Incarceration is a hurdle for The State, the perpetrator‘s family, society in general, the victim, and the perpetrator themselves. Laws, regulations, and rules are as relative, and fragile as their associated human group intended them to be, and it is frequently the case that they change so completely from one location to another that one can be regarded as a hero in one place, and most unacceptable perpetrator in another for practicing the same acts. It is time for a change: (...) community justice centers are a good start - especially if one considers their court intervention programs –because they align with the concept of restorative justice, and form a natural step toward incarceration zero, which has to be human kind‘s goal. (shrink)

Traditional African societies are noted for their religiosity and so one would naturally expect that when it comes to matters of morality they will appeal to some divinities or gods for their moral jurisdiction and interpretation of their moral codes. Yet, according to Wiredu (1992) and Gyekye (1996), this is not true of traditional African societies when it comes to finding the source of their moral codes. For the two, an appeal to religion as a source of African moral values (...) is a mistaken position. This paper challenges their position by showing the defects in their arguments and argues that the fabric of traditional African morality may tumble if God or religion is removed as either the source or part of the source. (shrink)

Traditional Africans' belief in and veneration of ancestors is an almost ubiquitous, long-held and widely known, for it is deeply entrenched in the African metaphysical worldview itself. This belief in and veneration of ancestors is characterised by strong moral undertone. This moral undertone involves an implicit indication that individual members of communities must live exemplary lives in accordance with the ethos of the community. Living according to the ethos is among the conditions for attaining the prestige of being elevated to (...) an ancestor after one's death. The aim of this paper is to gain an understanding of the metaphysical and moral demands connected to ancestor veneration. With this understanding, the paper suggests values that can promote a better way for humans to coexist, and indicates a moral sense of the responsibility people should hold towards each other. The paper's focal aim is to expose what it considers to be the moral undertones or features associated with a belief in and veneration of ancestors, mainly from traditional Akan perspectives. The paper also considers how principles and values of Akan communitarianism can be espoused to promote human well-being. It is the position of the paper that the metaphysical and, especially, the moral underpinning of ancestor veneration in the traditional Akan society, can provide values that can serve as catalysts for the furtherance of human well-being. (shrink)

To address the underrepresentation of women in philosophy effectively, we must understand the causes of the early loss of women. In this paper we challenge one of the few explanations that has focused on why women might leave philosophy at early stages. Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich offer some evidence that women have different intuitions than men about philosophical thought experiments. We present some concerns about their evidence and we discuss our own study, in which we attempted to replicate their (...) results for 23 different responses to 14 scenarios . We also conducted a literature search to see if other philosophers or psychologists have tested for gender differences in philosophical intuitions. Based on our findings, we argue that that it is unlikely that gender differences in intuitions play a significant role in driving women from philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to provide a theory that explains human behavior, and thinking in their totality. We missed the corporeal part when writing the theory about our new model for the human psyche: It was missing explaining that some things are physical, such as memories, involuntary organic movements, disease, etc. If we had developed a philosophical model for the soma, we would also miss the essence of the individual, what we have decided to call psyche. In order to (...) explain how our hand could not stand the pressure and ended up releasing the link that then got lose and killed somebody, we need the philosophical explanation involving the soma. In order to explain why a person had a shared-ego moment, we need the philosophical explanation involving the psyche. In this way, it is missing creating a theory that unifies all in order to produce a set that can explain any situation that involves human behavior and thinking. We are then calling the entity that collects all in one, which is needed for our better understanding, Human Persona. Persona because that reminds us of individuality, unique characteristics that tell us that the individual we call John Smith, of id 143, is someone special. Human because we do talk about personality of animals, and we would like to make sure we create an impression of difference and superiority when referring to humans. The tools we here use are logical analysis, deductive reasoning, selection and collection of real-life evidence, etc. (shrink)

In this paper, we take the approach of the lexicon makers: We contemplate human language instead of trying to resist its forces. Basically, some sigmatoids seem to have been created to be free of boundaries: We fence them as we please when we apply them to our assertions, but they are quite vague in the lexicon. We here identify at least two types of such sigmatoids: The synthetisers and the specifiers. The former would originate from our capacity of isolating common (...) features of objects that, in principle, have no possible intersection. The latter would originate from our attempt of describing the 3D World by means of 2D entities. We conclude that the intrinsic vagueness of these sigmatoids is something not only acceptable, but either pleasant or necessary. (shrink)

Entailment is an interesting sigmatoid: It should mean one thing, but it means another, just for starters. When used in Mathematics, it is usually with the sense of saying that something is definitely true. That would be the use in Classical Logic then. When used in Logic, it became something else. Now it was about how the logical system, which can be any nonclassical one, could be making a proposition become true or false. The major issue we found in 2000, (...) when learning from the own nonclassicists what they do, was that they talk about Nonclassical Logic, therefore a way of thinking that is not Cartesian, yet they stick to the notion of entailment we use in Mathematics, and therefore to the Classical Logic ways. We here discuss exactly this. (shrink)

A discussion on this so debatable and debated concept, Higher Order Vagueness. After going through the issues that make Higher Order Vagueness an object of scientific attention, we conclude that vagueness is undesirable in logical systems but desirable in language, and the Semiotics Universe splits into three other universes inside of the universe of the Computer Science Systems. We create a new way of addressing problems with sigmatoids, and define vagueness in an almost mathematical fashion.

