AI designers endeavour to improve ‘autonomy’ in artificial intelligent devices, as recent developments show. This chapter firstly argues against attributing metaphysical attitudes to AI and, simultaneously, in favor of improving autonomous AI which has been enabled to respect autonomy in human agents. This seems to be the only responsible way of making further advances in the field of autonomous social AI. Let us examine what is meant by claims such as designing our artificial alter egos and sharing moral selves with (...) artificial humanoid devices. (shrink)

Faulkner a bâti une partie de sa renommée sur la violence parfois controversée de ses récits. Mais l’acte criminel retient moins son attention que son contexte et sa signification morale. L’objet premier de la littérature, selon Faulkner, ce sont les conflits de l’homme, ou du cœur humain, avec eux-mêmes. Le propos de cet article est de mettre en évidence la façon dont Faulkner subvertit le modèle du roman noir, et substitue à l’enjeu traditionnel des histoires policières, celui des faits et (...) de l’identité du coupable, un problème moral. Il donne quelques indications sur la structure générale des rapports crime-culpabilité dans l’œuvre de Faulkner, avant de montrer comment cette thématique se décline dans ses « histoires de crime » au sens propre, c’est-à-dire dans L’Intrus (Intruder in the dust, 1948) et Le Gambit du cavalier, et irrigue la reconstitution faulknérienne de la société du Sud et de l’histoire des États-Unis. (shrink)

Que les récits utopiques et contre-utopiques sont-ils censés nous apprendre que nous ne sachions déjà – que l'état du monde pourrait être meilleur, ou pire, qu'il n'est ? Qu'ont-ils à nous dire de la sanction pénale, comme concept et comme pratique, et que celle-ci nous apprend-elle en retour des limites de l'utopie comme récit et comme discours ? En mettant l'accent sur les références explicites, dans 1984, à la suppression systématique de tout ce qui pourrait ressembler à une règle, et (...) en resituant le roman dans le contexte social et colonial de l'expérience orwellienne de l'injustice pénale, cet article montre que les lectures d'Orwell inspirées de Rorty, Foucault et Deleuze, et centrées sur les notions de pouvoir, de discipline et de contrôle, manquent en partie leur objet. Ni simple « satire », ni « prophétie », ni « expérience de pensée », 1984 exprime la grammaire profonde de notre conception libérale du droit pénal, comme le dirait Wittgenstein. S'il n'est jamais question pour Orwell de dénoncer l'utopie comme intrinsèquement dangereuse, 1984 révèle toutefois qu'il est impossible d'en saisir l'élément de perfection par le droit. En ce sens, la « dernière utopie » des droits humains (S. Moyn) n'en est pas une. --- What are we supposed to learn from utopian/dystopian fiction – beyond the obvious fact that the state of the world could be better, or worse ? What can these fables tell us about criminal penalty as a concept and as practice ? Conversely, what can punishment tell us of the limits of utopia as a tale and as discourse ? By stressing 1984's explicit references to the meticulous elimination of anything vaguely resembling a rule, while putting the novel in the perspective of Orwell's social and colonial experience of penal injustice, this paper shows that interpretations of Orwell inspired by the likes of Rorty, Foucault or Deleuze, which are grounded on power, discipline or control, somehow miss their target. No mere “satire” nor “prophecy”, nor even “thought experiment”, 1984 expresses the deep-seated grammar of our liberal conception of penal law, as Wittgenstein would put it. While Orwell aims in no way to dismiss utopia as intrinsically dangerous, 1984 however shows that the element of perfection it contains cannot be grasped by law. In this respect, the “Last Utopia” of human rights (S. Moyn) is certainly not one. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although in recent years Christine Ladd-Franklin has received recognition for her contributions to logic and psychology, her role in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, as well as her relationship with American pragmatism, has yet to be fully appreciated. My goal here is to attempt to better understand Ladd-Franklin’s place in the pragmatist tradition by drawing attention to her work on the nature and unity of the proposition. The question concerning the unity of the proposition – namely, (...) the problem of how to determine what differentiates a mere collection of terms from a unified and meaningful proposition – received substantial attention in Ladd-Franklin’s time, and would continue to interest analytic philosophers well into the twentieth century. I argue that Ladd-Franklin had a distinct theory of the proposition and solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition that she developed over the course of her writings on logic and philosophy. In spelling out her views, I will also show her work interacted with and influenced that of the pragmatist who was her greatest influence, C.S. Peirce. (shrink)

