In his lectures on Logic and Metaphysics, Kant distinguishes between logical and real essences. While the former is related to concepts and is knowable, the latter is related to things and is unknowable. In this paper, I argue that the unknowability is explained by the modal characteristic of real essences as a necessitating ground on which a priori knowledge is impossible. I also show how this claim is related to the unknowable necessity of particular laws of nature. Since laws of (...) nature are conceived as grounded in real essences, the unknowability of the latter is equivalent to Kant's other claim that there can be no knowledge of the necessity of particular laws of nature. Necessity can only be known a priori, and therefore, the necessity of particular laws is only assumed and conceived as grounded in something unknowable, a real essence. This conclusion will allow me to attribute to Kant a position I label as “regulative essentialism”, meaning that real essences have an indispensable role in accordance with the rational interest to explain nature as a system of laws and natural kinds, combined with an epistemic humility about the correspondence of our empirical concepts to real essences. (shrink)

Andrew Chignell and Omri Boehm have recently argued that Kant’s pre-Critical proof for the existence of God entails a Spinozistic conception of God and hence substance monism. The basis for this reading is the assumption common in the literature that God grounds possibilities by exemplifying them. In this article I take issue with this assumption and argue for an alternative Leibnizian reading, according to which possibilities are grounded in essences united in God’s mind (later also described as Platonic ideas intuited (...) by God). I show that this view about the distinction between God’s cognition of essences as the ground of possibility and the actual world is not only explicitly stated by Kant, but is also consistent with his metaphysical picture of teleology in nature and causality during the pre-Critical period. Finally, I suggest that the distinction between the conceptual order of essences embodied in the idea of God and the order of the objects of experience plays a role in the transition into the Critical system, where it is transformed into the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. (shrink)

In the ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant contends that the idea of God has a positive regulative role in the systematization of empirical knowledge. But why is this regulative role assigned to this specific idea? Kant’s account is rather opaque and this question has also not received much attention in the literature. In this paper I argue that an adequate understanding of the regulative role of the idea of God depends on the specific (...) metaphysical content Kant attributes to it in the Critique and other writings. I show that neither a heuristic principle of conceptual systematicity, nor conceiving God as a hypothesis of an intelligent designer, can satisfy the demands of reason to make the unity and necessity of the laws of nature intelligible. Regarding the positive account about the metaphysical content of the idea of God, I support my argument by referring to Kant’s pre-critical discussion of the usefulness of the conception of God for the project of science, and by expounding Kant’s critical account of the necessity of the laws of nature. Thus my account sheds light on the continuity of Kant’s conception of God and his appropriation of his own rationalistic metaphysics. (shrink)

It is well-known that in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl puts forth a theory of intersubjectivity. Most commentators of Husserl have read his Cartesian Meditations as presenting a theory of intersubjectivity whose basis is empathy, in the form of a process of constituting the sense of “other” in one’s own experience, as the primary origin of the intersubjective layer of experience. In this paper, I claim that the structure of intersubjectivity as Husserl presents it in the Cartesian Meditations (...) is articulated as being governed by a logic of parts and wholes rather than that of a phenomenology of empathy, and that the articulation of this logic demonstrates that the transcendental ego is intrinsically intersubjective. My main philosophical claim in this regard is that the way Husserl’s account of transcendental empathy unfolds in the Cartesian Meditations implies a prior fundamental mereological structure of which the individual transcendental ego is only a part. That is, the transcendental ego has an eidetic a-priori intersubjective structure, in the sense of being a moment of an intersubjectively structured transcendental whole. In this sense, rather than being a singulare tantum, it is more fitting to say that transcendental subjectivity is actually a plurale tantum. (shrink)

This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements—e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations—make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. -/- At the outset, two (...) competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action that exclude some other reasons; and an antithesis, according to which law-making institutions (even those that meet prerequisites of legitimacy) can at most provide us with reasons that compete in weight with opposing reasons for action. These two positions are examined from several perspectives, such as justified disobedience cases, law's conduct-guiding function in contexts of bounded rationality, and the phenomenology associated with authority. -/- It is found that, although each of the above positions offers insight into the conundrum at hand, both suffer from significant flaws. These observations form the basis on which an alternative position is put forward and defended. According to this position, the existence of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes a reason that fits neither into a model of ordinary reasons for action nor into a pre-emptive paradigm—it constitutes a reason to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system's requirements. (shrink)

This chapter centers around law's capacity to constitute practical reasons. In discussing this theme, consideration is given to law's artifactual character. The discussion falls into two main parts. In Section 1, I critically examine a skeptical line of thought about law's capacity to constitute reasons for action, which draws, in part, on law's artifactuality. I argue for a somewhat less skeptical (but still qualified) stance, according to which the fact that a legal directive has been issued can (notwithstanding the artifactuality (...) involved) be a reason for action, yet one that is underpinned by bedrock values which (under certain conditions and constraints) law is apt to serve. In Section 2, I consider whether, and in what sense, law can acquire an even more 'robust' status as a source of practical reasons. I focus particularly on Joseph Raz's position about the normative force of (legitimate) legal authority and on an alternative position I have proposed and advocated elsewhere. (shrink)

The conviction that ‘intention’ is not semantically ambiguous but has a single and distinctive meaning frames the argument of Anscombe’s masterwork Intention. What this meaning is, however, is barely recognizable in her book. One reason for this difficulty is that Intention starts from a threefold division of the appearance of the concept in our natural language and proceeds to develop its various accounts piecemeal. Another is the obscurity of the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ it introduces, precisely for shedding the light (...) that would make its topic perspicuous as a whole. The present article aims to amend this obscurity by providing both a schema of unity for the various parts of the division and an account of the fixed character of the concept. For the former task, the article recaptures Anscombe’s technical use of the term ‘a kind of statement’, uses it to clarify the nature of the division’s parts, and argues that they are co-constituted in a larger context of rational proceedings. Having done this, the article shows that the point of such proceedings is to display the validity of practical reasoning in a given case. It analyses Anscombe’s account of this kind of validity, providing thereby the representation of the fixed character of ‘intention’ as a distinct form of thinking. (shrink)

People tend to think of our intellectual characters as at least partially malleable. We can become more – or less – virtuous or vicious epistemic agents. However, people also tend to think of characterological change as typically slow and incremental. I use recent empirical work on the effects of psychedelic experiences on personality to argue that such circumscribed experiences may be epistemically transformative, for better or worse. We have good, if tentative reasons to believe that psychedelics can alter their user's (...) character traits in ways that may lead her to become a more (or less) virtuous epistemic agent after as little as one or two trips. This, in turn, means that even if psychedelics do not drastically alter our stock of, say, true or justified beliefs, they can still drastically change our epistemic standing. Since, plausibly, the value (or disvalue) of epistemic traits is not exhausted by their capacity to assist or hinder the attainment of the ends of inquiry, psychedelic experiences are epistemically valuable (or disvaluable) in ways hitherto little explored by philosophers of psychedelics. (shrink)

This article juxtaposes a jurisprudential thesis and a practical problem in an attempt to gain critical insight into both. The jurisprudential thesis is Dworkin’s rights thesis. The practical problem revolves around judicial resort to the floodgates argument in civil adjudication (or, more specifically, a version of this argument focused on adjudicative resources, which is dubbed here the FA). The analysis yields three principal observations: (1) Judicial resort to the FA is discordant with the rights thesis. (2) The rights thesis is (...) instructive in one way but mistaken in another. While Dworkin has highlighted some valid and sound reasons against judicial policymaking, his conclusive exclusion of judicial policymaking from civil law adjudication is erroneous. Civil law adjudication, it is argued, is an arena of ineliminable tension between principle and policy. (3) The FA is a type of policy argument particularly vulnerable to objections against judicial policymaking. There should, therefore, be a (rebuttable) presumption against judicial resort to it. (shrink)

In the aftermath of World War II, U.S. policy toward the Asian colonies of the European powers followed a simple rule: where the nationalists in a territory were leftist (as in Vietnam), Washington would support the reimposition of European colonial rule, while in those places where the nationalist movement was safely nonleftist (India, for example), Washington would support their independence as a way to remove them from the exclusive jurisdiction of a rival power. At first, Indonesian nationalists were not deemed (...) sufficiently pliable, so U.S.-armed British troops (assisted by Japanese soldiers) went into action against the Indonesians to pave the way for the return of Dutch troops, also armed by the United States. In 1948, however, moderate Indonesian nationalists under Sukarno crushed a left-wing coup attempt, and Washington then decided that the Dutch should be encouraged to settle with Sukarno, accepting Indonesian independence. (shrink)

The nature of Kant’s criticism of his pre-Critical ‘possibility proof’ for the existence of God, implicit in the account of the Transcendental Ideal in the Critique of Pure Reason, is still under dispute. Two issues are at stake: the error in the proof and diagnosis of the reason for committing it. I offer a new way to connect these issues. In contrast with accounts that locate the motivation for the error in reason’s interest in an unconditioned causal ground of all (...) contingent existence, I argue that it lies in reason’s interest in another kind of unconditioned ground, collective unity. Unlike the conception of the former, that of the latter directly explains the problematic ontological assumption of the possibility proof, the existence of intelligible objects as the ground of possibility. I argue that such Platonic entities are assumed because they are amenable to the kind of unity prescribed by reason. However, since the interest in collective unity has a legitimate regulative use when applied to the systematic unity of nature, the conception of God entailed by the possibility proof is retained as a regulative idea of reason. (shrink)

