In many spheres, the law takes the legal concept of causation to correspond to the folk concept (the correspondence assumption). Courts, including the US Supreme Court, tend to insist on the "common understanding" and that which is "natural to say" (Burrage v. United States) when it comes to expressions relating to causation, and frequently refuse to clarify the expression to juries. As recent work in psychology and experimental philosophy has uncovered, lay attributions of causation are susceptible to a great number (...) of unexpected factors, some of which seem rather peripheral to causation. One of those is the norm effect (Knobe & Fraser, 2008): Agents who, in acting as they do, break a salient norm, are more likely to be considered as having caused a certain consequence than when they do not violate a norm. According to some (e.g., Alicke, 1992) this constitutes a bias. According to others (e.g., Sytsma, 2020), the folk concept of causation is sensitive to normative factors, and there’s nothing wrong with that. In this paper, we explore the question whether the norm effect should be considered a bias from the legal perspective on the one hand, and from the psychological perspective on the other. To do this, we test whether norms which are nonpertinent to the consequences or outright silly also impact causation judgements. The data from two preregistered experiments (total N=593) clearly show they do. This, we argue, makes the bias interpretation plausible from the psychological perspective, and both plausible and problematic from the legal perspective. It also shows that the law should abstain from unreflectively assuming conceptual correspondence between legal and ordinary language concepts. (shrink)

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not (...) modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency. (shrink)

Collected and edited by Noah Levin -/- Table of Contents: -/- UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The (...) Ethics of our Digital Selves (Noah Levin) -/- UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD” 7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas) 8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge) 9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis) 10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (Noah Levin) 11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) 12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) -/- UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS 13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar) 14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies) 15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman) 16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (Noah Levin) 17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar) 18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes) -/- UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS 19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh) 20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill) 21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge) 22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (Noah Levin) 23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton) 24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill) -/- UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY 25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato) 26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley) 27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant) 28 The Virtues (Aristotle) 29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche) 30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko). (shrink)

Extant research has shown that ordinary causal judgments are sensitive to normative factors. For instance, agents who violate a norm are standardly deemed more causal than norm-conforming agents in identical situations. In this paper, we explore two competing explanations for the Norm Effect: the Responsibility View and the Bias View. According to the former, the Norm Effect arises because ordinary causal judgment is intimately intertwined with moral responsibility. According to the alternative view, the Norm Effect is the result of a (...) blame-driven bias. In a series of five preregistered experiments (N = 2688), we present evidence that predominantly favours the Bias View. In particular, and against predictions made by the Responsibility View, we show that participants deem agents who violate nonpertinent or silly norms – norms that do not relate to the outcome at hand – as more causal, and that this effect cannot be explained in terms of plausible mediators such as the agent’s foreknowledge and desire, or the foreseeability of harm. We close with a discussion regarding the implications of these findings, in as regards the just assessment of proximate cause in the law. (shrink)

A growing body of literature has revealed ordinary causal judgement to be sensitive to normative factors, such that a norm-violating agent is regarded more causal than their non-norm-violating counterpart. In this paper, we explore two competing explanations for this phenomenon: the Responsibility View and the Bias View. The Bias View, but not the Responsibility View, predicts features peripheral to the agent’s responsibility to impact causal attributions. In a series of three preregistered experiments (N = 1162), we present new evidence that (...) the Norm Effect arises from such peripheral features, namely from nonpertinent or entirely silly norm violations. Furthermore, we show that this effect cannot be explained by recourse to the agent’s foreknowledge or desire of the outcome, nor by its foreseeability: the Norm Effect arises even when participants judge the norm-violating agent’s doing as equally foreseeable. This, we argue, provides evidence in favour of the Bias View. (shrink)

