The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of (...) its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze. (shrink)

Five experiments investigated the role of spatial connectedness between a pair of objects presented in the change detection task for the actual capacity of visual working memory (VWM) in healthy young adults (total N = 405). Three experiments yielded a surprising nonlinear relationship between the proportion of pair-wise connected objects and capacity, with the highest capacity observed for homogenous displays, when either all objects were connected or disjointed. A drop in capacity, ranging from an average of a quarter (...) of an object out of three objects maintained in VWM, was noted when only some objects were connected while others were disjointed. As indicated by another two experiments, this effect was specific to double-feature encoding, but disappeared when single visual features had to be memorized. No existing theoretical model of VWM can directly explain this novel effect. Overall, the nonlinear effect of spatial connectedness implies that representations in VWM possess hierarchical structure defined by wholes, parts, features, and their relations, and the heterogeneity of such a structure hinders VWM performance, while homogeneity facilitates it. (shrink)

A common way to understand memory structures in the cognitive sciences is as a cognitive map​. Cognitive maps are representational systems organized by dimensions shared with physical space. The appeal to these maps begins literally: as an account of how spatial information is represented and used to inform spatial navigation. Invocations of cognitive maps, however, are often more ambitious; cognitive maps are meant to scale up and provide the basis for our more sophisticated memory capacities. The (...) extension is not meant to be metaphorical, but the way in which these richer mental structures are supposed to remain map-like is rarely made explicit. Here we investigate this missing link, asking: how do cognitive maps represent non-spatial information?​ We begin with a survey of foundational work on spatial cognitive maps and then provide a comparative review of alternative, non-spatial representational structures. We then turn to several cutting-edge projects that are engaged in the task of scaling up cognitive maps so as to accommodate non-spatial information: first, on the spatial-isometric approach​ , encoding content that is non-spatial but in some sense isomorphic to spatial content; second, on the ​ abstraction approach​ , encoding content that is an abstraction over first-order spatial information; and third, on the ​ embedding approach​ , embedding non-spatial information within a spatial context, a prominent example being the Method-of-Loci. Putting these cases alongside one another reveals the variety of options available for building cognitive maps, and the distinctive limitations of each. We conclude by reflecting on where these results take us in terms of understanding the place of cognitive maps in memory. (shrink)

Using a novel enumeration task, we examined the encoding of spatial information during subitizing. Observers were shown masked presentations of randomly-placed discs on a screen and were required to mark the perceived locations of these discs on a subsequent blank screen. This provided a measure of recall for object locations and an indirect measure of display numerosity. Observers were tested on three stimulus durations and eight numerosities. Enumeration performance was high for displays containing up to six discs—a higher subitizing (...) range than reported in previous studies. Error in the location data was measured as the distance between corresponding stimulus and response discs. Overall, location errors increased in magnitude with larger numerosities and shorter display durations. When errors were computed as disc distance from display centroid, results suggest a compressed representation by observers. Additionally, enumeration and localization accuracy increased with display regularity. (shrink)

Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form of first–person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer’s personal past. In this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that (a) (...) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (b) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, “enabling” systems. Although these systems – ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency – are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (c) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather than intrinsic – i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory. (shrink)

It is widely held that episodic memory is constitutively connected with space and time. In particular, many contend that episodic memory constitutively has spatial and/or temporal content: for instance, necessarily representing a spatial scene, or when a given event occurred, or at the very minimum that it occurred in the past. Here, I critically assess such claims. I begin with some preparatory remarks on the nature of episodic memory. I then ask: How, if at all, (...) is episodic memory constitutively spatial? And, how, if at all, is episodic memory constitutively temporal? In answer, I argue that episodic memory need not have any spatial content, nor (in any substantial sense) need it represent when its events occur, nor even that they occur in the past. Instead, only a relatively modest connection holds between episodic memory and time in virtue of the temporal structure of its objects. Finally, I critically assess whether considerations concerning the organization and encoding of episodic memory in creatures like us provide stronger reason to posit a constitutive link between our episodic memories and space or time. (shrink)

This book studies the technognomies of memory in scripto as in texts, lists, dictionaries and databases and less the technognomies of memory in vivo (as in remembering). There are of course some relations between these two kinds of memories, being memory-in-scripto a development parallel to the development of written language. We notice that the historical presentation is built upon both forms of memory. We notice that the historical explanation is tied to the concrete experience of persons (...) belonging to a culture. In the history of memory then, it is necessary to distinguish two important aspects, the development of spoken memory and the development of written memory. The essential characteristic of written memory is its muteness. Muteness is also associated to spatiality and to stability. On the other hand, audial presentations are inseparable of the notions of movement and time passing. According to Don Ihde the spheres of the invisible and the silent, limit the spheres of the visual and the audial. These two spheres overlap partially in visual presentations that also are audial presentations; however, their natural being is to be independent from each other. [Ihde, Don. Listening and Voice. Phenomenologies of Sound; State University Press; 2007; p. 50-51.] In our time, which is also the time of the globalization and digitalization of culture, a new philosophical paradigm is going on characterized by the fragmentation of experience. This fragmentation does not allow an overview of the totality of a field of experience, which is only possible to reduce to singular analytical moments. The fragmentation of experience is the result of a new jump of the capability to concretion. Inside this new paradigm, the world becomes multistable. The multistability of the world creates a gap between intention and implementation that distinguishes the “full” history as Natural history from the “broken” history as Cultural history. (shrink)