This chapter begins with an empirical analysis of attitudes towards the law, which, in turn, inspires a philosophical re-examination of the moral status of the rule of law. In Section 2, we empirically analyse relevant survey data from the US. Although the survey, and the completion of our study, preceded the recent anti-police brutality protests sparked by the killing of George Floyd, the relevance of our observations extends to this recent development and its likely reverberations. Consistently with prior studies, we (...) find that people’s ascriptions of legitimacy to the legal system are predicted strongly by their perceptions of the procedural justice and lawfulness of police and court officials’ action. Two factors emerge as significant predictors of people’s compliance with the law: (i) their belief that they have a (content-independent, moral) duty to obey the law (which is one element of legitimacy, as defined here); and (ii) their moral assessment of the content of specific legal requirements (‘perceived moral content of laws’). We also observe an interactive relationship between these two factors. At higher levels of perceived moral content of laws, felt duty to obey is a better predictor of compliance. And, similarly, perceived moral content of laws is a better predictor of compliance at higher levels of felt duty to obey. This suggests that the moral content incorporated in specific laws interacts with the normative force people ascribe to legal authorities by virtue of other qualities, specifically here procedural justice and lawfulness. In Section 3, the focus shifts to a philosophical analysis, whereby we identify a parallel (similarly interactive) modality in the way that form and content mutually affect the value of the rule of law. We advocate a distinctive alternative to two rival approaches in jurisprudential discourse, the first of which claims that Lon Fuller’s eight precepts of legality embody moral qualities not contingent on the law’s content, while the second denies any independent moral value in these eight precepts, viewing them as entirely subservient to the law’s substantive goals. In contrast, on the view put forward here, Fuller’s principles possess (inter alia) an expressive moral quality, but their expressive effect does not materialise in isolation from other, contextual factors. In particular, the extent to which it materialises is partly sensitive to the moral quality of the law’s content. (shrink)

Kant's “Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason” seems an odd element in Kant's oeuvre. Parts of it seem like scholastic theology or an arbitrary effort to reconcile the Kantian philosophical system with the doctrines of Christianity1. One of the most troubling notions is that of radical evil. Not only is the motivation for introducing the notion unclear, it is also difficult to grasp the line of argumentation, and furthermore accept its conclusion that there must be an innate propensity for (...) evil in human nature. The vague introduction of the concept of grace exacerbates the puzzlement even further. Nevertheless, I claim that the notions of radical evil and grace form a significant addition to Kant's conception of moral life lacking in his earlier works in ethics, Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. I contend that the depiction of human moral life is not exhausted by the consciousness of duty and the endless pursuit toward virtue. Moral life is characterized also by the ongoing introspection of character accompanied by the hope for moral transformation as manifested by the notions of radical evil and grace. (shrink)

This chapter considers whether legal requirements can constitute reasons for action independently of the merits of the requirement at hand. While jurisprudential opinion on this question is far from uniform, sceptical views are becoming increasingly dominant. Such views typically contend that, while the law can be indicative of pre-existing reasons, or can trigger pre-existing reasons into operation, it cannot constitute new reasons. This chapter offers support to a somewhat less sceptical position, according to which the fact that a legal requirement (...) has been issued can be a reason for action, yet one that is underpinned by bedrock values which law is apt to serve. Notions discussed here include a value-based conception of reasons as facts ; a distinction between complete and incomplete reasons ; and David Enoch’s idea of triggering reason-giving. Following a discussion of criticism against the view adopted here, the chapter concludes by considering some more ‘robust’ conceptions of law’s reason-giving capacity. (shrink)

This article discusses an anomaly in the English law of reproductive liability: that is, an inconsistency between the law’s approach to wrongful life claims and its approach to cases of negligent selection of gametes or embryos in infertility treatments (the selection cases). The article begins with an account of the legal position, which brings into view the relevant inconsistency: while the law treats wrongful life claims as non- actionable, it recognises a cause of action in the selection cases, although the (...) selection cases bear a relevant resemblance to wrongful life claims. The article then considers arguments that may be invoked in an attempt to reconcile the above two strands of the law. Three of these counterarguments consist in attempts to distinguish the selection cases from wrongful life claims. It is argued that these attempts fail to reveal a valid basis for treating these situations differently. A fourth possible counterargument levels against the present analysis a charge of reductio ad absurdum. It is shown that this argument suffers from a fundamental flaw caused by confusion between different senses of the term “identity”. Finally, the article discusses possible changes to the legal position that could rectify the problem. It argues that one of these changes, which focuses on legal redress for violation of personal autonomy, is particularly apt to resolve the problem at hand, but also highlights the need for further inquiry into the broader implications of introducing this form of redress into the law of torts. (shrink)

This article examines the critique of materialism in the work of Noam Chomsky which treats the doctrine as lacking in any clear content. It is argued that Chomsky’s critique is a coherent one drawing on an understanding of the Newtonian revolution in science, on a modular conception of the mind, and on the related conception of epistemic boundedness. The article also seeks to demonstrate the limits of Chomsky’s position by drawing attention to his use of the third-person point of (...) view in considering the mental and his resulting failure to make good sense of consciousness. Finally, a dual-aspect theory is recommended which would incorporate Chomsky’s agnosticism about the nature of matter. (shrink)

Thesis on metaphysics featuring Galen Strawson and Noam Chomsky. I discuss Strawsons' Materialism, panpsychism and the topic of reference. I compare Strawson's view with Chomsky's in relation to panpsychism, the nature of reference and the limits of human understanding by reviewing important historical events in the history of philosophy. I also cover some aspects of neuroscience to see if empirical evidence in any way contradicts the claims made by Strawson and Chomsky. I conclude by recasting the questions of metaphysics (...) under an epistemological framework. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky’s well-known claim that linguistics is a “branch of cognitive psychology” has generated a great deal of dissent—not from linguists or psychologists, but from philosophers. Jerrold Katz, Scott Soames, Michael Devitt, and Kim Sterelny have presented a number of arguments, intended to show that this Chomskian hypothesis is incorrect. On both sides of this debate, two distinct issues are often conflated: (1) the ontological status of language and (2) the relation between psychology and linguistics. The ontological issue is, (...) I will argue, not the relevant issue in the debate. Even if this Chomskian position on the ontology of language is false, linguistics may still be a subfield of psychology if the relevant methods in linguistic theory construction are psychological. Two options are open to the philosopher who denies Chomskian conceptualism: linguistic nominalism or linguistic platonism. The former position holds that syntactic, semantic, and phonological properties are primarily properties, not of mental representations, but rather of public languagesentence tokens; The latter position holds that the linguistic properties are properties of public language sentence types. I will argue that both of these positions are compatible with Chomsky’s claim that linguistics is a branch of psychology, and the arguments that have been given for nominalism and platonism do not establish that linguistics and psychology are distinct disciplines. (shrink)

La position mystérienne en philosophie de l’esprit est minoritaire. Notamment défendue par Noam Chomsky et Colin McGinn, ces derniers prétendent que nos capacités cognitives et conceptuelles sont insuffisantes afin d’offrir une réponse satisfaisante à la question suivante : comment de notre cerveau peut émerger la conscience? En présentant la généalogie partielle du problème corps-esprit que dresse Chomsky, nous nous intéresserons à l’argument central de McGinn prétendant que nous avons de bonnes raisons de croire que nous n’éluciderons jamais le problème (...) de la conscience. L’objectif sera de considérer son argument d’un point de vue critique afinde déterminer s’il est concluant. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky's Poverty of the Stimulus Argument is one of the most famous and controversial arguments in the study of language and the mind. Though widely endorsed by linguists, the argument has met with much resistance in philosophy. Unfortunately, philosophical critics have often failed to fully appreciate the power of the argument. In this paper, we provide a systematic presentation of the Poverty of the Stimulus Argument, clarifying its structure, content, and evidential base. We defend the argument against a (...) variety of philosophical criticisms, new and old, and argue that the Poverty of the Stimulus Argument continues to deserve its guiding role in the study of language and the mind. (shrink)

Universal Basic Income has become a popular idea in the last few decades even though one can find its roots in the earlier centuries. In this thesis, I have examined the position of UBI in the works of the most influential contemporary philosophers. By connecting the idea of UBI with some certain concepts from different philosophers, I aimed to improve the overall understanding of UBI. I have mentioned the concepts such as "labor", "leisure", "idleness", "boredom", "poverty", "inequality", "distribution", "happiness", "power", (...) "needs", "truth", "alienation", etc. I have used a literature methodology for my research. I have tried to read and relate the concept of UBI with the works of 10 philosophers: Arthur Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, William James, Bertrand Russell, Michel Foucault, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Noam Chomsky, Slavoj Zizek, Peter Singer. (shrink)

Ted Honderich's edited volume, with introductions to his chosen philosophers shows his contempt/ignorance of the non-white world's thinkers. Further, this review points out the iterative nature of Western philosophy today. The book under review is banal and shows the pathetic state of philosophising in the West now in 2020.

