In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...) Evil Genius thought experiment is at best incomplete. As presented, therefore, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains. (shrink)

In this article, we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption (...) in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberty and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...) have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief. (shrink)

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue that (...) these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives. (shrink)

In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike (...) with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker’s testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples. So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony. (shrink)

This chapter first surveys general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. -/- The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.

Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...) of social defeat with our existing epistemological apparatus. (shrink)

Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, (...) as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. -/- My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address. (shrink)

In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at the same time granting the force of NED intuitions. But what if despite initial appearances, Simple Reliabilism, without qualification, is compatible with the NED intuition? (...) What we can call the Dispositionalist Response to the New Evil Demon problem is fascinating because it contends just that: Simple Reliabilism is fully compatible with the NED intuition. It is claimed that all we need to do to recognize their compatibility is appreciate that reliability is a dispositional property. In this paper I shall critically evaluate the Dispositionalist proposal. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that personalization technologies used by Google for the purpose of tailoring search results for individual users create filter bubbles, which reinforce users’ political views. Surprisingly, empirical evidence for a personalization-induced filter bubble has not been forthcoming. Here, we investigate whether filter bubbles may result instead from a searcher’s choice of search queries. In the first experiment, participants rated the left-right leaning of 48 queries (search strings), 6 for each of 8 topics (abortion, benefits, climate change, sex (...) equality, immigration, nuclear family, Islam, and taxation). An independent sample of participants were then asked to select one of these queries for each of the 8 topics. With the exception of the topic of Islam, participants were significantly more likely to select a query corresponding to their own political leaning, compared to other queries, explaining between 12% and 39% of the variance. A second experiment investigated the effect of the political leaning of the same queries on the overall political leaning of Search Engine Result Pages (SERPs) in Google Search. The top six results of each SERP were rated collectively by a third group of participants, explaining 36.3% of the variance across all 48 search terms (p < .00001). That is, (1) participants in our experiments tended to select own-side search queries, and (2) using those queries tended to yield own-side search results when using the Google search engine. Our results are consistent with the notion of a self-imposed filter bubble in which query selection plays a salient role. (shrink)

Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it is distinct from knowledge. However, if recent work by Jonathan Sutton is correct, this view is deeply mistaken, for according to Sutton justification is knowledge. That is, a subject is justified in believing that p iff he knows that p. Sutton further claims that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, a consequence of Sutton’s view is that there are no false (...) justified beliefs. <br> Following Sutton, I will begin by outlining kinds of beliefs that do not constitute knowledge but that seem to be justified. I will then be in a position to critically evaluate Sutton’s arguments for his position that justification is knowledge, concluding that he fails to establish his bold thesis. In the course of so doing, I will defend the following rule of assertion: (The JBK-rule) One must: assert p only if one has justification to believe that one knows that p.<br>. (shrink)

In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a “generalized rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be “entitled”, or justified, in forming a given belief. In the course of his discussion, Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism and establish a justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, respectively. If sound, these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and most vexing epistemological problems. In (...) this paper I will evaluate these arguments, concluding that they are inconclusive at best. Despite offering some interestingly original arguments, Peacocke gives us no reason to think that scepticism is false, and that perception is generally reliable. (shrink)

In addition to the notion of defeat, do we need to expand the epistemological repertoire used in accounting for the context dependence of justification? It has recently been argued that we ought to admit a hitherto unrecognized fundamental epistemic kind called ‘disqualifiers’. Disqualifiers are taken to be not reducible to any other epistemic notion. Rather, they are meant to be primitive. If this is correct, it is a surprising and novel discovery, and so it is worthy of further epistemological investigation. (...) In this paper I shall first argue that the cases given do not motivate positing the notion of a disqualifier. Conclusions drawn about the existence of disqualifiers do not follow from the considerations advanced. Second, I shall directly argue that an essential core claim of those who would posit disqualifiers, that so-called disqualifiers actually do prevent epistemic bases from conferring justification, is false. In sum, I shall argue that there are no disqualifiers. (shrink)

Vice epistemology, as Quassim Cassam understands it, is the study of the nature, identity, and significance of the epistemic vices. But what makes an intellectual vice a vice? Cassam calls his own view “Obstructivism” – intellectual vices are those traits, thinking styles, or attitudes that systematically obstruct the acquisition, retention, and transmission of knowledge. -/- I shall argue that Cassam’s account is an improvement upon virtue-reliabilism, and that it fares better against what I call Montmarquet’s objection than its immediate rivals. (...) Nevertheless, I contend that it does not go far enough — Montmarquet’s objection stands. -/- I conclude that either the objection needs to be answered in some other way, or else proponents of Obstructivism need to explain why their account of the nature of the intellectual vices does not have the counterintuitive consequences it appears to have. Alternatively, another account of the nature of the intellectual vices needs to be sought. (shrink)

If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own (...) example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible. (shrink)