In this Master's dissertation, I try to show that the causal theory of memory, which is the only theory developed so far that at first view seems more plausible and that could be integrated with psychological explanations and investigations of memory, shows some conceptual and ontological problems that go beyond the internal inconsistencies that each version can present. On one hand, the memory phenomenon analyzed is very limited: in general it is reduced to the conscious act of (...) remembering expressed in a propositional format: the idea of an agent who can control his memory reports, in contrast to a passive subject who merely retrieve his encoded memories, is not even considered. Furthermore, the representational function of memory is the only function taken into account; and all the diachronic changes that could entail a dynamic conception of memory are ignored, as is the consideration of context in a broad sense of the term. On the other hand, causal theories make some implicit assumptions that are obviously questionable (e.g., the difference between facts and events) and leave some of their key concepts unexplained, like the nature of the causality, the isomorphism between the memory trace and the memory event, etc. Nonetheless, the principal point that we criticized is the idea of a correspondence between a past event or representation of it, the correspondent memory trace and the memory representation of it. Psychological models of memory, with the exception of the spatial analogy, question some of these assumptions and suggest that memory information is organized in a way other than that implied by the causal theory. But it is distributed connectionism that actually challenges the causal theory of memory, not only through some of its basic postulates, like the superpositional conception of memory traces, their mutual influence and constant state of change, but also because it is compatible with a more situated approach to memory phenomena as well as with the idea that memory in reality accomplishes a variety of functions that go beyond the representational one. The explicit and implicit ideas provided by distributed connectionism, together with the previous criticisms that we made to of causal theory, clearly suggest the possibility of developing another kind of philosophical theory of memory, different from existing theories. This task, nonetheless, implies: (a) A much deeper study of connectionism principles and memory models, as well as of the rival candidate, symbolism, plus the evaluation of these models in the light of psychological and neurophysiological empirical research, which unfortunately I have not dealt with in this work. (b) An analysis of the metaphysical nature of events and facts, in order to see if we should decide in favor of a realist or a non-realist account. It is also clear that this decision can’t be taken without an examination of perception studies (and not exclusively philosophical ones) which would be crucial for determining what is encoded in memory, and studies devoted to language, which, I suspect, plays an important role in the segmentation of reality. (c) A clarification of the notion of causality, because we wouldn’t like to deny any kind entail the complete disappearance of boundaries between memory and imagination. And even if I suspect that my future work will question the existence of absolute boundaries between these two capacities, the notion of causality can’t be completely erase from the theory of memory without erasing the memory phenomenon itself. But this causality, as we’ve already showed, can’t consist in the naïve conception adopted by the causal accounts of memory, nor can it be explained in counterfactual terms. If we think of the reconsolidation concept, of the interdependence between all the memory system, and of the deciding influence of context, it’s almost sure that more than one notion of causality will need to be invoked in order to explain memory. (d) Because I do not want to reduce the study of memory exclusively to cases of remembering, it’s essential to analyze how memory intervenes not only in imagination, but also in perception, reasoning and future projection, for example. In this respect, we could quote the interesting articles of Atance & O’Neill (2001) and Bucker & Carroll (2006), the first concerning the relationship between episodic memory and episodic future thinking, the second concerning the relationship between episodic memory and all kinds of self-projection, such as navigation and theory of mind, relations that would also have to be explored from a philosophical perspective, in particular to overcome the tendency to suppose that representation is the only function of memory. I will also mention the necessity of combining the notion of metamemory with that of memory to some extent; as I have already remarked, it is implausible to suppose that a subject who consciously remembers something is unable to exert any kind of control over his memory reports. (e) Finally, in order to integrate a situated conception of memory into a philosophical account, it will also be indispensable to take into consideration what is known as “everyday memory research” as well as studies in social and collective memory. (shrink)

Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the 20th century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of (...) the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While previous work has addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory (Trakas, 2022), the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past. (shrink)

Clinical evidence has shown that physical exercise during pregnancy may alter brain devel- opment and improve cognitive function of offspring. However, the mechanisms through which maternal exercise might promote such effects are not well understood. The present study examined levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and absolute cell num- bers in the hippocampal formation and cerebral cortex of rat pups born from mothers exer- cised during pregnancy. Additionally, we evaluated the cognitive abilities of adult offspring in different behavioral paradigms (exploratory (...) activity and habituation in open field tests, spatial memory in a water maze test, and aversive memory in a step-down inhibitory avoid- ance task). Results showed that maternal exercise during pregnancy increased BDNF lev- els and absolute numbers of neuronal and non-neuronal cells in the hippocampal formation of offspring. No differences in BDNF levels or cell numbers were detected in the cerebral cortex. It was also observed that offspring from exercised mothers exhibited better cognitive performance in nonassociative (habituation) and associative (spatial learning) mnemonic tasks than did offspring from sedentary mothers. Our findings indicate that maternal exer- cise during pregnancy enhances offspring cognitive function (habituation behavior and spa- tial learning) and increases BDNF levels and cell numbers in the hippocampal formation of offspring. (shrink)

The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must examine (...) the classical, spatial metaphysic of space and time, for practical purposes initiated by Galileo, wherein the real has been equated with the quantitative and wherein quality has been stripped from the material world. In this metaphysic, which sees form as quantitative or computable, the origin of qualia is problematic, with a problem of even greater primacy becoming the “memory” that supports the transforming events of perception, e.g., rotating cubes, buzzing flies, twisting leaves. It is this memory, supporting time-extended, flowing events, that necessarily supports all qualia. The concept of storage of “snapshots” of time-flowing events, a notion which the classic metaphysic engenders, is unworkable as a solution to the perception of these flows. Form, in fact being dynamic and defined over flowing fields, equally is a quality, equally requires this memory, and since forms populate the image, the origin of the entire image is indeed a problem. The counter-proposal becomes Bergson’s temporal metaphysic wherein motion is indivisible (or non-differentiable), the global motion of the universal field itself then carrying an intrinsic form of memory. In this framework, with this field viewed as holographic, Bergson provides a unique solution – one that leaves the problem of representation behind – as to how the brain specifies the qualitative image of the dynamically transforming external world. (shrink)