Entiendo la acción filosófica como un proceso doble de crítica axiomática y construcción teórica. Cuando esta acción se aplica a las construcciones simbólicas de nuestra identidad, la llamo mitopoética. Por motivos evidentes, este libro no puede sino aspirar a ser el bosquejo de un mapa epistemológico a gran escala de las narraciones de la identidad humana, esquema que he dividido en tres partes. En las dos primeras, defino una estructura conceptual que será utilizada en la tercera para desarrollar una teoría (...) de la acción mítica. La primera es una introducción general a los problemas de la mitología tal y cómo han sido tratados desde el punto de vista de la filosofía de la religión, la lingüística, la historia, la estética y la epistemología, fundiendo todos en un concepto más general de antropología filosófica. La segunda parte está dedicada a la definición de las emociones y a la comprensión de su centralidad en relación a la racionalidad y la estructura de los mitos. A partir de los procesos de desarrollo semántico-emocional del lenguaje, construyo una teoría de la racionalidad continua, en la que los ritos animales son entendidos como protomitos, y los rituales y mitos humanos como un desarrollo simbólico enario de unos protocolos generales de supervivencia. Ambas partes son, entonces, una discusión sobre los elementos conceptuales necesarios para comprender las estructuras mítico-rituales, definidas y tratadas en la tercera sección, en la que defino las propiedades de las acciones miméticas interpretativas, o acciones míticas, y examino las diferentes configuraciones que han tomado a lo largo de nuestro desarrollo simbólico. El libro concluye con un análisis de los condicionamientos generales para el desarrollo de futuras estructuras míticas. Mi punto de partida ontoepistemológico es evolucionista, emergentista y constructivista, una postura que queda mejor expresada a partir de la teoría de la racionalidad continua, de inspiración aristotélica, que parte de que los procesos vitales muestran -en diferentes estados de complejidad- la propiedad de la inteligencia. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um quadro conceitual para examinar a questão do especismo. Começa definindo-o como a consideração ou tratamento desfavorável injustificado daqueles que não pertencem a uma determinada espécie. A seguir, esclarece alguns dos mal-entendidos comuns acerca do que é e do que não é o especismo. Depois disso, argumenta contra a confusão entre (1) os diferentes modos em que se pode defender o especismo; e (2) as diferentes posições que assumem o especismo como uma de suas premissas. Dependendo se (...) essas últimas aceitam ou não outros critérios para a consideração moral à parte do especismo, podem ser posições especistas simples ou combinadas. Mas o especismo segue sendo em todos os casos a mesma ideia. Finalmente, este artigo examina o conceito de antropocentrismo, que define como o tratamento ou consideração desfavorável daqueles que não são membros da espécie humana. O conceito de antropocentrismo difere do de especismo e do de misoteria (animadversão para com os animais não humanos). Não obstante, pode-se concluir que o antropocentrismo é uma forma de especismo, à luz do que indicam, entre outros, o argumento da sobreposição de espécies e o argumento da relevância. (shrink)

Existen conceptos clave en las diversas ciencias (ya sean formales, naturales, biosociales o sociales) como “teoría” o “modelo” que están aún hoy sujetos a un amplio debate epistemológico, i.e. desde la teoría del conocimiento, y centrada en el estudio del conocimiento científico en particular. Los científicos, pues, construyen y utilizan diferentes nociones que cargan tras de sí realmente con un exhaustivo debate extracientífico sobre su naturaleza. En este trabajo se ofrecerán algunas aclaraciones y propuestas formales de definición sobre tales nociones (...) desde la filosofía de la ciencia del astrofísico y filosofo Gustavo Esteban Romero (G. E. Romero). En concreto se ensayaran unas definiciones formales de “teoría” y “modelo”, para las ciencias actuales (y otras disciplinas pasibles de su aplicación), y se contextualizarán estas ideas en el debate sobre la estructura y organización de los saberes científicos. (shrink)

Longtermism should not be wrongly defined as the view that we should act so that the future is as good as possible for human beings and their descendants; rather, longtermists should be concerned with what the long-term future may be like for all sentient beings. This includes nonhuman animals, as different risks of future suffering may afflict them. Indifference toward their interests could lead to the worsening of their use as resources, quantitatively and qualitatively. It could also help expand wild (...) animal suffering, a process that may have already begun. (shrink)

