I argue that current discussions of the epistemological significance of reflection have entangled concerns about reflection with agential concerns. I begin by showing that a central strand of internalist criticism finds externalism unsatisfactory because it fails to provide a particular kind of self-knowledge, knowledge about the epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Identifying this internalist motivation as the desire for a kind of self-knowledge opens up new possibilities and suggests new conceptual resources. I employ one of these resources—Richard Moran’s (...) distinction between the theoretical stance and the deliberative stance—to locate two types of reflection: mere reflective awareness of one’s attitudes and agent-awareness of one’s attitudes. I then examine Ernest Sosa’s account of the importance of reflection, showing how Moran’s distinction brings out the centrality of agential concerns in Sosa’s argument for reflective knowledge. I also consider briefly its relevance to fully apt knowledge. While I focus on Sosa’s epistemology, the point extends to internalism more generally. (shrink)

The birth of a new science is long, drawn out, and often fairly messy. Comparative psychology has its roots in Darwin’s Descent of Man, was fertilized in academic psychology departments, and has branched across the universities into departments of biology, anthropology, primatology, zoology, and philosophy. Both the insights and the failings of comparative psychology are making their way into contemporary discussions of artificial intelligence and machine learning (Chollett 2019; Lapuschkin et al. 2019; Watson 2019). It is the right time to (...) turn a philosophical lens onto the methodologies of comparative psychology. That is the aim of this Element. -/- Comparative psychology is the umbrella covering the different ways scientists study animal mind and behavior. Comparative psychologists study animal behavior and mentality, including the mechanisms and inner states that allow crows to form hooks, vervet monkeys to give warnings, crabs to make trade-off decisions, and humans to use language. While focus is on the similarities and differences between different species, capacities are often studied in terms of their evolutionary history, development, and current ecological or cultural context. What this entails is that comparative psychologists have a range of different kinds of training, different areas of expertise, and different research questions. One comparative cognition researcher compares children and dogs on causal reasoning abilities (Daphna Buchsbaum), another looks at memory in corvids (Nicola Clayton). An animal behaviorist examines raccoon territories in a city (Suzanne MacDonald). One anthropologist looks at war in wild chimpanzees (John Mitani), another looks at how innovations are adopted in capu- chin monkeys (Susan Perry). One ethologist looks at play in wolves (Marc Bekoff), and another looks at deception in birds (Carolyn Ristau). One biologist looks at male alliances in dolphins (Richard Connor), and another examines economic game performance in apes and monkeys (Sarah Brosnan). An animal welfare scientist studies the effect of enrichment on mink (Georgia Mason). A learning theorist looks at gambling in pigeons (Thomas Zentall). A zoologist studies social learning in bees (Lars Chittka). It is not easy to guess in which department you’ll find a comparative psychologist. -/- This Element aims to examine the methods of comparative psychology, which remains especially concerned about how to study animal minds and behavior without falling prey to fuzzy thinking. Animals can be cute, so humans are often intrinsically drawn to them; and this love of animals is sometimes taken to be at odds with being a careful scientist. The methods of comparative psychology reflect this worry with their special emphases on avoiding bias and on avoiding developing warm relationships with animal subjects. The first two sections analyze three textbooks to examine what young scientists are taught. Section 1 investigates three methodological principles students are taught to follow: Anti-anthropomorphism, Morgan’s Canon, and Anti-anthropocentrism. I argue that the first two principles should be discarded, and that developing relationships with animals should no longer be discouraged, as relationships promote understanding. Building on this critique, in Section 2 I challenge the common prohibition against including animal consciousness in comparative psychology by arguing that it does not harm the science, but promotes it. Setting aside the special prohibitions for comparative psychology, in Section 3 I examine how the quest for objectivity in comparative psychology introduces its own bias and argue that the different disciplines of comparative psychology will introduce different biases; the best scientists can do is identify the sources of bias. The quest to eliminate all bias is a misguided one. Section 4 applies these issues to recent debates in ape cognition research between scientists who work in the field and those who work in the lab, and suggests best practices for integrating knowledge from both sources. -/- I have had the opportunity to work with a number of comparative psychologists in a variety of contexts, including a stint at Lou Herman’s dolphin communication lab in the 1990s, collaborative studies with Peter Verbeek on the child’s theory of mind at the University of Minnesota’s Institute for Child Development, conducting research on orangutan pantomime communication with Anne Russon at her field sites in Borneo, research on rat social learning with Noam Miller at Wilfrid Laurier University, and co-teaching a field course in dolphin communication with Kathleen Dudzinski. As a philosopher of science who has been in the field and in the lab, I have a perspective from which to compare the comparative psychologists. This Element is my attempt to synthesize almost thirty years of experience and thinking about how to study animal minds. (shrink)

In this essay, I look at some extraordinary actors who never got their due—actors who had distinguished careers, but never won an Academy Award for acting. I review the work of: Joseph Cotten; Orson Welles; Edward G. Robinson; Cary Grant; James Mason; Richard Burton; Claude Rains; Alan Ladd: Robert Mitchum; and Fred MacMurray. In each case, I explore the actor’s best work, what made his acting outstanding, and offer possible explanations why he was not so honored.