This article considers Helmholtz’s relation to philosophy, including Fichte’s philosophy. Recent interpreters find Fichtean influence on Helmholtz, especially concerning the role of voluntary movement in distinguishing subject from object, or “I” from “not-I.” After examining Helmholtz’s statements about Fichte, the article describes Fichte’s ego-doctrine and asks whether Helmholtz could accept it into his sensory psychology. He could not accept Fichte’s core position, that an intrinsically active I intellectually intuits its own activity and posits the not-I as limiting and determining that (...) activity, because that account requires cognitive abilities that conflict with Helmholtz’s claim that the development of spatial perception relies primarily on associative memory and involves no direct awareness of the ego’s activity as such. Helmholtz would have known various accounts of the distinction between subject and object, or self and world, from sensory physiology, including associative accounts invoking voluntary motor movements and accounts describing checks on the perceiver’s activity. Some of the accounts cite Fichte on the I and not-I, but most do not, and none adopt Fichte’s Idealism. Finally, the article examines Helmholtz’s relation to metaphysics, finding that in all periods he rejected Fichtean Idealism and that the modest metaphysics of his mature period is a version of structural realism. (shrink)

The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order (...) evidence about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. When vividness is sufficiently low, it can give one reason to doubt the epistemic basis of the mental image and thereby act as a defeater. This account has important implications for theorizing about the epistemic roles of memory, imagination, mental imagery, and phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

The vast number of neurons in the brain are ceaselessly engaged in spontaneously generated activity in virtue of interactions between those. It is in the background of this intrinsic activity that the brain responds to signals from the environment and from endogenous signals received by way of active mental processes. This spontaneous activity persists in the `resting state' and is modulated by evoked signals resulting from task-induced activity. The two together generate an ongoing process of self-organization in the brain whereby (...) dynamic excitation patterns are set up and correlated with one another in neuronal aggregates of diverse population size in an intricately nested hierarchy. These correlated patterns constitute distributed models of reality, based on which the brain generates expectations, plans, and predictions relating to the dynamically evolving world that we all are embedded in. -/- The process of neuronal self-organization provides the basis for the emergence of a structured mind exhibiting an exquisite functional complexity. Generally speaking, mental (and, in particular, psychological) processes are based on large scale (`macroscopic') neuronal networks, while microscopic and mesoscopic neuronal populations constitute the `substratum' of the mind, where elementary and tiny bits of experience are represented so as to act as atomic ingredients in the more complex processing of compositely constituted information involved in mental activities. -/- Processes in the microscopic and mesoscopic neuronal aggregates occur on relatively short spatial and temporal scales while those in macroscopic networks are slower and distributed across brain regions. The large scale networks operate near the `edge of instability', which means that these networks, taken together, form a system close to criticality---this is what makes the mind possessed of its remarkable fluidity. -/- The neuronal aggregates themselves are in a constant state of flux, with groups of neurons constantly entering and leaving larger aggregates, and with neurons being simultaneously operative in the functioning of more than one aggregates at a time. In the backdrop of this enormous complexity, the operations of the mind constitute a complementary description of the brain-mind complex to those of the neuronal populations---neither of the two is reducible to the other. In other words, the functioning of the mind is not determinable in terms of the activities of the neuronal populations. -/- The `substratum of the mind', made up of microscopic and mesoscopic populations of neurons, in addition to providing the hinterland in which latent operations supporting all mental processes are enacted, is involved more directly with representations of elementary concepts, with distributed memory (in a broad sense), and with heuristics of an elementary and atomic nature that help us in making vast numbers of `decisions' of a similarly elementary nature. (shrink)

Time and space are conflated in time-warps when asleep we dream. Our wakeful cognitive ability to keep them separate indicates different ways of envisaging self-hood. Awareness that dream-time and life-time are separate is itself a propensity of human minds that has evolved by natural selection with adaptive developments in cerebral neuronal circuitry that underpin human behavioural complexity. The contrast is highlighted between how memory of our spatio-temporal experiences appears to be treated by our brain one way when we are (...) wide-awake and thus well aware of our unfolding personal life-history, and in a different way when, fast asleep, our dreaming dissolves any such awareness and our oneiric self-hood seems different from our real-life self-hood. The difference is considered from two angles. Regarding simultaneous memory-storage for an experience recalled from alternative perspectives, a theoretical possibility is proposed of a pro-system comparable to Cantor Ternary Set topology. Regarding the brain, the difference is considered in relation to the temporo-spatial theory of consciousness and the compatible concept of active inference forestalling surprisal by minimising variational free energy according to the free energy principle. (shrink)

The present study examined the relationship between left–right discrimination (LRD) performance and handedness, sex and cognitive abilities. In total, 31 men and 35 women – with a balanced ratio of left-and right-handers – completed the Bergen Left–Right Discrimination Test. We found an advantage of left-handers in both identifying left hands and in verifying “left” propositions. A sex effect was also found, as women had an overall higher error rate than men, and increasing difficulty impacted their reaction time more than it (...) did for men. Moreover, sex interacted with handedness and manual preference strength. A negative correlation of LRD reaction time with visuo-spatial and verbal long-term memory was found independently of sex, providing new insights into the relationship between cognitive skills and performance on LRD. (shrink)

The visuospatial system integrates inner and outer functional processes, organizing spatial, temporal, and social interactions between the brain, body, and environment. These processes involve sensorimotor networks like the eye–hand circuit, which is especially important to primates, given their reliance on vision and touch as primary sensory modalities and the use of the hands in social and environmental interactions. At the same time, visuospatial cognition is intimately connected with memory, self-awareness, and simulation capacity. In the present article, we review (...) issues associated with investigating visuospatial integration in extinct human groups through the use of anatomical and behavioral data gleaned from the paleontological and archaeological records. In modern humans, paleoneurological analyses have demonstrated noticeable and unique morphological changes in the parietal cortex, a region crucial to visuospatial management. Archaeological data provides information on hand–tool interaction, the spatial behavior of past populations, and their interaction with the environment. Visuospatial integration may represent a critical bridge between extended cognition, self-awareness, and social perception. As such, visuospatial functions are relevant to the hypothesis that human evolution is characterized by changes in brain–body–environment interactions and relations, which enhance integration between internal and external cognitive components through neural plasticity and the development of a specialized embodiment capacity. We therefore advocate the investigation of visuospatial functions in past populations through the paleoneurological study of anatomical elements and archaeological analysis of visuospatial behaviors. (shrink)