Scholars in the field of environmental and animal ethics have propounded theories that outline what, in their view, ought to constitute an ethical relationship between humans and the environment and humans and nonhuman animals respectively. In the field of animal ethics, the contributions by Western scholars to theorize a body of animal ethics, either as an ethic in its own right or as a branch of the broader field of environmental ethics is clearly seen. Consequently, there are, notably, two main (...) schools of thought in the field of animal ethics. These are the ‘welfarist’ and the ‘rightist’ approaches (Regan, 2006; Owoseni & Olatoye, 2014). Unfortunately, a clearly concerted effort to theorize on animal ethics from an African perspective is at the minimal, although there is a lot written in African environmental ethics, broadly construed. It is within this context that this study locates an African animal ethic within the two main theories in the global animal ethics debate, using traditional Akan ontology and ethics particularly, those that speak to their relationship with the environment and, especially animals. Thus, using Akan ontological worldview and ethics as foundational sources, alongside learned principles from the emerging theories in African environmental ethics, the study seeks to find the place of Akan animal ethics within the rightist and welfarist debates. (shrink)

We here propose a solution to the problem we have raised. Basically, the mathematical notion of entailment seems to be connected to the inferential rules from Classical Logic, so that if we have P: x belongs to the reals, and Q: x+2=5 => x=3, P |= Q. Notwithstanding, we would also have that if P: x belongs to the interval (7,10), and Q: x+2=5 => x=3, P |= Q. The second instance of entailment does not seem to be justifiable if (...) our intuition is consulted: Even though we could say that absurdity implies anything in Classical Logic, entailment should be a concept that belongs to the metalogic, not to the logic of the system, so that we should not be inside of the Classical Logic World by the time we assess things in what regards entailment. As another point, our discussions in Entailment led us to choose the sense has as a consequence for entailment, so that it is not really acceptable that we have, as a consequence, using normal language, of x being inside of the real interval (7,10) that if x+2=5, then x=3. If x is in that interval, x+2 should not be 5, unless we are talking about moduli of vectors. However, when we transfer to Classical Logic, in having the antecedent false, and the consequent false as well, we have that the implication, which some call material, is true. We here discuss this sort of matter in detail, and hope to get to the bottom of the issue, and perhaps to a universal solution. (shrink)

In his book, The Last Word, Thomas Nagel expresses the hope that there exists no God. Guy Kahane, in his paper ‘Should We Want God to Exist?’, attempts to defend Nagel from an argument that concludes such a hope may be impermissible. In this paper we present a new defense for the hope that God does not exist.

Deidealization as a topic in its own right has attracted remarkably little philosophical interest despite the extensive literature on idealization. One reason for this is the often implicit assumption that idealization and deidealization are, potentially at least, reversible processes. We question this assumption by analyzing the challenges of deidealization within a menu of four broad categories: deidealizing as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, deidealizing as concretizing, and deidealizing as situating. On closer inspection, models turn out much more inflexible than the reversal (...) thesis would have us believe, and deidealization emerges as a creative part of modeling. (shrink)

Oswald Spengler is best known as a philosopher of history. However, one can trace in volume one of his The Decline of the West a sustained consideration of philosophical issues pertaining to the nature and practice of science that I suggest can be considered to be a philosophy of science. Not only has Spengler’s philosophy of science been largely overlooked, so too has its peculiar fictionalist character. By elaborating on the fictionalist character of Spengler’s scientific views I shall consider his (...) work in comparison with that of Hans Vaihinger, a contemporary of Spengler and noted fictionalist with regards to science. This comparison not only supports my interpretation of Spengler’s philosophy of science as fictionalist, it also throws into relief the numerous affinities between the thought of two philosophers who are not usually associated, in particular with regards to their accounts of the origins of science in the structures of human consciousness. This fictionalist affinity in turn suggests the need for a wholesale reappraisal of Spengler’s philosophical outlook. (shrink)