The editorial introduces issue 21.1 of Technoetic Arts via a critical reflection on the artificial intelligence hype (AI hype) that emerged in 2022. Tracing the history of the critique of Large Language Models, the editorial underscores that there are substantial ethical challenges related to bias in the training data, copyright issues, as well as ecological challenges which the technology industry has consistently downplayed over the years. -/- The editorial highlights the distinction between the current AI technology’s reliance on extensive pre-existing (...) human-generated data for pattern recognition and the performative process inherent in art practice. Patterns of creative output can be replicated without a thorough understanding of underlying concepts. In contrast, the performative process of art practice, as explored through the conceptual frameworks of creativity by Noam Chomsky, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Roger T. Ames and discussed in previous publications by this editorial's author, creates concepts and continually ‘strives to extend itself towards the unknown.’ -/- Following this introductory section, the editorial provides an overview of the ten articles featured in this issue of Technoetic Arts. The first four texts engage with emerging technologies from various perspectives in art and design. The subsequent six articles, part of a special section titled 'Perspectives from Chandigarh,' reflect a quest for meaningful existence within colonial, patriarchal, and biopolitical structures that frame everyday practices of exclusion and oppression. (shrink)

This article investigates the semantics of sentences that express numerical averages, focusing initially on cases such as 'The average American has 2.3 children'. Such sentences have been used both by linguists and philosophers to argue for a disjuncture between semantics and ontology. For example, Noam Chomsky and Norbert Hornstein have used them to provide evidence against the hypothesis that natural language semantics includes a reference relation holding between words and objects in the world, whereas metaphysicians such as Joseph Melia (...) and Stephen Yablo have used them to provide evidence that apparent singular reference need not be taken as ontologically committing. We develop a fully general and independently justified compositional semantics in which such constructions are assigned truth conditions that are not ontologically problematic, and show that our analysis is superior to all extant rivals. Our analysis provides evidence that a good semantics yields a sensible ontology. It also reveals that natural language contains genuine singular terms that refer to numbers. (shrink)