Cross-linguistic strategies for mapping lexical and spatial relations from body partonym systems to external object meronymies (as in English ‘table leg’, ‘mountain face’) have attracted substantial research and debate over the past three decades. Due to the systematic mappings, lexical productivity and geometric complexities of body-based meronymies found in many Mesoamerican languages, the region has become focal for these discussions, prominently including contrastive accounts of the phenomenon in Zapotec and Tzeltal, leading researchers to question whether such systems should be (...) explained as global metaphorical mappings from bodily source to target holonym or as vector mappings of shape and axis generated “algorithmically”. I propose a synthesis of these accounts in this paper by drawing on the species-specific cognitive affordances of human upright posture grounded in the reorganization of the anatomical planes, with a special emphasis on antisymmetrical relations that emerge between arm-leg and face-groin antinomies cross-culturally. Whereas Levinson argues that the internal geometry of objects “stripped of their bodily associations” (1994: 821) is sufficient to account for Tzeltal meronymy, making metaphorical explanations entirely unnecessary, I propose a more powerful, elegant explanation of Tzeltal meronymic mapping that affirms both the geometric-analytic and the global-metaphorical nature of Tzeltal meaning construal. I do this by demonstrating that the “algorithm” in question arises from the phenomenology of movement and correlative body memories—an experiential ground which generates a culturally selected pair of inverse contrastive paradigm sets with marked and unmarked membership emerging antithetically relative to the transverse anatomical plane. These relations are then selected diagrammatically for the classification of object orientations according to systematic geometric iconicities. Results not only serve to clarify the case in question but also point to the relatively untapped potential that upright posture holds for theorizing the emergence of human cognition, highlighting in the process the nature, origins and theoretical validity of markedness and double scope conceptual integration. (shrink)

The essay brings a summation of human efforts seeking to understand our existence. Plato and Kant & cognitive science complete reduction of philosophy to a neural mechanism, evolved along elementary Darwinian principles. Plato in his famous Cave Allegory explains that between reality and our experience of it there exists a great chasm, a metaphysical gap, fully confirmed through particle-wave duality of quantum physics. Kant found that we have two kinds of perception, two senses: By the spatial outer sense we (...) perceive phenomena, objects in space. Our temporal inner sense lets us perceive our inner state, noumena . Kant's two senses are fully confirmed through bilateral brain duality of cognitive science. The bilateral brain serves inner, temporal sense, logic & noumena in the left hemisphere. The right brain half is for the outer, spatial sense, geometry & phenomena. We form a whole system, a bilateral interior cosmos, a kind of world model, expressing what may lie beyond the metaphysical gap. In the right brain we build a phenomenal cosmos, to resemble the outer environment. In the brain's left hemisphere a noumenal cosmos, a model of our private world including Saint Teresa of Avila's castillo interior. The cosmos is regularly updated with novel sense data integrated into our memory banks. This was recognized early by Helmholtz (1860s). Our lives, health & well-being depend on us keeping our interior cosmos in good order. This used to be seen as saving one's precious soul from perdition. While we endeavour to keep our phenomenal cosmos neat & orderly by protecting the environment from harm, our noumenal cosmos to be livable requires us to engage in ethical conduct. This bilateral cosmos is responsible for our common sense judgment power, that we depend on for being able to lead a good & benign life. The 200 million neurons of BA10 in the prefrontal lobe have global access to the interior cosmos, & apply massive feedback to identify environmental conditions rapidly. The global access also gives conscious presence of the individual to itself, all that is present in the interior cosmos, for total freedom of action. In the left brain private ego, we are guarded by faith in divine mercy, & guided to choose the best course of action, able to survive under the most adverse conditions. For this, we receive directions from the Holy Ghost in Saint Teresa's castillo interior. (shrink)

Based on the analysis of the accumulated experimental data and on the informational concepts of the Informational Model of Consciousness (IMC), in this article is presented an informational modeling of the operability of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Examination of the experimental results obtained with the modern non-destructive, high spatial resolution investigation tools to study the functional characteristics of the PCC and associate metabolic processes, shows mainly that this is involved in the large scale default mode network (DMN), composed (...) primarily by PCC, medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), displaying an increased activity under passive task conditions (i.e. negative mode). This operability mode is in an opposing balance with attention and task performances mode, acting thus as a disruption process. One of the main conclusions is that the PCC cognitive orientation is primarily focused on the self person or on the “self” (I) projected from others, in “daydreaming” or “mind-wandering" wakeful rest, involved in present or future virtual projects. In spite of these advances, the particular role and specific functions of PCC are not yet fully understood, PCC remaining an enigmatic/contradictory structure of the brain, not included up to date in any brain model, so the PCC informational modeling presented here in terms of IMC covers this lack. IMC assigns to the brain the fundamental role of informational processor, composed by various operating structures according to specific objectives synthetically expressed by seven main cognitive centers of “self" (I) as: Iknow (memory), Iwant (decision), Ilove (emotions), Iam (self-status), Icreate (genetic transmission), Icreated (genetic inheritance), Ibelive (info-selection), assuring the info-connectivity with the body and external/internal world, the adaptability (learning process) and survival. It is deduced in this way that the specific behavior of PCC according to its intermediary architectural position between the vital central region of the brain, connecting the mind with the external/internal reality, is that of a moderator/integrator hub/informational YES/NO switcher from the external/awake captured focusing information to the internal accumulated experience of life, used as a valid reference. Therefore, the specific operability of PCC in terms of cognitive centers is that of an informational switcher, mainly operating with Iknow/Iwant to explore the self-status reflected in Iam, within day-dreaming/imaginary virtual sceneries. (shrink)

The results show that the hybrid CNN-LSTM model outperforms the individual models in terms of prediction accuracy and robustness, suggesting that combining convolutional layers with recurrent units is beneficial for capturing both spatial and temporal patterns in air quality data. This study demonstrates the potential of deep learning methods to offer real-time, accurate air quality forecasting systems, which can aid policymakers and urban planners in managing air pollution more effectively.

