In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).

how does one inquire into the truth of first principles? Where does one begin when deciding where to begin? Aristotle recognizes a series of difficulties when it comes to understanding the starting points of a scientific or philosophical system, and contemporary scholars have encountered their own difficulties in understanding his response. I will argue that Aristotle was aware of a Platonic solution that can help us uncover his own attitude toward the problem.Aristotle's central problem with first principles arises from the (...) fact that they cannot be demonstrated in the same way as other propositions. Since demonstrations proceed from prior and better-known principles, if the principles themselves were in need of... (shrink)

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...) particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...) Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory. Jago argues that accepting the Disjunction Thesis and rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is hard to maintain. But I show that Jago has not shown that accepting the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is impossible or even hard to maintain. Jago believes that, to accept the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis, one needs to reject his axiom (T3), which says that all the truthmakers for <P&P> are truthmakers for <P>. I argue that there are reasons to reject such a principle, and the version of it that says that what makes <P&P> true makes <P> true. (shrink)

According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...) related problem that we dub the Problem of Guaranteed Proof . We argue that Leibniz has an answer to these problems since for him one has not proved that ‘Peter denies Christ’ unless one has also proved that ‘Peter’ is a consistent concept, an impossible task since it requires the full decomposition of the infinite concept ‘Peter’. We defend this view from objections found in the literature and maintain that for Leibniz all truths about created individual beings are contingent. (shrink)

Sacrificial dilemmas such as the trolley problem play an important role in experimental philosophy (x-phi). But it is increasingly argued that, since we are not likely to encounter runaway trolleys in our daily life, the usefulness of such thought experiments for understanding moral judgments in more ecologically valid contexts may be limited. However, similar sacrificial dilemmas are experienced in real life by animal research decision makers. As part of their job, they must make decisions about the suffering, and often the (...) death, of many non-human animals. For this reason, a context-specific investigation of so-called “3R dilemmas” (i.e., dilemmas where there is a conflict between the principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement of the use of animals in research) is essential to improve the situation of both non-human animals and human stakeholders. An approach well suited for such investigation is experimental philosophical bioethics (“bioxphi”), which draws on methods similar to x-phi to probe more realistic, practical scenarios with an eye to informing normative debates and ethical policy. In this article, we argue for a need to investigate 3R dilemmas among professional decision-makers using the tools of bioxphi. In a first step, we define 3R dilemmas and discuss previous investigations of professionals’ attitudes in such cases. In a second step, we show how bioxphi is a promising method to investigate the whys and hows of professional decision-making in 3R dilemmas. In a last step, we provide a bioxphi template for 3R dilemmas, give recommendations on its use, explore the normative relevance of data collected by such means, and discuss important limitations. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se presenta el panorama y algunos de los más importantes avances que en Colombia se han dado en materia ambiental desde la Constitución Política de 1991. La metodología llevada a cabo es descriptiva y analítica, en tanto se estudian no sólo las normas sino las sentencias más relevantes que se han constituido en un hito en la protección de los derechos ambientales. En tal sentido, lo que se pretende evidenciar es la existencia de un panorama de (...) constitucionalización de los derechos ambientales con signicativos avances tales como el rol preponderante que ha adquirido el principio de precaución o el reconocimiento de la función ecológica de la propiedad. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the nature of halakhic facts and I frame the discussion in a broader meta-ethical context. Most of the existing literature on the philosophy of halakha has focused on the contrast between ‘Halakhic Realism’ and ‘Halakhic Nominalism’. This theoretical contrast is vague and includes a wide range of theories. Inspired by the meta-ethical literature, I propose to focus the discussion on views that can be called ‘Halakhic Naturalism’ and ‘Halakhic Non-naturalism’. I present, develop and distinguish between (...) different meanings of 'naturalism' and consider arguments for and against 'Halakhic Naturalism'. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present and demonstrate the fruitful encounter between meta-ethics and the philosophy of halakha. Second, to present, evaluate and promote the substantive discussion of naturalistic and non-naturalistic views. (shrink)

Dialogamos con Cintia Rodríguez Garat, quien obtuvo el Primer Premio Bioética 2023 de la Fundación Jaime Roca por su trabajo “Resiliencia y salud pública de las mujeres mapuce ante el cambio climático. Un análisis desde una perspectiva intercultural, participativa y de derechos humanos”.

