Experimental activity is traditionally identified with testing the empirical implications or numerical simulations of models against data. In critical reaction to the ‘tribunal view’ on experiments, this essay will show the constructive contribution of experimental activity to the processes of modeling and simulating. Based on the analysis of a case in fluid mechanics, it will focus specifically on two aspects. The first is the controversial specification of the conditions in which the data are to be obtained. The second is conceptual (...) clarification, with a redefinition of concepts central to the understanding of the phenomenon and the conditions of its occurrence. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that simulation can serve as epistemic substitute for experimentation. Such a claim might be suggested by the fast-spreading use of computer simulation to investigate phenomena not accessible to experimentation (in astrophysics, ecology, economics, climatology, etc.). But what does that mean? The paper starts with a clarification of the terms of the issue and then focuses on two powerful arguments for the view that simulation and experimentation are ‘epistemically on a par’. One is based on the claim (...) that, in experimentation, no less than in simulation, it is not the system under study that is manipulated but a system that ‘stands-in’ for it. The other one highlights the pervasive use of models in experimentation. It will be argued that these arguments, as compelling as they might seem, are each based on a mistaken interpretation of experimentation and that, far from simulation and experimentation being epistemically on a par, they do not have the same epistemic function, do not produce the same kind of epistemic results. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state (...) of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called “objectless” awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labelled as ‘nothingness phase’ since it described what participants took to be an experience of ‘nothingness’. his common phase was characterised by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being ‘somewhere’—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded. (shrink)

This paper aims 1) to introduce the notion of theoretical story as a resource and source of constraint for the construction and assessment of models of phenomena; 2) to show the relevance of this notion for a better understanding of the role and nature of values in scientific activity. The reflection on the role of values and value judgments in scientific activity should be attentive, I will argue, to the distinction between models and the theoretical story that guides and constrains (...) their construction. The aim of scientific activity is to develop understanding of phenomena, and something that serves this aim and contributes to the development of understanding has a cognitive value. Cognitive values are the features that something that plays a role in scientific activity should have so that it can serve its aim. I will focus my attention on the features of the theoretical story and of the models. (shrink)

With an extensive amount of research on the social lives of primates, Frans de Waal has been a pioneering advocate for the continuity of human and non-human minds, putting forward the idea that these creatures exhibit rudimentary political and moral behaviors. One of the traits which de Waal focuses on is animal normativity, a set of behaviors functionally defined as adherence to social standards. Recently, some philosophers have endorsed this position, holding that animals show a psychological capacity called normative cognition (...) underlying those and other social behaviors. In this paper, I assess whether advocacy for animal normativity is an exercise of theory construction in comparative cognition. To that end, I present three features of this kind of theory construction. First, the explanatory goal of building functional analyses of cognitive capacities. Second, the conceptual aid of comparative thinking for theory construction. Third, the heuristic value of theory in specifying possible roads of inquiry. Taking these features into account, I assess whether the claims advocates make regarding animal normativity consider them. My answer is negative. First, since some advocates focus on behavioral traits and not on psychological capacities, they are not producing theory in comparative cognition, although, as I argue, they should. Second, there is a disregard for hypothesis testing and no evolutionary considerations to support their views. Finally, the claim that non-human animals exhibit normativity does not seem to have heuristic value. (shrink)

The intuitive distinction between natural and unnatural properties (e.g., green vs. grue) informs our theorizing not only in fundamental physics, but also in non-fundamental domains. This paper develops a reductive account of this broad notion of naturalness that covers non-fundamental properties: for a property to be natural, I propose, is for it to figure in a law of nature. After motivating the account, I defend it from a potential circularity charge. I argue that a suitably broad notion of lawhood can (...) be defined independently of naturalness, if we help ourselves to the notion of a fundamental physical property. I end by showing how the notions of naturalness and lawhood that my account delivers help illuminate a number of other important philosophical notions, like causation, reference/meaning, and rational induction. (shrink)

El trabajo explora críticamente la idea de una justificación débil o pen última de la moral enmarcándola en el conjunto de la filosofía de Tugendhat, reordenan do sus escritos éticos y discriminando los diversos aspectos que incluye dicha idea. Entre ellos, revisa el concepto formal de moral, ligado a los sentimientos, antes de centrarse en el punto crucial: la fundamentación de la ética moderna. Aquí se distingue, por un lado, la justificación comparativa de un contractualismo igualitario frente a otras alternativas (...) teóricas y, por otro, los motivos que pueden llevar a un individuo autónomo a entenderse en términos morales. (shrink)