24 undergraduates were blindfolded and walked through paths laid out on a floor to investigate whether the orientation of Ss' cognitive maps (CMs) could be determined after they had learned a path by walking through it. Given the assumption that the CM is picturelike, it was predicted that it has a specific orientation, which implies that tests in which the CM is assumed to be aligned with the path should be less difficult than tests in which the CM is hypothesized (...) to be contraligned. In Exp I (8 Ss), Ss were required to draw a picture of the path they had walked through; in Exp II (14 Ss), Ss were required to locate targets in the path under conditions in which their presumed CMs were either aligned or contraligned with the path. Results show that, in Exp I, all Ss drew the 1st line segment of the path upward, suggesting that this part of the path was fixed in an upward direction in memory. In Exp II, Ss were more accurate and faster in locating points on the path when the CM was hypothesized to be aligned with the path than when it was hypothesized to be contraligned. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention (...) and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the “single voice” of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention. (shrink)

Cognitive Optimization in the Age of AI: Enhancing Human Potential -/- Introduction -/- Cognitive optimization is the process of enhancing mental functions such as memory, learning, decision-making, and problem-solving to achieve peak intellectual performance. It is a multidisciplinary approach that integrates neuroscience, psychology, nutrition, lifestyle adjustments, and, increasingly, artificial intelligence (AI). In an era where information is abundant and rapid decision-making is crucial, optimizing cognitive abilities is more Important than ever. -/- AI-driven technologies, video games, mobile apps, and digital (...) platforms like YouTube are playing a transformative role in enhancing human cognition. YouTube, in particular, has become a powerful tool for self-directed learning, offering access to educational content, expert insights, and cognitive training exercises. -/- This essay explores cognitive optimization, key strategies involved, and how AI, video games, mobile apps, and platforms like YouTube are revolutionizing human intelligence. -/- The Science Behind Cognitive Optimization -/- Cognitive optimization is rooted in neuroplasticity—the brain’s ability to rewire itself through experience and learning. Several key factors contribute to cognitive enhancement: -/- 1. Neuroplasticity and Learning – Continuous learning strengthens neural connections, fostering intelligence and adaptability. Activities such as reading, solving complex problems, and learning new skills stimulate brain function. -/- 2. Nutrition and Brain Health – Diet plays a vital role in cognitive performance. Nutrients such as omega-3 fatty acids, antioxidants, and essential vitamins support brain function and protect against cognitive decline. -/- 3. Physical Exercise – Regular exercise increases blood flow to the brain, promotes neurogenesis (the growth of new neurons), and enhances memory and problem-solving skills. -/- 4. Sleep and Recovery – Sleep is essential for memory consolidation, emotional regulation, and mental clarity. Chronic sleep deprivation impairs cognitive function and decision-making. -/- 5. Mindfulness and Stress Management – Practices such as meditation, deep breathing, and yoga improve focus, reduce anxiety, and enhance mental resilience. -/- 6. Social Interaction and Collaboration – Engaging in meaningful discussions and debates strengthens cognitive agility and enhances problem-solving skills. -/- Beyond these traditional methods, digital tools such as AI-driven learning platforms, video games, mobile applications, and YouTube have expanded the possibilities for cognitive enhancement. -/- AI and Cognitive Optimization: A New Frontier -/- AI technology is revolutionizing cognitive optimization by providing personalized insights, accelerating learning, and even augmenting human intelligence. Below are several ways AI is transforming cognitive enhancement: -/- 1. AI-Powered Personalized Learning -/- AI-driven educational platforms such as adaptive learning systems customize lessons based on an individual’s learning style and pace. These systems use machine learning to analyze cognitive strengths and weaknesses, adjusting content dynamically to optimize learning efficiency. Platforms like Coursera, Duolingo, and Khan Academy utilize AI algorithms to provide personalized recommendations, ensuring users focus on areas that need improvement. -/- 2. Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) -/- Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are AI-powered systems that enable direct communication between the human brain and computers. Companies like Neuralink and OpenBCI are developing BCIs that could enhance memory, restore lost cognitive functions, and even allow direct mental interaction with AI systems. This technology has the potential to revolutionize learning and decision-making by integrating human cognition with artificial intelligence. -/- 3. AI-Powered Cognitive Assistants -/- AI-driven virtual assistants such as ChatGPT, Google Assistant, and IBM Watson enhance cognition by providing instant access to information, summarizing complex topics, and even suggesting optimal decision-making strategies. These tools help individuals process vast amounts of information efficiently, reducing cognitive overload and enhancing productivity. -/- 4. AI in Mental Health and Stress Management -/- Mental health is a critical component of cognitive optimization. AI-driven mental health apps like Woebot and Wysa use machine learning to provide real-time emotional support, track mood patterns, and offer cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) techniques. By reducing stress and anxiety, these AI-powered tools help maintain optimal cognitive function. -/- The Role of YouTube in Cognitive Optimization -/- YouTube has emerged as one of the most powerful platforms for cognitive enhancement. With millions of educational videos covering diverse subjects, YouTube serves as a free and accessible learning tool that fosters continuous cognitive growth. -/- 1. Learning New Skills and Expanding Knowledge -/- YouTube provides access to high-quality educational content in virtually every field. Channels like Veritasium, TED-Ed, and CrashCourse offer lessons on science, history, philosophy, and more. Learning new concepts regularly strengthens cognitive flexibility and enhances problem-solving skills. -/- 2. Enhancing Memory and Comprehension -/- Visual and auditory learning through YouTube helps reinforce memory retention. Watching documentaries, explainer videos, and step-by-step tutorials aids in deepening understanding and reinforcing neural pathways associated with knowledge acquisition. -/- 3. Improving Focus and Critical Thinking -/- Channels that discuss philosophy, logic, and critical thinking—such as Academy of Ideas or PBS Idea Channel—train the brain to analyze complex arguments, recognize biases, and develop sharper reasoning skills. Engaging in thought-provoking discussions through video content strengthens cognitive agility. -/- 4. AI-Generated Content for Personalized Learning -/- AI-powered recommendation algorithms help users discover personalized content based on their interests and learning habits. AI-curated video playlists allow individuals to engage in structured learning journeys, optimizing cognitive development in areas of personal interest. -/- 5. Interactive Learning and Problem-Solving -/- YouTube’s interactive features, such as quizzes, live Q&A sessions, and discussion threads, allow users to actively engage with educational content. This social interaction enhances cognitive engagement and retention. -/- By leveraging YouTube strategically, individuals can create personalized learning experiences that optimize cognitive function in a self-directed manner. -/- Video Games and Cognitive Optimization -/- Video games are increasingly recognized as tools for cognitive enhancement, providing interactive and engaging ways to improve various mental skills. -/- 1. Action Video Games for Reflexes and Decision-Making -/- Fast-paced action games like Call of Duty, Fortnite, and Counter-Strike train players to react quickly, improve hand-eye coordination, and develop strategic thinking under pressure. Studies suggest that such games enhance cognitive flexibility and decision-making speed. -/- 2. Puzzle and Strategy Games for Problem-Solving -/- Games like Portal, The Witness, and Tetris challenge players with complex puzzles that require logical thinking, spatial reasoning, and pattern recognition. -/- 3. Open-World and Role-Playing Games (RPGs) for Memory and Creativity -/- Games like The Legend of Zelda, Elden Ring, and The Witcher 3 encourage exploration, problem-solving, and strategic planning. -/- 4. Multiplayer and Cooperative Games for Social Cognition -/- Team-based games like League of Legends, Dota 2, and Among Us enhance communication skills, teamwork, and emotional intelligence. -/- The Future of Cognitive Optimization -/- The future of cognitive optimization lies in the seamless integration of AI, video games, mobile applications, and digital platforms like YouTube. Emerging technologies such as neuroprosthetics, AI-enhanced memory implants, and real-time brain augmentation could redefine human potential. -/- Furthermore, as AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) develops, AI could become an even more powerful tool in cognitive enhancement, potentially working alongside humans as cognitive partners. This could align with initiatives such as Angelito Malicse’s universal formula for decision-making, where AI-driven cognitive optimization ensures that human choices align with the natural law of balance. -/- Conclusion -/- Cognitive optimization is essential for maximizing human potential, and AI, video games, YouTube, and cognitive training apps are playing an increasingly significant role in this process. From personalized learning to interactive gaming and mobile applications, digital tools are transforming the way we enhance cognition. -/- By leveraging these tools responsibly and integrating them with fundamental cognitive enhancement strategies, humanity can unlock new levels of intelligence, creativity, and problem-solving ability—ensuring that the future of cognition is both powerful and sustainable. -/- . (shrink)