According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...) problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agent's utility function is defined over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. (shrink)

When we look around us, some things look “alive,” others do not. What is it to “look alive”—to perceive animacy? Empirical work supports the view that animacy is genuinely perceptual. We should construe perception of animacy as perception of agents and behavior. This proposal explains how static and dynamic animacy cues relate, and explains how animacy perception relates to social cognition more broadly. Animacy perception draws attention to objects that are apt to be well‐understood folk psychologically, enabling us to marshal (...) our folk psychological resources efficiently. (shrink)

What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me” and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level – the plurality problem. The things that (...) plausibly qualify as personal are motley. Other attempts at accounting for the personal level either cannot accommodate this plurality, or cannot explain what unifies the personal. Given arguments others have given for a pluralistic conception of folk psychology, constructionism explains and predicts this plurality in a systematic and unified way, thereby solving the plurality problem. (shrink)

How do we know about other minds on the basis of perception? The two most common answers to this question are that we literally perceive others’ mental states, or that we infer their mental states on the basis of perceiving something else. In this paper, I argue for a different answer. On my view, we don’t perceive mental states, and yet perceptual experiences often immediately justify mental state attributions. In a slogan: other minds are neither seen nor inferred. I argue (...) that this view offers the best explanation of our deeply equivocal intuitions about perception-based mental state attributions, and also holds substantial interest for the epistemology of perception more generally. (shrink)

People are manifestly polarized. On many topics, extreme perspectives are much easier to find than 'reasonable', 'moderate' perspectives. A natural reaction to this situation is that something epistemically irrational is afoot. Here, I question this natural reaction. I argue that often polarization is epistemically innocuous. In particular, I argue that certain mechanisms that underlie polarization are rational, and polarized beliefs are often fully justified. Additionally, even reflective subjects, who recognize themselves as in a polarized or polarizing situation shouldn't necessarily reduce (...) confidence in the relevant beliefs. Finally, I draw attention to some often overlooked epistemic benefits associated with polarization. A fuller understanding of the epistemology of polarization requires incorporating both the potential costs and the potential benefits, and being more precise about exactly what is—and is not—epistemically objectionable in these situations. (shrink)

Quilty-Dunn et al. argue that deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) optimized for image classification exemplify structural disanalogies to human vision. A different kind of artificial vision – found in reinforcement-learning agents navigating artificial three-dimensional environments – can be expected to be more human-like. Recent work suggests that language-like representations substantially improves these agents’ performance, lending some indirect support to the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH).

In this essay, I offer some of the reasons to think that Plato has a substantial contribution to make to contemporary thinking about moral education. To allow a sense of how wide the range of reasons is, I start by listing ten miscellaneous reasons that one can compellingly offer and some of which scholars *have* offered. Then I present my preferred reason, which involves a way of approaching Plato that is new and unorthodox. When you approach Plato this way, you (...) don't try to interpret him correctly. Instead, you use his writings simply as a tool for theorizing, and what you theorize about is how best to carry out the Socratic project of leading other people to self-examination. (shrink)

Nietzsche announces his intentions to publish a “physiology of aesthetics”, namely a naturalistic explanation for how aesthetic judgements are grounded in the physiology of both the one experiencing the work, and the creator of it. But as well as the physiological reduction of aesthetic judgements, Nietzsche in many places across his oeuvre frames the apparatus of physiology, especially the prescriptive dimension of self-cultivation, in terms amenable to being treated as ‘aesthetic’. The first section will mount a (re-) defense of the (...) use of aestheticized language for discussing Nietzschean self-cultivation. The second section demonstrates an aesthetic evaluation of capacities that make possible the acquisition and removal of instinctual components, ultimately arguing for Nietzsche’s qualified indeterminism regarding the capacity for self-cultivation. The third section will assess the pres- ence of another aesthetic measure, this time in terms of envisaging one’s psycho-physiology by reference to an external spectacle. The final section discusses metaethical questions stemming from Nietzsche’s prescriptive language regarding the aestheticization of our physiology. (shrink)

Two doxastically significant demands of friendship have been discussed in recent literature, a demand to be epistemically partial and a demand to take our friends seriously. Though less discussed than epistemic partialism, I suggest that the demand to take our friends seriously is motivated by similar cases and considerations, and can avoid key objections to epistemic partialism that have been raised. I further suggest that it does justice to what we care about in friendship, and thus is to be preferred.

In this article, I discuss what motivated reasoning research tells us about the prospects for deliberative democracy. In section I, I introduce the results of several political psychology studies examining the problematic affective and cognitive processing of political information by individuals in nondeliberative, experimental environments. This is useful because these studies are often neglected in political philosophy literature. Section II has three stages. First, I sketch how the study results from section I question the practical viability of deliberative democracy. Second, (...) I briefly present the results of three empirical studies of political deliberation that can be interpreted to counter the findings of the studies in section I. Third, I show why this is a misinterpretation and that the study results from section I mean that it is implausible that sites of political deliberation would naturally emerge from the wide public sphere and coalesce into institutionalized forms of the practice such that deliberative democracy can satisfy its raison d’être. Finally, in section III, I conclude that viable conceptions of deliberative democracy should be limited to narrower aims. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the proposed use of combinatorial derivatives markets for event prediction, especially for catastrophic events such as terrorism, war, or political assasination. Following a presentation of the philosophical principles underlying these politico-economic tools, I examine case studies (U.S. DoD proposals) that evaluate their advantages and disadvantages in terms of both efficacy and moral considerations. I conclude that these markets are both fatally flawed due to internal conceptual contradictions and morally problematic.