This paper argues that the recent renewal of interest in the philosophy of Oswald Spengler, particularly concerning its warnings of the imminent demise of Western Civilisation, is misplaced. Arguments concerning the accuracy of his predictions or cultural analysis have overlooked the necessity of evaluating the coherence of the philosophical system that Spengler used to generate and justify his speculative declarations. Such an evaluation indicates a number of apparent contradictions at the heart of Spengler’s historical model. The attempt to resolve these (...) contradictions has resulted in a sharp division of interpretation amongst Spengler commentators, into positivist and relativist camps. Neither interpretation, I suggest, is capable of rendering Spengler’s historical system coherent. It is therefore argued that Spengler’s philosophy is fundamentally flawed. (shrink)

In The Decline of the West Spengler puts forward a type of philosophical anthropology, an account of the structures of human experiential consciousness and a method of “physiognomic” analysis, which I argue has dimensions that can be understood as akin to existential phenomenology. Humanity, for Spengler, is witness to the creative flux of “Becoming” and constructs a world of phenomena bounded by death, underpinned by the two prime feelings of dread and longing and structured by the two forms of Destiny (...) (Time) and Direction (Space). Human existence, Spengler argues, is future-directed and open in the sense that there is a certain degree of freedom in the ways in which humanity can actualize its existential possibilities. In the course of elaborating the existential implications of this future-orientation, Spengler introduces the concept of care (Sorge), the fundamental experiential structure. (shrink)

We argue, contra Joshua Knobe in a companion chapter, that most people have an understanding of free will and responsible agency that is compatible with a naturalistic vision of the human mind. Our argument is supported by results from a new experimental philosophy study showing that most people think free will is consistent with complete and perfect prediction of decisions and actions based on prior activity in the brain (a scenario adapted from Sam Harris who predicts most people will find (...) it inconsistent with free will). We explain why most people are "theory-lite" about the nature of mind and free will--they are not committed to substantive theories of the underlying causal structure of mind, such as Knobe's "transcendence vision". Rather, we suggest a "causal competition principle"--that an agent's actions will be deemed unfree when they are perceived to be fully caused by factors that do not include her reasons. This principle explains why people, including some scientists, perceive neuroscientific explanations as threatening free will when they are described in terms of neural processes fully causing actions to the exclusion of agents' reasons or reasoning processes. (shrink)

We present a new model for the human psyche in this paper. We support the thinkers from Philosophy of Science that believe that we should keep the theory that best explains our phenomena, and, therefore, we believe that we should keep the theory we here present for the human psyche. We present evidences as to why our theory explains the human psyche better than the Freudian and the Jungian theories. We include all concepts created by Jung and Freud in our (...) theory apart from the collective unconscious. We introduce the elements extended id and extended ego in terms of human personality and the elements judgmental, non-judgmental, shared, and non-shared in terms of human mind. Our methodology consists in performing a logical analysis of the theories of Freud and Jung and then put them against the known reality to come up with solutions that address the gaps that both exhibit. (shrink)

Our investigative question is what part of the human psyche is active when we are sleeping. We use the single-counter-example method, extracted from Classical Logic, to prove that it could not be the case that one of our existing models for the human psyche could explain the human sleep. The models of the human psyche that we consider are the Freudian, the Jungian, and our own. By proving that no known part could be active whilst we sleep, and we prove (...) all by presenting known facts, we reach the conclusion that we need a new model of psyche to account for the entire complexity of our beings. We associate sleep with dreams. Upon discussing the human dreams in more details, we end up applying the principles of the inference to the best explanation to explain the human dreams by means of references to the spiritual world. That makes us think about how the spiritists would describe our psyche, and we then present a new model. The new model is obviously a fruit of speculation. This time, the model involves all Freudian elements, our extensional elements, body, and soul. We use the synthetic method to construct our new model. Since our sleep time is so important, to the point of obliging us to build a new model for the human psyche, we worry about protecting it. We then use studies on the impact of noise on humans to talk about how bad the consequences of having a person speaking to us during sleep are. This trivially extends to people that are in hypnotic state. We try to make a case against hypnosis and interference with the sleep of human beings by referring to health, spiritual, and world consequences. Our main result is then a new model for the human psyche, and this time a model that has to do with what is beyond what has already been formally acknowledged by us. A secondary result is that we should not allow people to hypnotize others or to speak to them as they sleep. Our conclusions are that there is definitely something beyond our rationality that happens during our sleep time and this something has not been identified by Freud, Jung or us this far. Besides, that we should not allow people to hypnotize others or speak to them as they sleep. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss three translation techniques: literal, cultural, and artistic. Literal translation is a well-known technique, which means that it is quite easy to find sources on the topic. Cultural and artistic translation may be new terms. Whilst cultural translation focuses on matching contexts, artistic translation focuses on matching reactions. Because literal translation matches only words, it is not hard to find situations in which we should not use this technique. Because artistic translation focuses on reactions, judging the (...) quality of an artistic translation work is one of the most difficult things one can do. We end up having a score of complexity and humanity for each one of the mentioned techniques: Literal translation would be the closest thing we have to the machines world and artistic translation would be the closest thing we have to the purely human world. By creating these classifications and studying the subtleties of each one of them, we are adding degrees of quality to our courses and to translation as a professional field. The main contribution of this paper is then the formalization of such a piece of knowledge. We, however, also lay the foundations for studies of this type. (shrink)