Cunoașterea și informațiile (abordate în ansamblu sau în componentele lor distincte) sunt o preocupare majoră pentru tehnologia informației, sisteme de informații, știința informației și activitatea de informații în general. Procesul obţinerii, prelucrării şi analizei informaţiilor este o preocupare majoră pentru societatea actuală. În acest scop se folosesc procedee şi tehnici specifice pentru culegerea sau generarea de informaţii, prelucrarea acestora prin analiză şi sinteză, generarea de predicţii şi strategii, transmisia şi prezentarea informaţiilor factorilor de decizie, şi stocarea lor. Analiza informațiilor poate (...) fi caracterizată ca o intreprindere epistemologică, care urmărește să dezvolte o înțelegere clară a produselor cunoașterii. Perspectiva lui Polanyi despre cunoaștere servește unor considerații epistemologice fundamentale privind cunoașterea ca produs. Conceptul acesta de cunoaștere personală contribuie la o înțelegere mai profundă a cunoașterii. Perspectiva inversează ierarhia tradițională epistemologică. Cea mai mare provocare ar putea fi aceea de a convinge analiștii, conducerea și clienții lor de avantajele metodelor analitice structurale. O introducere treptată și naturală a acestor metode în fluxul obișnuit de procese și produse de informații ar putea fi mai eficientă decât realinierea la scară largă a gândirii. "Spațiul" activităților de informații s-a extins de la guverne ca actori statali la actori non-statali precum ONG-uri, instituții transnaționale și corporații, firme private și grupuri de interese și presiuni reprezentând comunități, concepte și ideologii diverse. Procesul de luare a deciziilor a devenit dispersat și granular. Actuala "democratizare" a serviciilor de informații are un impact major asupra colectării și analizei informațiilor, și a procesului decizional, determinând serviciile de informații să devină mai transparente, să ia în considerație dezbaterile publice a acțiunilor lor și să fie nevoite, uneori, să le justifice public. Un domeniu de care pot beneficia serviciile de informații este cel al managementului cunoașterii, implicat într-o dezbatere riguroasă asupra conceptelor, teoriilor și abordărilor cunoașterii și utilizării acestora. Noua paradigmă a serviciilor de informații impune schimbări majore la nivel organizațional și de pregătire a profesioniștilor pentru a înțelege și adopta noile concepte și tehnologii. -/- CUPRINS -/- Introducere 1 Cunoaștere - Definirea cunoașterii în filozofie - Comunicarea cunoașterii - Cunoașterea situată - Cunoașterea parțială - Cunoașterea științifică - 1.1 Ontologia - - Prezentare generală - - - Unele întrebări fundamentale - - - Concepte - - - Tipuri - - Istorie - - - Originile - - - - Parmenide și monismul - - - - Pluralismul ontologic - - - - Platon - - Ontologia în știință - - Alte subiecte ontologice - - - Formațiuni ontologice - - - Certitudine ontologică și epistemologică - - - Corpul și mediul, care pun la îndoială semnificația ființei - - - Ontologie și limbă - - - Ontologie și geografia umană - - - Realitate și actualitate - 1.2 Epistemologia - - Context și semnificație - - Cunoașterea - - - Cunoașterea că, cunoașterea cum și cunoașterea directă - - - Credință - - - Adevăr - - - Justificare - - - Problema lui Gettier - - - Externalism și internalism - - - Problema valorii - 1.3 Metodologii - - Prezentare generală - - - Procesul - - - - Formularea unei întrebări - - - - Ipoteza - - - - Predicția - - - - Testarea - - - - Analiza - - - Alte componente - - - - Replicarea - - - - Examinarea externă - - - - Înregistrarea și partajarea datelor - - Investigații științifice - - - Proprietățile cercetării științifice - - - Credințe și prejudecăți - - Elementele metodelor științifice idealizate - - Elemente ale metodei științifice - - - Caracterizări - - - Incertitudine - - - Definire - - - Dezvoltarea ipotezelor - - - Predicții din ipoteze - - - Experimente - - - Evaluare și îmbunătățire - - - Confirmarea - - Modele de cercetare științifică - - - Modelul clasic - - - Modelul ipotetico-deductiv - - - Modelul pragmatic - - Știința sistemelor complexe - 1.4 Hermeneutica - - Etimologie - - Hermeneutica filosofică - - - Hermeneutica modernă - - - - Schleiermacher (1768-1834) - - - - Dilthey (1833-1911) - - - - Heidegger (1889-1976) - - - - Gadamer (1900-2002) și colab. - - - - Noua hermeneutică - - - - Hermeneutica marxistă - - - - Hermeneutica obiectivă - 1.5 Filosofia limbajului - - Subiecte și sub-domenii majore - - - Compoziție și părți - - - Natura sensului - - - Referință - - - Mintea și limba - - - - Înnăscut și învățat - - - - Limba și gândul - - - Interacțiunea socială și limba - - Limbajul și filozofia continentală - - Probleme în filosofia limbajului - - - Imprecizia - - - Problema universalului și a compoziției - - - Natura limbajului - - - Abordări formale versus informale - - - Traducere și interpretare - 1.6 Logica - - Concepte - - Forma logică - 1.7 Filosofia logicii - - Adevăr - - - Purtătorii de adevăr - - - Adevăruri analitice, adevăr logic, valabilitate, consecință logică și implicare - 1.8 Declarații - - Declarația ca o entitate abstractă - 1.9 Dileme - - Utilizarea dilemei în logică - 1.10 Limitările cognitive - - Colin McGinn - - Friedrich Hayek - - John Tyndall - - Noam Chomsky - - Fenomene și obiecte și evenimente care nu se pot simți (numene) - - Noi misterieni - 1.11 Managementul cunoașterii - - Cercetare - - - Dimensiuni - - - Strategii - - - Motivații - 1.12 Ingineria cunoașterii - 1.13 Cunoașterea tacită în activitatea de informații 2 Date - Date, informații, cunoaștere și înțelepciune - În alte domenii - Memoria - - Procese - Înregistrări - 2.1 Referințe - - Etimologie și semnificații - - Semantică - - - Sens - - - Referent absent - - - Semnul lingvistic - - Informatică - - Biblioteci și știința informației - - Psihologie - - Școala - - Lege - - Artă - 2.2 Simboluri - - Etimologie - - Definiții - - Simbolurile și semiotica - - Psihanaliza, retorica și arhetipuri - - Paul Tillich - - Rolul contextului în simbolism - - - Semnificația istorică - - - Context - - Acțiuni simbolice - 2.3 Baze de date - - Baze de date guvernamentale - - - Uniunea Europeană - - Baze de date naționale ADN - 2.4 Metadate - - Definiție - - Identificarea - - - Exemplu - 2.5 Statistici - - Domeniu - - - Statistica matematică - - - Prezentare generală 3 Informații - Abordarea teoriei informației - Ca intrare senzorială - Ca reprezentare și complexitate - Informația ca mesaj - Informația ca determinant al transformărilor - Utilizarea studiului informațiilor - Informații mediate tehnologic - Informații sub forma unor fișiere - Semiotica - 3.1 Teoria informației - - Domeniul de studiu - - Evoluție - - Cantități de informații - - - Entropia unei surse de informații - - - Entropia comună - - - Entropia condițională (echivocă) - - - Informații reciproce (transinformații) - - - Divergența Kullback-Leibler (câștigul de informații) - - - Alte cantități - - Teoria codificării - - - Teoria surselor - - - - Rata - - - Capacitatea canalului - - - - Capacitatea anumitor modele de canale - - Aplicații în alte domenii - - - Utilizări în intelligence și aplicații de secretizare - - - Generarea numerelor pseudoaleatorii - - - Explorarea seismică - - - Semiotica - - - Aplicații diverse - - Unități de informație - - Unități primare - - Unități derivate din biți - - - Octet (byte) - - - Nibble - - - Cuvânt, bloc și pagină - - Exemple de valori - 3.2 Tehnologia informației - - Procesarea datelor - - - Stocarea datelor - - - Regăsirea datelor - - - Transmisia de date - - - Manipularea datelor - - Perspectiva - - - Perspectiva academică - - - Perspectiva etică - 3.3 Confidențialitatea informațiilor - - Tipuri de informații - - - Internet - - - Televiziunea prin cablu - - - Informații medicale - - - Informații financiare - - - Localizarea - - - Informații politice - - - Informații educaționale - - Legalitatea - 3.4 Informații sensibile - - Informații non sensibile - - - Informații publice - - - Informații de rutină în afaceri - - Tipuri de informații sensibile - - - Informații comerciale confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Protecția legală împotriva divulgării neautorizate - - - Informații personale și private - - - Informații de afaceri confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Informații sensibile digitale - 3.5 Informații clasificate - - Clasificări guvernamentale - - Nivele de clasificare - - - Top Secret (TS) - - - Secret - - - Confidențial - - - Resticționat - - - Neclasificat - - Permisul de acces - - Informații compartimentate - - Informații nucleare - - Internațional - - - Clasificările NATO - - - Organizații internaționale - - - Clasificări echivalente în diferite țări - - Clasificarea corporativă - - Protocolul luminii de trafic - 3.6 Tipuri de informații clasificate 4 Activitatea de informații - 4.1 Istoria activității de informații - 4.2 Știința informației - - Fundamente - - - Domeniu de aplicare și abordări - - - Definiții ale științei informației - - - Filozofia informației - - - Ontologie - - Extragerea informațiilor - - Vectori de cercetare și aplicații - - - Accesul la informații - - - Arhitectura informațiilor - - - Managementul informațiilor - - - Extragerea informațiilor - - - Societatea informațională - - - Reprezentarea cunoașterii și raționamentul - 4.3 Ontologia activității de informații - 4.4 Economia informațională - - Valoarea informațiilor - - Informațiile, mecanismul prețurilor și organizațiile - - Asimetria informațională - - - Semnalizare - - - Screening - - Bunuri informaționale - - - Împachetarea - 4.5 Economia informațiilor industriale - 4.6 Managementul informațiilor - - Aspecte teoretice - - - Teorii comportamentale și organizaționale - - - Teoria economică - - Managementul informațiilor strategice - - - Alinierea tehnologiilor și strategiilor de afacere cu managementul informațiilor - - - Un model de portofoliu contemporan pentru informații - - - Competențe pentru gestionarea calității informațiilor - - - Rezumat - - Operaționalizarea managementului informațiilor - - - Gestionarea schimbării necesare - - - Opera timpurie a lui Galbraith - - - Organizații matriceale - - Informații în sursă deschisă - - - Surse deschise pentru informații - - - Definiții pentru OSINT - - - Informații competitive - - - OSINT în afaceri - 4.7 Ciclul de informații - 4.8 Managementul ciclului de informații - - Prezentare generală - - - Definirea intelligence - - - Managementul ciclului de informații - - - Planificarea și prezentarea generală a direcției - - Cerințe - - - Naționale / strategice - - - Militare / operaționale - - Arhitectura intelligence - - - Bugetarea - - - Factori politici - - - Echilibrarea aplicării legii și securitatea națională - - - Public versus privat - - Planificarea colectărilor - - - CCIRM - - Emiterea de ordine și cereri - - - Prioritizare - - Alte subiecte - - - Folosirea politică greșită - - - Intelligence clandestină față de acțiunea sub acoperire - - - - Coordonarea acțiunii HUMINT și a acțiunii sub acoperire - - - - Riscuri și resurse comune - - Eșecurile din ciclul intelligence - - Alte cicluri - - - Bucla Boyd OODA - 4.9 Informațiile în afaceri (Business intelligence) - - Componente - - Istorie - - Depozitarea datelor - - Comparație cu inteligența competitivă - - Comparație cu cercetarea analitică de afaceri - - Aplicații într-o întreprindere - - Prioritizarea proiectelor - - Factori de succes în implementare - - - Suportul afacerii - - - Nevoile afacerii - - - Cantitatea și calitatea datelor disponibile - - Aspect utilizator - - Date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Date nestructurate vs. date semistructurate - - - Probleme cu date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Utilizarea de metadate - 4.10 Informații competitive - - Dezvoltare istorică - - Tendințe recente - - Domenii similare - - Etica - - Externalizarea - 4.11 Analogii cu alte discipline - - Știința - - Arheologia - - Afaceri - - Medicina 5 Comunitatea - 5.1 Sisteme informaționale - - Prezentare generală - - Tipuri de sisteme informaționale - 5.2 Comunicarea - - Comunicare nonverbală - - Comunicare verbală - - Comunicarea scrisă și dezvoltarea sa istorică - - Comunicare de afaceri - - Comunicare familială - - Comunicarea interpersonală - - Proiectarea comunicării - - Revoluția comunicării informațiilor - - Consultanța - 5.3 Societatea informațională - - Ce este? - - Creșterea informației în societate - - Dezvoltarea modelului