New biotechnologies have the potential to both dramatically improve human well-being and dramatically widen inequalities in well-being. This paper addresses a question that lies squarely on the fault line of these two claims: When as a matter of justice are societies obligated to include a new biotechnology in a national healthcare system? This question is approached from the standpoint of a twin aim theory of justice, in which social structures, including nation-states, have double-barreled theoretical objectives with regard to human well-being. (...) The first aim is to achieve a sufficient level of well-being in each of six core dimensions. In the special case of healthcare systems, this aim is focally but not exclusively attentive to achieving health sufficiency as one of the core dimensions. The second aim is to combat the emergence and persistence of densely woven patterns of systematic disadvantage that tend to undermine the achievement of a sufficient level of health and the other core elements of well-being of some persons and groups. Judgments about entitlements to health related resources, including new biotechnologies, are made in light of a threshold notion of health sufficiency. What is enough or sufficient health? The answer that is defended here is that sufficient health is enough health for a decent human life, understood as enough health to live a full life course without preventable, significant functional disability or decrement in health, or treatable pain or suffering. When a state must include a new biotechnology in its national healthcare system is also influenced by ancillary concerns about the connection between health and other core dimensions of well-being. What counts as a significant functional impairment or health decrement is thus explicated, in part, in relation to the theory’s sufficiency aim for the other essential dimensions of well-being, and thus for a decent life, overall. Those elements of health that play a critical role in the experience of sufficient reasoning, affiliation, security, respect and self determination are especially important; any loss of health function or capacity that threatens the individual’s prospects for sufficiency in these other dimensions, including the relational egalitiarian concerns they entail, constitutes a significant functional impairment. Within national borders, individuals are thus entitled to those health-related goods and services that are essential for a sufficiency of each of the dimensions of well-being; with regard to self determination and respect, what is sufficient by way of guaranteed access to specific goods and services is going to depend on the implications of such access for where an individual stands in relation to her co-nationals. The content of any entitlement to health-related goods and services is also necessarily dynamic. What can be done for health and the other core dimensions of well-being as a function of technological innovation and diffusion is in constant flux. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this analysis for the conditions under which states are obligated to include access in their healthcare systems to one biotechnology, deep brain stimulation. (shrink)

We provide an analysis of the public's having warranted epistemic trust in science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy regarding the connection between autism and measles–mumps–rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science (...) requires various societal conditions, which we briefly introduce in the concluding section. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a new approach to integrating philosophical phenomenology with qualitative research. The approach uses phenomenology’s concepts, namely existentials, rather than methods such as the epoché or reductions. We here introduce the approach to both philosophers and qualitative researchers, as we believe that these studies are best conducted through interdisciplinary collaboration. In section 1, we review the debate over phenomenology’s role in qualitative research and argue that qualitative theorists have not taken full advantage of what philosophical phenomenology (...) has to offer, thus motivating the need for new approaches. In section 2, we introduce our alternative approach, which we call Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Research (PGQR). Drawing parallels with phenomenology’s applications in the cognitive sciences, we explain how phenomenological grounding can be used to conceptually front-load a qualitative study, establishing an explicit focus on one or more structures of human existence, or of our being in the world. In section 3, we illustrate this approach with an example of a qualitative study carried out by one of the authors: a study of the existential impact of early parental bereavement. In section 4, we clarify the kind of knowledge that phenomenologically grounded studies generate and how it may be integrated with existing approaches. (shrink)

I examine the epistemic import of collaborative research in science. I develop and defend a functional explanation for its growing importance. Collaborative research is becoming more popular in the natural sciences, and to a lesser degree in the social sciences, because contemporary research in these fields frequently requires access to abundant resources, for which there is great competition. Scientists involved in collaborative research have been very successful in accessing these resources, which has in turn enabled them to realize the epistemic (...) goals of science more effectively than other scientists, thus creating a research environment in which collaboration is now the norm. (shrink)

“Doğal din” terimi, bazen doğanın kendisinin ilahi olduğu bir panteistik doktrine atıfta bulunur. “Doğal teoloji” terimi ise aksine, başlangıçta gözlemlenen doğal gerçekler temelinde (ve bazen) Tanrı’nın varlığını savunmaya yönelik projeye atıfta bulunur. Bununla birlikte çağdaş felsefede, hem “doğal din” hem de “doğal teoloji” genel olarak, dinî veya teolojik konuları araştırmak için insana, “doğal” olan bilişsel yetilerini – akıl, algı, içgözlem- kullanma projesini ifade eder. Doğal din veya teoloji, mevcut anlayış üzerine, doğayla ilgili ampirik araştırmalarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte ayrıca panteistik bir (...) sonuçla da bağlantılı değildir. Bununla birlikte o, özel doğal olmayan yetilere (ESP, telepati, mistik deneyim) veya doğaüstü bilgi kaynaklarına (kutsal metinler, vahiy teolojisi, inanç otoriteleri, doğrudan doğaüstü iletişim) hitap etmekten kaçınır. Genel olarak, doğal din veya teoloji (bundan böyle “doğal teoloji” olarak anılacaktır), diğer felsefi ve bilimsel girişimlerle aynı rasyonel inceleme standartlarına uymayı amaçlamaktadır ve aynı değerlendirme ve eleştiri yöntemlerine tabidir. (shrink)