In this paper I discuss various hard cases that an account of moral ignorance should be able to deal with: ancient slave holders, Susan Wolf’s JoJo, psychopaths such as Robert Harris, and finally, moral outliers. All these agents are ignorant, but it is not at all clear that they are blameless on account of their ignorance. I argue that the discussion of this issue in recent literature has missed the complexities of these cases by focusing on the question of epistemic (...) fault. It is not clear that all blameworthy morally ignorant agents have committed an epistemic fault. There are other important issues that pull us in various directions: moral capacity, bad will, and formative circumstances. I argue that bad will is what is crucial, and moral ignorance itself can be a form of bad will. I argue that we should distinguish between two sorts of bad will, and correspondingly, two sorts of blameworthiness. Ordinary blameworthiness, requires moral knowledge, and is based on akratic action. The other kind of blameworthiness, objective blameworthiness, applies when the agent is morally ignorant, and when this indicates bad will. Objective blameworthiness can be undermined by unfortunate formative circumstances. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary paper identifies principles of an affluent country (im)migration policy that avoids: (1) the positivist inclusion/exclusion mechanism of liberalism and communitarianism; and (2) the idealism of most cosmopolitan (im)migration theories. First, I: (a) critique the failure of liberalism and communitarianism to consider (im)migration under distributive justice; and (b) present cosmopolitan (im)migration approaches as a promising alternative. This paper’s central claim is that cosmopolitan (im)migration theory can determine normative shortcomings in (im)migration policy by coupling elements of Frankfurt School methodology to (...) case studies of (im)migration regimes. Lastly, I apply this analytical procedure to recent special changes in Spanish and UK immigration law. (shrink)

This paper presents the history of the Frankfurt School’s inclusion of normative concerns in social science research programs during the period 1930-1955. After examining the relevant methodology, I present a model of how such a program could look today. I argue that such an approach is both valuable to contemporary social science programs and overlooked by current philosophers and social scientists.

It is common to think that clarity is an essential ingredient of good teaching, meaning, in part, that good teachers always make it as easy as possible to follow what they say. We disagree. What we argue is that there are cases in which a philosophy teacher needs to forego clarity, making strategic use of obscurity in the undergraduate classroom.

It is a truism that humans are social animals. Thus, it is no surprise that we understand the world, each other, and ourselves in terms of social kinds such as money and marriage, war and women, capitalists and cartels, races, recessions, and refugees. Social kinds condition our expectations, inform our preferences, and guide our behavior. Despite the prevalence and importance of social kinds, philosophy has historically devoted relatively little attention to them. With few exceptions, philosophers have given pride of place (...) to the kinds studied by the natural sciences, especially physics. However, philosophical interest in social kinds is growing in recent years. I critically examine answers to a cluster of related questions concerning the metaphysics of social kinds. Are social kinds natural kinds? Do social kinds have essences? Are social kinds mind dependent? Are social kinds real? (shrink)

Despite contemporary moral philosophers' renewed attention to the moral significance of emotions, the attitudinal repertoire with which they equip the mature moral agent remains stunted. One attitude moral philosophers neglect (if not disown) is contempt. While acknowledging the nastiness of contempt, I here correct the neglect by providing an account of the moral psychology of contempt. In the process, I defend the moral propriety of certain tokens of properly person-focused contempt against some prominent objections -- among them, objections stemming from (...) Kantian worries that contempt is incompatible with the respect we owe to persons as such. (shrink)

What’s so good about John Ames? The narrator of Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead has been much admired, but it’s far from obvious why. His life is quiet and unassuming, and has for the most part been uneventful in the extreme. In this chapter I draw on Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy to explain the moral arc of the novel, and suggest that the novel in turn can shed light on Murdoch’s key ethical ideas. What is so notable about John Ames, I suggest, (...) is his commitment to seeing the world justly and lovingly—a commitment which for Murdoch is at the heart of virtuous agency. (shrink)

Many recent philosophers have been tempted by epistemic partialism. They hold that epistemic norms and those of friendship constitutively conflict. In this paper, I suggest that underpinning this claim is the assumption that friendship is not an epistemically rich state, an assumption that even opponents of epistemic partiality have not questioned. I argue that there is good reason to question this assumption, and instead regard friendship as essentially involving knowledge of the other. If we accept this account of friendship, the (...) possibility of epistemic partialism does not arise. (shrink)

Murdoch makes some ambitious claims about love’s epistemic significance which can initially seem puzzling in the light of its heterogeneous and messy everyday manifestations. I provide an interpretation of Murdochian love such that Murdoch’s claims about its epistemic significance can be understood. I argue that Murdoch conceives of love as a virtue, and as belonging at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of the virtues, and that this makes sense of the epistemic role Murdochian love fulfills. Moreover, I suggest that there (...) is good reason to think that Murdochian love is not as far from everyday conceptions of love as it can initially appear. (shrink)

Anselm’s ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God. This paper presents Iris Murdoch’s ontological argument for the existence of the Good. It discusses her interpretation of Anselm’s argument, her distinctive appropriation of it, as well as some of the merits of her version of the argument. In doing so, it also shows how the argument integrates some key Murdochian ideas: morality’s wide scope, the basicness of vision to morality, moral realism, and Platonism.

Traditionally, social entities (i.e., social properties, facts, kinds, groups, institutions, and structures) have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. In this chapter, we consider whether the exclusion of social entities from mainstream metaphysics is philosophically warranted or if it instead rests on historical accident or bias. We examine three ways one might attempt to justify excluding social metaphysics from the domain of metaphysical inquiry and argue that each fails. Thus, we conclude that social entities are not justifiably excluded (...) from metaphysical inquiry. Finally, we ask how focusing on social entities could change the character of metaphysical inquiry. We suggest that starting from examples of social entities might lead metaphysicians to rethink the assumption that describing reality in terms of intrinsic, independent, and individualistic features is preferable to describing it in terms of relational, dependent, and non-individualistic features. (shrink)