societății informaționale - - - Tranziția economică - - Procesarea informațiilor sociale - 5.4 Guvernarea electronică - - Definirea e-guvernării - - Indicele ONU de dezvoltare a e-guvernării - - Exemple de e-guvernare și e-guvernanță - 5.5 Servicii secrete - - Relația dintre serviciile aceleiași țări - 5.6 Epistemologia activității de informații - 5.7 Comunități epistemice - 5.8 Comunități epistemice în UE - - Conceptul comunităților epistemice și limitele sale - - Agenția Europeană de Apărare - - Centrul UE de analiză a informațiilor - - Concluzie 6 Contrainformații - 6.1 Istoria spionajului - - Istoria timpurie - - Europa timpurie modernă - - Secolul al 18-lea - - - Franța - - - Marea Britanie - - - Spionaj industrial - - - Revoluția americană, 1775-1783 - - - Revoluția franceză și războaiele napoleoniene, 1793-1815 - - Secolul al 19-lea - - - Războiul civil american 1861-1865 - - - Informații militare - - - - Austria - - - - Marea Britanie - - - - Franța - - - - Germania - - - - Italia - - - - Rusia - - - Informații navale - - - Contraspionaj - - Secolul 20 - - - Agenții de informații civile - - - Primul Razboi Mondial - - - - Decodarea - - - Revoluția rusă - - - Perioada interbelică - - - - Germania nazistă - - - Al doilea razboi mondial - - - - MI6 în Marea Britanie - - - - MAGIC: SUA sparge codul japonez - - - - OSS în Statele Unite - - - - Contraspionaj - - - Războiul rece - - - Războiul post-rece - - - - Războiul din Irak 2003 - - - - Antiterorism - - - - - Israel - 6.2 Spionajul - - Țintele spionajului - - Metode și terminologie - - - Tehnologii și tehnici - 6.3 Contraspionaj - - Operațiunile de contraspionaj defensive - - - Contra-HUMINT - - - Motivații pentru divulgarea informațiilor și operațiunilor - - Teoria contraspionajului ofensiv - 6.4 Securitatea - - Clasificarea securității - - Concepte de securitate - - Managementul securității în organizații - 6.5 Terorism - - Lupta UE împotriva terorismului - - - Strategia UE - - - - Prevenirea - - - - Protecția - - - - Urmărirea - - - - Răspunsul - 6.6 O teorie a contrainformațiilor - - Definiții concurente - - Serviciile de informații - - - Factorii care determină comportamentul serviciilor de informații - - Contrainformații aplicate - - - Asistență politică - - - Suport operațional - - - Evidențierea documentelor - - Operațiuni de contrainformații - - Contraspionaj - - Domenii de studiu 7 Culegerea de informații - 7.1 Extragerea cunoașterii - - Privire de ansamblu - - Extragerea din surse structurate în RDF - - - Maparea din tabele/vizionări RDB în entități/atribute/valori RDF - - - Mapări complexe ale bazelor de date relaționale RDF - - - XML - - Extracția din surse naturale de limbaj - - - Extracție de informații (EI) tradițională - - - Extracția de informații bazată pe ontologie (EIBO) - - - Învățarea ontologiei - - - Adnotare semantică - - - Instrumente - - Descoperirea de cunoștințe - 7.2 Colectarea de informații umane - - Surse - - Operații de bază HUMINT - - - Pregătirea ofițerilor pentru lucrul în culturi - - - Diferențierea de bază pe tip de subiect - - - Selectarea surselor potențiale - - - Identificare - - - Tipuri de interviuri - - - - Informarea (debriefing) - - - - Interogare - - - Planificarea interviului inițial - - - - Caracteristicile interogatorului (anchetatorilor)â - - - - Sprijinirea nevoilor - - - - Atitudini ale subiectului - - - Planificarea interviurilor suplimentare - - Principii de interogare - - - Raport de construcție - - - Utilizarea înregistratoarelor - - - Lucrul cu interpreți - - Surse recrutate / de încredere - - - Spionaj - - Analiza relațiilor dintre subiecții HUMINT - 7.3 Investigații - - Surse clasice - - - Deducția - - - Inducția - - - Abducția - - Investigații criminale - 7.4 Profilarea infractorilor - 7.5 Informația asimetrică - - Modele de informații asimetrice - - Selecția adversă - - - Semnalizare (Signaling) - - - Investigare (Screening) - - Aplicarea asimetriei de informații în domeniul cercetării - - Surse de asimetrie informațională - - Efectul blogurilor asupra asimetriei informaționale - - Efectul inteligenței artificiale asupra asimetriei informaționale - 7.6 Proiectarea mecanismului - - Intuiția - - Proiectarea - - - Mecanismul - - - Principiul revelației - - - Gradul de implementare - 7.7 Raportul circular - - Exemple specifice - 7.8 Liberul acces la informații 8 Supravegherea - Tipuri - - Calculator - - Telefoane - 8.1 Camere de supraveghere - 8.2 Camere IP - - Standarde - - Avantaje ale camerelor IP - - Dezavantaje potențiale - 8.3 Camere web - - Probleme de intimitate - - Efecte asupra societății moderne - - Utilizări ale camerelor web - - - Monitorizare video pentru îngrijirea copiilor - - - Comerț - - - Apeluri video și videoconferințe - - - Video de securitate - - - Clipuri video și fotografii - - - Dispozitive de control al intrărilor - - Tehnologia camerelor web - 8.4 Supravegherea în IR - - Applicații - - Specificații - - Cum funcționează supravegherea în IR - 8.5 Supravegherea în masă - - Supravegherea în masă în Uniunea Europeană - - - INDECT - - - HIDE - 8.6 Supravegherea aeriană - 8.7 Supravegherea calculatoarelor - - Emanații - - Policeware - 8.8 Interceptarea convorbirilor telefonice - - Aspecte legale - - Supravegherea electronică a telefoanelor - 8.9 Identificarea automată și captura de date (AIDC) - 8.10 Captarea datelor din documente tipărite - - Cele mai cunoscute tipuri de aplicații - - - ABBYY - - - Accusoft - - - AnyDoc Software - - - Cvision Technologies - - - Expervision - - - I.R.I.S. Group - - - LEADTOOLS - - - Nuance Communications - - - PSIGEN Software - 8.11 Ingineria securității - - Calificări - - Atitudini privind securitatea - - Practici de bază - - Subdomenii - 8.12 Securitatea calculatoarelor - - Securitate prin proiectare - 8.13 Biometria - - Sisteme biometrice adaptive - - Direcții noi de dezvoltare - - - Accesul în rețele publice - - Supravegherea biometrică - - Funcționalitatea biometrică 9 Analiza informațiilor - Prezentare generală - Metoda analitică - - Stabilirea obiectivelor pentru o analiză de informații - - - Fii îndrăzneț și cinstit - - - Acord privind conținutul - - - Orientarea spre clienți - - - Orientarea spre colegi - - Organizând ceea ce aveți - Natura analizei - - Tipuri de raționament - - - Inducție: căutarea cauzalității - - - Deducția: aplicarea generalului - - - Intuiția instruită - - - Metoda științifică - - Metode de analiză - - - Analiza oportunităților - - - Analiza cuiului de siguranță - - - Analiza ipotezelor concurente - - - Analogie - Procesul analitic - - Definirea problemei - - Generarea de ipoteze - - Determinarea nevoilor de informații și colectarea de informații - - Evaluarea surselor - - Evaluarea ipotezelor (teste) - - Producția și ambalarea - - Evaluarea colegială - - Feedback de la client și evaluarea producției - Nu uitați niciodată utilizatorul final - 9.1 Conceptualizarea funcțiilor analizei de informații - 9.2 Metodologii în analiza informațiilor - 9.3 Euristica în analiza de informații - - Puterea de expertiză - - Paradoxul de expertiză - - Sarcinile analiștilor de informații - - Pro și contra echipelor - - Tehnologii - - Metodologii analitice - - Euristica - 9.4 Raționamentul inductiv - - Raționamentul inductiv vs. raționamentul deductiv - - Critici - - - Prejudecăți - - Tipuri de raționament inductiv - - - Generalizare - - - Silogismul statistic - - - Inducția simplă - - - Argumentul din analogie - - - Inferența cauzală - - - Predicția - - Inferența bayesiană - - Inferența inductivă - 9.5 Evaluarea informațiilor - - Procesul de evaluare a informațiilor - - Ciclul informațiilor centrice specifice - - Evaluarea informațiilor criminale - - - Utilizarea de Armata SUA - - - Procesul CRIMINT - - Analiza informațiilor criminale - 9.6 Abordarea orientată spre țintă a ciclului de informații - - Analiza orientată pe țintă - - - Procesul de intelligence - - Crearea modelului - - - Modele în intelligence - - - Surse de informații de intelligence - - - Popularea modelului - - Analiza organizațională - - Aplicarea abordării centrate pe țintă în intelligence - - Critici - 9.7 Analiza ipotezelor competitive - - Proces - - Puncte forte - - Puncte slabe - - - Analiza structurată a ipotezelor concurente - - - Alte abordări ale formalismului - 9.8 Analiza indicatorilor - - Istorie - - Elemente de analiză a indicatorilor - - - Tehnici analitice structurate - - - Cerință - - - Categorii - - - Factori - - - Scenarii - - - Indicatori - - Proces - - Beneficii - - Puncte slabe - - Tehnici analitice structurate înrudite - 9.9 Cuvinte de probabilitate estimativă - - Istorie - - - Informații - - - - Eșecuri de politică și de informații legate de CPE - - Reformele metodologiei - - - Cuantificarea fiabilității sursei și a încrederii analitice - - - Analiza stocastică - - - Standardizare - - - - Experiența Mercyhurst cu CPE standardizate - 9.10 Predicții - - Predicții informale pe bază de ipoteze - - Sondaje de opinie - - Statistici - - Supranaturalul (profeții) - - Predicția în știință - - Finanțe 10 Media și rețele sociale - Studiul - Istoria - Nivele de analiză a rețelelor sociale - - Nivel micro - - Nivel mediu - - Nivel macro - Legături teoretice - - Teorii importate - - Teorii specifice - Decalaje structurale - Clustere de cercetare - - Comunicare - - Comunitate - - Rețele complexe - - Rețele criminale - - Difuzarea inovațiilor - - Demografie - - Sociologia economică - - Sănătate - - Ecologie umană - - Limba și lingvistica - - Rețele literare - - Studii organizatorice - - Capitalul social - - Poziția și beneficiile rețelei - - Media socială - Servicii în rețele sociale - - Impactul social - - Caracteristici tipice - - Caracteristici suplimentare - 10.1 Media socială - - Clasificarea mediei sociale - - - Viralitate - - Bloguri - - Comunicarea prin calculator - - Defăimarea - - Jurnalism - - - Mass media - - Facebook - - Twitter - - YouTube - 10.2 Știri - - Caracteristici - - - Noutatea - - - Marfă - - - Tonul - - - Valoarea de noutate a știrii - - Media de știri - - - Ziare - - - Televiziunea - - - Internet - 10.3 Psihologia mulțimilor - 10.4 Manipularea prin media - - Contexte - - - Activism - - - Publicitate - - - Farsa - - - Propaganda - - - Război psihologic - - - Relații publice - - Tehnici - - - Marketingul motoarelor de căutare - - Profesioniști în conformitate - - - Tehnici - 10.5 Psihologia rețelelor sociale - - Neuroplasticitatea - 10.6 Analiza rețelelor sociale 11 Etica - Definirea eticii - 11.1 Relativismul moral - - Variații - - - Descriptiv - - - - Meta-etic - - - - Normativ - 11.2 Utilitarism - - Etimologie - - Fundal istoric - - - Filozofia chineză - - - Filosofia occidentală - 11.3 Dileme etice - - Exemple de dileme etice - - Răspunsuri la argumente - - Dileme morale - - - Exemple - - - Conceptul - - - Probleme - 11.4 Codul de conduită FBI - 11.5 Meta-etica - - Întrebări meta-etice - - Teoriile semantice - - - Centralism și non-centralism - 11.6 Filosofia dreptului - - Jurisprudență analitică - - Jurisprudența normativă - - Abordări filosofice ale problemelor juridice Încheiere Resurse Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . 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The victories of the Go-playing artificial intelligence “AlphaGo” against professional player Lee Sedol in 2016 had a profound impact on public and academic perceptions of AI. This event shocked observers, as the ability of a machine to defeat a world champion human in a highly complex game seemed to indicate that a machine had achieved human-like—or more than human—intelligence. But why was AlphaGo so readily anthropomorphized by academic and non-academic audiences alike? Drawing from existing analyses of reactions to and arguments (...) concerning AlphaGo and AI generally, this paper argues that “generative” cognitive science—a school of thought exemplified by the linguistic work of Noam Chomsky—offers two novel contributions to this subject. First, generativism sheds light on an irrational double standard in the study of the human mind in contrast to the study of non-cognitive systems—“methodological dualism”—which, I argue, has been transferred to evaluations of AlphaGo and other AI. Second, by exposing this irrational double standard in perceptions of AI, I employ generativism’s more well-known arguments concerning the nature of human intelligence and its scientific study to the evaluation of AI, exposing deficient interpretations widely used in the case of AlphaGo and AI generally. (shrink)