Güvenilirci (reliabilist) bilgi teorisi, çağdaş epistemik gerekçelendirme kuramları içerisinde, dışsalcı (externalist) kuramın bir türü olarak kendisine yer bulmaktadır. Kısaca, bir inancı gerekçelendiren şeyin o inancın oluşturulduğu sürecin güvenilirliği olduğunu öne süren bu yaklaşım, bu bilişsel süreçleri özne dışı unsurlara bağladığı içinde dışsalcı bir pozisyonda yer almaktadır. Bu bilgi teorisinin tam karşı konumunda yer alan içselci (internalist) bilgi teorisi ise, özne merkezli bir yaklaşımla, doğru inancı gerekçelendirecek yöntemin, kişinin kendi zihinsel yapısından yola çıkarak, belli kognitif süreçler sonucunda ulaşılabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Epistemik (...) gerekçelendirme kuramları içerisinde birçok tartışmada kendisine yer bulan bu iki bilgi teorisi, kendi içerisinde de birçok farklı kurama kapı aralamıştır. Burada içselci bilgi teorisinden ortaya çıkan erişim içselciliği, farkındalık içselciliği gibi kuramları ve dışsalcı bilgi teorisinden ortaya çıkan süreç güvenilirciliği, gösterge güvenilirciliği ve erdem güvenilirciliği gibi farklı türden kuramları örnek olarak verebiliriz. Öte yandan çağdaş epistemolojideki bu tartışmalar, dini epistemoloji içerisinde de kendisine yer bulmuştur. Özellikle Alvin Plantinga, kendi dini epistemolojisi içerisinde dışsalcı bir tutum sergilemiş ve son dönem çalışmaları içerisinde de güvenilirci bir anlayışla Tanrı inancının epistemik mahiyetini ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. Bu makalede öncelikle dışsalclık ve onun bir türü olan güvenilirci bilgi anlayışını ve bu kuramlara getirilen eleştirileri ele almaya çalışacağız, daha sonra A. Plantinga’nın son dönem dini epistemolojisinin de yönünü belirleyen güvence (warrant) kavramını açıklayıp, bu kavramın bütün teist dinlere uygulanabilirliğini sorgulayacağız. (shrink)

Dini epistemoloji, teistik inançların rasyonel zeminde gerekçelendirilme yollarını arayan, çağdaş epistemolojinin bir alt dalıdır. Musa Yanık, bu kitapta günümüzdeki en güçlü yaklaşım olan reform epistemolojisinden güvenilircilik bakış açısıyla yani “daha yüksek bir olasılıkla doğru olması yönünden” İslam inancının rasyonelliğini ortaya koymakta ve uygulamalı dini epistemolojinin sağlam ve cesur bir örneğini sergilemektedir. (Prof. Dr. Hasan Yücel Başdemir) -/- Epistemoloji topyekûn insan zihnini biçimlendirme ve inanç da dahil olmak üzere bilişsel faaliyetleri yönlendirme potansiyeline sahip bir alandır. Zira Allah’ın varlığı, birliği, nübüvvet ve (...) ahiretle ilişkili meseleler “nasıl bilebilirim, neleri bilebilirim, bildiğim şeyin kesinliğinden nasıl emin olabilirim?” gibi epistemik sorulardan bağımsız olamaz. Bu nedenle konu İslam düşüncesinde felsefecilerin olduğu kadar kelâmcıların da ilgisini çekmiştir.Bu bağlamda Musa Yanık tarafından modern teoriler de dikkate alınarak yazılan bu kitabın dini epistemoloji konusunda bir farkındalık oluşturmasını umuyorum. (Doç. Dr. Mehmet Bulgen) -/- Analitik felsefe ülkemizde yeni yeni tanınmaya başlanmış olmasına rağmen özellikle İslam entelektüel tarihindeki kelâm geleneği ile etkileşime geçme potansiyeli oldukça yüksek bir gelenektir. Musa Yanık, bu çalışmasıyla günümüzün en önemli analitik din felsefecilerinden AlvinPlantinga’nın dini epistemolojisini tanıtmakta ve kelâmla irtibatını eleştirel bir zeminde kurmaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışmanın güncel tartışmaları takip etmesi kadar bu tartışmalara farklı geleneklerden bakabilme becerisi felsefenin çok-yönlü bir çerçevede nasıl yapılabileceğine dair güzel bir örnek oluşturuyor. Musa Yanık’ın bu eseri, her şeyin birbiriyle etkileşime geçmeye başladığı global dünyada felsefe yapmanın olanaklarına dair yenilikçi bir yaklaşım ortaya koyuyor. -/- (Doç. Dr. Nazif Muhtaroğlu) -/- Elinizde tuttuğunuz bu kitap, dini epistemoloji ve erdem epistemolojisi kesişiminde yer almakla birlikte, inanç ve imanın epistemik statüsünü incelemek ve bunu yaparken ise İslam inancını merkeze almaktadır. Bu haliyle Türkçe literatür açısından önemli bir boşluğu doldurmaktadır. Okuyucunun bu kitap aracılığıyla karşılaşacağı bazı sorular şunlardır: İnanç ve bilgi nedir? Kanıt olmadan inanmak ahlaken yanlış mıdır? İnançlarımızı rasyonel olarak gerekçelendirmenin yolları nelerdir? İslam inancı reform ve erdem epistemolojisi açısından güvenilir bir temele sahip midir? Fakat belki de en büyük kadim soru şudur: Tanrı’nın varlığını bilmek mümkün müdür? -/- (Taner Beyter-Öncül Analitik Felsefe Dergisi). (shrink)

Modal ontolojik argüman, Tanrı’nın varlığını sadece bilfiil gerçek olan bu dünyada değil, bütün mümkün dünyalarda göstermeye yönelik bir argümandır. Anselm’in (1033-1109) Proslogion adlı eserinin 3. bölümünde “kendisinden daha büyüğü düşünülemeyen” şeklinde tanımlanan; Tanrı’nın var olmamasının da düşünülemeyeceğini, bu yüzden de varolmamasının imkansızlığı üzerinde kurulu yeni bir argüman bulunduğunu öne süren bazı araştırmacılar, bu argümanı mümkün dünyalar semantiği yardımıyla formüle edip, “modal ontolojik argüman” şeklinde adlandırmışlardır. Çok farklı şekillerde formüle edilmiş bu argüman kabaca Tanrı’nın mümkünse zorunlu olması, dolayısıyla bilfiil gerçek olan (...) bu dünyada da var olması gerektiğini savunur. (shrink)