In this paper the relations between the almost unknown Spanish mathematician Ventura Reyes Prósper (1863-1922) with Charles S. Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin are described. Two brief papers from Reyes Prósper published in El Progreso Matemático 12 (20 December 1891), pp. 297-300, and 18 (15 June 1892) pp. 170-173 on Ladd-Franklin, and on Peirce and Mitchell, respectively, are translated for first time into English and included at the end of the paper.

This article is an effort to understand how the Peirce's Arrow (Logical NOR), as a logical operation, can act within the concept of Ludwig Wittgenstein's language-game, considering that the language game is a satzsystem, i.e., a system of propositions. To accomplish this task, we will cover four steps: (1) understand the possible relationship of the thought of C. S. Peirce with the founding trio of analytic philosophy, namely Frege-RussellWittgenstein, looking for similarities between the logic of Peirce and his students (notably (...) Christine Ladd and O.H. Mitchell) with a New Wittgenstein’s approach, which sees Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus),Middle Wittgenstein and Last Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations) while a coherent way of thinking and not a theoretical break; (2) describe the operation of the Peirce’s Arrow (Logical NOR) as a logical connective; (3)understand the notion of satzsystem (Middle Wittgenstein) and the possibility of applying the concept of language-game (Last Wittgenstein) on it; and (4) understand how the Logical NOR can operate within a satzsystem. The goal here is a search for the logic of the language-game and how the logical ideas of C. S. Peirce can help in this construction. And this construction might be interesting for a better understanding of the analytic philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this essay, I look at some extraordinary actors who never got their due—actors who had distinguished careers, but never won an Academy Award for acting. I review the work of: Joseph Cotten; Orson Welles; Edward G. Robinson; Cary Grant; James Mason; Richard Burton; Claude Rains; Alan Ladd: Robert Mitchum; and Fred MacMurray. In each case, I explore the actor’s best work, what made his acting outstanding, and offer possible explanations why he was not so honored.

O presente artigo busca debater a posição de Charles Sanders Peirce e dos primeiros estudantes peirceanos de Lógica (Christine Ladd e O. H. Mitchell nos Studies in Logic, 1883) dentro do debate inspirador da visão da linguagem dentro da Filosofia Analítica, conhecido como “Lingua Universalis contra Calculus Ratiocinator”, cujos primórdios podem ser traçados desde a filosofia de Gottfried Leibniz. Para isso, comparamos esse campo do pensamento peirceano com o debate crucial entre a conceitografia de Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift, 1879) e (...) a lógica algébrica de George Boole (An investigation of the Laws of Thought on which are founded the mathematical theories of Logic and Probabilities, 1854). O nosso objetivo principal é observar que esse momento da filosofia peirceana pode ser comparado com o pensamento wittgensteiniano, especialmente em sua nova vertente, chamada New Wittgenstein, que tenta superar a tradicional divisão entre Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e Investigações Filosóficas. Pela comparação entre pensadores influenciados por C. S. Peirce e a filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, pretendemos abrir caminhos na compreensão do conceito de jogo de linguagem, especialmente em sua gramática e em seus operadores simbólicos, através da observação das funções de verdade [truth functions] e as tabelas de verdade [truth tables] enquanto lógica algébrica. (shrink)

In this fragment of Opuscula Logica it is displayed an arithmetical treatment of the aristotelic syllogisms upon the previous interpretations of Christine Ladd-Franklin and Jean Piaget. For the first time, the whole deductive corpus for each syllogism is presented in the two innovative modalities first proposed by Hugo Padilla Chacón. A. The Projection method (all the possible expressions that can be deduced through the conditional from a logical expression) and B. The Retrojection method (all the possible valid antecedents or (...) premises conjunction for an expression proposed as a conclusion). The results are numerically expressed, with their equivalents in the propositional language of bivalent logic. (shrink)