En este breve ensayo me interesa analizar el concepto de lenguaje privado desarrollado por Ludwig Wittgenstein. La importancia radica en el desafío que plantea esta noción cuando nos ponemos a pensar sobre las posibilidades reales de un lenguaje puramente privado. En este sentido, el argumento del enfoque wittgensteiniano sostiene que el significado de las palabras no se origina en experiencias subjetivas individuales, sino en la interacción social dentro de una comunidad de hablantes. De modo que, si cada persona tuviera un (...) lenguaje exclusivamente privado, la comunicación sería imposible. Por ello, el objetivo de este escrito se centra en debatir si efectivamente el lenguaje es un fenómeno colectivo, arraigado en prácticas compartidas y acuerdos tácitos, o bien, puede tratarse de una construcción personal subjetiva. En síntesis, para examinar este planteo me centraré en el argumento propuesto por Kripke contra el lenguaje privado, y desde allí, analizaré la paradoja escéptica de Wittgenstein. (shrink)

"Translating Key Terms Terms in Lu Cheng's Records in the Chuan xi lu: Some Preliminary Considerations" Draft paper for the 2024 Conference on [Wang] Yangming's Learning of Mind, Shaoxing, Zhejiang. Updated October 4, 2024. The final version will appear in the conference volume. -/- Criticism and suggestions welcome. Please do email.

Cuento ganador en la categoría "Mini ficción" de la compilación "El covid no es un cuento".

The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, (...) namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. I shall argue that the resemblance nominalist can say that those conjunctions have the same truthmakers but these truthmakers make them true in different ways. I shall also use this view to account for the truthmakers of propositions like 〈Socrates is white〉, and respond to previous objections by Cian Dorr and Jessica Wilson. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a Kantian framework for moral trust—trust in another person to only act with us in morally permissible ways. First, I derive an understanding of trustworthiness from Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. I argue that trustworthiness embodies a moral imperative, guiding us to act in ways that are reliable and recognizable as conducive to engaging in trusting relations. However, this alone is not enough, as it doesn't provide a means to assess whether someone is (...) truly committed to the moral law and thus morally trustworthy. Therefore, in the second part, I explore a basis for assessing their moral conduct found in a local version of the Kingdom of Ends: given an ideal or archetype of a morally perfect interpersonal relationship, an archetype of the morally trustworthy agent allows us to comparatively assess the moral disposition of fellow agents. (shrink)

In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.

Since 1968, the irreversible loss of functioning of the whole brain, called brain death, is assimilated to individual’s death. The almost universal acceptance of this neurological criterion of death had decisive consequences for the contemporary medicine, such as the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in these patients and organ retrieval for transplantation. The new criterion was successfully accepted in part because the assimilation of brain death state to death was presented by medicine --and acritically assumed by most of societies-- as a (...) scientific and objective fact. Nevertheless, many people do not think that the patients suffering brain death are actually dead. We show here that those people are not necessarily wrong. It can be argued that, in fact, the justification of the neurological criterion is not scientific but moral. We outline the thesis that the problem surrounding the vital status of brain dead patients is due to a confusion between factual and normative questions. Furthermore, we claim that the donation of organs and the withdrawal of life-support could be ethically acceptable even if the patients suffering brain death are considered as alive. As an alternative to the dead donor rule, we propose a justification for organ donation of brain-dead patients based on the (moral) concepts of harm and consent : what truly justifies the procurement of organs on those patients is not that they are dead, but that they wish to donate their organs and that, since they have irreversibly lost their brain, they cannot be harmed. (shrink)

When philosophers consider factors compromising autonomy in consent, they often focus solely on the consent-giver’s agential capacities, overlooking the impact of the consent-receiver’s conduct on the consensual character of the activity. In this paper, I argue that valid consent requires justified trust in the consent-receiver to act only within the scope of consent. I call this the Trust Condition (TC), drawing on Katherine Hawley’s commitment account of trust. TC constitutes a belief that the consent-receiver is capable and willing to act (...) as we expect from them. If such trust is not warranted, I argue, consent lacks the appropriate normative grounds. After establishing TC, I explore its application in the sexual arena, asserting that due to the non-contractual dimensions of sexual activity — such as the dynamic nature of sexual desires and the absence of external factors effectively binding sexual partners to the terms of consent—trust is warranted in sexual consent by means of care. I define care as a special sensitivity and attention toward the partner’s will and discuss how this approach leads to safer intimate relationships in practice. (shrink)

The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.