Çağdaş epistemoloji içerisinde, dışsalcı, güvenilirci ve erdeme dayalı epistemolojik tartışmaların bir benzerini, dini epistemoloji içerisinde etkili bir şekilde yer edinen ve reformcu epistemoloji olarak bilinen yaklaşım üzerinden görebilmek mümkündür. Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff ve William Alston gibi filozofların öne çıktığı bu yaklaşımın ana iddiası, kanıta ya da argümana dayanmaksızın, Tanrı’nın varlığına inanmanın bütünüyle doğru, rasyonel, makul ve güvenilir olacağı şeklindeki bir tezdir. Kanıtın, gerekçelendirme için zorunlu bir koşul olmadığı fikri, algısal deneyimlerin gerekçelendirilmesine benzer şekilde, dini deneyimlerin de öyle olduğu ve (...) dolayısıyla, aynı epistemik statüye sahip olması gerektiğini öne süren, eşitlik tezine dayanır. İlk ortaya çıktığı günden bugüne, üzerinde çokça konuşulan ve tartışılan bir yaklaşım olan reformcu epistemoloji, özellikle son beş yıl içerisinde, oldukça farklı bir hale gelmiştir. Zira bu yaklaşımı, kanıtsalcılıkla uyumlu, erdem epistemolojisiyle bağlantılı ve diğer teistik dinler üzerinden değerlendiren yeni çalışmalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makalede, reformcu epistemoloji ana hatlarıyla ele alınmıştır. Beraberinde, ona yöneltilen itirazlara değinilmiş ve sonrasında, bahsi geçen yenilik iddiaları soruşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Son olarak, teistik inancın rasyonalitesiyle ilgili, farklı bir bakış açısı sunulmuştur. (shrink)

The Aristotelian view that the moral virtues–the virtues of character informed by practical wisdom–are essential to an individual's happiness, and are thus in an individual's self-interest, has been little discussed outside of purely scholarly contexts. With a few exceptions, contemporary philosophers have tended to be suspicious of Aristotle's claims about human nature and the nature of rationality and happiness. But recent scholarship has offered an interpretation of the basic elements of Aristotle's views of human nature and happiness, and of reason (...) and virtue, that brings them more into line with common-sense thinking and with contemporary philosophical and empirical psychology. This makes it fruitful to reexamine the question of the role of virtue in self-interest. (shrink)

Mitos ve Logos kavramları Antik Yunan uygarlığında söz kavramına karşılık gelen sözcükleri karşılamak için kullanılmıştır. Felsefe tarihinin başlangıcı için yapılan tanımlamalarda ise mitos kavramının yerine logos kavramının tercih edilmesi iki kavram arasında bir farklılığı ortaya koymak için yapılmaktadır. Bu ayrımın nedeni ise mitos’un daha çok dinsel içerikle anılması logos’un ise içerisinde bir tür akılsallık barındırması şeklindeki yorumlarda kendini göstermektedir. Ancak söz konusu ayrımın ilk doğa filozofu/ilk felsefeci olarak nitelendirilen Thales için geçerli olup olmadığı geçmişte olduğu gibi günümüzde de halen tartışılmaktadır. (...) Felsefe tarihi yazımlarında ilk sıraya konan Thales’in anılan kavramları gerçekten farklı şekilde yorumlayıp yorumlamadığı bizce de tartışmaya açık bir husustur. Bu açıdan bakıldığında Thales, söz konusu kavramları iki farklı problemler alanı olarak mı görmüştür? Onun düşüncelerinde kendinden önceki mitolojik mirasın izleri bulunabilir mi? O, katışıksız bir rasyonel midir, yoksa henüz felsefenin yeni filizlendiği bir toplumda bir ara basamağı mı temsil etmektedir? Bu makalenin içerisinde tartışacağımız bu sorular, felsefe tarihinin başlangıcına ilişkin kavramsal arka planın ne olduğu hakkında bize katkı sağlayacaktır. (shrink)