The Unexpected Hanging Problem is also known as the Surprise Examination Problem. We here solve it by isolating what is logical reasoning from the rest of the human psyche. In a not-so-orthodox analysis, following our tradition (The Liar, Dichotomy, The Sorites and Russell’s Paradox), we talk about the problem from a perspective that is more distant than all the known perspectives. From an observational point that is in much farther than all the observational points used until now, the reader can (...) finally see why the problem has been perpetuated as a problem and can also see that the problem was never an actual problem: Once more, we have an allurement. The allurement this time makes us start paying attention to all the complexity of the human psyche when studying problems that involve human feelings. The main finding could be told to be that we have to understand and study more the human psyche, in all its intricacies, also when dealing with problems that seem to belong with exclusivity to Mathematics or Logic. (shrink)

In much of the literature graffiti is connected to notions of defacing, devaluing, vandalising, participating in an illegal activity or exhibiting ‘anti-social behaviour.’ The aim of this paper is to show the change of perceptions toward graffiti as less of an act of vandalism or a criminal activity and more of a solution to many social and political concerns. The paper offers a way to reframe graffiti as the solution rather then the problem based on a study of graffiti crews (...) in Sofia, Bulgaria. The paper presents three cases of these crews, each attempting to address different social and political issues within the capital of Bulgaria. This paper is hoping to highlight how graffiti can be used as a tool to help reduce crime, showcase a critical subcultural communication that is inclusive of the community at large, and depict the aesthetic value that can be added to a place in order to re-design the space and people’s attitude and behaviour. More importantly, the paper serves to show how graffiti can enable introspection and bring out not only the ‘soul’ from the wall, but also our own. (shrink)

We talk about how to best protect Australia against cyberterrorist attacks of the type in which the offenders use a computer to attack or in which the offenders attack computers. Our concern is phenomena like Stuxnet and Ransomware, but also any attack that has not yet happened, as for our official records, so say hacking of satellite and use of its allowances to burn people alive to death. We talk about the basics, which could be the advice of FireEye, and (...) we talk about the sophisticated, which could be what is not yet printed. We worry about actions that could be considered part of the intelligence system, so things that demand detailed study of the past and systemic plus organised collection of data in the present. We do not talk about how to deal with Acts of War: Only about how to protect our systems to best so that we do not get those happening via computer or from a computer. (shrink)

This essay discusses the Vietnam War from the perspective of the strategist, and with focus on men-power,which is part of the concept of `order of the battle’. The interest is progressing toward determining best methodsfor the calculation of estimates of this type to decrease mistake in wars that involve various nations. Uponstudying the debate involving the estimates for the Vietnam War, period ranging from 1965 to 1968, theconclusion is that there were gross mistakes from the part of the military, and (...) methods of producing the order ofthe battle have to be much better examined. Systems of decision, and management deserve revision, so that whathas happened during the Vietnam War does not repeat: important is saving human lives, not the prestige ofindividual institutions or even the amount of negative criticism that is made publicly available about them.National forces must mean also Academia, and there is a chance that Academia can improve those systems bymuch if governmental authorities acknowledge its existence in all sectors of the national life. The best strategyis still including the dissident group or person, not facing them as an enemy, when it comes to those who areregarded by the general public as part of the national forces. (shrink)

In higher education, interdisciplinarity involves the design of subjects that offer the opportunity to experience ‘different ways of knowing’ from students’ core or preferred disciplines. Such an education is increasingly important in a global knowledge economy. Many universities have begun to introduce interdisciplinary studies or subjects to meet this perceived need. This chapter explores some of the issues inherent in moves towards interdisciplinary higher education. Definitional issues associated with the term ‘academic discipline’, as well as other terms, including ‘multidisciplinary’, ‘cross-disciplinary’, (...) ‘pluridisciplinarity’, ‘transdisciplinarity’ and ‘interdisciplinary’ are examined. A new nomenclature is introduced to assist in clarifying the subtle distinctions between the various positions. The chapter also outlines some of the pedagogical and epistemological considerations which are involved in any move from a conventional form of educational delivery to an interdisciplinary higher education, and recommends caution in any implementation of an interdisciplinary curriculum. (shrink)