Una de las tesis que tradicionalmente han sido defendidas por la tradición del positivismo jurídico es la tesis coactiva, según la cual el derecho consiste en un conjunto de normas coactivas, en el sentido de impuestas por medio de la fuerza. Pero, sin abandonar esta corriente, ha habido históricamente diversas maneras de entender las relaciones entre derecho y fuerza. Si, pues, hasta comienzos del s. XX era opinión común la idea de que el derecho constituía un conjunto de mandatos o (...) normas de conducta cuya eficacia se garantizaba a través de la amenaza del uso de la fuerza coactiva a los transgresores de aquéllas; a lo largo del siglo pasado, empero, algunos autores muy destacados dieron en sostener la opinión de que la fuerza disponible por jueces y funcionarios venía a constituir sustancialmente el objeto mismo de toda regulación jurídica. Según esta última concepción, el derecho tendría primordialmente la función de articular las condiciones de legitimidad para el uso de la fuerza, designando a los sujetos a los que se encomienda tal uso y determinado los casos y modalidades en los que pueda utilizarse. Entre quienes sustentan la primera tesis, que afirma que la fuerza constituye la garantía del derecho, es lugar común citar a Austin y, a menudo, se cita también a Jhering. Entre los defensores de la segunda tesis común es habitual mencionar a Kelsen, Olivecrona y Ross, habiéndose sustanciado una polémica entre Bobbio y Olivecrona en punto a determinar si fuera menciona Olivecrona o fue Kelsen el primero en adoptarla. Sin embargo, es problemático incluir a Jhering dentro del primer grupo y no dentro del segundo, en cuyo caso habría que atribuirle la primera formulación histórica de la tesis. Este trabajo, de carácter histórico, parte de la citada polémica y trata de verificar la constancia de la segunda tesis en las obras no sólo de Kelsen y Olivecrona, sino sobre todo de Jhering. (shrink)

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.

Whipple disease is a rare, infectious, disease first described from a single case by Whipple in 1907. As well as characterising the clinical and pathological features of the condition, Whipple made two suggestions regarding its aetiology. These were either than the disease was caused by an infectious agent, or that it was of metabolic origin. As the disease is now thought to be caused by infection with the bacterium Tropheryma whipplei, historical reviews of the history of the disease typically mention (...) only the first of these suggestions. In this paper, we therefore revisit Whipple’s other theory. We argue that a diverse and often successful research programme was developed around this mechanism of disease causation which gave rise to many useful findings on the condition. In the later parts of this article, we then turn to discuss the surprising neglect of this period of Whipple disease research in the current literature, and conclude by offering a brief reconstruction of this early history suitable for use in a technical context. (shrink)

El artículo pretende provocar un acercamiento a la enseñanza de la estadística descriptiva y probabilística, con el diseño de experiencias didácticas basadas en experiencias de maestros que aprenden de maestros a través de la implementación de tecnologías de información y comunicación, con el fin de implementar un recurso concreto para la modelación y estructuración de situaciones en las que las diferentes distribuciones de probabilidad se pueden implementar pedagógicamente. Como estrategia pedagógica, se persigue más que “hacer datos”, conseguir la familiaridad del (...) concepto, con el cual los estudiantes colombianos están enfrentados en particular dentro del componente de estándares básicos de pensamiento aleatorio y variacional (MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN NACIONAL -MEN-, 2006). La estrategia, para el cuerpo de docentes del área de matemáticas y estadística, constituye una metodología dirigida a la conformación de un banco de alternativas innovadoras para trabajar didácticamente en estos conceptos tanto en su didáctica, como en su forma de implementar el software libre GeoGebra. La perspectiva de la propuesta se materializa en la expresión reflexiva de estrategias de enseñanza continuamente mejoradas. En cuanto a la estadística descriptiva e inferencial, se persigue el desarrollo de actitudes positivas de maestros y de estudiantes frente a la cotidianidad y al mundo de la vida, en donde las actividades suelen involucrar situaciones contextualizadas en las que se demanda del lenguaje estadístico. (shrink)