Hristiyan inancı içerisinde merkezi konuma sahip olan mevzulardan birisi de, İsa’nın ölümünden üç gün sonra diriltildiğine yönelik olan inançtır. Hristiyan eskatolojisinin de dayanak noktasını oluşturan bu mevzu, dinler tarihi ya da teoloji gibi disiplinlerin içerisinde tartışıldığı gibi, çeşitli Hristiyan düşünürlerce, din felsefesi disiplini içerisinde de tartışılmıştır. Din felsefesi açısından bakıldığında, konunun merkezi konumda olması, bu mevzunun rasyonel bir zeminde tartışılıp tartışılamayacağını da beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, özellikle din felsefesi içerisinde birçok Hristiyan düşünür tarafından konu ele alınmış ve farklı çevrelerce de (...) mevzuya yönelik karşı itirazlar dile getirilmiştir. Bu noktada yapılan tartışmaların içeriğine baktığımızda, mucize kavramı önem taşımakla birlikte, Hristiyan düşünürlerin argüman haline getirdikleri ve bir delil olarak öne sürdükleri “Boş mezar” ve “Tanıklıklar gibi birçok farklı husususun din felsefesi açısından tartışıldığını söyleyebiliriz. Ayrıca bazı ateist düşünürlerin bu delillere yönelik itirazları olmakla birlikte, bazı Hristiyan tarihçilerinde konuya ilişkin ciddi itirazları bulunmaktadır. Biz de bu makalemizde, İsa’nın ölümünden sonra dirilişinin rasyonel bir şekilde izahının nasıl olabileceği sorusunu merkeze alıp, konuyu Hristiyan düşünürlerin bakış açısından değerlendirmeye çalıştık. Bu noktada İslam gibi farklı dinlerde ve farklı anlatılarda karşımıza çıkan Hz. İsa figürünü konumuzun dışında tuttuğumuzu ayrıca belirtelim. Çünkü bizim yazımızın konusunu oluşturan kişi Hristiyan inancındaki İsa ve bu din içerisinde önem taşıyan kutsal metinler ve bu metinlerde geçen anlatılar oldu. Bu açıdan bakıldığında yazımız içerisinde, konuya ilişkin doğrudan bir teoloji ya da dinler tarihi çerçevesinde değerlendirme yapmaktan çok, din felsefesi içerisinde bize sunulan tartışmalardan yola çıkarak eleştirilerimizi ve tahlillerimizi dile getirmeye çalıştığımızı ifade edebiliriz. (shrink)

David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with an eye to realizing (...) the very goals that Hull believes need to be explained by reference to an invisible hand mechanism. Thus, I reduce the scope of Hull's invisible hand explanation and supplement it by appealing to a hidden hand explanation. (shrink)

This paper offers a review of the catalogue composed by Myriam Vogelaar of one of the largest and most important collections of Fight Books and fencing manuals in the field of Historical European Martial Arts Studies (HEMAS). The Mokken Collection is named after Wiebe Mokken, the man who meticulously built it up over the past decades in Amsterdam. The book also highlights the glaring lack of contemporary knowlegde about other major historical fencing-related collections, like Gotti’s spectacular private collection held at (...) the Museo dell Arte Marziale in Brescia, Italy. Others, such as the Corble collection at the KU Leuven Libraries, recently published their catalogue on line. This catalogue thus constitutes an important milestone for this exciting and still relatively new subdomain in the field of European cultural studies, by making accessible one of the most important collections of source materials dedicated to it. (shrink)

There is no doubt that custard apple diseases are among the important reasons that destroy the Custard Apple plant and its agricultural crops. This leads to obvious damage to these plants and they become inedible. Discovering these diseases is a good step to provide the appropriate and correct treatment. Determining the treatment with high accuracy depends on the method used to correctly diagnose the disease, expert systems can greatly help in avoiding damage to these plants. The expert system correctly diagnoses (...) Custard Apple disease to make it easier for farmers to find the right treatment based on the appropriate diagnosis. Objectives: A specialized syllable language system was established for the diagnosis of Custard Apple plant disease. (shrink)

Usually, modular construction involves the off-site manufacturing of standard building components in a factory before the components are assembled on the construction site. It is common to use terms like "prefabrication," "off-site construction," and "modular construction" interchangeably. The construction of modular constructions nowadays is flourishing all over the globe. The roots of the Albanian prefabricated constructions are extended for the first time around the 1970s. This paper will indeed analyze some recently built modular construction in Albania, considering and comparing it (...) with international case studies. The demand for new construction in Albania is rising rapidly. Currently, the most common structures are cast-in-place beam-column designs, driven by both traditional mindsets and industrial capabilities. However, with Albania's economic growth, there is an increasing need for affordable, quickly built, and technologically advanced buildings. Modular construction, which assembles prefabricated modules on-site, offers a solution. This method aligns with bioclimatic design principles, reducing environmental impact and optimizing resources, marking a shift toward sustainability in the construction industry. The purpose of this article is to explore the potential integration of “modular construction techniques” with “bioclimatic design concepts” to create buildings that are environmentally friendly, energy-efficient, and multipurpose by function. This study explores the use of modular construction techniques in conjunction with bioclimatic techniques to increase “building sustainability”. Combining these tactics encourages energy efficiency and a reduced environmental effect, making people far more resilient and weather-adaptable. The synergy between the two of them is necessary. (shrink)

This chapter identifies and explores a series of challenges raised by the clinical concept of delusion for theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. The first challenge is to address the autonomy-impairing nature of delusions consistently with their role as grounds for full legal and ethical excuse, on the one hand, and psychopathological significance as key symptoms of psychoses, on the other. The second challenge is to take into account the full logical range of delusions, (...) which may take the form of true or false factual beliefs, positive or negative evaluations, as well as the paradoxical delusion of mental illness. The third and final challenge is to make room for non-pathological or, autonomy-preserving delusions and to offer a credible way of distinguishing between these and pathological or, autonomy-impairing delusions. By setting out these challenges, we are able to, firstly, distinguish between two separate conceptions of objectivity that may be at work in existing accounts of delusions and, secondly, to put a spotlight on an elusive yet inescapable notion of agential success that underlies our thinking about autonomy as well as mental disorder. (shrink)