Con el objetivo de reflexionar sobre la potencialidad filosófica y política que tienen los afectos “negativos”, me interesa repensar el rol social de estos afectos a partir de abordar los efectos, en términos de agencialidad, que pueden propiciar en el ámbito político. Para ello, comenzaré con una breve caracterización sobre las implicancias del concepto de “olas” del feminismo, para entender a grandes rasgos los cambios históricos conquistados por las luchas feministas y los activismos. En este sentido, me situaré en la (...) “cuarta ola” del feminismo para abordar las nociones vinculadas al giro afectivo, a partir del fuerte cuestionamiento que esta matriz teórica le realiza a la noción de temporalidad lineal. Finalmente, analizaré la potencialidad que portan los afectos “negativos” en la escena política, a partir de resaltar el fuerte tono revolucionario que estas emociones, en tanto expresiones de la visceralidad, pueden tener en la transformación de la sociedad cuando irrumpen en el orden público. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss a subset of preferences in which a person desires the fulfillment of a choice they have made, even if it involves the violation of their desires, as in rape fantasies. I argue that such cases provide us with a unique insight into personal autonomy from a proceduralist standpoint. In its first part, I analyze some examples in light of Frankfurt's endorsement theory and argue that even when we cannot endorse a practical decision that involves being (...) violated, we nonetheless regard those cases as instances of autonomy. Therefore, autonomy does not necessarily require endorsement. Instead, I propose that the nature of the relevant highest-order volition dictates the procedure that should be established in one’s desire structure for its fulfillment. In the second part, I discuss how an agent may effectively consent to the violation of their decision by another person. Ordinary consent typically refers to actions but fails to communicate one's higher-order desires or commitments. To address this limitation, I propose a practical tool that accomplishes this by signaling shifts in the normative context where the agents are interacting. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone documentar y reflexionar sobre la utilización de herramientas pedagógico-didácticas en tiempos de SAR-COV-2 desde el espacio de la Práctica Docente de los Institutos de Formación Docente del Distrito 040-General Madariaga, provincia de Buenos Aires (ISFD N°169; ISFDyT N°59). Motiva la investigación que existen pocos trabajos empíricos que documenten las experiencias de la práctica docente en esta zona y en este contexto sanitario. Desde una perspectiva crítica se dará cuenta de las concepciones, utilización de herramientas y estrategias (...) que se ponen en juego desde las prácticas y residencia de los Profesorados de Inicial y Primaria, durante la pandemia mencionada. Se trata de una investigación cualitativa, exploratoria. Como resultados principales se abordarán la resignificación de distintas herramientas pedagógico-didácticas, como las videollamadas; la organización de contenidos mediante Classroom, Plataformas digitales y el dictado de clases por canales de YouTube. La finalidad es subrayar como común denominador la búsqueda de alternativas de interacción gratuitas, por parte de las docentes que, en casi la totalidad de los casos, tuvieron que garantizar la continuidad pedagógica mediante la propia construcción de dichos canales de comunicación. (shrink)

Criticism and recommendations are very much welcome. Please don't hesitate to contact me with them. -/- .

Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...) causation. (shrink)

El artículo analiza el papel del resentimiento en la Teoría de los sentimientos morales de Adam Smith y su conexión con el proceso de la simpatía mutua por medio del cual el “espectador imparcial” asume plenamente el resentimiento de la víctima, al considerar que su pasión se rige por los principios de la propiedad y la justicia. Se sostiene que el resentimiento no solo cumple un rol central en la teoría del castigo de Adam Smith, en la medida en que (...) permite retribuir, disuadir y rehabilitar al victimario sino que, además, aporta a la discusión contemporánea sobre el perdón y la reconciliación, pues convoca la posibilidad de superar el resentimiento y restablecer las relaciones sociales entre el agresor y la víctima. (shrink)

In this paper we seek to take notice of the evolution and continuity of Jan Patočka’s phenomenology on the topic of the world and human existence’s relationship with it. We believe that this problem underlies and stimulates Patočka’s whole phenomenological research and we think that it is a key element to understand the ensemble of his thought.