The present paper tries to answer the question _Is religious education compatible with the purposes of liberal education?_ This work argues that it is possible, and desirable, that democratic states built on liberal ideals include religious education in all schools since increasing the number of options among which the future citizen may choose the conception of the good with which he or she wishes to live is a condition for autonomy as one of its educational purposes. However, the proposal is (...) not based on religious confessional education, which by itself does not satisfy the liberal educational goals, but is redefined from the common noahide principles compatible both religious confessions and non-religious views of morality and citizenship. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivist Model Building: Empirical Examples From Mathematics Education” by Catherine Ulrich, Erik S. Tillema, Amy J. Hackenberg & Anderson Norton. Upshot: I argue that radical constructivism poses a series of deep methodological constraints on educational research. We focus on the work of Ulrich et al. to illustrate the practical implications of these constraints.

a book review for Hagen Schulze's "Gibt es überhaupt eine deutsche Geschichte?" done as a homework for university (KIT Institut für Geschichte) Modul Pol.G. I.

Se trata de la Presentación al libro Coordenadas Epistemológicas para una estética en construcción, obra publicada por la Colección La Fuente y coeditada entre el Cuerpo Académico de Estética y Arte de la BUAP y el Instituto de Filosofía de Cuba. En la presentación se describen los contenidos básicos de las tres partes que componen el libro: Parte I. Una estética en construcción; Parte II: El arte en el discurso de la estética; Parte III: Espectacularidad y seducción. Miradas estéticas a (...) la socialidad contemporánea. También se hace referencia al papel jugado por la Dra. Alicia Pino en la concepción, contenido y estructura de este libro, a cuya memoria se dedica. (shrink)

El presente texto pretende analizar el concepto de 'destino' atribuido a Heráclito por ciertos autores de la antigüedad a la luz de los fragmentos del corpus heraclíteo y la doxografía disponibles. Se pretende mostrar la pertinencia de leer a los filósofos presocráticos, como Heráclito de Éfeso, en un contexto enriquecido por fragmentos y material textual de otras clases (doxografía, reminiscencias y paráfrasis) a fin de ofrecer una explicación para la atribución del término ειμαρμεν-eta o su correspondiente en latín 'fatum', al (...) filósofo Efesio. (shrink)

"El ser es uno con la comida; ser significa comer; es (ist) lo que come (isst) y lo que ha comido. Comer es la forma subjetiva, activa, siendo lo comido la forma objetiva, pasiva, pero ambas son inseparables. Por tanto, únicamente comiendo se llena el concepto vacío del ser y se revela el carácter absurdo de la pregunta: ¿el ser y el no ser son idénticos, es decir, comer y pasar hambre son idénticos?".

Desde la certidumbre del sentido necesariamente inacabado, nómada y abierto de sus propuestas, el presente volumen de la Colección La Fuente da cuentas del esfuerzo de un grupo de investigadores del Instituto de Filosofía de La Habana (IF) y de la Universidad Autónoma de Puebla (BUAP) por esbozar, más que respuestas, aquellas interrogantes sociales, culturales y artísticas que, desde constelaciones cambiantes de conceptos y reflexiones estéticas, puedan ser emplazadas en sus respectivas realidades. El presente libro es el tercero de la (...) serie Redes, dedicada a plasmar los principales resultados del trabajo de colaboración del Cuerpo Académico de Estética y Arte de la BUAP con otros grupos de investigación. La coordinación de esta entrega contó con la sapiencia y laboriosidad académica de la doctora Alicia Pino Rodríguez (1954-2017), investigadora del IF, integrante del Consejo de la Colección, coordinadora de su segundo volumen y parte esencial de este, dedicado a su memoria. (shrink)

En este texto nos proponemos abordar la última clase del semanario de Deleuze sobre el poder en Foucault a partir de dos momentos. El primero tiene que ver con el concepto de imagen y la interpretación sobre el cine que ya venía siendo una constante —aunque marginalmente— en estas clases de Deleuze. Seguidamente, el segundo momento tiene que ver con la relación entre poder y resistencia que arroja como resultado una interpretación del pensamiento de Foucault por parte de Deleuze como (...) una obra viva y en constante construcción. Así, cumpliremos con la exigencia de una lectura que invita a pensar en los conceptos como herramientas de análisis integradas al desarrollo de situaciones donde el poder se presenta como noción central. (shrink)

Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena — belief polarization and the size-weight illusion — that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?