This chapter argues that the space of the thermal pool is central to Tarkovsky’s exploration of the mystery of sacrifice and the pain of exile in Nostalghia. Spatially, the geometry and textures of the pool are echoed throughout the film’s interiors, in hotel corridors and cathedrals. I propose that we can see Tarkovsky’s aesthetic in Nostalgia as one of overflow. The water that initially fills the pool overflows into nearly every scene, as interiors of houses are flooded in dream-like visions, (...) and the echoing sound of dripping water is omnipresent. Thematically, the film explores the way in which past and present, memory and dream, and the spaces of home and exile flow into each other, using techniques of superimposition. I argue that such overflowing, in both theme and aesthetic, can be productively read in conjunction with Henri Bergson’s theories of duration, in which variegated temporal rhythms continually bleed into each other. Nostalgia’s pool forms a space of becoming, where place and identity is continually in flux. (shrink)

The place of Glissant’s philosophy of decolonisation in relation to Fanon and Césaire has been theorised by some authors, but the emphasis has not been placed on the fact that Glissant refers to both his predecessors as examples of the absence of a link between the two tactics of resistance – un détour [a tactical diversion] and un retour [a return]. For Glissant, both Césaire and Fanon are still diverters and not properly producers of a new reality, of a real (...) Caribbean territory and history. Thus, following previous analyses by commentators, but departing from them (or adding a new layer, the layer of spatiality that should be combined with a traditional analysis of temporality), this chapter defends the idea that Glissant locates his decolonial thought between Césaire and Fanon: it neither advocates a reconstruction that points to a past located elsewhere (Africa), nor recommends the rejection and replacement of the here/now with a different, unknown spatiality and temporality. For Glissant, the locus of resistance is located in the present and in the possibilities of decolonisation already contained in the Caribbean, although concealed and understated. This chapter begins by showing what is, according to Glissant, the necessary conjunction between the different tactics of resistance, then focuses on some of Césaire’s and Fanon’s texts in order to show why they do not offer this necessary link. The final section comes back to Glissant to analyse the notion of l’antillanité as the possibility of truly focusing on a here/now as a multilayered strategy of resistance. (shrink)