There are words. There are sentences. There are languages. Commonsense linguistic realism is the conjunction of the three preceding claims. Linguists and philosophers including Noam Chomsky (1986, 2000), Georges Rey (2006, 2008), and Barry C. Smith (2006) have presented skeptical doubts regarding the existence of linguistic entities. These doubts provide no good reason to deny commonsense linguistic realism. Some skeptical doubts are in fact not directed at the metaphysical thesis of commonsense linguistic realism but rather only at non-metaphysical methodological (...) concerns. In some instances, linguistic antirealists make their case by foisting upon the realist assumptions that she need not hold regarding the nature of linguistic entities. Furthermore, those who have denied the existence of linguistic entities have not themselves presented an alternative account of words, sentences, or languages that is coherentor defensible. I present an elaboration and defense of commonsense linguistic realism as a metaphysical thesis, with the aim of deflating concerns that have arisen about the existence of language. (shrink)

The rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, particularly in natural language processing, have brought to light a critical challenge, i.e., the semantic grounding problem. This article explores the root causes of this issue, focusing on the limitations of connectionist models that dominate current AI research. By examining Noam Chomsky's theory of Universal Grammar and his critiques of connectionism, I highlight the fundamental differences between human language understanding and AI language generation. Introducing the concept of semantic grounding, I emphasise the need (...) for AI to connect language with real-world experiences and context to achieve true understanding. While multi-modal models represent a step forward, they fall short of addressing the core issue. The article concludes with a call for a course correction in AI development, advocating for the integration of embodied cognition, dynamic learning, hybrid models, and ethical practices. This shift is essential for creating AI systems that can meaningfully interact with the world, reducing the incidence of hallucinations and enhancing their reliability and utility. (shrink)

A Cinematic Humanist approach to film is committed inter alia to the following tenet: Some fiction films illuminate the human condition thereby enriching our understanding of ourselves, each other and our world. As such, Cinematic Humanism might reasonably be regarded as an example of what one might call ‘Cinematic Cognitivism’. This assumption would, however, be mistaken. For Cinematic Humanism is an alternative, indeed a corrective, to Cinematic Cognitivism. Motivating the need for such a corrective is a genuine scepticism about the (...) very notion of the cognitive. Using historical reconstruction, I reveal how ‘cognitive’ has become a multiply ambiguous, theory-laden term in the wake of, indeed as a consequence of, Noam Chomsky’s original stipulative definition. This generates a constitutive problem for cognitivism as both a research programme and a set of claims, and as such poses a trilemma for philosophers of film, art and beyond. I propose a Cinematic Humanist solution to the problematic commitments of cognitive film theorising and, in so doing, gesture towards a methodology I am calling ‘philosophy of film without theory’. (shrink)