Nie Bao 聶豹 (1487–1563) was a Neo-Confucian philosopher and scholar-official of sixteenthcentury Ming China. In his Ming ru xue an 明儒學案 (Case studies of Ming Confucians), Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 placed him in the Jiangxi (Jiangyou 江右) group of Wang Yangming followers. Nie Bao met the influential founder of the Ming School of Mind in 1526 and was inspired by his teaching of the innate knowing (liangzhi 良知). However, he differed from other followers in his quietist approach to realizing and extending (...) this knowledge. While developing his ideas over the course of two decades, as a holder of the highest civil service examination degree, Nie Bao also held a series of impactful official positions, and earned a reputation for effectiveness and integrity. However, he was also the unwitting victim of factionalism at the Ming court, which led to his imprisonment in 1548. The goal of this article is to provide a sketch of Nie Bao’s political trajectory and intellectual development from his early years until his imprisonment, as well as translation of significant passages pertaining to that trajectory and development. By the time of his imprisonment, Nie Bao had articulated the essential elements of his philosophy of returning to the root (by which he meant silence), and attaining centeredness and, with that, his unique interpretation of his teacher’s central tenet. (shrink)

Israel Gottlieb Canz’s Uberzeugender Beweiß, first published in 1741 and reprinted here in its second, expanded edition stands as his most influential discussion of the soul’s immortality, with one contemporary pronouncing it to be “one of the best [treatments of immortality] that we have.” In this text, Canz seeks to augment and supplement traditional Wolffian proofs by considering, first, the grounds for the soul’s immortality that are contained in its own nature and, second, the grounds for the same that (...) are found in God. In addition, Canz extends his treatment to include a detailed discussion of the souls of children and he offers speculations concerning the soul’s condition in the afterlife. On account of its systematic presentation and original argumentation, Canz’s Beweiß represents a key contribution to Leibniz-Wolffian rational psychology, and through the critical reaction it generated it would help shape the debate concerning the soul’s immortality for years after its original publication. (shrink)

Leibniz’s short letter to the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati of 1689 is a short but interesting text on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, to which it is entirely dedicated. Since there is no watermark in the paper of the letter, the letter is difficult to date, but it is likely that it was written during Leibniz’s stay in Rome, sometime between April and November of 1689 (A 2 2 287–8). When addressing the letter, Leibniz wrote ‘Casani’, but this (...) seems to be a mistake and the real addressee is thought to be Ludovico Casati, nephew of Paolo Casati, the Jesuit mathematician. The letter, reproduced in the Berlin’s Academy edition of Leibniz’s works, was first published by Gerhardt in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie in 1892 (Gerhardt 1892: 53–54). It also appears in Robinet’s Iter Italicum (Robinet 1988: 134–35). But neither Gerhardt nor Robinet provide a philosophical discussion of the letter, and I am not aware of any other philosophical discussion of it. Furthermore, as far as I know, the letter has never been translated into any language. Thus I shall here provide a transcription (from A 2 2 288–89) and a translation of the letter into English, and a philosophical discussion of its treatment of the Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

In this issue of the Report, James L. Bernat proposes an innovative and sophisticated distinction to justify the introduction of permanent cessation as a valid substitute standard for irreversible cessation in death determination. He differentiates two approaches to conceptualizing and determining death: the biological concept and the prevailing medical practice standard. While irreversibility is required by the biological concept, the weaker criterion of permanence, he claims, has always sufficed in the accepted standard medical practice to declare death. Bernat argues that (...) the medical practice standard may be acceptable on the ground that proving circulatory or brain permanence is sufficient to assure complete accuracy for death diagnosis. -/- The topic requires public deliberation: processes to survey people's opinions and mechanisms to channel their opinions into policy-making. What is at stake is the nature of our society. Do we want an expertocracy, in which an enlightened few design policies for the greater good of the majority and exploit the lack of public knowledge to achieve compliance? (shrink)

Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and his School of Mind dominated the intellectual world of sixteenth-century Ming China (1368-1644), and his Confucian philosophy has since remained an essential component of East Asian philosophical discourse. Yet, the volume of publications on him in the Western-language literature has consistently paled in comparison to the volume of scholarship on classical Chinese philosophy, modern Chinese philosophy, Buddhism, and Daoism. Studying Wang Yangming: History of a Sinological Field explains the history of writing in the West about the (...) famed Ming dynasty scholar-official. From eighteenth-century French Jesuit books to English-language publications in 2020, this book provides a historical overview and summary of a literature published by scholars attempting to grapple with one of the most influential Confucians in the history of China, East Asia, and the world. (shrink)

Halakha consists of a variety of laws that determine the halakhic status of various actions. Halakhic laws, by their very nature, have a general aspect in that they apply to all similar actions under similar conditions. In this paper, I examine, from a philosophical-analytical point of view, the relationship between the general aspect of the halakhic laws and the fact that these laws apply to particular actions. After the introduction, this paper is divided into three parts. First, I distinguish between (...) two competing theses regarding the "metaphysical order" between the general aspect of halakhic law and its individual cases. The first one, I call 'Halakhic Generalism', according to which the general aspect of Halakhic law has essential precedence. The second one I refer to as 'Halakhic Particularism', according to which the general aspect of the halakhic law is nothing more than a generalization of all its individual cases. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the particularist position has the power to justify a unique and puzzling halakhic principle. According to this principle, in cases of normative over-determination where the same action is forbidden due to two different halakhic laws, then "a prohibition does not apply to a prohibition". Finally, I compare the reasoning I offer for this principle to alternative justifications of said principle. I argue that, compared to the alternatives, the particularist position provides the best explanation for the principle. (shrink)

Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...) the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity. (shrink)

¿Cómo es posible encontrar una constante en una obra que tiene en la ruptura su principal argumento? Una primera línea se puede percibir en el trabajo de Žižek sobre una política del goce cuya trayectoria circula desde el deseo a la pulsión. Desde una investigación muy orientada en el problema del sujeto, en el carácter sintomático del mismo, Žižek se ha desplazado hacia un análisis de la relación entre el objeto a y la pulsión en el marco del capitalismo actual. (...) En conexión con esta problemática se encuentra una segunda línea que tiene como punto central el trabajo crítico sobre las relaciones entre economía y política; frente al desafío que supone hoy en día la circulación espontánea del capital y el abandono del ámbito económico por parte de la teoría política. Por un lado nos encontramos con los dos sentidos del término escatología, el económico y el teológico-político, que convergen en la noción de exceso, sea de la pulsión o sea del objeto a. Al mismo tiempo, Žižek considera que no es posible traducir la atención sobre el exceso capitalista y su propia revolución inmanente en términos de dominación política.Ambas secuencias se encuentran, en definitiva, íntimamente vinculadas en la crítica de la economía política del discurso que Žižek lleva a cabo. La introducción del término paralaje puede servir como alternativa para entender la oscilación permanente que se produce en su obra entre síntoma y escatología. Una opción para leer a Žižek en función de sus incesantes desplazamientos, comenzando por el más fundamental: la paralaje entre lectura y escritura. (shrink)

Este capítulo forma parte del libro "Viaje entre relatos. Ejercicios decoloniales", el cual plantea un trabajo dialógico y decolonial entre relatos pasados y presentes, llevados a cabo por autores muy diversos en sus trayectorias, generaciones y nacionalidades de la Universidad Nacional de Catamarca y de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata.

En el presente ensayo abordaremos el conflicto que se plantea entre las políticas de la redistribución y las del reconocimiento en el marco de la justicia de género. Para ello, analizaremos la propuesta bidimensional de la filósofa estadounidense Nancy Fraser. En efecto, plantearemos la necesidad de reflexionar sobre las implicancias de este planteo en el plano de las injusticias de género. De esta manera, el análisis estará centrado en la relación que se produce entre las injusticias ligadas a cuestiones de (...) reconocimiento y las injusticias vinculadas a la redistribución económica. (shrink)

Desde un esquema epistemológico sujeto-sujeto y desde un planteo feminista decolonial, nos acercará narrativas de mujeres mapuce que versan sobre la precarización de sus vidas y salud como parte de las violencias instituidas por la cultura hegemónica, poniendo sobre relieve la resiliencia de las culturas subalternizadas a partir de la lucha y re-existencia de estas mujeres.