Optogenetics is an invasive neuromodulation technology involving the use of light to control the activity of individual neurons. Even though optogenetics is a relatively new neuromodulation tool whose various implications have not yet been scrutinized, it has already been approved for its first clinical trials in humans. As optogenetics is being intensively investigated in animal models with the aim of developing novel brain stimulation treatments for various neurological and psychiatric disorders, it appears crucial to consider both the opportunities and dangers (...) such therapies may offer. In this review, we focus on the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics, investigating what it is capable of and how it differs from other memory modification technologies. We then outline the safety challenges that need to be addressed before optogenetics can be used in humans. Finally, we re-examine crucial neuroethical concerns expressed in regard to other MMTs in the light of optogenetics and address those that appear to be unique to the memory-modifying potential of optogenetic technology. (shrink)

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three (...) main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency. (shrink)

This paper explores spatial justice in urban environments through immersive art and design, focusing on Amsterdam and Houston. It presents a case study from the Venice Biennale 2023, showcasing art's potential in fostering inclusive urban spaces. The study delves into the socio-political complexities of urban areas, highlighting often-ignored liminal spaces and their tensions and possibilities. Immersive art emerges as a transformative medium, capable of challenging and reshaping perceptions of space, and addressing systemic socio-economic disparities. Adopting a transdisciplinary approach, the (...) research combines insights from various fields to enrich discussions on spatial justice and inspire urban transformations. (shrink)

When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes depending on (...) one's perspective on the object. How should we account for the perspectival aspect of spatial perception? We present a framework within which to discuss the perspectival aspect of perception and put forward three desiderata that any account of the perspectival aspect of perception should satisfy. We discuss views on which the perspectival aspect of perception is analyzed in terms of constitutively mind-dependent appearance properties as well as views on which the perspectival aspect of perception is analyzed in terms of representations of mind-independent perspectival properties. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that (...) beliefs formed on the basis of our memories are protected from certain errors of misidentification and justified in a way which does not rely on any cognitive capacity other than memory. The aim of the book is to explain these features of memory. It proposes that memories have a particular functional role which involves past perceptual experiences and beliefs about the past and suggests that memories have a particular content as well; they represent themselves as having a certain causal origin. The book then accounts for the feelings associated with our memories as the experience of some of the things that our memories represent; things such as our own past experiences, or the fact the memories originate in those experiences. It also accounts for the special justification for belief afforded by our memories in terms of the content that memories have. The resulting picture is a unified account of several philosophically interesting aspects of memory. (shrink)

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term “ memory ” to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the “received view”, is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical (...) and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of re-acquaintance with one’s past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more nuanced view of memory. -/-. (shrink)

Memory seems intuitively to consist in the preservation of some proposition (in the case of semantic memory) or sensory image (in the case of episodic memory). However, this intuition faces fatal difficulties. Semantic memory has to be updated to reflect the passage of time: it is not just preservation. And episodic memory can occur in a format (the observer perspective) in which the remembered image is different from the original sensory image. These difficulties indicate that (...) memory cannot be preserved content. It is proposed that what is preserved in memory isan underlying "trace", and that in every act of remembering, memorial content is reconstructed from the preserved trace. (shrink)

Episodic memory is sometimes described as mental time travel. This suggests three ideas: that episodic memory offers us access to the past that is quasi-experiential, that it is a source of knowledge of the past, and that it is, at root, passive. I offer an account of episodic memory that rejects all three ideas. The account claims that remembering is a matter of representing the past to oneself, in a way suitably responsive to how one experienced the (...) remembered episode to be. I argue that episodic memory is active, in the way this view suggests. I clarify the idea that it is, as the view also implies, not a source of knowledge but an expression of knowledge the subject already has. And I suggest the view need not limit memories to states that are in any way experience-like. This position offers a way to articulate the relations between episodic memory and related phenomena: factual memory, generic memory, remembering-how and anticipation. And it allows us to explain how we know which aspects of our episodic memory states to take seriously and which (such as the shift to an observer perspective on the remembered events) to treat as merely incidental. (shrink)

Philosophical considerations regarding experiential spatial content have focused on exteroceptive sensations presenting external entities, and not on interoceptive experiences that present states of our own body. A notable example is studies on interoceptive touch, in which it is argued that interoceptive tactile experiences have rich spatial content such that tactile sensations are experienced as located in a spatial field. This paper investigates whether a similarly rich spatial content can be attributed to experiences of acute, cutaneous pain. (...) It is argued that such experiences of pain do not have field-like content, as they do not present distance relations between painful sensations. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of the psychology of constructive memory for philosophical theories of the metaphysics of memory and for a central question in the epistemology of memory. I first develop a general interpretation of the psychology of constructive memory. I then argue, on the basis of this interpretation, for an updated version of Martin and Deutscher's influential causal theory of memory. I conclude by sketching the implications of this updated theory for the question (...) of memory 's status as a generative epistemic source. (shrink)

Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self-defeating. If (...) it does not threaten memory in this way, then the challenge leaves a foundation for an inference to the best explanation response, one we articulate and support. (shrink)

A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. (...) This essay rejects the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences. The resulting view stands opposed to prominent discussions of memory and testimony, which either, like the diary model, treat memory by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory. (shrink)

Memory is a privileged context for inquiry into subjective life; no wonder that the way philosophers theorize memory is indicative of their conception of subjectivity as a whole. In this essay, I turn to Sartre and Husserl with the aim of unveiling how their accounts of recollection resolve the question of identity and difference within the temporality of one's life. Tracing Sartre's arguments against Husserl's, as well as Husserl's and Sartre's own presentations of recollection, I inquire into the (...) reasons that incited them to bring either the aspect of sameness or otherness at the heart of subjective life into view. (shrink)