Many pragmatist and non-representational approaches to cognition, such as the enactivist, have focused on the relations between actions, affectivity, and habits from an intersubjective perspective. For those adopting such approaches, all these aspects are inextricably connected; however, many questions remain open regarding the dynamics by which they unfold and shape each other over time. This paper addresses a specific topic that has not received much attention: the impact on future behavior of not fulfilling possibilities for social interaction even though their (...) fulfillment is desirable within a given context. Inspired by Gibson’s theory of affordances and Dewey’s account of habits, these situations will be characterized as events where an agent does not act upon an inviting affordance for social interaction due to a conflict which he or she experiences between given concerns, needs, and social norms. This conflict leads to a sense of unfulfillment that may eventually bring about a crisis and revision of habits. Through specific examples, this work presents the potential impact of the connection between affordances, habits, and affectivity on everyday situations. It therefore represents an exploration of the common ground between pragmatism and enactivism and an attempt to contribute to a process-based approach to social interaction. (shrink)

This paper explores various notions of aesthetic affordance recently developed through embodied, situated and enactive approaches to aesthetic experience by Maria Brincker and Shaun Gallagher, and the similarities and differences between them and the idea of affective affordance put forward by Joel Krueger and Giovanna Colombetti. This discussion is a way to try to offer some answers to the question of what aesthetic affordances particularly afford compared to affective affordances. I will focus on the affordances that we perceive during various (...) aesthetic experiences in which we find ourselves more moved by the object, event or person(s) causing the experience than we had anticipated. I will argue that these experiences emerge as opportunities to carry out an active exploration of aspects of the narrative self that we feel is related to features of the experience; and that one particular brain network likely to be involved in these experiences – i.e. the default network – might help us to understand how these experiences meaningfully change our relationship with ourselves and with the social context of which we are a part. (shrink)

This essay proposes a reductive account of robust macro-regularities. On the view proposed, regularities can earn their elite scientific status by featuring in good summaries of restricted regions in the space of physical possibilities: our “modal neighborhoods.” I argue that this view vindicates “nomic foundationalism”, while doing justice to the practice of invoking physically contingent generalizations in higher-level explanations. Moreover, the view suggests an explanation for the particular significance of robust macro-regularities: we rely on summaries of our modal neighborhoods when (...) reasoning hypothetically about “agentially accessible” possibilities. (shrink)

Abstract: In the past fifteen years Tugendhat has tentatively proposed to recover the role of anthropology as the core philosophical discipline or first philosophy. This peculiar return to the German thinking of the ‘20s is, on the one hand, a projection of the author’s whole intellectual evolution. On the other hand, it allows us to focus on classic epistemological problems of philosophical anthropology such as its object and contents, its method, and its place among other philosophical studies. The present paper (...) criticizes Tugendhat’s position, yet considers this sort of return to Kant as valuable, a return that sees anthropology as the core and ultimate self-reflective telos of philosophy. -/- Key Words: Ends of reason. Human vulnerability. Kant. Metaphilosophy. Self-reflection. (shrink)

The mind and brain sciences influence how human beings understand one another. Histories of the concepts of repression, implicit bias, ADHD, IQ, and personhood reveal that scientific psychology has played a role, not just in shaping people's thinking about minds, but also (and thereby) in shaping minds themselves. These case studies may thus be seen as supporting the contentious thesis that science aids in the social construction of minds. Three considerations are relevant to determining how seriously we should take that (...) contention: (1) to what extent was it inevitable that socially sophisticated animals would come to describe minds in the ways that 21st century humans do?; (2) to what extent do human sociocognitive practices accurately describe the inherent structure of the mind?; (3) to what extent can historical stability in descriptions of minds be chalked up to the fact that people are accurately describing the structure of the mind? (shrink)

The most recent work by Jürgen Habermas tries to revalue religion in today's society. For this he tries to find genealogical connections between secular content and the worldviews that emerged in the Axial Age, including Jewish monotheism. In this article we try to propose that a genealogical approach to monotheism from the perspective of those involved would have to start from the context of undetected origin that constitutes the ethical universalism of Judaism: the Noahide code. To do this, we analyze (...) narrative and conceptual elements of axial and non-axial cultures and show their parallels with the seven laws of the children of Noah as the moral core of humanity. (shrink)