The dominant framework for addressing procreative ethics has revolved around the notion of harm, largely due to Derek Parfit’s famous non-identity problem. Focusing exclusively on the question of harm treats what procreators owe their offspring as akin to what they would owe strangers (if they owe them anything at all). Procreators, however, usually expect (and are expected) to parent the persons they create, so we cannot understand what procreators owe their offspring without also appealing to their role as prospective parents. (...) I argue that prospective parents can wrong their future children just by failing to act well in their role as parents, whether or not their offspring are ultimately harmed or benefitted by their creation. Their obligations as prospective parents bear on the motivations behind their reproductive choices, including the choice to select for some genetic trait in their offspring. Even when procreators’ motivations aren’t malicious, or purely selfish, they can still fail to recognize and act for the end of the parental role. Procreators can wrong their offspring by selecting for some genetic trait, then, when doing so would violate their obligations as prospective parents, or when their motivation for doing so is antithetical to the end of the parental role. (shrink)

Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption: early fetuses can elicit feelings of joy, love, indifference, or distress. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses reflect a real difference in their moral status, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain that difference. (...) I argue that we can have or lack relational obligations to early fetuses in light of our own activities or choices, independent of the fetus’s own features or properties. Those relational obligations make the early fetus morally considerable to the persons who stand in a moral relation to it. Pregnant persons (and other participants in the procreative process) can come to have relational obligations to an early fetus just in virtue of their own decision to create a person, either by intentionally getting pregnant or by deciding to continue a pregnancy. That decision not only makes it appropriate for them to care about the fetus, but it also generates obligations to the fetus that they didn’t have before that decision. (shrink)

“1950’li yıllarda dönemin büyük felsefecileri arasında dinsel inancı savunan bir kişi bile yoktu. 1990’lı yıllarda Yale’den UCLA’ya, Oxford’dan Heidelberg’e kadar birçok yerde insanın manevi yanını savunan ve geliştiren yüzlerce kitap yazılacak, sel olup akacaktı. Aradaki 40 yıllık süre zarfındaysa sadece ve sadece Alvin Plantinga vardı.” Kelly James Clark Tanrı’nın veya tanrıların varlığı sorusu felsefenin ezeli sorularından biri olagelmişse de Nietzsche’nin Tanrı’nın ölümünü ilan ettiği günden bu yana onu doğrularcasına yaşanan acılar, savaşlar, kötülükler bu konudaki tartışmaların sesini uzun süre bastırdı. Ama (...) özellikle yüzyılın ikinci yarısından sonra palazlanan analitik felsefede meydana gelen “metafiziğe dönüş”, dine yakınlık duyan, en azından dinle ilgilenen filozofların tekrar Yahudi-Hıristiyan ve İslam geleneklerinde anlaşıldığı şekliyle Tanrı’nın varlığına duyulan inancın gerekçelerini yeniden değerlendirmelerine, konuya yeni bir bakış ve araçlarla bakmalarına vesile oldu. Alvin Plantinga’nın bu kitabı, yayımlandığı tarihten itibaren “analitik din felsefesi” alanının da en önemli ve sarsıcı eserlerinden biri hâline geldi ve Tanrı’nın ölmediğini ilan etti. Anselmus’tan Hume’a, Kant ve pozitivistlerden John Mackie gibi modern ateologlara kadar felsefe geleneğiyle hesaplaşan Plantinga, bu abidevi çalışmasında ontolojik, kozmolojik ve teleolojik tanrı kanıtlamalarının eski ve yeni biçimlerinin çıkmazlarını, meziyetlerini ve sunduğu imkânları değerlendiriyor. Tanrı’nın varlığına duyulan inanç ile diğer insanların varlığına ve zihinlerine duyulan inanç arasındaki şaşırtıcı ve sarsıcı bağlantıyı ortaya koyuyor. (shrink)

Tarihte herhalde çok az soru Tanrı’nın varlığı sorusu kadar sık sorulmuş, çok yanıtlanmış ve verilen birbirinden farklı onca yanıta rağmen kesin bir sonuca ulaştırılamayıp tartışılmaya devam etmiştir. Yine de geçmişe dönüp baktığımızda bu soruya verilen farklı yanıtların farklı uygarlıkların inşa edilmesine, bazılarının yıkılmasına, acımasız çatışmalara ve her şeye rağmen kucaklaşmalara da vesile olduğunu görüyoruz. Tanrı var mı? Varsa onu nasıl bilebiliriz? Tanrı yoksa her şey mubah mı? İnsan aklı ilahi olanı kavrayabilir mi? Tanrı’nın varlığı ahlaklı olmanın şartı mı? Evren akıllı (...) bir tasarımcının imzasını taşıyor mu? Bu kitapta felsefeci William David Beck, bu sorulara tarihte verilen yanıtları ve bu konudaki tartışmaları ele alarak meselenin genel ve tarihsel bir tablosunu bize sunuyor. Platon, Aristoteles, Marcus Aurelius gibi Eski Yunan ve Roma düşünürlerinden Anselmus, Thomas Aquinas, Augustinus ve Yahudi-Hıristiyan geleneğine, Doğu’nun bilgelerine, İbni Rüşd, Fârâbî ve Gazzâlî gibi İslam düşünürlerinden Alvin Plantinga, Graham Oppy, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Max Tegmark gibi Batılı modern ilahiyatçılara, bilim insanlarına ve Yeni Ateizm hareketine kadar uzanan bir çizgide “Tanrı var mı?” sorusuna verilen çeşitli yanıtları ve bu yanıtlara sunulan akılcı gerekçeleri ortaya koyarak soruya felsefece bir yanıt vermenin nasıl bir iş olduğunu da gösteriyor. (shrink)

Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be (...) called "knowledge." In this paper, I (a) explain Longino's epistemology, and (b) defend it against charges that have recently been raised by Kitcher, Schmitt, and Solomon. Longino rightly recognizes that not all social factors have the same (adverse) affect on inquiry. She also recommends that we distinguish knowledge from mere opinion by reference to a social standard. (shrink)

Duress is a defense in both law and morality. The bank teller who provides an armed robber with the bank vault combination, the innocent suspect who fabricates a story after hours of interrogation, the Good Samaritan who breaks into a private cabin in the woods to save a stranded hiker, and the father who drives at high speed to rush his injured child to the hospital—in deciding how to respond to agents like these, we should take into account that they (...) have acted under duress. In this paper, I offer a new duress defense, which I call “distinctive duress.” The distinctive-duress defense is neither ordinary justification nor ordinary excuse. Rather, it is a defense available to agents who act wrongly because they are appropriately insensitive to certain reasons. In the distinctive-duress cases, an agent’s normative sensitivities are rightly directed elsewhere, leading them awry. (shrink)

This article explores the enduring mysteries of consciousness and the afterlife, two enigmatic topics that have fascinated humanity for ages. Despite extensive scientific efforts, the existence of an afterlife remains unproven, and understanding consciousness remains a significant challenge. The research introduces innovative hypotheses through simple thought experiments with empirical evidence and robust theoretical foundations. It delves into the complexities of consciousness, its relationship with the brain, and the need for interdisciplinary approaches including philosophy. Boldly contemplating the probability of a continuous (...) consciousness after death, the study argues that existing evidence strongly supports this idea. Beyond theoretical implications, it envisions practical outcomes, suggesting that insights into these mysteries could enhance human well-being and contribute to a more harmonious world. In summary, this article embarks on a quest to shed light on age-old questions about consciousness and the high probability of the afterlife. Through fresh methodologies, it aims to provide new perspectives that could reshape our understanding of existence and inspire intellectuals to positive individual and societal advancements including peace, happiness, health, and intelligence. -/- . (shrink)

Context: Many recent research areas such as human cognition and quantum physics call the observer-independence of traditional science into question. Also, there is a growing need for self-reflexivity in science, i.e., a science that reflects on its own outcomes and products. Problem: We introduce the concept of second-order science that is based on the operation of re-entry. Our goal is to provide an overview of this largely unexplored science domain and of potential approaches in second-order fields. Method: We provide the (...) necessary conceptual groundwork for explorations in second-order science, in which we discuss the differences between first- and second-order science and where we present a roadmap for second-order science. The article operates mainly with conceptual differentiations such as the separation between three seemingly identical concepts such as Science II, Science 2.0 and second-order science. Results: Compared with first-order science, the potential of second-order science lies in 1. higher levels of novelty and innovations, 2. higher levels of robustness and 3. wider integration as well as higher generality. As first-order science advances, second-order science, with re-entry as its basic operation, provides three vital functions for first-order science, namely a rich source of novelty and innovation, the necessary quality control and greater integration and generality. Implications: Second-order science should be viewed as a major expansion of traditional scientific fields and as a scientific breakthrough towards a new wave of innovative research. Constructivist content: Second-order science has strong ties with radical constructivism, which can be qualified as the most important root/origin of second-order science. Moreover, it will be argued that a new form of cybernetics is needed to cope with the new problems and challenges of second-order science. (shrink)

There have recently been novel applications of medical systematic review guidelines to economic policy interventions which contain controversial methodological assumptions that require further scrutiny. A landmark 2017 Cochrane review of unconditional cash transfer (UCT) studies, based on the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE), exemplifies both the possibilities and limitations of applying medical systematic review guidelines to UCT and universal basic income (UBI) studies. Recognizing the need to upgrade GRADE to incorporate the differences between medical and policy interventions, (...) the GRADE Public Health Project Group (PHPG) was convened to enumerate and address these methodological challenges. However, in light of our analysis of additional methodological challenges that arise for UCT and UBI studies, we argue that the adaptation of medical systematic review guidelines to economic methodology is far from straightforward and is in fact more challenging than claimed by the PHPG. (shrink)

A review of Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism, by Gary E. Varner. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xv + 336. H/b £40.23. and The Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Robert W. Lurz. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. 320. P/b £20.21.

Epistemolojik olarak bilgiye başvuran ve bilme faaliyetinde bulunan insanın, Kur’an’da önemli bir yeri vardır. Buradaki bilme faaliyetini, salt teolojik bir buyruk olarak, yani Allah’ı bilmek olarak değil, doğru bilgi ile yanlış bilgi arasında hem teorik hem de ahlaki bir farklılık olarak anlamak ve Kur’an'da insana epistemik özellikler atfedildiğini ve böylece insanın epistemik başarılarından dolayı övüldüğünü söyleyebilmek mümkündür. Bu açıdan bakıldığında herhangi bir önermeye yönelik olarak rasyonel bir tutum benimseyen, yani bilen özne ile bu faaliyette isteyerek ve istemeyerek giren kişinin durumu (...) arasında bir fark olduğu açıktır. Doğrusu bu farkın epistemik önceliği kadar, ahlaki önceliği de dikkate değerdir. Nitekim buradaki ahlaki üstünlük, doğru bilgiyi hedefleme ve ona ulaşma noktasında ortaya çıkan erdemdir. Doğru bilgiye ulaşmanın entelektüel bir erdem olduğu düşünüldüğünde, Kur’an’ın Erdem epistemolojisi üzerinden değerlendirilmesi bu noktada önemlidir. Doğrusu erdemli bir bilişsel faaliyet, Kur'an’da açık bir şekilde ana fikir olarak ortaya konulur ve buna göre cehaletten kaçınmak ve doğru bilgiye ulaşmak için erdemli bir çaba göstermek önem taşır. Kur’an’daki ifadeleri bilgeliğe ulaşmak olarak anlayacak olursak, asıl hedef; bilgi ve anlayışımızın, entelektüel ve ahlaki vicdanımızı veya takvamızı güçlendirmesi için kullanılabileceği söylenilebilir ve bu inanç, erdem epistemolojisine dayalı bir yaklaşım içerisinde şekillendirilebilir. (shrink)