En su libro Una ética sin fundamentos, Nicolás Zavadivker sostiene que la teoría ética y metaética de Mario Bunge pretende fundamentar las normas morales en premisas fácticas, sin hacer uso de valores. El presente trabajo discute esa tesis y sostiene que la teoría de Bunge busca construir y evaluar un sistema de valores y de normas, de forma rigurosa y sin arbitrariedad, a partir de conocimientos fácticos y valores de los evaluadores. Dado que la teoría de Bunge incluye valores entre (...) sus premisas argumentativas, es incorrecto categorizarla como una posición fundacionista que prescinde de valores. (shrink)

This article examines and rejects the view that nonhuman animals cannot be recipients of justice, and argues that the main reasons in favor of universal human rights and global justice also apply in the case of the international protection of the interests of nonhuman animals. In any plausible theory of wellbeing, sentience matters; mere species membership or the place where an animal is born does not. This does not merely entail that regulations of the use of animals aimed at reducing (...) their suffering should be implemented. It actually supports the end of such use, as well as other positive steps to provide help and to promote what is good not only for domesticated animals, but also for those living in the wild. Another reason to bring the protection of animals' interests into the international arena is that it is at this level that numerous animal exploitation industries enjoy the protection of different agreements and institutions. It does not follow from this that changing international law should be animal advocates' first priority, but it does follow that they should conduct their work internationally and not limit it to their own countries. (shrink)

Argument that Lewis and others are wrong that physicalism is if true then contingently true.

En el presente trabajo se utiliza el problema ético de la automatización en transportes y vehículos dotados de inteligencia artificial (IA) para un análisis crítico de las diferentes posiciones éticas y morales clásicas. Debido a la intersección de la IA con los campos de investigación de la bioética, la nomoética y la tecnoética, existe un hilo conductor en sus fundamentos. Además, se juzga necesario para este propósito, así como por rigurosidad, hacer uso de una cantidad mínima de herramientas formales y (...) exponer un proyecto de una teoría ética actualizada, sistémica y materialista, que sobrepase a sus sistemas rivales. Así, se pretende ofrecer las bases para una teoría alterna más fecunda y explicar cómo las posiciones éticas tradicionales pueden ser obsoletas, si no directamente inaplicables, para afrontar la automatización inteligente y problemas morales similares, en la actualidad. (shrink)

In this essay, I reflect on the implications of intellectual virtues in scientific endeavor. To this end, I first offer a depiction of scientific endeavor by resorting to the notion of academic attitude, which involves aspects concerning the generation and possession of knowledge. Although there are differences between these activities, they have in common the engagement of diverse intellectual agents (scientists). In this sense, I analyze how intellectual virtues are linked to 1) scientific research tasks, such as theory appraisal, and (...) 2) those tasks of vigilance and intervention in the uses of scientific knowledge. I conclude that intellectual virtues play a leading role in achieving higher quality scientific research and adequate foresight on the uses and impacts of scientific findings. In this order of ideas, I propose an agenda for further inquiries on these matters, highlighting the relevance of reflecting and empirically researching the relationship between intellectual virtues and science, as well as cultivating intellectual virtues in various stages of scientific training. (shrink)