“Conciencia”, la sección inicial de la Fenomenología de Hegel, se ocupa de la comprensión del mundo físico que nos rodea. La sección siguiente, “Autoconciencia”, comienza a considerar nuestra comprensión de nosotros mismos y de los otros. Este orden de discusión no es ni arbitrario ni meramente conveniente. Por el contrario, una de las principales lecciones que hemos de aprender hacia el final del desarrollo de la “conciencia” es que nuestra mejor concepción del mundo que es el objeto de nuestras actividades (...) cognitivas es inteligible solo como una parte de un relato que además considera la naturaleza del sujeto que se dedica a tales actividades. La razón para esta transición expositiva es un aspecto importante en el idealismo de Hegel. En este capítulo ofrezco una reconstrucción racional de un argumento que veo como el soporte de esta transición y del tipo de idealismo que esta implica. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind (from eliminative materialists to psychofunctionalists to interpretivists) generally assume that a normative ideal delimits which mental phenomena exist (though they disagree about how to characterize the ideal in question). This assumption is dubious. A comprehensive ontology of mind includes some mental phenomena that are neither (a) explanatorily fecund posits in any branch of cognitive science that aims to unveil the mechanistic structure of cognitive systems nor (b) ideal (nor even progressively closer to ideal) posits in any given (...) folk psychological practice. Indeed, one major function of scientific psychology has been (and will be) to introduce just such (normatively suboptimal but real) mental phenomena into folk psychological taxonomies. The development and public dissemination of IQ research over the course of the 20th century is a case in point. (shrink)

Introductory but opinionated essay on what (and why) minds are.

What are the probabilities that this universe is repeated exactly the same with you in it again? Is God invented by human imagination or is the result of human intuition? The intuition that the same laws/mechanisms (evolution, stability winning probability) that have created something like the human being capable of self-awareness and controlling its surroundings, could create a being capable of controlling all what it exists? Will be the characteristics of the next universes random or tend to something? All these (...) ques-tions that with different shapes (but the same essence) have been asked by human be-ings from the beginning of times will be developed in this paper. (shrink)

Aunque no puede hablarse en sentido estricto de una teoría moral del existencialismo a la manera de los grandes sistemas y modelos éticos de occidente, sí existen muchos argumentos que respaldan una versión en la cual es discutida la moral tradicional en contraposición a la posibilidad de una moral de la situación apoyada por las tesis más importantes de los existencialistas. Simone de Beauvoir ha elaborado un conjunto de textos donde esta posibilidad es expuesta.

This article reconsiders the relationship between interpretivism about belief and normative standards. Interpretivists have traditionally taken beliefs to be fixed in relation to norms of interpretation. However, recent work by philosophers and psychologists reveals that human belief attribution practices are governed by a rich diversity of normative standards. Interpretivists thus face a dilemma: either give up on the idea that belief is constitutively normative or countenance a context-sensitive disjunction of norms that constitute belief. Either way, interpretivists should embrace the intersubjective (...) indeterminacy of belief. (shrink)

This paper is an essay published under the title A Critical Praxis from the Americas: Thinking about the Zapatistas in Chiapas with Herbert Marcuse, Bolívar Echeverría, and Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, in Lamas, A. T .; Wolfson, T. & Funke, P. N. (Eds.). (2017). The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements (pp. 329-342). Philadelphia: Temple University Press. The author kindly authorized the publication in Spanish version by Jhoan Sebastian David Giraldo and Cristian Leandro Sánchez Marín.

Making sense of modeling: beyond representation Content Type Journal Article Category Original paper in Philosophy of Science Pages 335-352 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0032-8 Authors Isabelle Peschard, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Ave, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 3.