Philosophers writing on moral responsibility inherit from P.F. Strawson a particular problem space. On one side, it is shaped by consequentialist accounts of moral criticism on which blame is justified, if at all, by its efficacy in influencing future behavior in socially desirable ways. It is by now a common criticism of such views that they suffer a "wrong kind of reason" problem. When blame is warranted in the proper way, it is natural to suppose this is because the target (...) deserves blame – thus opposing to consequentialist views of blame desert-based views. The latter, however, raise worries that blame is a form of retributive sanction whose justificatory burdens cannot be met. I evaluate T.M. Scanlon's recent attempt to maneuver this space. In doing so, I argue that although Scanlon’s relationship-impairment model of blame has clear advantages over consequentialist and desert-based alternatives, it fails: (1) to adequately appreciate the significance of person-focused emotional attitudes in constituting persons as agents subject to a nexus of normative expectations and demands, and (2) to recognize that a victim may owe nearly nothing *to* a blameworthy agent while nonetheless retaining unconditional moral obligations to act in certain ways (and forego acting in other ways) toward him. (shrink)

Philosophical suspicions about the place of shame in the psychology of the mature moral agent are in tension with the commonplace assumption that to call a person shameless purports to mark a fault, arguably a moral fault. I shift philosophical suspicions away from shame and toward its absence in the shameless by focusing attention on phenomena of shamelessness. In redirecting our attention, I clarify the nature of the failing to which ascriptions of shamelessness might refer and defend the thought that, (...) as an evasion of moral self-censure, shamelessness can be morally pernicious. Far from foregoing shame, I conclude, we should be mindful of its moral importance and unapologetic in its defense. (shrink)

唯物論、還元主義、行動論、機能主義、動的システム理論、計算論は一般的な見解であるが、ヴィトゲンシュタインは支離滅裂であると示した。行動の研究は人間の生活のすべてを包含するが、行動は主に自動で無意識であ り、主に言語で表現される意識的な部分(ウィトゲンシュタインは心と同一視する)でさえも、知覚的ではないので、サールが合理性の論理構造(LSR)と呼ぶ枠組みを持つことは重要であり、私は高次思考の記述心理学 (DPHOT)と呼ぶ。ヴィトゲンシュタインとサールが働いた枠組みを要約した後、現代の推論研究によって拡張されたように、私は現代の行動科学を含む行動のほとんどの議論に浸透するカーサーの見解の不十分さを示 します,。私は、彼の本は2冊の本のアマルガムであり、1つは認知心理学の要約であり、もう1つは新しい専門用語を追加して心の標準的な哲学的混乱の要約であることを維持しています。私は、後者は支離滅裂または人 生の漫画の見解とみなされるべきであり、彼の言葉でヴィトゲンシュタインを取ることは、私たちは言語/身体の問題として心/体の問題を考慮することによって成功した自己療法を実践できることを示唆しています。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

1 Some philosophers defend the thesis that women are adult human females. Call this the adult human female thesis (AHF). There are two versions of this thesis—one modal and one definitional. Accord...

Among the lessons Rosalind Hursthouse has taught us is to consider the quotidian contexts, such as childrearing, that prove so important (and yet, in philosophical writing, so often neglected) for understanding the place of the ethical virtues in human life. I attend to examples drawn from childrearing in order to explore a role pride appears to play in the acquisition of ethical virtue, an exploration that puts Philippa Foot’s remarks about the emotion of pride in conversation with Hursthouse’s thoughts about (...) virtue. I do so with the aim, ultimately, of interrogating the Aristotelian metaphor of megalopsuchia as a crown of the virtues. Whereas Aristotelian pride adorns virtue fully achieved, on my view pride serves the virtues as a tool to be stored away once its use no longer is needed. In one respect, however, my account of pride hews more closely to Aristotle’s views: Aristotle famously argued that shame, although not itself a virtue, played an indispensable role in the proper education of the young; I defend a similar role for pride. (shrink)

In "Godel es Way" diskutieren drei namhafte Wissenschaftler Themen wie Unentschlossenheit, Unvollständigkeit, Zufälligkeit, Berechenbarkeit und Parakonsistenz. Ich gehe diese Fragen aus Wittgensteiner Sicht an, dass es zwei grundlegende Fragen gibt, die völlig unterschiedliche Lösungen haben. Es gibt die wissenschaftlichen oder empirischen Fragen, die Fakten über die Welt sind, die beobachtungs- und philosophische Fragen untersuchen müssen, wie Sprache verständlich verwendet werden kann (die bestimmte Fragen in Mathematik und Logik beinhalten), die entschieden werden müssen, indem man sich anschaut,wie wir Wörter in bestimmten (...) Kontexten tatsächlich verwenden. Wenn wir klar werden, welches Sprachspiel wir spielen, werden diese Themen als gewöhnliche wissenschaftliche und mathematische Fragen angesehen, wie alle anderen auch. Wittgensteins Einsichten wurden selten übertroffen und sind heute so treffend wie vor 80 Jahren, als er die Blauen und Braunen Bücher diktierte. Trotz seiner Versäumnisse – wirklich eine Reihe von Notizen statt eines fertigen Buches – ist dies eine einzigartige Quelle für die Arbeit dieser drei berühmten Gelehrten, die seit über einem halben Jahrhundert an den blutenden Rändern von Physik, Mathematik und Philosophie arbeiten. Da Costa und Doria werden von Wolpert zitiert (siehe unten oder meine Artikel über Wolpert und meine Rezension von Yanofskys 'The Outer Limits of Reason'), da sie auf universelle Berechnung schrieben,, und unter seinen vielen Errungenschaften ist Da Costa ein Pionier in Parakonsistenz. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