This paper addresses the generally neglected topic of Vandana Shiva’s ontology. It is argued that there is a significant ontological component to Shiva’s ecofeminist philosophy and that this ontology underpins her ecological and feminist views. Shiva’s ontology provides a standpoint from which she can critique dichotomous ontologies of domination and oppression, and from which she can identify life-sustaining modes of existence. It is argued that this ontology is implicit in most of her works and is best grasped through the analysis (...) of her critique of Western scientific metaphysics. It is further argued that this implied ontology is a continuation of the Hindu-ecofeminist ontology of Prakriti explicitly set forth in Shiva’s Staying Alive (1989). Both forms of Shiva’s ontology, the explicit and the implicit, will be reconstructed and their points of continuity detailed. (shrink)

Several prominent voices have called for a democratization of science through deliberative processes that include a diverse range of perspectives and values. We bring these scholars into conversation with extant research on democratic deliberation in political theory and the social sciences. In doing so, we identify systematic barriers to the effectiveness of inclusive deliberation in both scientific and political settings. We are particularly interested in what we call misidentified dissent, where deliberations are starkly framed at the outset in terms of (...) dissenting positions without properly distinguishing the kinds of difference and disagreement motivating dissent. (shrink)

Addressing classicists, philosophers, students, and general readers alike, this volume emphasizes the unity of Seneca's work and his originality as a translator of Stoic ideas in the literary forms of imperial Rome. It features a vitalizing diversity of contributors from different generations, disciplines, and research cultures. Several prominent Seneca scholars publishing in other languages are for the first time made accessible to anglophone readers. (See also the attached file with ToC and Introduction).

The debate between instrumentalist and technological determinist positions on the nature of technology characterised the early history of the philosophy of technology. In recent years however technological determinism has ceased to be viewed as a credible philosophical position within the field. This paper uses Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to reconsider the technological determinist outlook in phenomenological terms as an experiential response to the encounter with the phenomenon of modern technology. Recasting the instrumentalist-determinist debate in a phenomenological manner enables one to reconcile the (...) apparent dualism of the instrumentalist and determinist positions through Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh. This ontology has recently been used to ground accounts of virtual embodiment. We argue that in addition to explaining away the classical form of technological determinism, it can also phenomenologically ground a novel understanding of technological determinism. Namely, a technological determinism of virtual embodiment. (shrink)

This paper explores the existential motivation for the formation of extremist echo chambers through a phenomenological analysis. We advance two claims. Firstly, following Ortega y Gasset, that virtuality is a constant framework for experience. And secondly, following Merleau-Ponty, that there is persistent embodiment in online spaces. On this account virtuality is a permanent feature of embodiment, existing prior to technological intervention while at the same time being modifiable by technological artefacts. Understanding virtuality in this way allows us to analyse the (...) existential phenomenological characteristics of extremist echo chambers online. We argue that due to the persistence of embodiment throughout, and the restructuring of the virtual axes of experience, such online spaces can and do influence political praxis in offline spaces. (shrink)

This paper argues that Oswald Spengler has an innovative philosophical position on the nature and interrelation of mathematics and science. It further argues that his position in many ways parallels that of Martin Heidegger. Both held that an appreciation of the mathematical nature of contemporary science was critical to a proper appreciation of science, technology and modernity. Both also held that the fundamental feature of modern science is its mathematical nature, and that the mathematical operates as a projection that establishes (...) in advance the manner in which an object will present itself. They also assert that modern science, mathematics and metaphysics all have their roots in the ‘mathematical’, whose essence is itself nothing numerical. (shrink)

How does microbiota research impact our understanding of biological individuality? We summarize the interdisciplinary summer school on "Microbiota, Symbiosis and Individuality: Conceptual and Philosophical Issues" (July 2019), which was supported by a European Research Council starting grant project "Immunity, DEvelopment, and the Microbiota" (IDEM). The summer school centered around interdisciplinary group work on four facets of microbiota research: holobionts, individuality, causation, and human health. The conceptual discussion of cutting-edge empirical research provided new insights into microbiota and highlights the value of (...) incorporating into meetings experts from other disciplines, such as philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

Spengler’s work is typically represented as speculative philosophy of history. However, I argue that there is good reason to consider much of his thought as preoccupied with existential and phenomenological questions about the nature and ends of human existence, rather than with history per se. In this paper I consider Spengler’s work in comparison with Heidegger’s history of Being and analysis of technological modernity. I argue that Spengler’s considerable proximity to much of Heidegger’s thought compels us to reconsider the nature (...) and scope of Spengler’s philosophical project. (shrink)