When do several objects compose a further object? The last twenty years have seen a great deal of discussion of this question. According to the most popular view on the market, there is a physical object composed of your brain and Jeremy Bentham’s body. According to the second-most popular view on the market, there are no such objects as human brains or human bodies, and there are also no atoms, rocks, tables, or stars. And according to the third-ranked view, there (...) are human bodies, but still no brains, atoms, rocks, tables, or stars. Although it’s pleasant to have so many crazy-sounding views around, I think it would also be nice to have a commonsense option available. The aim of this paper is to offer such an option. The approach I offer begins by considering a mereological question other than the standard one that has been the focus of most discussions in the literature. I try to show that the road to mereological sanity begins with giving the most straightforward and commonsensical answer to this other question, and then extending that answer to further questions about the mereology of physical objects. On the approach I am recommending, it turns out that all of the mereological properties and relations of physical objects are determined by their spatial properties and relations. (shrink)

In our evolving era, memory, technology, and society intersect, prompting a reevaluation of human experience. Adaptive recall systems help navigate the blurred lines between personal and collective realities. This text tackles aging and brain herpes as experience highlighters, emphasizing the need for adaptive strategies and memory-enhancing techniques. Memory relies on automatic processes, with the hippocampus key for episodic reconstructions. Technology enhances cognitive abilities, merging individual and collective understandings, and redefining truth and reality while fostering resilience and adaptability. (...) This study embraces diverse perspectives to enrich our understanding, inviting interconnectedness, creativity, compassion, and new forms of humanism. Abstract-In our evolving era, memory, technology, and society intersect, prompting a reevaluation of human experience. Adaptive recall systems help navigate the blurred lines between personal and collective realities. This text tackles aging and brain herpes as experience highlighters, emphasizing the need for adaptive strategies and memory-enhancing techniques. Memory relies on automatic processes, with the hippocampus key for episodic reconstructions. Technology enhances cognitive abilities, merging individual and collective understandings, and redefining truth and reality while fostering resilience and adaptability. This study embraces diverse perspectives to enrich our understanding, inviting interconnectedness, creativity, compassion, and new forms of humanism (DOI: 10.17406/GJHSS). (shrink)

When someone is in a conscious state, must they be aware of it? The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga offers a brilliant route to answering this question by leveraging the role awareness might play as a constraint on memory. I begin by clarifying his strategy and what conclusions it might be used to establish, and then turn to explain why it fails. The first main problem is that, contrary to his contemporary defenders, there is no good way to use it to (...) reach a conclusion about all conscious states. The second main problem is that the proposed awareness constraint on memory is highly problematic, in tension both with ancient objections as well as current psychology. (shrink)

Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the (...) other generating the sense of mineness. We argue that this new model of the sense of identity has implications for debates about quasi-memory. In addition, articulating the components of the sense of identity promises to bear on the extent to which this sense of identity provides evidence of personal identity. (shrink)

Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. Working memory has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system – that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious working memory. In this paper, we focus on visual working memory and critically examine these studies as (...) well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious working memory. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious working memory store, though we offer independent reasons to think that working memory may operate on unconsciously perceived information. (shrink)

Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining (...) why memory judgments are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory. (shrink)

Through a selective historical, theoretical, and critical survey of the uses of the concept of scaffolding over the past 30 years, this chapter traces the development of the concept across developmental psychology, educational theory, and cognitive anthropology, and its place in the interdisciplinary field of distributed cognition from the 1990s. Offering a big-picture overview of the uses of the notion of scaffolding, it suggests three ways to taxonomise forms of scaffolding, and addresses the possible criticism that the metaphor of scaffolding (...) retains an overly individualist vision of cognition. The chapter is aimed at a broad interdisciplinary audience interested in processes of learning, teaching, and apprenticeship as they apply to the study of memory. (shrink)

Cognitive science can help literary scholars formulate specific questions to be answered by archival research. This essay takes, as its starting point, embedded mental states (that is, mental states about mental states) and their role in generating literary subjectivity. It then follows the transformation of embedded mental states throughout several manuscripts of Christa Wolf’s autobiographical novel, Patterns of Childhood (Kindheitsmuster, 1976), available at the Berlin Academy of Arts. The author shows that later versions of Patterns of Childhood have more complex (...) embedments in the chapter describing the adolescent protagonist’s relationship with her schoolteacher. This textual development is integral to the process whereby the presumably authentic memories of the past are constructed to fit the present needs of the person who is doing the remembering. Accompanying the three case studies of the manuscript revision is a discussion of theoretical and practical implications of this “cognitive-archival” approach to literature. (shrink)

It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how (...) the constructive nature of visual memory can be reconciled with the authenticity constraint. In what respect and to what extent may the content of a visual memory differ from the original perceptual state while still adequately reflecting the subject's original perception? (shrink)

Working memory is thought to be the psychological capacity that enables us to maintain or manipulate information no longer in our environment for goal-directed action. Recent work argues that working memory is not a so-called natural kind and in turn cannot explain the cognitive processes attributed to it. This paper first clarifies the scope of this earlier critique and argues for a pluralist account of working memory. Under this account, working memory is variously realized by many (...) mechanisms that contribute to the maintenance and manipulation of information across tasks. This view in effect updates one of the earliest pluralist formulations of working memory. Juxtaposing this view against deflationary descriptions allows us to delineate two gradients that help us chart various accounts of working memory and identify their respective theoretical commitments. In turn, we can isolate those accounts that fail to accord with the evidence supporting a pluralist view, and we can begin to rehabilitate working memory as a pluralist, and ultimately more informative, construct. (shrink)

The health industry is experiencing change, the newest forerunner of which is being propelled by spatial computing and generative AI. Spatial computing simply refers to the ability to interface with physical space through computation and digital devices; on the other hand, generative AI means using advanced machine learning to generate new output. This paper examines the roles and the combined possibilities of these two technologies with the view of transforming health care and diagnostics in the field of patient (...) care. Precision medicine unveils new opportunities of integrating precise spatial computing components and generative artificial intelligence to provide a personalized treatment for patients and data visualization for surgeons. The paper examines major use cases, concerns, and future of this convergence specifically in the fields of medicine. (shrink)