Resumen Hermenéutica y toma de decisiones en ética clínica La moderna hermenéutica se interesa por las condiciones de posibilidad de la comprensión humana. Sus aportaciones son de indudable interés para el campo de la ética biomédica, donde médico y paciente tratan de comprenderse mutuamente con el fin de concretar determinado proyecto de cuidados. Sin embargo, esta aproximación está lejos de ser aprovechable para formar una pauta concreta de cara a la toma de decisiones en este campo. La hermenéutica acierta al (...) poner el centro de gravedad en el diálogo, en lugar de en el método, pero olvida que, en Gadamer, el diálogo está dirigido a la verdad. Esto es lo que se tratará de poner de manifiesto en este trabajo, intentado establecer la conexión de dicha noción con las de bien, historia y comunidad. -/- Abstract Modern hermeneutics deals with the conditions of the possibilities of human understanding. Its contributions are particularly pertinent to clinical ethics, where patient and doctor seek to mutually understand one another in order to establish a determined care plan. Nevertheless, this approach is far from useful for the formulation of a concrete standard for decision making in this area. Hermeneutics is effective in putting the focus on dialogue, rather than method. But it overlooks the fact that dialogue, according to Gadamer, is directed towards truth. The present article aims to highlight this point, and seeks to establish the connection between this notion of truth and ideas of good, history and community. -/- Resumo Hermenêutica e a tomada de decisões em ética clínica A hermenêutica moderna interessa-se pelas condições de possibilidade da compreensão humana. Indubitavelmente, os seus contributos são de interesse para a ética biomédica, na qual o médico e o paciente tratam de compreender-se mutuamente a fim de concretizar um determinado projeto de cuidados. No entanto, esta perspectiva está longe de poder ser utilizada como padrão concreto para a tomada de decisões neste campo. A hermenêutica tem razão ao colocar o centro de gravidade no diálogo e não no método, entretanto, esquece-se de que, em Gadamer, o diálogo está orientado para a verdade. É precisamente isso que se pretende evidenciar neste trabalho, procurando estabelecer-se a conexão entre a referida noção de verdade com as noções de bem, história e comunidade. (shrink)

Sentences \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) are _cognitive synonyms_ for one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1 ), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2 ), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1 ). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2 ), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3 ). A cognitively adequate individuation (...) of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3 ) due to ‘dead parrot’ series: sequences of sentences \(\varphi _1, \ldots, \varphi _n\) where adjacent \(\varphi _i\) and \(\varphi _{i+1}\) are cognitive synonyms while \(\varphi _1\) and \(\varphi _n\) are not (Sect. 3.1 ). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won’t do (Sect. 3.2 ) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn’t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3 )._Sed contra_, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4 ). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light. (shrink)

Resumen: Todo hecho debe ser narrado para ser objeto de examen valorativo. Pero este examen depende, en parte, de cómo aquél sea narrado. Algunos autores han señalado el valor democrático que posee el enfoque narrativo, en la medida en que permite que una narración sea construida a partir de diferentes puntos de vista. El problema es que estos puntos de vista pueden conducir a soluciones alternativas o incluso antagónicas, fenómeno no infrecuente en una sociedad multicultural como la nuestra. Desde un (...) punto de vista estrictamente narrativo, el mejor relato es el más persuasivo. Pero esto nos aboca al relativismo, puesto que la eficacia de un relato está en función del auditorio ante el que se argumenta. En este trabajo se ha intentado poner de manifiesto que sólo se alcanza a comprender la verdadera contribución de la narrativa si nos situamos, no tanto en el plano de los hechos, como en el plano de la normatividad. La tesis que aquí se sostiene es que la utilidad del enfoque narrativo está en función del valor arquetípico del modelo o estándar de conducta que eventualmente contenga una determinada narración. Entronca así directamente con la noción de razón práctica, más allá de sus específicos puntos de conexión con algunas de las metodologías bioéticas más importantes. Abstract: Every fact must be narrated in order to be subject of value judgement. But this value judgement depends partly on how that fact is narrated. Some authors have highlighted the democratic value of the narrative approach, because of its admission of different points of view to construct a story. The problem is that these points of view can easily lead to alternative solutions o even opposing ones. This phenomenon is not rare in our multicultural society. From an strictly narrative point of view, the best story is the most persuasive. But this lead us to relativism, because the efficacy of an story relies on the audience towards the argumentation is developed. In this work we have tried to bring to light that the genuine contribution of the narrative approach is not achieved if we stay on the level of facts and we do not pass to the level of normativity. We suggest the thesis that the utility of narrative approach is a function of the archetypical standard of behavior that a story may content. So this approach, beyond its specific connections with some of the most prominent bioethical methodologies, become directly connected with the notion of practical reason. (shrink)