El derecho internacional surgió para regular las relaciones entre Estados, dejando por fuera a otro tipo de organizaciones, comunidades y personas. Con el paso del tiempo, se fue ampliando la posibilidad de hacer parte en esos escenarios restringidos cuando surgieron las organizaciones internacionales que son creadas por los Estaos, que tienen la capacidad de participar en las relaciones internacionales de manera limitada. Posteriormente el derecho internacional ha dejado participar con ciertas restricciones, a las Organizaciones no Gubernamentales - ONG y a (...) las personas. Los pueblos indígenas, a pesar de contar con más de 300 millones de personas alrededor del mundo y de contribuir con la diversidad cultural y la protección de la biodiversidad, han sido ignorados y excluidos de los escenarios internacionales. Sin embargo después de un largo y lento proceso de reivindicación han logrado hacer sentir su voz y hoy en día han empezado a ser considerados en algunos de estos escenarios internacionales. En este documento se presentará un breve recuento de algunos de esos espacios en el ámbito de los organismos internacionales, en donde se han desarrollado temas relativos al medio ambiento en los cuales tienen interés los pueblos indígenas. *El mismo se encuentra dividido en dos partes, la primera corresponde a los organismos internacionales universales que involucran la Organización de Naciones Unidad ONU y sus diferentes órganos y organismos especializados en temáticas ambientales. ** Además hace referencia a las declaraciones y los principales convenios internacionales sobre medio ambiente y conocimiento tradicional, adicionalmente se incluyen las organizaciones y acuerdos conexos que corresponden a la Organización Mundial del Comercio y a los tratados de libre comercio. La segunda parte corresponde a los escenarios de protección del medio ambiente a nivel regional que son relevantes para los pueblos indígenas, entre ellos, la Organización de Estados Americanos OEA, el Bando Interamericano de Desarrollo BID, la Organización Panamericana de la Salud OPS, la Comunidad Andina de Naciones CAN y se incluyen adicionalmente los tratados y declaraciones importantes en la materia. El objetivo al realizar este documento es ofrecer un panorama sobre las funciones de estos organismos y mencionar la manera como puede darse la participación de los pueblos indígenas en los mismos, mediante una obra de divulgación que sirva como material de consulta para líderes, autoridades de pueblos y organizaciones indígenas, funcionarios de organizaciones internacionales y sociales que apoyan a los pueblos indígenas. (shrink)

The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the (...) Laser should replace the Razor. In Sections 2-4 we shall discuss and argue against Schaffer’s arguments for replacing the Razor with the Laser. Schaffer considers several objections to his views, and in Sections 5-7 we shall argue that Schaffer does not deal successfully with two of them. In Section 8 we shall present a probabilistic argument for the Laser. However, the argument has a limitation and does not support the replacement of the Razor with the Laser. Indeed, it supports only the claim that, given certain assumptions, the multiplication of explanatorily relevant derivative entities does not matter; but, as we argue in the same section, there is an argument that multiplying explanatorily superfluous derivative entities does makes a theory less rationally acceptable. Our conclusion is that the Laser cannot replace the Razor and that derivative entities are not an ontological free lunch. (shrink)

This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.

Draft Chapter for Chinese Philosophy and Its Thinkers: From Ancient Times to the Present Day .

In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.

In my dissertation, "The Nature of Halakha: Philosophical Investigations," I explore the metaphysics of Halakha using contemporary analytical philosophy. The central question guiding my research is: How are the natural world and the world of Halakha related, according to the underlying assumptions of Halakha? My work consists of three papers addressing the relationship between natural facts and halakhic facts. In the first paper, I propose a shift from the traditional debate between halakhic realism and nominalism to a discussion of halakhic (...) naturalism and non-naturalism. I evaluate arguments for and against various interpretations of these views, favoring a non-naturalistic perspective. In the second paper, I argue for a strong version of non-naturalism, which I term "Halakhic Occasionalism." This view suggests that God's primary involvement in the world is His responsiveness to halakhic practices. I analyze the Talmudic principle that "the mitzvot were not given to produce benefit" and its implications, using this analysis to support the occasionalist interpretation. The third paper examines the metaphysical nature of halakhic laws, focusing on the relationship between their general aspect and specific applications. I present two competing theses: Halakhic Generalism and Halakhic Particularism. I argue that the particularist position better justifies the halakhic principle that "no prohibition applies to prohibition" in cases of normative overdetermination. Throughout my dissertation, I argue that the halakhic concepts do not carve nature at its joints, indicating that the halakhic framework does not align with the natural divisions of the physical world. I explore this insight across the three papers, contributing to an understanding of the relationship between God, the natural world, and halakhic practice. My work aims to contribute to the field of philosophy of Halakha by applying analytical methods to traditional Jewish legal concepts. I also seek to bridge discussions in metaethics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of law with halakhic thought, offering perspectives on longstanding questions in Jewish legal philosophy. I draw on sources including Talmudic literature, Jewish commentaries, and contemporary philosophical works. By engaging with traditional Jewish texts and modern analytical philosophy, I create an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the nature of Halakha. (shrink)