私は計算と宇宙の限界に関する最近の議論をコンピュータとして読み、ポリマス物理学者と意思決定理論家デビッド・ウォルパートの驚くべき仕事に関するいくつかのコメントを見つけることを望んでいますが、単一の引用 を見つけていないので、私はこの非常に簡単な要約を提示します。ウォルパートは、計算を行うデバイスから独立し、物理学の法則から独立している推論(計算)の限界に関する驚くべき不可能または不完全な定理(199 2年から2008年のarxiv.org参照)を証明したので、コンピュータ、物理学、人間の行動に適用されます。彼らは、カントールの対角化、嘘つきのパラドックス、ワールドラインを利用して、チューリングマシ ン理論の究極の定理である可能性のあるものを提供し、不可能、不完全性、計算の限界、そしてコンピュータとしての宇宙に関する洞察を提供し、すべての可能な宇宙とすべての存在またはメカニズムを生み出し、とりわけ 非量子機械不確実性原理と単一主義の証明を生み出します。チャイティン、ソロモノフ、コモルガロフ、ヴィトゲンシュタインの古典的な作品と、どのプログラム(したがってデバイスも)が所有するよりも複雑なシーケン ス(またはデバイス)を生成できないという考えには明らかなつながりがあります。この作品の体は、物理的な宇宙よりも複雑な存在はあり得ないので無テズムを意味すると言うかもしれませんし、ヴィトゲンチニアンの観 点から見ると、「より複雑な」は無意味です(満足の条件はありません、すなわち、真実のメーカーやテスト)。「神」(つまり、無限の時間/空間とエネルギーを持つ「デバイス」)でさえ、与えられた「数」が「ランダ ム」であるかどうかを判断したり、与えられた「公式」、定理または「文章」または「デバイス」(これらはすべて複雑な言語ゲームである)が特定の「システム」の一部であることを示す特定の方法を見つけることができ ません。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、21世紀4日(2019年)の「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治」を見ることができます。 .

この巻は少し古いが、殺人の心理学を特に扱う最近の人気のある本はほとんどなく、数ドルで利用可能な簡単な概要なので、それでも努力する価値があります。それは包括的な試みを行うおらず、読者は彼の他の多くの本と 暴力に関する膨大な文献から空白を埋めることが期待されている場所でやや表面的です。更新については、例えば、バス、進化心理学のハンドブック第2位 v1 (2016) p 265、 266, 270-282, 388-389, 545-546, 547, 566, 進化心理学第5回,(2015年) p 26, 96-97,223, 293-4, 300, 309-312, 410 およびシャックフォードハンセンと進化 200444 暴力.彼は数十年にわたりトップの進化心理学者の一人であり、彼の作品の中で幅広い行動をカバーしていますが、ここでは、個々の人々が殺害を引き起こす心理的メカニズムとEEA(進化適応の環境、すなわち過去10 0万年ほどの間のアフリカの平原)におけるその可能な進化機能にほぼ完全に集中しています。 バスは、他の行動と同様に、精神病理学、嫉妬、社会環境、集団圧力、薬物、アルコールなどの「代替」説明は、なぜこれらの殺人的衝動を生み出すのかという疑問がまだ残っているので、彼らは近位の原因であり、究極の 進化(遺伝的)ものであるわけではないことを知ることによって始まります。いつものように、それは必然的に包括的なフィットネス(親族の選択)に煮詰まるので、すべての生物のすべての行動のための究極の説明である 仲間やリソースへのアクセスのための闘争に。社会学的データ(および常識)は、若い貧しい男性が殺す可能性が最も高いことを明らかにしています。彼は、先進国からの殺人データ、部族文化、動物における特異な殺害、 考古学、FBIデータ、そして通常の人々の殺人ファンタジーに関する彼自身の研究を提示します。多くの考古学的証拠は、先史時代に、グループ全体、または若い女性を差し引いたグループを含む殺人の蓄積を続けていま す。 Bussのコメントを調査した後、私は私の他の多くの記事や本で広く取り上げられている意図的心理学(合理性の論理的構造)の非常に簡単な要約を提示します。 進化的な観点から殺人的暴力の詳細な歴史を望む多くの時間を持つ人は、スティーブン・ピンカーの「なぜ暴力が衰退したのか私たちの自然のより良い天使たち」(2012)に相談し、私のレビューはネットと私の最近の 本の2冊で簡単に入手できます。簡単に言えば、ピンカーは、殺人は飼育者として私たちの時代から約30倍の着実かつ劇的に減少していると指摘しています。だから、銃は今では誰もが殺すことを非常に簡単にしているに もかかわらず、殺人ははるかに一般的ではありません。ピンカーは、これは私たちの「より良い天使」を引き出す様々な社会的メカニズムによるものだと考えていますが、主に私たちの惑星の無慈悲な強姦からの資源の一時 的な豊富さ、警察の存在の増加と相まって、それが罰せられる可能性がはるかに高い通信と監視と法制度によるものだと思います。これは、警察の短い、地元の不在さえあるたびに明らかになります。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀5日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 5th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 バスは、他の行動と同様に、精神病理学、嫉妬、社会環境、集団圧力、薬物、アルコールなどの「代替」説明は、なぜこれらの殺人的衝動を生み出すのかという疑問がまだ残っているので、彼らは近位の原因であり、究極の 進化(遺伝的)ものであるわけではないことを知ることによって始まります。いつものように、それは必然的に包括的なフィットネス(親族の選択)に煮詰まるので、すべての生物のすべての行動のための究極の説明である 仲間やリソースへのアクセスのための闘争に。社会学的データ(および常識)は、若い貧しい男性が殺す可能性が最も高いことを明らかにしています。彼は、先進国からの殺人データ、部族文化、動物における特異な殺害、 考古学、FBIデータ、そして通常の人々の殺人ファンタジーに関する彼自身の研究を提示します。多くの考古学的証拠は、先史時代に、グループ全体、または若い女性を差し引いたグループを含む殺人の蓄積を続けていま す。 p 12で、彼は、資源をめぐる各個人と世界中の戦争は、概念、母親の食べ物を奪い、彼女の体を強調することによって成長し始め、そして彼女のシステムが概念のために頻繁に致命的な結果で反撃するとき、概念から始まる と指摘しています。彼は、自発的中絶の推定値がすべての概念の約30%の範囲にあることを教えておらず、年間8000万人もの人が死亡し、母親が妊娠していることを知らないほど早く、おそらく彼女の生理は少し遅れ ています。これは、私たちが敗北に成功していない自然の優生学の一部です。 文明の全体的な異形成効果は続いており、毎日生まれた約30万人は、世界人口が20万人増加し、地球を破壊するためにこれまで以上に大きな「不適当な」人口を持つ約10万人よりも、平均して肉体的にわずかにフィッ トしていない。 p13では、OJシンプソンが有罪であったことははっきりとは分からないと言いますが、裁判に関係なく、彼の奇妙な行動を含む事件の事実の唯一の合理的な解釈なので、私たちは彼が知っていると言うでしょう。また、 数百万ドルの弁護人が司法を覆すために出席していなかったその後の民事裁判では、彼はすぐに有罪判決を受け、資産の添付につながり、武装強盗の有罪判決と投獄につながった。 彼はp20に関して、過去100年間に世界中で約1億件の既知の殺人事件があり、報告されていないすべての殺人が含まれていれば、おそらく3億件もの殺人があったと指摘している。彼は中国共産党(約100万人では ない)によって約4000万を数えるとは思わない。飢えた6000万人、スターリンの1000万人。 tenまた、ほとんどの犠牲者の犠牲者を救う世界クラスの医療システムにより、アメリカの殺人率は約75%減少することを念頭に置いておく必要があります。私は、メキシコは約20倍の米国とホンジュラスの殺人率を 約5倍持っており、あなたの子孫は確かにアメリカの多様性の致命的な抱擁のために、その方向に移動する私たちのレートを楽しみにすることができると付け加えます。「アディオス・アメリカ」(2015年)のアン・コ ールターは、ヒスパニックが過去数十年間にここで約23,000件の殺人を犯したと指摘しています。今のところ、何も行われず、国境が解散し続け、環境崩壊と倒産に近づくにつれて、ここでの犯罪は経済を解消するに つれて、メキシコのレベルに達するでしょう。2014年だけでも、100人の米国市民が殺害され、130人以上が誘拐され、他の人が失踪し、他の外国人やメキシコ人を加えれば数千人に及ぶ。詳細については、私の「 民主主義による自殺」2 nd ed(2019年)を参照してください。 .