Architecture and Deconstruction Case of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi -/- Introduction Towards deconstruction in architecture Intensive relations between philosophical deconstruction and architecture, which were present in the late 1980s and early 1990s, belong to the past and therefore may be described from a greater than before distance. Within these relations three basic variations can be distinguished: the first one, in which philosophy of deconstruction deals with architectural terms but does not interfere with real architecture, the second one, in which (...) a collaboration between Jacques Derrida and a group of architects interested in his concepts is commenced, and the third one, in which completed or only designed objects or new concepts of deconstruction created by architects gain their supremacy over philosophy. The following book analyses these three possible ways, first of all with the reference to Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. -/- Peter Eisenman -/- Misreading… and Other Errors -/- The issue of relations between Peter Eisenman’s work and philosophy of deconstruction may be referred to his activity more than ten years preceding his direct collaboration with Jacques Derrida (in 1985) and organisation of the exhibition Deconstructivist Architecture at Museum of Modern Art in New York (in 1988). As soon as at the stage of designing the first houses (House I-III, 1967-1970), which almost entirely inscribed in formalistic aesthetics of Modernism, the architect analysed the problem of architecture dependence on its assumptions. All his later designs may be treated as consequence of this initial interest in relations between practice and theory, and at the same time as an introduction to manipulations later on led at the level of metaphysics of architecture. Beginning with the issue of presence, considered in comments to House VI (1972), the number of ideas having their analogies in philosophy of deconstruction increased. The text entitled The End of the Classical: The End of the Beginning, The End of the End (1984), in which Eisenman criticised questions of representation in architecture, its delusive strive for truth and comparably unattainable attempts at ultimate definition of elementary rules, should be acclaimed the breaking point. This attitude was extended by numerous strategies disturbing architecture rules defined at metaphysical level in an essay Moving Arrows, Eros, and Other Errors: an Architecture of Absence (1986). The issue of Eisenman’s passage from formalism to deconstruction has already been much discussed in the literature (Rosalind Krauss, Thomas Patin among others), still it should be mentioned that the threads similar to Derrida’s concept included in Eisenman’s writing reveal untranslatability of architecture and philosophy. -/- Choral Works or Separate tricks -/- In 1985-1986 a series of seven disputes between Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman took place. The pretext for them were designs concerning Parc de la Villette in Paris. The situation of many months of collaboration between a notable philosopher of the second half of the 20th c. and an architect that already had a huge theoretical oeuvre, ended up with a publication of a large volume entitled Chora L Works and it became at the same time a vast study area for historians of contemporary architecture and philosophers. Derrida’s contribution to concept works were his considerations over the idea of chôra, the properties related to this concept were about to be reflected in shapes of the park. Therefore, Chora L Works became an example of the abilities of contemporary art, both in its capability of translation from philosophical ideas to artistic forms and its resistance to tradition of representing in architecture some phenomena and values originating outside this discipline. In the final period of their collaboration both interlocutors started to polemicise with each other more decidedly, what became a separate part of their thought exchange. The exchange of letters between Derrida and Eisenman at the turn of 1989 ended up the period of their direct contacts, nevertheless, at this time precisely a large group of experts in issues of deconstruction joined the discussion and extended the revealed in the former dispute problems into more than ten years of further considerations and publications. Except for a long text by Jeffrey Kipnis, who had participated in the meetings of the philosopher and the architect, there appeared also comments of researchers of artistic theories (K. Michael Hays, Thomas Patin), philosophers (Andrew Benjamin), and even experts in Greek literature (Maria Theodorou or Ann Bergren). Following these debates a contemporary reflection on architecture has saturated with indeed numerous concepts originating in philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Architecture which imitates mute philosophy -/- The series of Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman meetings, which took place in the period of 1985-1987, induced many authors to make comments. Some of them (Jeffrey Kipnis, Ann Bergren, Maria Theodorou) developed the subject of chôra which was introduced to the discussion by Derrida. The problem that was about to be solved was the question of tying up the concept of chôra with architecture, including Eisenman’s architecture and the series of meetings within frames of Chora L Works project. Kipnis on this occasion paid attention to chôra and its character of anachronia which infects any being created within chôra. In other words any event has its counterpart (analogon) in another, earlier event. He demonstrated the similarity of structure of many events and statements from the times of Derrida and Eisenman’s meetings to the almost identical behaviour of figures in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. The loss of beginning present in this phenomenon was appropriate to both features of chôra and the effects of typical analyses of philosophy of deconstruction. Bergren’s analyses focused on accentuating gender of chôra, which, according to this author, had been neglected hitherto in discussions. She collated chôra descriptions with characteristics of women in myths, early Greek epic and philosophy and she arrived at a conclusion that chôra has features of a single woman and a married one at the same time. And yet Theodorou’s studies showed that in the Homeric epics chôra is not treated as an idea but is related with single things and events. The other part of the comments (represented by Andrew Benjamin and K. Michael Hays’ utterances) concerns Eisenman’s attitude to tradition which was treated as a variety of iteration understood philosophically. Benjamin commenced his considerations at the point of closeness between a definition of tradition and a concept of chôra understood as perpetuation (placement). A problematic issue was for him Eisenman’s complex relation to tradition based on its contest and affirmation at the same time. Overcoming the simple subordination to tradition – according to Benjamin – was based on awareness of the role of repetition in culture not known before. Hays made an attempt to explain the pleasure and torment of repetition with the support of Sigmund Freud and Roland Barthes’ concepts. According to Hays repetitions are attempts of a single being to a certain primal state perceived as free of any tension. In a similar way Rosalind Krauss explained a motif of a grate present in Modernistic art and also exceptionally frequent in Eisenman’s work. -/- Annex Architecture is still writing Balzac novels. Peter Eisenman and literature -/- Architecture’s approach to writing, script or literature, present within Peter Eisenman’s work, is an exceptional phenomenon, furthermore a complex one. The article considers four possible relations. The first one relates to Eisenman’s characteristics as a person extremely gifted with the ability to wordplay, which very ‘play’ reveals skills to create architectural images. In the second approach the attention has been paid to Eisenman’s interests – in the first period of his oeuvre – in linguistic works by Noam Chomsky and his transformational-generative grammar. The third kind of relations applied to overcoming the need for autonomy of architecture (and of modernist aesthetics at the same time) and renew interests in questions of meaning in architecture. The fourth sort of relations occurred when Eisenman started to create reflections of historic or literary narrations in architecture – ‘stone stories’ and architectural fictions of their kind. -/- Bernard Tschumi -/- From perversion to deconstruction In Bernard Tschumi’s writings from the 1970s and 1980s we can find a transposition of important threads of post-structuralist ideas deriving from Georges Bataille, Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida’s works. The analysis of the architect’s writings also shows roots in Phillippe Sollers, Michel Foucault and Denis Hollier’s works. The analysis of borrowed elements from the beginnings of Tschumi’s theoretical activity may be helpful in explaining the contents of his later writings motre inspired by philosophy of deconstruction. The set of his earliest views was inspired by Marxism, Neo Marxism and French Structuralism, mainly by the writings of Henri Levebre and Guy Debord. From the thought of Levebre Tschumi took interest for city as not only a question of urbanistics but also a political issue. From Debord’s concepts he borrowed a conviction about the role of situational violation for changes in the society structure. Some of these beliefs were preserved in his own concepts of architecture as an event. From this period derived also his will to change conservative elements of social structure not by means of political revolution but of theoretical and creative activity. Tschumi acknowledged that the effective way of the proceedings towards achieving his aims would be accepting the role of both a critical intellectualist and architecture expert who would not hide away his left-wing orientation. The speculations defined by the architect as ‘revolting analyses’ were about to characterise contradictions which tear the society apart, penetrate architecture and constitute the basis of culture. Spreading away of the conscience of false assumptions hidden away in various disciplines could have weakened cohesion of a conservative society and influence the will to change among the elites. This way the beginnings of political revolution were rooted in philosophy of architecture. In 1977 Tschumi published his text entitled The Pleasure of Architecture inspired by Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text, it also included some concepts derived from Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. First of all the author used Barthes’s concept which made an assumption that literary activity is pervaded by the spirit of resistance towards social rules, and Tschudi transferred this remark onto architecture. From the ideas of Bataille, acquainted via Holier’s work, he derived his belief that two concepts of space, a conceptual one (defined as Pyramid) and a sensual one (defined as Labirynth), not losing their distinct features, they join in the concept of experienced space which exceeds contradictions. The exceeding itself was defined as the basic rule of architecture and it was referred to situations in which architecture not only negates social needs, but also disavows its own tradition. Crossing the borders applies not only to political issues or permanent rules of the very discipline but also interfering with other fields (especially literature and film). The fact that architecture is associated with organising events turned Tschumi’s attention to questions of violence that result from upsetting architectural order of a given building by its users and the one hand, and on the other from forcing the users to specific acts imposed by this very order. The analysis of the concepts used by Tschumi in his early writings indicates that they are close to definitions that would occur in his reflection in the following years influenced by philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Approaching deconstruction Tschumi in his theories developed in the 1980s presumed that the current social world had undergone a deep process of decay, and the reaction against which ought to be based on ordering-up actions, and also preserving the main outline of disintegration of the whole and its elements in the state of conflict. The statements concerning the nature of the contemporary to Tschumi social relations were applied by him to the world of architecture, this led him to coming up with designing strategies that took into consideration the destabilised character of conditions in which works of architecture were created. New ways of conduct invented by Tschumi drew their inspiration from literature and research on literature, psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, structuralism and post structuralism, and eventually also deconstruction philosophy. The proposed methods were opposed by their author both to functionalism continuity trends and postmodern architecture. Tschumi’s proposals contradicted any forms of conservatism or traditionalism in political sphere as well as in reference to tendencies in architecture. They were not simple contradictions of social or architectural rules, they intrude them from the inside, weaken or escalate the already existing incongruities, they move the boundaries between the areas. Revolutionary illusions about the possibility of radical changes were replaced with strategies which completed, tainted or test former rules in the series of formal games of permutation and combination. Quite different from avant-garde formalism Tschumi’s games were not about maintaining the autonomy of a given area, but on the contrary – polluting it with other areas’ influences. Tschumi enjoyed demonstrating illusions of architecture concerning simple relations between form and function, or between form and meaning. Making use of Freud, Lacan and Foucault’s research he introduced a category of “madness” into architecture allowing an observation that the recognised norms are nothing but merely ones of many possible principles of behaviour, and their recognised status resulted from unjustified hindering innovativeness which is crucial for architecture. To reborn architecture’s capability of changing Tschumi also made use of Barthes’s discoveries concerning rules of narration and works by writers who applied in their writing knowledge on linguistics. Making a work’s author unclear by various mechanical transformations of its elements was however apparent only, and formal rigours imposed on the process of designing liberated possibilities difficult to obtain in more traditional creative action. Another mode of acting introduced by Tschumi was combining his work of elements deriving from outside architecture; joining space records with notation of motion and events accompanying architectural objects among others. These architectural and extra-architectural elements were not unified, on the contrary their heterogenous and conflictual character was stressed. This is how shock, anxiety and instability, typical for live in great metropolises, infiltrated architecture. Taking some ideas of deconstruction philosophy as a pattern Tschumi also took into critical consideration in his essays traditional in architecture oppositions between form and figuration, or theory and practice. By combining various inspirations he eventually worked out an idea of architectural event, which he understood as a series of actions contesting its own field, redefining its sources, principles and elements. An event, understood in this way, was not so much producing works as rather creating conditions of their production and at the same time designing the society different from a hierarchic one. -/- Park of deconstruction Among numerous philosophical strategies of deconstruction most frequently used was questioning the practice of strong opposition of two reasons. In many cases Bernard Tschumi’s writings just consider functioning of the conflict juxtaposition of the ideas of structure and ornament or theory and practice in history of architecture. Violation of traditional relations between terms of this kind, both old and modern, raised Jacques Derrida’s objections, when he was induced for the first time to co-operate with architects’ milieu. During this long lasting thought exchange the philosopher eventually acknowledged Bernard Tschumi’s arguments for reasoning the encroachment of architecture’s fundamental rules. Deconstruction applied in architecture was not a simple transposition or analogy of practices that had been applied by philosophy of deconstruction. We may even say that considering architectural terms became an important formula of deconstruction. Architecture understood in philosophical way became something beyond the practice and theory of its own discipline, a sort of metaphysics of both philosophy and architecture. The deliberate encroachment of simplicity of dividing architecture into theory and practice, for the first time became a clear aim for Tschumi in his drawings and texts entitled The Manhattan Transcripts. The contents of this series of works was a record of characteristic features of this New York district in such a way that not only objects were the subject of the record but also relations between objects, people and events. The record was about to take into consideration a conflict character of elements of this representation and at the same time to avoid applying to them the rule of mimetism. The record became a form of reflection over the very record by an increased control over the ways of representation. Architecture which was considered in the The Manhattan Transcripts was not directed to fulfill the needs of inhabitation or production, it was rather related with hitherto usually marginalised liminal situations: building ostentatiously big monuments, religious cult, war etc. Architecture operating in these relations focused also the attention on the included in it continuous tendency to overpass its own restrictions, the role of violence as its not recognised factor, or the meaning of excess and shock in its operation. Architecture moving from reason towards madness became even more visible in the design of Parisian Parc de la Villette, whose pavilions were defined as folies (in French it means both small park buildings and follies). The park was supposed to be on the one hand a reflection of traditional society disintegration while on the other it questioned basic rules of producing a work of architecture. The traditional rules of designing, based on ordering up, were replaced with the strategies of dysfunction and dissociation. In Tschumi’s opinion methods of this kind may be equivalent of what Derrida named différance. Instead of aiming at mergence, any diversity, plays or variations were strengthen. Tschumi’s texts, in which he explained his attitude, were completed by Derrida’s extent statement entitled Point de folie – Maintenant l’architecture. Derrida’s article is the most significant of all his statements on architecture as a form of thinking and activity. According to the philosopher, architecture should divide space (in French defined as espacement), what enables both thinking and action – it arranges the space of an event. Tschumi’s buildings, defined as folies, in an essential way destabilise any created order, and at the same time they refresh it. Derrida’s statement suggests that architecture may become both metaphor of an order merging a language or a society but also of inner forces which deconstruct and reconstruct it. Therefore architecture is at the same time a construction, a deconstruction and a reconstruction. Parc de la Villette stands out in this system with its attempt to step beyond the scheme of an easy repetition and its heading for chances of achieving more radical otherness. -/- Conclusion Destruction as construction. Paradoxes of deconstruction in architecture -/- Scepticism about persistence and common importance of fundamental values of human culture evinced in philosophers and writers’ works as early as in Greek antiquity, nevertheless it was not expressed so strongly as in the second half of the 20th century. Especially in Heidegger’s work Being and Time (although originated in 1927, still influential in all later philosophy) the following states were characterised: the state of losing the ground (Abgrund), of being out of sight (Unheimlichkeit) and of being out of dwelling (Un-zuhause-sein) – as the basis of self-confidence of conscious being there (Dasein). The entire criticism of philosophy of home and dwelling draws the inspiration from this early writing of the German philosopher, it combines crisis of basic terms of metaphysics with social conditions which are dictated by living in large metropolis. The crisis of both metaphysical foundation and home appears to be similar to the situation of weakening the relations between a man and his dwelling in extensively expanding cities. Whereas philosophy, as well as many disciplines of social sciences, have diagnosed for a long time the destabilisation of fundamental ideas of Western culture and crucial changes in the ways of dwelling, architecture itself occurred to be “the last fortress of metaphysics” (J. Derrida). Among contemporary architects, Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi were the ones who engaged most decidedly in the issues of critical analysis of architecture foundation and its social role. Both the architects noticed new formulas of contemporary social and individual existence, tremendously different from the entire history, and at the same time they affirmed lack of adequacy of architecture concepts to new situations. Both Eisenman and Tschumi used to describe the existing architecture as a tool for consolidation of highly integrated and hierarchised societies, and also as a discipline extremely uncoincidental with the current character of social life based on ideas of freedom and diversity. The means to transform architecture and make a factor of further social changes out of it, was a concept that accentuated revealing the inner contradictions of this discipline, and considering them in designing strategies. Eisenman’s activity, in regard of what has just been noticed, was focused on questioning the basic rules of traditionally comprehended architecture, especially the rule of purpose. The American architect noticed that the concept of architecture as fulfilment the need of location, hides away the fact that the location has to be constantly reconsidered, and hence it is overtaken by change (dislocation). Therefore new concept of architecture propounded architectural activity to translocate the concept of location – more than before – but also to change its status perpetually. Such comprehended architecture should claim, as its main purpose, the constant revision of this purpose and create itself anew permanently. Even Eisenman’s earliest designs of houses nos. I-IV broke with such values as the sense of safety, closeness and familiarity, and just on the contrary they accentuated senses of strangeness, homelessness and loss of confidence. The contradictions within architecture noticed by Tschumi referred to combination of intellectual and sensual values in architecture, when their non-appropriation was defeated by an additional condition, namely the way of experience based on pleasure of excess, marked by insanity. The features of folly were especially visible in his designs of gardens, where the order of planning was mixed with sensual experience introduced by particular elements (both the ones created by nature, and the buildings defined as folies). Parc de la Villette designed by the French architect in Paris put in question not only the common understanding of purpose in architecture but also the ideas of order and integrity, as its plan was based on the combination of independent layers with records of grids of points, various lines and planes. The architecture that collides inadequate elements with each other was supposed to be a kind of an event with no beginning and no end. The architecture treated as an event became a form of a space weakened articulation that maintains its diversity and lack of accordance of the elements building it up. The analyses of Eisenman and Tschumi’s theoretical writings indicate how much the aims of architecture have actually changed; instead of supporting social persistence, the architecture is rather intensifying contradictions, and instead of providing people with the sense of safety, it sublimes danger. From simple acts of defamiliarisation, increasing the distance to itself and enhancing the role of theory, through discomfort, anxiety, not feeling someone at home, weirdness, excess, shock and violence, architecture reached the edge of stability and uncertainty, only to make an attempt at penetrating what is impossible and unutterable, and recording what cannot become the subject of any records. -/- . (shrink)