Philosophy of technology was not initially considered a consolidated field of inquiry. However, under the influence of sociology and pragmatist philosophy, something resembling a consensus has emerged in a field previously marked by a lack of agreement amongst its practitioners. This has given the field a greater sense of structure and yielded interesting research. However, the loss of the earlier “messy” state has resulted in a limitation of the field’s scope and methodology that precludes an encompassing view of the problematic (...) issues inherent in the question of technology. It is argued that the heterodox disunity and diversity of earlier philosophy of technology was not a mark of theoretical immaturity but was necessitated by the field’s complex subject matter. It is further argued that philosophy of technology should return to its pluralistic role as a meta-analytical structure linking insights from different fields of research. (shrink)

Technological determinism, as a position on the nature and effects of technology/technologies can be divided into optimistic and critical forms. The optimistic variety, of which contemporary cyber-utopianism is an instance, holds that the development of technology shapes or at least facilitates ameliorative alterations in society. The critical variety, on the other hand, tends to problematise or condemn the positive narrative of technological impact on human existence. Whilst the optimistic form still retains some academic credibility, especially concerning digital technologies, the critical (...) variety tends to be viewed as reductionist, essentialist and pessimistic. Furthermore, the fact that many of its leading proponents base their critiques on the analysis of industrial technology, reinforces the impression that critical technological determinism is outdated. I argue that focussing on the specific forms of technology analysed by classic technological determinists is to miss the key point of their arguments. Critical determinism warns that with the increasing integration of technology into everyday life, we run the risk of idealising technological organisation and making sociotechnical relations a model for all social relations. Drawing upon Rendueles’s (2017) analysis of the sociophobic tendencies of the online public sphere, I argue for the continuing relevance of so-called ‘Classic’ technological determinism. The danger posed by the ubiquity of the internet on this account is not that it possesses some innate quality that imposes a particular social pattern on humanity, but that the way in which we interact in cyberspace becomes the norm for social relations outside the cybersphere. (shrink)

Levinas never engaged closely with Fichte’s work, but there are two places in the chapter “Substitution,” in Otherwise than Being (1974), where he mentions Fichte by name. The point that Levinas underscores in both of these passages is that the other’s encounter with the subject is not the outcome of the subject’s freedom; it is not posited by the subject, as Fichte has it, but is prior to any free activity. The aim of this paper is to deepen the comparison (...) between Levinas and Fichte, giving special attention to Fichte's own novel theory of intersubjectivity and the summons. One result that emerges from this treatment is that both Levinas and Fichte view the second person in a way that has no equivalent in the current philosophical landscape. On this reading, each thinker views responsibility to the other, not only as an immediate and particular obligation, but also as an asymmetrical relation that gives the other moral priority. (shrink)

Abstract This paper argues that the concept of authenticity has evolved since the time of Adorno’s critique in The Jargon of Authenticity, and that an analysis of tourism offers a way of grasping the altered status of the concept of authenticity and its current ideological function in the contemporary capitalist system. It is suggested that authenticity no longer refers to an existential state, but instead to a purchased experiential moment. This paper traces the alterations in the understanding of existential authenticity (...) from its origins in existential phenomenology to its current status as a key concept in tourism research. It suggests that, while Adorno’s critique of authenticity has become somewhat outdated due to changes in the social relations of modern capitalism, its central argument still holds true, in that contemporary notions of authenticity still play an ideological role in securing the socio-economic status quo by both expressing and concealing the sense of alienation caused by social relations under capitalism. (shrink)

Ecofeminist philosophy is a development of feminist philosophy that addresses the intersection of sexism and environmental issues. Coined by Francoise d’Eaubonne, the term “ecofeminism” refers to a diverse collection of feminist thought that shares the conviction that the present environmental crisis is due not solely to the anthropomorphic nature of dominant conceptualisations of human-nature relations, with their emphasis on notion of mastery and control, but also to their androcentric nature. Technology features frequently in ecofeminist writings, in analyses of technocracy (Birkeland (...) 1993), Nuclear Power (Caputi 1993), reproductive technologies (Diamond 1990), or the production of computer interfaces (Romberger 2011), to give but a few examples. Despite being a recurrent theme, technology itself as a phenomenon is rarely directly considered. For many ecofeminists technology seems to operate as an umbrella term for a collection of artefacts whose positive or negative characteristics are ultimately contingent upon the manner in which they are employed. The individual technologies appear as value neutral. There are of course exceptions to this piecemeal approach to technological artefacts, and in this chapter I shall focus upon two ecofeminist philosophers whose consideration of technology moves from the individual instance towards a more general account of the nature of technology. The first, Karen Warren, gives technology a central place in her philosophical analysis. However, I shall suggest, her commitment to an instrumental understanding of technology renders her approach problematic. I will then consider the work of Vandana Shiva. Standard analyses of Shiva’s work tend to overlook the philosophical dimensions of her thought, in particular the continuous emphasis on science and technology. I argue that Shiva puts forward a sophisticated technological determinist philosophy of that emphasises the role of political and patriarchal interests in technological development and subsequent social and environmental interventions. (shrink)