Saya telah membaca banyak diskusi baru-baru ini batas komputasi dan alam semesta sebagai komputer, berharap untuk menemukan beberapa komentar pada karya menakjubkan fisikawan polimatematika dan teori keputusan David Wolpert tetapi belum menemukan satu rujukan dan jadi aku menyajikan ringkasan ini sangat singkat. Wolpert terbukti beberapa impotensi yang menakjubkan atau teorema ketidaklengkapan (1992 untuk 2008-Lihat arxiv dot org) pada batas untuk kesimpulan (perhitungan) yang begitu umum mereka independen dari perangkat melakukan komputasi, dan bahkan independen dari hukum fisika, sehingga mereka berlaku di (...) seluruh komputer, fisika, dan perilaku manusia. Mereka memanfaatkan diagonalisasi Cantor, paradoks liar dan worldlines untuk memberikan apa yang mungkin menjadi teorema utama dalam teori mesin Turing, dan tampaknya memberikan wawasan ketidakmungkinan, ketidaklengkapan, batas komputasi, dan alam semesta sebagai komputer, di semua semesta yang mungkin dan semua makhluk atau mekanisme, menghasilkan, antara lain, non-kuantum prinsip ketidakpastian mekanik dan bukti monoteisme. Ada hubungan yang jelas dengan karya klasik Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov dan Wittgenstein dan dengan anggapan bahwa tidak ada program (dan dengan demikian tidak ada perangkat) dapat menghasilkan urutan (atau perangkat) dengan kompleksitas yang lebih besar daripada memiliki. Orang mungkin mengatakan bahwa tubuh kerja menyiratkan ateisme karena tidak dapat ada entitas yang lebih kompleks daripada alam semesta fisik dan dari sudut pandang Wittgensteinian, ' lebih kompleks ' tidak berarti (tidak memiliki kondisi kepuasan, yaitu, pembuat kebenaran atau tes). Bahkan ' Allah ' (yaitu, sebuah ' device'dengan waktu tak terbatas/ruang dan energi) tidak dapat menentukan apakah yang diberikan ' nomor ' adalah ' acak ', atau menemukan cara tertentu untuk menunjukkan bahwa diberikan ' formula ', ' teorema ' atau ' kalimat ' atau ' perangkat ' (semua ini menjadi permainan bahasa yang kompleks) adalah bagian dari ' sistem ' tertentu. Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan ulasan 2006-2019 2nd Ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019). (shrink)

Along with fresh interpretations of Plato, this book proposes a radically new approach to reading him, one that can teach us about protreptic, as it is called, by reimagining the ways in which Socrates engages in it. Protreptic, as it is conceived in the book, is an attempt to bring about a fundamental change of heart in people so that they want truth more than anything else. In taking the approach developed in this book, one doesn't try to get Plato (...) right but simply uses his dialogues as a theoretical tool for gaining insight into protreptic. The book argues that by analyzing Socrates' behavior in the right way, one can better understand how to foster thoughtfulness nowadays, and there is a need to foster it, in part since the health of democracy is at stake. (shrink)

Recent discussions of moral testimony have focused on the acceptability of forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony, but there has been little acknowledgement of the limits to testimony's capacity to convey moral knowledge. In this paper I outline one such limit, drawing on Iris Murdoch's conception of private moral concepts. Such concepts, I suggest, plausibly play an important role in moral thought, and yet moral knowledge expressed in them cannot be testimonially acquired.