The methods of philosophical consultation vary enormously according to the practitioners who conceive and apply them. In this paper, we discuss the conceptions and methods we have been carrying out for several years in this field, such as philosophical naturalism, the dual requirement, first steps, anagogy and discrimination, thinking the unthinkable, switching to the "second floor", and being philosophical. Our methodology is mainly inspired by the Socratic maieutic, where the philosopher questions his interlocutor, invites him to identify the stakes of (...) his discourse, to conceptualize it by distinguishing key terms in order to implement them, to problematize it through a critical perspective, to universalize its implications. This practice has the specificity of inviting the subject to move away from a mere sensation to allow him a rational analysis of his speech and of himself, a sine qua non condition for deliberating on the cognitive and existential stakes which must be made explicit at first. The removal from oneself that this unnatural activity presupposes, for which it requires the assistance of a specialist, poses a certain number of difficulties, e.g., frustration, speech as a pretext, the issue of truth, pain and epidural. Finally, some additional exercises are very useful for the reflection process, such as establishing connections, real speech, order, universal and singular, and accepting the pathology. (shrink)

Rapid technological advancements such as fMRI have led to the rise of neuroscientific discoveries. Coupled with findings from cognitive psychology, they are claiming to have solved the millennia-old puzzle of moral cognition. If true, our societal structures – and with that the criminal law – would be gravely impacted. This thesis concerns itself with four distinct theories stemming from the disciplines above as to what mechanisms constitute moral judgement: the Stage Model by KOHLBERG, the Universal Moral Grammar Theory by MIKHAIL, (...) the Social Intuitionist Model by HAIDT, and the Dual-Process Theory by GREENE – comparing the findings of the latter to the consequentialist and retributivist theories of punishment present in the American Criminal Law Doctrine. Analysing both a direct (link to deontology) and indirect (link to incompatibilism) approach to discrediting retributivism, I come to the conclusion that while science can have an impact on our morals and thus on the law, the current state of neuroscientific findings are not capable of shattering foundational notions of the criminal law. (shrink)

The properties of angular momentum and its connection to magnetic momentum are explored, based on a reconsideration of the Stern-Gerlach experiment and gauge invariance. A possible way to solve the so called spin crisis is proposed. The separation of angular momentum of a quan- tum system of particles into orbital angular momentum plus intrinsic angular momentum is reconsidered, within the limits of the Schrodinger theory. A proof is given that, for systems of more than two particles, un- less all of (...) them have the same mass, the possibility of having eigenvalues of the form (n + 1/2)h is not excluded. (shrink)

Como es sabido, en el ámbito de la ética biomédica, se han formulado diversas propuestas metodológicas que tratan de ofrecer una serie de pautas para la toma de decisiones. Estas metodologías son útiles, en la medida en que aportan criterios, pero son esencialmente insuficientes. En efecto, tomar una buena decisión requiere un tino especial, que va más allá de la mera técnica, y que tradicionalmente se ha denominado prudencia. No en el sentido más común y periférico de precaución, sino en (...) el sentido más central de phrónesis o prudentía. Aunque no es una noción nueva, sí se trata de una noción que suele aparecer desdibujada, ocupando un lugar equivocado, marginal o indefinido en la teoría de la toma de decisiones biomédicas. A partir de esta constatación se pretende dos cosas. En primer lugar, señalar la necesidad de comprender el papel troncal que tiene la prudencia en el ámbito de la toma de decisiones, para lo que se partirá de algunas de las metodologías más influyentes en nuestro entorno. Y, en segundo lugar, recuperar los colores originales de la noción aristotélica de prudencia. Por razones de espacio, en el presente trabajo la segunda cuestión es sólo parcialmente abordada. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la noción de ciencia jurídica de los profesores Carlos E. Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin. Ésta parte del presupuesto de que la ciencia jurídica no está autorizada a crear nuevo Derecho, sino que sólo puede aspirar legítimamente a representarlo de alguna manera. Eso no significa que la suya sea una actividad meramente especulativa, en el sentido etimológico del término. Esto es, la ciencia jurídica no se limita a reflejar, como en un espejo, el Derecho tal (...) y como se nos presenta empíricamente, sino que confiere a éste un importante valor añadido a través de su sistematización. La primera parte de este trabajo está dedicada a exponer el modelo científico propuesto por los mencionados autores. En la segunda parte se presta especial atención a la cuestión de la separación entre descripción y prescripción en la actividad de la ciencia jurídica. Por último, en la tercera parte se cuestiona la utilidad del modelo propuesto sobre la base de los postulados teóricos de que se le hace partir, a lo que se suman ciertas dificultades metodológicas. (shrink)