The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.

Human mind has undergone a complex evolution throughout the history of our genus, Homo. The brain structures and processes that make this mental activity possible have been the result of a series of evolutionary patterns not only biological but also cultural, so it is possible to assume that consciousness did not emerge with the same characteristics in our predecessors. One of the most distinctive features that reflects the conscious image of the archaic man is the absence of a dualistic interpretation (...) of reality. This apparition stem from our analytical mind as an exaptation, commonly assigned to the activity of the left hemisphere which is attributed to play a greater role in linguistic activity. This paper introduces the idea that, along with other abilities such as linguistic predisposition, spatial perception and pattern recognition, human beings are also born with an innate tendency to interpret and represent the surrounding world in antithetical terms, that is, in antinomies. The idea of Self as an exaptation arises from the cultural development of our species closely influenced by the ripening of our cognitive structures and the evolution of human natural language. This illusory perception of Self also conditions scientific activity, giving birth to a new form of knowledge that attributes a new value judgment to man and life. (shrink)

After being recalled to Beijing in 1510 for evaluation and reassignment in the wake of his two-year exile to Guizhou and his period of service as a magistrate, Wang Yangming was assigned to a succession of posts at the capital that kept him there through 1512. During that short time, he remained disillusioned with the Ming court and high politics and chose to put his energies into fostering a philosophical movement. He believed that by restoring the “way of master-disciple relations (...) and friendship,” he could help propagate the learning of the sages. To that end, he held jiangxue gatherings with colleagues and friends and carried on an active correspondence. In those venues, Wang Yangming engaged others with his ideas about the goal of sagehood, the obstacles to attaining it, and the methods for overcoming those obstacles. The following article reconstructs this critical period in Wang Yangming's philosophical development and the intellectual movement he sought to foster, as well as the status of his philosophy as of this point in time. -/- . (shrink)

En este texto se presenta un espacio de intercambio de conocimientos desde una perspectiva científica, técnica y jurídica, para contribuir a la protección de los recursos naturales. Debido a la importancia de establecer mecanismos para proteger la biodiversidad y posibilitar la preservación de los conocimientos asociados especialmente al uso de la flora medicinal, la Línea de Investigación en Política y Legislación, del Grupo de Estudios en Sistemas Tradicionales de Salud de la Facultad de Medicina, y la Línea de Derecho Ambiental (...) y Grupos Étnicos, del Grupo de Derechos Humanos de Jurisprudencia de la Universidad del Rosario, desarrollaron este libro a través del cual la Universidad se propone profundizar en el panorama actual de la reglamentación y política –Internacional, nacional y local—respecto a la flora medicinal y al patrimonio cultural inmaterial asociado a ésta. (shrink)

The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and Stoneham (...) 2005). I shall defend the subtraction argument* from Alexander Paseau’s (2006) objection that because a crucial premise of the subtraction argument* may have no plausibility independent from Metaphysical Nihilism, the subtraction argument* is not suasive. Although Paseau focuses on the subtraction argument*, I shall point out that Efird and Stoneham could reply to Paseau’s objection in the same way. Thus there are (at least) two suasive versions of the subtraction argument that establish Metaphysical Nihilism. But are those two arguments equally good? I shall argue that the subtraction argument* is preferable to Efird and Stoneham’s argument. (shrink)

Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.

A book with all the abstracts of the talks held in the conference "La Escuela de Salamanca y su proyección iberoamericana": University San Dámaso (Madrid), 13th-15th October 2021.