Ho letto molte recenti discussioni sui limiti del calcolo e dell'universo come computer, sperando di trovare alcuni commenti sull'incredibile lavoro del fisico polimatematico e del teorista delle decisioni David Wolpert, ma non ho trovato una sola citazione e quindi presento questo brevissimo riassunto. Wolpert si dimostrò una straordinaria impossibilità o incompletezza teoremi (1992-2008-see arxiv dot org) sui limiti dell'inferenza (calcolo) che sono così generali che sono indipendenti dal dispositivo che fa il calcolo, e anche indipendenti dalle leggi della fisica, in (...) modo che si applichino tra computer, fisica e comportamento umano. Fanno uso della diagonalizzazione di Cantor, del paradosso bugiardo e delle linee del mondo per fornire quello che potrebbe essere il teorema definitivo nella Teoria delle Macchine di Turing, e apparentemente forniscono intuizioni sull'impossibilità, l'incompletezza, i limiti del calcolo, e l'universo come computer, in tutti gli universi possibili e in tutti gli esseri o meccanismi, generando, tra le altre cose, un principio di incertezza meccanica non quantistica e una prova di monoteismo. Ci sono evidenti connessioni con l'opera classica di Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov e Wittgenstein e alla nozione che nessun programma (e quindi nessun dispositivo) può generare una sequenza (o dispositivo) con maggiore complessità di quella che possiede. Si potrebbe dire che questo corpo di lavoro implica l'ateismo poiché non può esserci alcuna entità più complessa dell'universo fisico e dal punto di vista della Wittgensteinian, "più complesso" non ha senso (non ha condizioni di soddisfazione, cioè, creatore di verità o test). Anche un 'Dio' (cioè un 'dispositivo'con tempo/spazio illimitato ed energia) non può, determinare se un dato "numero" è 'casuale', né trovare un modo per dimostrare che una determinata "formula", "teorema" o "sentenza" o "dispositivo" (tutti questi sono giochi linguistici complessi) fa parte di un particolare "sistema". Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019nd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

나는 컴퓨터로 계산과 우주의 한계에 대한 많은 최근의 토론을 읽었습니다, polymath 물리학자 및 결정 이론가 데이비드 울퍼트의 놀라운 작품에 대한 몇 가지 의견을 찾을 수 있기를 바라고 있지만 하나의 인용을 발견하지 않은 그래서 나는이 매우 간단한 요약을 제시. Wolpert는 계산을 수행하는 장치와 는 별개이며 물리학법칙과는 무관하므로 컴퓨터, 물리학 및 인간의 행동에 적용되므로 추론(계산)에 대한 제한에 대해 놀라운 불가능또는 불완전성 정리(1992년에서 2008년 참조 arxiv dot org)를 입증했습니다. 그들은 캔터의 대각선화, 거짓말쟁이 역설 및 세계관을 사용하여 튜링 머신 이론의 궁극적 인 정리가 될 (...) 수있는 것을 제공하고, 겉보기에 불가능, 불완전성, 계산의 한계, 그리고 컴퓨터로서의 우주, 가능한 모든 우주와 모든 존재 또는 메커니즘에서, 생성, 비 양자 기계적 불확실성 및 증거. 차이틴, 솔로모노프, 코몰가로프, 비트겐슈타인의 고전 적 작품과 어떤 프로그램 (따라서 어떤 장치)이 소유보다 더 큰 복잡성시퀀스 (또는 장치)를 생성 할 수 없다는 개념에 명백한 연결이 있습니다. 이 작품의 몸은 물리적 우주보다 더 복잡한 어떤 실체가 있을 수 없고 비트겐슈타인의 관점에서 볼 때 '더 복잡한'은 의미가 없다고 말할 수 있습니다(즉, 진리를 제작자나 시험하는 조건은 없습니다). 심지어 '신'(즉, 무한한 시간과 에너지를 가진 '장치')은 주어진 '숫자'가 '무작위'인지 여부를 결정할 수없으며, 주어진 '수식', '정리' 또는 '문장' 또는 '장치'(이 모든 것이 복잡한 언어 게임)가 특정 '시스템'의 일부임을 보여줄 수 있는 특정 방법을 찾을 수 없습니다. 현대 의 두 systems보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 2nd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타. (shrink)