The rejection of behaviorism in the 1950s and 1960s led to the view, due mainly to Noam Chomsky, that language must be studied by looking at the mind and not just at behavior. It is an understatement to say that Chomskyan linguistics dominates the field. Despite being the overwhelming majority view, it has not gone unchallenged, and the challenges have focused on different aspects of the theory. What is almost universally accepted, however, is Chomsky’s view that understanding language demands (...) a theory that posits mental states that represent rules of language. Call this claim, following Cowie (1999), Representationalism or (R). According to (R), ‘‘[e]xplaining language mastery and acquisition requires the postulation of contentful mental states and processes involving their manipulation’’ (Cowie, 1999, p. 154). Although (R) is nothing more than the general assumption on which cognitive psychology is founded applied to the case of language, even it has had its detractors. Critics have argued that linguistic competence should not in fact be thought of as based on the possession of a body of linguistic knowledge but should be thought of, rather, as a kind of skill. This is an important challenge because one might be inclined to think that no recognizable form of Chomskyan linguistics could withstand the falsification of (R). In this paper we attempt to show that in fact (R) could be false without doing much damage to Chomskyan linguistics at all. Indeed, it is possible that the Chomskyan position could be made more coherent by adopting the view we will sketch. Our claim, therefore, is that critics of (R) might be right, but that this does not obviously make them serious critics of the Chomskyan program. (shrink)

Translation based on: Y. Katz, Noam Chomsky on Where Artificial Intelligence Went Wrong, The Atlantic, November 1, 2012.

The purpose of this essay is to draw attention to conceptual similarities between two important texts in the history of political philosophy, Plato’s Republic and Noam Chomsky’s and Edward S. Herman’s work, Manufacturing Consent. Similar to the way the “propaganda model,” which Chomsky and Herman describe as a phenomenon by which “news media” is used as a means to transmitting false ideas, the method described by Socrates in the Republic, where poetry is used as a means to transmit false (...) ideas is not entirely different. Furthermore, those who transmit false ideas under such conditions do so automatically, consciously or not, because they’ve internalized certain values, which lead to an automatic rule and certain political order. I will also employ the concepts of “harmful propaganda” and “flawed ideologies” that Jason Stanley outlines in How Propaganda Works, and show that these concepts are either identical or closely related to the problem of manufacturing consent, amongst others. (shrink)

An overview of debates surrounding the use of meta-linguistic judgments in linguistics, including recent relevant empirical results.

This paper aims to exemplify the language acquisition model by tracing back to the Socratic model of language learning procedure that sets down inborn knowledge, a kind of implicit knowledge that becomes explicit in our language. Jotting down the claims in Meno, Plato triggers a representationalist outline basing on the deductive reasoning, where the conclusion follows from the premises (inborn knowledge) rather than experience. This revolution comes from the pen of Noam Chomsky, who amends the empiricist position on the (...) creativity of language by pinning down it with the innateness hypothesis. However, Chomsky never rejects the external world or the linguistic stipulation that relies on the objective reality. Wittgenstein’s model of language acquisition upholds a liaison centric appeal that stands between experience (use theory of meaning) and mentalism (mind based inner experiences). Wittgenstein’s Tractatus never demarcates the definite mental processes that entangle with the method of understanding and meaning. Wittgenstein’s ‘language game’ takes care of the model of language acquisition in a paradigmatic way. The way portrait language as the form of life and the process of language acquisition is nothing but a language game that relies on the activity of men. (shrink)

This paper attempts to articulate a dispositional account of innateness that applies to cognitive capacities. After criticizing an alternative account of innateness proposed by Cowie (1999) and Samuels (2002), the dispositional account of innateness is explicated and defended against a number of objections. The dispositional account states that an innate cognitive capacity (output) is one that has a tendency to be triggered as a result of impoverished environmental conditions (input). Hence, the challenge is to demonstrate how the input can be (...) compared to the output and shown to be relatively impoverished. I argue that there are robust methods of comparing input to output without measuring them quantitatively. (shrink)

Mysterianism has become a popular stance in philosophy of consciousness and other philosophical subdisciplines. The aim of this paper is to show that mysterianism is not justified, mainly because its inclination to epistemic defeatism and the misunderstanding of the division of epistemic labour. In the first part, I will present the history of mysterianism in the 19th and 20th century philosophy. Then, in the second part, I will point out how epistemic defeatism is founded in the unwarranted philosophical futurology. The (...) third part will deal with the division of labour in society, language and knowledge. Because of the division of epistemic labour, the understanding is distributed among numerous agents without possibility of individual comprehension. Finally, I will coin the term “ignorance illusion” that plays the central role in the mysterians’ worldview. (shrink)

The Chomskian holds that the grammars that linguists produce are about human psycholinguistic structures, i.e. our mastery of a grammar, our linguistic competence. But if we encountered Martians whose psycholinguistic processes differed from ours, but who nevertheless produced sentences that are extensionally equivalent to the set of sentences in our English and shared our judgements on the grammaticality of various English sentences, then we would count them as being competent in English. A grammar of English is about what the Martians (...) and we share. In this note, I argue that a recent attack on the Martian Argument by Laurence fail to mitigate its force. (shrink)

The new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence gives us knowledge *of* a language, and that the representations in the language faculty are representations *of* anything. In reply, I have argued that through their intuitions speaker/hearers, (but not their language faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend this idea against the objections Collins has raised to (...) such an account. (shrink)

The paper intends to zoom in and find a uniqueness in human language by narrowing down the range of cognitive domains to human computational mind having a property of recursion which is exclusively unique to human and not in any other species in animalia kingdom.This notion of recursion is the centrality of the paper. There has been an opposition to the notion of recursion being only unique to human and the paper makes an attempt to reply to such arguments using (...) experimental findings from modern neuroscience. The existing controversies over the proposed minimalist language and its future remains open to the future of modern neuroscience and modern physics. (shrink)

One after Other, Legionella and Covid have marked everyday life on Portugal and on the world in the last two-there years, creating a kind of vão (bay), rebaixamento, in the moeur of society and individuals.