Este trabajo gira en torno al casuismo. Se hace hincapié en su necesidad para la ética biomédica. A través de su carácter analógico, se pone de manifiesto, a su vez, su dependencia de los principios. Sin embargo, ni principios ni casos bastan por sí solos para iluminar completamente las decisiones biomédicas, que presentan un notable componente de incertidumbre. Una decisión no es un objeto preexistente, sino algo que hay que producir, un operable. Aquí se pone de manifiesto que esta realidad (...) no se puede abordar si no es a través de la noción clásica de prudencia, en el sentido de la phrónesis aristotélica. Una vez esbozada ésta en sus líneas generales, dando cuenta de sus aspectos morales e intelectuales, es posible enfocar de nuevo el casuismo con nueva luz, superar las críticas más importantes y comprender que la relación clínica es también una relación jurídica, por lo que el papel del Derecho, y en particular el de la jurisprudencia, se muestra vital. (shrink)

In this essay we argue for the Janus-faced nature of hope. We show that attempts to sanitise the concept of hope either by separating it conceptually from other phenomena such as wishful thinking, or, more generally, by seeking to minimise the negative aspects of hope, do not help us to understand the nature of hope and its functions as regards religion. Drawing on functional accounts of religion from Clifford Geertz and Tamas Pataki, who both—in their different ways—see the function of (...) religion in terms of its capacity to satisfy deep psychological needs, we demonstrate that religion uniquely positions itself with regard to hope’s two faces, simultaneously exploiting positive and negative aspects of hope. (shrink)

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.

Respect for victims requires that we have social systems for punishing and condemning (reproving) serious crimes. But, the conditions of social marginalization and political subordination of the communities from which an overwhelming number of prisoners in the United States come place serious barriers in the face of effective reprobation. Mass incarceration makes this problem worse by disrupting and disrespecting entire communities. While humanities education in the prisons is far from a total solution, it is one way to make reprobation meaningful, (...) so long as the prison classroom is a place where the educators’ values are also put at risk. (shrink)

Según la teoría contemporánea, un sistema jurídico existe cuando es eficaz en general. Así, identificar las normas jurídicas válidas en tal sistema sólo requiere cumplir con los requisitos establecidos en su correspondiente regla de reconocimiento.**** De modo que ni en la cuestión de la existencia del sistema ni en la de la identificación de sus normas tiene que ver la de la moralidad del derecho. Esto se pone en cuestión en este trabajo a través del análisis del derecho de la (...) represión durante la dictadura franquista y las medidas reparadoras adoptadas a partir de la transición a la democracia hasta nuestros días. (shrink)