In this article I briefly explain what souls are. Which are in everything that exists; They are possessed by people, animals, plants, non-living matter and any type of energetic existence. But only those that have evolved into living matter can be living souls; Furthermore, these must belong to an order such as the living evolutionary order. At the same time that everything evolves, the souls of everything also evolve, because everything is mathematically hierarchical through the evolutions of all the souls. (...) The cosmos is a saturation of dynamically synchronized evolutionary souls. Souls are the smallest possible immaterial existences that exist, which have the ability to memorize an infinite amount of information, since information does not take up space. The more information the souls have memorized, the greater the chances they have of evolving further. (shrink)

La ciudadanía y lo político. Ciudadanía y crisis de la democracia liberal en un mundo en transformación es un texto provocador, que desafía directamente a las esferas de poder económico, político y social en el marco de la corrupción. Deja al descubierto las entrañas cancerígenas de una política enferma de poder, donde priman los intereses particulares o políticos sobre los intereses del pueblo. El libro es una lanza que atraviesa las profundidades que erosionan nuestra sociedad, realizando así un análisis riguroso (...) desde distintas aristas, que tienen un elemento común: la corrupción política. A lo largo de las páginas se ofrece un enorme panorama sobre el papel de la ciudadanía dentro de la sociedad, que reclama a gritos una revolución desalienante frente a la cleptoestructura. Es así como, el papel de la ciudadanía es el centro de la reflexión analítica que nos presenta Joan Lara Amat y León. (shrink)

De acuerdo con una caracterización filosófica estándar, el comportamiento humano se hace inteligible a partir de estados mentales, atendiendo especialmente a dos relaciones explicativas: la racionalidad y la causalidad. En el presente artículo evaluaremos cuán adecuada es dicha caracterización respecto a las explicaciones que se dan en las psicoterapias contextuales. Nuestro análisis establece varias respuestas por la negativa. Por un lado, el objetivo de estas terapias no es la comprensión ni la evaluación normativa, por lo que la racionalidad no juega (...) allí un rol explicativo. A su vez, el rol de la causalidad es secundario en la evaluación diagnóstica, dado que en esa etapa del proceso terapéutico es la función de los comportamientos la que busca elucidarse. Finalmente, sostenemos que la intervención terapéutica de estas psicoterapias se centra en explicaciones causales, aunque no desde el modelo de sentido común que la caracterización filosófica supone. Sugerimos, por la positiva, que las explicaciones del comportamiento en psicoterapias contextuales son híbridas: al evaluar apelan a explicaciones funcionales y al intervenir a explicaciones causales. (shrink)

In der Kritik der Urteilskraft vertritt Kant noch die analogische Beziehung zwischen Schönheit und Sittlichkeit (KU, AA 05: 351–354). Aber wir befinden uns hier in einem ganz anderen Zusammenhang. Und dies nicht nur, weil die Erörterung dieser analogischen Beziehung eine Lösung für das Problem der Verknüpfung zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft beansprucht. Die Reflexionen in den Vorlesungen über Anthropologie über die pragmatische Dimension des Geschmacks setzten die Möglichkeit dieser Verknüpfung bereits voraus, bevor Kant eine kritische Begründung derselben erreichte. Wir dürfen (...) aber diese Reflexionen nicht als das Ergebnis unreifer Versuche zur Lösung dieses kritischen Problems der Rationalitätstheorie Kants deuten. Während der Paragraph 59 der Kritik der Urteilskraft Teil der spekulativen Philosophie ist, wird die Kritik des Geschmacks in den Vorlesungen über Anthropologie vielmehr insofern sinnvoll, da sie zu einem pragmatischen, populären und aufgeklärten Bildungsprogramm der Anthropologie Kants gehört. (shrink)

Esta reflexión plantea el problema que se da al querer dar cuenta del individuo, como existencia, de manera sistemática en el terreno de las tendencias lógicas de la ética. Sören Kierkegaard, será la guía para plantear que tal pretensión es dañina y se presenta como la imposibilidad para la afirmación de la subjetividad como vitalidad abierta siempre a las posibilidades que ofrece la condición humana. Para el desarrollo de este planteamiento trataremos de confrontar algunos planteamientos de Kierkegaard -sobre todo el (...) de la irreductibilidad de la existencia a sistema- con la eticidad hegeliana en particular, para mostrar cómo se revienta el postulado de un sistema de la existencia. Este reventarse se debe entender no como destrucción de lo dado sino como enfrentamiento de ello y conducción hasta sus últimas consecuencias donde se hace manifiesta la imposibilidad de encerrar la existencia en la estrecha posición de la ética como ciencia normativa, es decir como imperativo de comportamiento y direccionamiento moral de la subjetividad por los carriles del pensamiento que absorbe al ser y que postula a la razón como la directriz de todo proyecto vital. (shrink)

This paper presents a discussion about how the necessity and teleology are present in the theory of nature in Empedocles and Aristotle. For this task we go through the fragments relate to the thought of Empedocles in the Poem From Nature as a central reference to the work The presocratic philosophers of Kirk and Raven, and the work Physics I and II of Aristotle.

Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as (...) patterns of living that contextualize behavior. (shrink)

The environment can elicit biological responses such as oxidative stress (OS) and inflammation as a consequence of chemical, physical, or psychological changes. As population studies are essential for establishing these environment-organism interactions, biomarkers of OS or inflammation are critical in formulating mechanistic hypotheses. By using examples of stress induced by various mechanisms, we focus on the biomarkers that have been used to assess OS and inflammation in these conditions. We discuss the difference between biomarkers that are the result of a (...) chemical reaction (such as lipid peroxides or oxidized proteins that are a result of the reaction of molecules with reactive oxygen species) and those that represent the biological response to stress, such as the transcription factor NRF2 or inflammation and inflammatory cytokines. The high-throughput and holistic approaches to biomarker discovery used extensively in large-scale molecular epidemiological exposome are also discussed in the context of human exposure to environmental stressors. We propose to consider the role of biomarkers as signs and to distinguish between signs that are just indicators of biological processes and proxies that one can interact with and modify the disease process. (shrink)

Basándome en la explicación que hace Jean-Paul Sartre de la violencia, sostengo que no solo la mala fe es inevitable en la práctica, sino que una mala fe limitada es necesaria para la autenticidad. Aunque violar la libertad de otros es mala fe, es imposible no violar nunca la libertad de alguien. Además, y de manera fundamental, la estructura ontológica del para-sí implica que este solo puede ser auténtico en el modo de no ser auténtico. Tratar de evitar por completo (...) la mala fe es, en sí mismo, un acto de mala fe, porque es un intento de constituirse como esencialmente auténtico, pero el para-sí no tiene esencia preexistente. Sin embargo, al reconocer la total responsabilidad de uno por elegir la mala fe, se limita su alcance. Esta mala fe limitada es, de hecho, necesaria para la autenticidad, un proyecto vivido en situaciones concretas y no una ley moral categórica que prohíbe la mala fe. [This is a Spanish translation by Leandro Sánchez Marín of the article "The Authentic Person's Limited Bad Faith".]. (shrink)

Originally formulated as a theory of perception, ecological psychology has shown in recent decades an increasing interest in language. However, a comprehensive approach to language by ecological psychology has not yet been developed, as there is neither a naturalist philosophy of language nor one that takes ecological psychology as its scientific background. Our goal here is to argue that a subject naturalist and non-factualist framework can open the possibility of an expressivist analysis of perceptual judgments that is compatible with the (...) ecological understanding of perception, showing that such utterances do not work as descriptions of facts or states-of-affairs, but rather say something about the practical requirements necessary to display a perceptual vocabulary. We will also argue that this approach allows an understanding of perceptual content as clusters of socially-mediated affordances. If our proposal is sound, it would constitute a first and fruitful approximation toward establishing a naturalist link between embodied cognitive science and philosophy of language. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dilemma for interpretivism first posed by Alex Byrne. On the first horn of the dilemma, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to an ideal interpreter (and thus loses any connection with actual folk psychological practices). On the second horn, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to individuals’ judgements (and thus denies the possibility of error). I show that this is a false dilemma. By (...) taking a model-theoretic approach to folk psychology, and marrying interpretivism with dispositionalism, interpretivists can viably reject the notion of an ideal (or canonical) interpreter—and relativize attitudes to actual lay interpreters—without taking on board the unacceptable epistemological consequences of allowing that attitudes are judgement-dependent. (shrink)

Una pandemia ha golpeado a millones de familias en el mundo. Este problema global parecía que cuestionaba todas nuestras formas de vida. No obstante, los malos hábitos y las viejas estructuras corruptas comenzaron a aprovecharse de esta situación. Y la corrupción volvió a la escena, en la sobrevaloración de medicamentos o equipos médicos, en la mala repartición de víveres o de dinero, en el cobro de dinero por ingreso a una unidad de cuidado intensivo, aprovecharse de su posición política para (...) vacunarse antes, etc. ¿Se ha normalizado la corrupción en la vida nacional? (shrink)