Eu li muitas discussões recentes sobre os limites da computação e do universo como computador, na esperança de encontrar alguns comentários sobre o trabalho surpreendente do físico polimatemático e teórico da decisão David Wolpert, mas não encontrei uma única citação e assim que eu apresento este muito breve Resumo. Wolpert provou alguma impossibilidade impressionante ou teoremas da incompletude (1992 a 2008-Veja arxiv dot org) nos limites à inferência (computação) que são tão gerais que são independentes do dispositivo que faz a (...) computação, e mesmo independente das leis da física, para que eles se apliquem em computadores, física e comportamento humano. Eles fazem uso da diagonalização de cantor, o paradoxo mentiroso e worldlines (linhas do mundo) para fornecer o que pode ser o teorema final na teoria da máquina de Turing, e, aparentemente, fornecer insights sobre a impossibilidade, incompletude, os limites da computação, e do universo como computador, em todos os universos possíveis e todos os seres ou mecanismos, gerando, entre outras coisas, um princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica e uma prova de monoteísmo. Há umas conexões óbvias ao trabalho clássico de Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov e Wittgenstein e à noção que nenhum programa (e assim nenhum dispositivo) pode gerar uma seqüência (ou dispositivo) com maior complexidade do que possui. Pode-se dizer que este corpo de trabalho implica ateísmo, uma vez que não pode haver qualquer entidade mais complexa do que o universo físico e do ponto de vista Wittgensteiniano, ' mais complexo ' é sem sentido (não tem condições de satisfação, ou seja, criador de verdade ou teste). Mesmo um ' Deus ' (ou seja, um ' dispositivo ' com tempo ilimitado/espaço e energia) não pode determinar se um determinado ' número ' é ' aleatório ', nem encontrar uma determinada maneira de mostrar que uma determinada ' fórmula ', ' teorema ' ou ' sentença ' ou ' Device ' (todos estes sendo linguagem complexa jogos) faz parte de um determinado «sistema». Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that there is a way to make sense of blameworthiness for morally problematic actions even when there is no bad will behind such actions. I am particularly interested in cases where an agent acts in a biased way, and the explanation is socialization and false belief rather than bad will on the part of the agent. In such cases, I submit, we are pulled in two directions: on the one hand non-culpable ignorance is usually an (...) excuse, but in the case of acting in a biased way we feel some pull to find the agent blameworthy. I argue that agents are sometimes blameworthy, (where I really mean that they are blameworthy, and not just that it is permissible to reproach them), even if they do not have any bad will. I argue that although the paradigmatic account of blameworthiness is based on quality of will, we can and should be willing to allow that there are non-paradigmatic cases. I argue that the zone of responsibility can be extended to include acts that we are not fully in control of, and acts whose moral status we are non-culpably ignorant about at the time of acting. This extension of responsibility happens through a voluntary taking of responsibility. I argue that there are certain conditions under which we should take responsibility, and that when we do so, we genuinely are responsible. (shrink)

The attitudes P. F. Strawson dubs reactive are felt toward another (or oneself). They are thus at least in part affective reactions to what Strawson describes as qualities of will that people manifest toward others and themselves. The reactive attitudes are also interpersonal, relating persons to persons. But how do they relate persons? On the deontic, imperative view, they relate persons in second-personal authority and accountability relations. After addressing how best to understand the reactive attitudes as sentiments, I evaluate the (...) deontic imperative view. I argue that the modality of reactive attitudes is not invariably deontic nor is their mood invariably imperative. Certain reactive attitudes are aretaic, appellative sentiments that prescribe non-jural ideals of conduct or character. Although expansive, my resulting conception of the reactive attitudes escapes the charge of failing to distinguish reactive sentiments from “disengaged aesthetic reactions” to the beautiful and ugly in human action and character. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Plato's views on Forms play a central role in his educational philosophy. In response to what certain commentators have recently written, I contend that this interpretation not only is accurate but also is advantageous because of how it can help philosophy of education. I also address the view, proposed by one philosopher of education, that Plato believes that the most valuable sort of knowledge cannot be fully expressed in words and that the objects of (...) this knowledge are something other than transcendent Forms. Preferable to that view, I argue, is the idea that Plato wants knowledge of Forms which is nonrepresentational. (shrink)

Subjective rightness (or ‘ought’ or obligation) seems to be the sense of rightness that should be action guiding where more objective senses fail. However, there is an ambiguity between strong and weak senses of action guidance. No general account of subjective rightness can succeed in being action guiding in a strong sense by providing an immediately helpful instruction, because helpfulness always depends on the context. Subjective rightness is action guiding in a weaker sense, in that it is always accessible and (...) comprehensible to the agent. Hence traditional belief formulations say roughly, “do what you believe is best.” This is not yet a satisfactory formulation, because it cannot make sense of our ongoing subjective duty to improve our beliefs. The notion of ‘trying’ does capture the dynamic and diachronic nature of our subjective obligation. Thus, we should formulate subjective obligation in terms of trying: “try to do well by morality.”. (shrink)

The complementary properties and functions of cognitive artifacts and other external resources are integrated into the human cognitive system to varying degrees. The goal of this paper is to develop some of the tools to conceptualize this complementary integration between agents and artifacts. It does so by proposing a multidimensional framework, including the dimensions of information flow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural transparency, informational transparency, individualization, and transformation. The proposed dimensions are all matters of degree and jointly they constitute a multidimensional (...) space in which situated cognitive systems can be located and have certain dimensional configurations. These dimensions provide a new perspective on the conditions for cognitive extension. They are, however, not meant to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but to provide a toolbox for investigating the degree and nature of the integration of agent and artifact into “new systemic wholes”. The higher a situated system scores on the proposed dimensions, the more functional integration occurs, and the more tightly coupled the system is. (shrink)

Despite appeals to Hume in debates over moralism in art criticism, we lack an adequate account of Hume’s moralist aesthetics, as presented in “Of the Standard of Taste.” I illuminate that aesthetics by pursuing a problem, the moral prejudice dilemma, that arises from a tension between the “freedom from prejudice” Hume requires of aesthetic judges and what he says about the relevance of moral considerations to art evaluation. I disarm the dilemma by investigating the taxonomy of prejudices by which Hume (...) justifies the true judge’s moralism. The result distinguishes Hume’s aesthetic and moral points of view while defending aesthetic moralism. (shrink)