Cross-species comparisons are benefited by compatible datasets; conclusions related to phylogenetic comparisons, questions on convergent and divergent evolution, or homologs versus analogs can only be made when the behaviors being measured are comparable. A direct comparison of the social function of physical contact across two disparate taxa is possible only if data collection and analyses methodologies are analogous. We identify and discuss the parameters, assumptions and measurement schemes applicable to multiple taxa and species that facilitate cross-species comparisons. To illustrate our (...) proposed guidelines for evaluating the role played by tactile contact in social behavior across disparate taxa, this paper presents data on mother-offspring relationships in the two species studied by the authors: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) and dolphins (bottlenose and spotted, Tursiops truncatus and Stenella frontalis, respectively). Cross-species comparative studies allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the similarities and differences with respect to how animals traverse the relationships that form their social groups and societies. (shrink)

Back in Ancient India, Shankaracharya postulated a philosophy which is now known as Advaita. According to Advaita philosophy, the ‘jivãtma’ (individual soul) and ‘Brahmãtma’ (universal soul) are one and the same and these are the only ‘real’ things that exist. Everything else is an illusion. To challenge this almost unshakeable viewpoint, I bring to the fore a book authored by a Nobel Laureate. In 1935, Alexis Carrel’s revolutionary book entitled “Man the Unknown” was published. Though controversial in terms of its (...) content, it delineates the unexplored aspects of the human being – the understanding of mental processes and consciousness, which he claims humans have not mastered. Throughout the book, Carrel suggests that there is something that is unknown in the homo sapiens and hence he titles his work “Man the Unknown.” Based on this, I argue that both the esoteric East and the pragmatic West have not uncovered something “hidden” –the unknown factor/element. Substantial evidence exists for this contention in the scientific community. For example, questions such as among identical twins diagnosed with depression, why does one medication cure depression for one twin and have no effect on the other twin? Ceteris paribus, why does therapy work for one client but not for another client with the same disorder? These questions do not have clear, crystallized answers. Perhaps, if such a thing like an unknown element exists, it would pave the way for the postulation of the Grand Theory of the behavioural sciences. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga, analitik felsefe düşüncesi içerisinde yetişmiş ve bu gelenek içinde teistik din felsefesinin oluşumuna katkıda bulunmuş bir filozoftur. Ayrıca teizmin savunusu için yaptığı çalışmalarla, çeşitli üniversitelerden aldığı onur ödülleri ve 2017 yılında kazandığı Templeton Prize ödülüyle, haklı bir üne kavuşmuş bir şahsiyettir. Bu çalışmayı yapmamızdaki en önemli amaç, Plantinga’nın dini epistemoloji üzerine yaptığı çalışmaları analiz edip bu düşüncelerinin ardalanına dair bir tespitte bulunmaktır. Bu çalışmada yararlandığımız öncelikli kaynaklar, Plantinga’nın Nicholas Wolterstorff ile birlikte kaleme aldığı “Faith and Rationality” adlı eser (...) ile birlikte son dönem epistemik fikirlerinin çerçevesini belirleyen üç ciltlik “Warrant and Proper Function”, “Warrant: The Current Debate”, “Warranted: Christian Belief” isimli eserler olmuştur. Plantinga’nın ilk dönem epistemoloji çalışmalarının gayesini bir tür olumsuzlama diyebileceğimiz klasik temelciliğin ve evidentializmin eleştirisi oluştururken, ikinci döneminde bu eleştirilerden yola çıkarak Tanrı inancının haklı bir temelde ve güvenceye sahip olduğunu gösterme amacına yönelmiştir. Plantinga’nın teolojik fikirlerini oluşturan Kalvinci ekol, onun dini epistemolojisinin de özünü oluşturmaktadır. Plantinga’nın dini epistemolojisini iki boyutlu olarak değerlendirdiğimizde, içe dönük olarak Hristiyan inancıyla ilgilense de çalışmalarının dışsal yönünü daha genel olarak teizmin Tanrı’sı ve onun rasyonelliği oluşturmaktadır. Açıkçası Plantinga’nın epistemolojik külliyatı bir tür kavram zenginliğini de beraberinde getirmektedir. Çalışmamız içerisinde ele aldığımız kadarıyla uygun işlevsellik, tasarım planı, güvence (warrant) gibi kavramlar onun Tanrı inancının epistemik mahiyetini ortaya koymak için ne derece kararlı olduğunu göstermektedir. Netice itibariyle Tanrı inancının ve onun bilgisinin rasyonel olabileceğini ifade eden Plantinga, her ne kadar Hristiyan inancının belli bir koluna mensup olsa da diğer mezhepleri dışlamaz. Ayrıca Plantinga, birçok çalışmasında belirttiği üzere projesinin Yahudilik, İslam gibi diğer teistik dinlere yönelik olduğunu da belirtmektedir. (shrink)