Resumen: Tomado en serio, el empirismo parece abocar a la negación de los derechos humanos; al menos entendidos como expresión de la naturaleza humana. Bajo esta óptica, K. Olivecrona rechaza explícitamente todo Derecho natural, por considerarlo una noción metafísica. En cambio, cuando describe el Derecho positivo, se encuentra con que éste parece asegurar un determinado orden de valores. Olivecrona, además de describir este dato, en diversos escritos asume dichos valores e incluso los defiende. Esta última postura no es muy coherente (...) con una metodología que niega el conocimiento moral. Seguramente por ello, con el paso del tiempo, Olivecrona va abandonando la defensa de dichos valores e, incluso, marginando su interés por constatarlos empíricamente. El Derecho queda reducido a mera fuerza organizada y monopolizada por el Estado. Pero esta renuncia escamotea otro hecho empírico: la opción general y radical a partir de la segunda Guerra mundial de los modernos sistemas constitucionales por separar ley y derechos, constituyendo a los más básicos como fundamento del orden político y jurídico. A la vista de este fenómeno, pensamos que no sólo es posible explicarlo, sino que incluso se puede justificar, en la medida en que la institucionalización de estos derechos fundamentales no es sólo moralmente debida, sino, de un modo más específico, jurídicamente debida. -/- Abstract: Seriously taken, empiricism seems to lead to the denial of human rights; at least if they are understood as the expression of human nature. In this optic, K. Olivecrona explicitly rejects any natural law, for being a metaphysical notion. However, when he describes positive law, he finds that it apparently assures a specific set of values. Olivecrona, besides describing this datum, accepts and defends these values in various writings. This last choice is not very coherent with a methodology which denies moral understanding. Probably this is the reason why he gradually abandons the defence of those values and progressively drops his interest in validate them empirically. Law is reduced to a mere organized force monopolized by the State. But this renunciation overlooks another empirical fact: after the Second World War modern constitutional systems have generally and radically opted to separate Law and rights and moreover some of these have been set up as the basis of the political and legal order. In view of this phenomenon, we strongly believe that it is possible to explain it, but even to justify it, considering that the institutionalization of these fundamental rights is based on a specific demand of justice. (shrink)

La FIV puede llevar aparejada la acumulación de embriones humanos excedentes. Aunque la ley prevé varios posibles destinos, las clínicas de reproducción asistida, que con frecuencia han de decidir qué hacer con ellos, buscan criterios para hacerlo de la forma más razonable posible. Este trabajo pretende aportar razones jurídicas y éticas que ayuden a esa decisión.

24 undergraduates were blindfolded and walked through paths laid out on a floor to investigate whether the orientation of Ss' cognitive maps (CMs) could be determined after they had learned a path by walking through it. Given the assumption that the CM is picturelike, it was predicted that it has a specific orientation, which implies that tests in which the CM is assumed to be aligned with the path should be less difficult than tests in which the CM is hypothesized (...) to be contraligned. In Exp I (8 Ss), Ss were required to draw a picture of the path they had walked through; in Exp II (14 Ss), Ss were required to locate targets in the path under conditions in which their presumed CMs were either aligned or contraligned with the path. Results show that, in Exp I, all Ss drew the 1st line segment of the path upward, suggesting that this part of the path was fixed in an upward direction in memory. In Exp II, Ss were more accurate and faster in locating points on the path when the CM was hypothesized to be aligned with the path than when it was hypothesized to be contraligned. (shrink)

I offer a new interpretation of Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety in Being and Time as an account of the relationship between individual agents and the public normative practices of their communities. According to a prominent recent interpretation, Heidegger’s discussions of anxiety, death and the “call of conscience” together explain how we can respond to the norms of our practices as reasons and subject them to critical reflection. I argue that this is only part of the story. Anxiety is an occasion (...) for Dasein to take responsibility for its ongoing activity of interpreting the possibilities for living and acting made available by the normative practices of its community, which is presupposed and overlooked from the perspective of everyday Dasein. Public normativity underdetermines Dasein’s conception of what it would mean to take up any of the possibilities available in its world as a way of living its own life. (shrink)

In this text we try to summarize the axiological and ethical theories, as well as its relation with human rights -HR- that is developed from scientific philosophy: a philosophy that seeks to construct general conceptual systems that are clear and exact, and tries to adjust itself to the sciences of its time, to feed back with them. In this way, it is investigated in the practical philosophy faced with the maximum possible rigor and focused on achieving certain objectivity; a technical (...) philosophy. All along this work we develop the central concepts, hypothesis and prescriptions of the practical philosophy on the scientific substrate available. It also proposes some ideas critical of ‘human rights’ that may be of interest to jurists and legal theorists. The final objective of these critics it is not the refutation or suppression of HR, but just the opposed: their strength reaffirmation with the improvements and readjustments required. (shrink)