In a theoretical reflection, the aim of this paper is primarily to discuss alterity in journalism. We believe that journalism plays a fundamental role in the construction of knowledge on similarities and differences between human beings, stressing social diversity as one of its purposes. We associate the concept of otherness, understood as a singular mode of existence of the “other”, with the purpose of journalism and with actions of empathy, sympathy and compassion. Based on a phenomenological perspective, we discuss the (...) importance of the meeting between the "self" and the "other", as well as the ability of journalists to perceive and narrate on the aspects that shape the identities of human beings. Moreover, we discuss otherness in journalistic narratives, approaching the relation between the lifeworld and the world of text... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the close link between technology and death in the philosophical writings of Lewis Mumford. Mumford famously argued that throughout the history of western civilization we find intertwined two competing forms of technics; the democratic biotechnic form and the authoritarian monotechnic form. The former technics were said to be strongly compatible with an organic form of life while the latter were said to be allied to a mechanical power complex. What is perhaps less (...) well known is the extent to which Mumford characterizes the authoritarian technical form as being a technics of death. This article will argue that the connection between death and technics is a key theme in Mumford’s philosophy of technology. In addition to elaborating this theme and detailing how it informs Mumford’s other positions on the nature of technology, this article will also argue that Mumford’s theory of a technics of death bears witness, both implicitly and explicitly, to the influence of Sigmund Freud’s theory of the death instinct. Freud’s account of the death instinct will be outlined briefly and its influence on Mumford’s writings will be explained. Death, in Mumford’s technological writings, has a generally negative function and serves to warn humanity of the perilous course that its technological civilization is set upon. However it also has a positive function in that it encourages man to transcend its biological existence in acts of creativity and purpose. Death, in this positive sense, serves the purpose of life whereas, in the negative sense, it hinders it. The role of death, in both aspects, will be explored and related to Mumford’s overall perspective on technics and life. It is argued that Mumford’s philosophy of technology cannot be fully understood without an awareness of his views on death and its role in the life of technological society. (shrink)

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of (...) mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation. (shrink)

The paper identifies the phenomenal rise of increasingly invasive forms of elective cosmetic surgery targeted primarily at women and explores its significance in the context of contemporary biotechnology. A Foucauldian analysis of the significance of the normalization of technologized women's bodies is argued for. Three "Paradoxes of Choice" affecting women who "elect" cosmetic surgery are examined. Finally, two utopian feminist political responses are discussed: a Response of Refusal and a Response of Appropriation.

Most commentators on Spengler's philosophy tend to focus on the details of his cyclical theory of world-history, according to which history should be understood in terms of the rise and fall of great cultures. I argue that Spengler's philosophy of history is itself an expression of his primary concern with philosophical analysis of the structures of human consciousness, and that an awareness of Spengler's account of the existential structures of subjective consciousness enables one to grasp the reasoning behind some of (...) the key features of his philosophy of history, such as his cultural isolation hypothesis and critique of Eurocentric historiography. I further argue that the way to access Spengler's theory of consciousness, and the ways in which it informs his philosophy of history, is via his critical engagement with the Kant character that recurs in the first volume of The Decline of the West. (shrink)

The introduction to the second of a two-part special issue on Oswald Spengler. This section explores his philosophical reception by his Weimar contemporaries and presents new analyses of the philosophical features of his thought.

Dark Tourism represents the intersection of reflections on mortality with the commodification and consumption of death as a tourist experience. It is a complex and contested concept that has been approached from a variety of theoretical standpoints. In this paper, I suggest that a phenomenological analysis of the experiences of those who engage in dark tourism can provide a means of approaching the subject that can both accommodate the diversity of experiences sought by the dark tourist, and deepen our understanding (...) of the nature and purpose of dark tourism. More specifically, I repurpose Cohen’s (Sociology 13(2):179–201, 1979) typology of tourist experience to suggest a phenomenological typology of dark tourist experiences. Following Cohen, I suggest that we can chart the dark tourist experience as a continuum ranging from a pleasure-seeking experience to a meaning-seeking experience, qualified by authenticity-seeking or alienation-avoiding motivations, and the individual tourist’s proximity to or distance from the “centre” of their worldview. Such an analysis allows us to differentiate between tourists whose motivations are more recreational in nature and those whose motivations are more existential. A phenomenological analysis also enables us to further differentiate amongst the different modes of existential experience sought by the “pure” dark tourist and to consider the conditions of possibility necessary for their realisation. (shrink)

