “meta” matters about the nature of morality, reasons and modeling within moral theories. I first turn to the general understanding of the moral enterprise underlying OPR, explaining why it takes a view at odds with the contemporary mainstream in moral philosophy. I then explain the idea of moral truth (...) in OPR: when it comes to social morality, moral truth is necessarily a function of what can be endorsed by some collectivity. Th is leads to a fundamental worry about theories of public reason: why is the endorsement of the public so important? And if some sort of public endorsement is really so terribly important, how can a theory of public reason withstand the fact that it advances its own controversial claims that cannot be publicly endorsed? After considering when public endorsement is necessary, and when public reason theories can make controversial claims, I close by considering in what way OPR does, and in what way it does not, employ a thought experiment, and the complexities of that. (shrink)

Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The (...) Equivalence Thesis has been formulated, according as the thesis equates the senses or the referents of the relevant sentences. -/- I have two aims in this paper. The first is to demonstrate that a sameness of sense thesis is inconsistent with Frege’s other theses. The second is to argue that a sameness of reference thesis is consistent with them. Thus, all else being equal, Frege ought to endorse a sameness of reference, rather than a sameness of sense thesis. (shrink)

Lawrence Kohlberg's Approach to Moral Education presents what the late Lawrence Kohlberg regarded as the definitive statement of his educational theory. Addressing the sociology and social psychology of schooling, the authors propose that school culture become the center of moral education and research. They discuss how schools can develop as just and cohesive communities by involving students in democracy, and they focus on the moral decisions teachers and students face as they democratically resolve problems. As the authors put it: "...we (...) propose an educational renewal of our democratic society.... We have attempted to establish schools that do more than just teach about democratic citizenship, that are themselves democratic societies.". (shrink)

This thesis examines the relationship between nihilism and postmodernism in relation to the sublime, and is divided into two parts: theory and literature. Beginning with histories of nihilism and the sublime, the Enlightenment is constructed as a conflict between the two. Rather than promote a simple binarism, however, nihilism is constructed as a temporally-displaced form of sublimity that is merely labelled as nihilism because of the dominant ideologies at the time. Postmodernism, as a product of the Enlightenment, is therefore implicitly (...) related to both nihilism and the sublime, despite the fact that it is often characterised as either nihilistic or sublime. Whereas prior forms of nihilism are ‗modernist‘ because they seek to codify reality, postmodernism creates a new formulation of nihilism – ‗postmodern nihilism‘ – that is itself sublime. This is explored in relation to a broad survey of postmodern literature through a series of interconnected themes. These themes – apocalypse, the absurd, absence, and space – arise from the debates presented in the theoretical chapters of this thesis, and demonstrate the ways in which nihilism and the sublime interact within postmodern literature. Because of the theoretical and literary debates presented within it, this thesis concludes that it cannot be a thesis at all. (shrink)

Agency is an amazing thing: it transduces cognitivity into causality, it makes thought real. How it does so has been a matter of considerable dispute, the resolution of which has been hampered by moral complications. The supposition of a rational basis for morality can play an essential role in clarifying agency by providing a ground for legitimizing the objects of desire and the motivation they provide. The four-stage model of agency presented here – deliberation, calculation, intention, and enactment – emerges (...) when the moral concerns regarding desire have been detoxified. A crucial distinction is between the cognitive and causal aspects of desire, between the estimation of desirability (preference) and the actual motivation it may initiate (desire). Failure to recognize desire’s cognitive aspect preemptively disables its participation in practical reasoning. (shrink)

Aqui se conta uma história de alguns segredos, tão antigos quanto algo entre 240 e 350 mil anos, revelados por uma misteriosa caverna. É uma história que ganha vida como um palimpsesto, sobrepondo-se à outra, narrada no documentário Caverna de Ossos, da série Explorando o Desconhecido. Impossível não ficar impactado por esse relato, pois levanta várias questões intrigantes sobre a evolução humana e sobre a própria definição de humano. Essa narrativa, mais do que pela razão formal e analítica, é conduzida (...) pela poética do tempo arcaico, ou seja, é levada pela emoção de vislumbrar raízes da natureza humana, tão distantes – pré-históricas – e pelo fascínio de muitas das indagações interdisciplinares postas aqui em evidência. É, em última análise, uma breve história de devaneio acerca do significado de ser humano. (shrink)