The Anatomy of Economic Inequality in Wales (2011) provides quantitative evidence for the pervasive nature of class-based inequalities in education, demonstrating that an individual in social housing is approximately 10 times less likely to be a graduate compared to those in other types of accommodation. This article moves beyond the baseline figures and argues that for marginalised, mature mothers re-entering education, the emotional cost is often one that they are unable to pay, and that practitioners and policy makers need to (...) be aware of, and responsive to their situation so that retention and completion rates can be improved. The article presents case studies from two research projects, which aimed to explore and represent the educational experiences of working-class mature students in urban south Wales. The article focuses on the accounts of women who completed Access courses and gained places in post-1992 universities, focusing on their initial aspirations and later disappointments. The article examines the ways in which classed, gendered and relational positionings conflicted with their education trajectory and often contributed to their withdrawal from academia. (shrink)

Haack classifies Spengler’s views on the end of science as what she terms annihilationist in that he forecasts the absolute termination of scientific activity as opposed to its completion or culmination. She also argues that in addition to his externalist argument that Western science, as cultural product, cannot survive the demise of Western Culture, Spengler also puts forward an internalist argument that science, regardless of the imminent demise of Western Culture, is in terminal decline as evidenced by its diminishing returns. (...) I argue against Haack that Spengler’s argument for the diminishing returns of modern science is in fact an externalist one, in that he locates the sources of science’s current decline outside the discipline of science itself, attributing them to a change in cultural attitude towards scientific endeavours. I further argue that Spengler’s prediction of the imminent end of science was directed specifically at pure science, and that he in fact held that applied science would continue to develop. I also take issue with Haack’s suggestion that Spengler’s views on science were outmoded at the time that he wrote them. (shrink)

Most interpretations of Oswald Spengler’s _The Decline of the West_ offer a relativist or positivist reading of his philosophy of history, with the latter being the most common. This paper argues that any positivist account of Spengler’s philosophy of history is untenable, and that only a relativist interpretation is plausible. It differs from standard arguments for the relativist interpretation by arguing that Spengler’s philosophy be understood as a form of fictionalism. However, rather than dismissing the positivistic elements of his philosophy (...) of history, it argues that they form a separate (albeit fictional) philosophy of history within his relativist philosophy designed to serve a heuristic purpose. (shrink)

Contemporary social science research is often concerned to engage with and promote particular forms of postmodern and innovative data production, such as photo-elicitation, autoethnography or free association interviews. This fascination with the latest and greatest techniques has been accompanied by an ever more fragmented range of research methods training for students where the week-by-week shift between approaches engenders a disjointed view of becoming the researcher. This individualisation of techniques has set up rival camps and critiques where the common ground of (...) being embedded in traditional ethnography is often forgotten. For researchers, who began their academic careers in the ethnographic tradition, there is an appreciation of the holistic base of enquiry from which a family of methods can be effectively employed. However, more recently qualitative researchers have been distracted by ‘the technique’; a distraction that can blind them to the occupation of ethnography. Concurrently, there have been shifts in the social and economic expectations placed on qualitative inquiry that have acted to close down spaces of ethnographic teaching and practice. In response, this article focuses on the importance of the ‘waiting field’; an opportunity to explore the times where real lives carry on before they make room for the intrusion of the data production of ‘the technique’ and remind us that much qualitative research is, in fact, an ethnographic undertaking: one that encompasses the researcher within and beyond the field. (shrink)

L'empathie est un mode émotionnel qui associe le point de vue d'autrui à des sensations physiologiques. Ce phénomène a tendance à être plus important envers certaines personnes qu'envers d'autres. Or, il existe parfois de bonnes raisons morales de promouvoir une empathie plus égalitaire. Notre hypothèse de psychologie morale est qu'il est possible d'utiliser l'imagination, et en particulier sa dimension volontaire et sa transparence aux émotions, pour corriger certains biais empathiques.

In August 2021, Froese et al. published survey data collected from 2,543 respondents on their subjective experiences living under imposed social distancing measures during COVID-19 (1). The questionnaire was issued to respondents in the UK, Japan, and Mexico. By combining the authors’ expertise in phenomenological philosophy, phenomenological psychopathology, and enactive cognitive science, the questions were carefully phrased to prompt reports that would be useful to phenomenological investigation and theorizing (2–4). These questions reflected the various author’s research interests (e.g., technology, grief, (...) time). Between April 7th and July 31st, 2021, a second questionnaire with the same question set was issued to respondents of the original who had agreed to do a follow-up. This was intended to capture subjective reports of life under social distancing measures a year after the initial survey. By this time–depending on their country of residence and health status–respondents had potentially lived with repeated and prolonged lockdowns and a variety of other restrictions on their social lives. When taken together, Survey I and Survey II provide a cross-cultural and longitudinal dataset that allows for analysis of longer-term impacts of imposed social distancing measures on people’s experiences. For researchers working in diverse disciplines, this dataset offers a rich resource that reflects people’s reactions to the imposition of different social restrictions in different countries and over different time periods. (shrink)