Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as (...) the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive. (shrink)

Introduction to Voragine’s Special Dossier “Death, from Painting to Film: Philosophical Conversations” -/- Vorágine’s ninth issue contains a special dossier on possible philosophical conversations between death and the arts, in particular regarding their transition from painting to photography and film. It includes four articles dedicated to exploring the ways in which death has been represented and imagined by the visual arts, prompting future film-philosophical conversations within aesthetic, cultural, and political studies.

Comparative thanatologists study the responses to the dead and the dying in nonhuman animals. Despite the wide variety of thanatological behaviours that have been documented in several different species, comparative thanatologists assume that the concept of death is very difficult to acquire and will be a rare cognitive feat once we move past the human species. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is based on two forms of anthropocentrism: an intellectual anthropocentrism, which leads to an over-intellectualisation of the (...) CoD, and an emotional anthropocentrism, which yields an excessive focus on grief as a reaction to death. Contrary to what these two forms of anthropocentrism suggest, we argue that the CoD requires relatively little cognitive complexity and that it can emerge independently from mourning behaviour. Moreover, if we turn towards the natural world, we can see that the minimal cognitive requirements for a CoD are in fact met by many nonhuman species and there are multiple learning pathways and opportunities for animals in the wild to develop a CoD. This allows us to conclude that the CoD will be relatively easy to acquire and, so, we can expect it to be fairly common in nature. (shrink)

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations. In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach, we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails (...) a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether animals can (...) have a concept of death. In order to answer this question, I begin by sketching an account of concept possession that favours intensional classification rather than mere extensional discrimination. Further, I argue that the concept of death should be construed as neither binary nor universal. I then present a proposal for a set of minimal conditions that must be met to have a concept of death. I argue that having a minimal understanding of death entails first expecting a dead individual to be alive, and then grasping its non-functionality and irreversibility. Lastly, I lay out the sort of observational and experimental evidence that we should look for to determine whether animals have the capacity for a minimal comprehension of death. (shrink)

The Deleuzian studies on cinema highlight the importance of two semiotic regimes (movement-image and time-image) for the understanding of our aesthetical and epistemological relationship with moving images. On the contrary, this article highlights the moments of crisis between the two regimes, pointing out the generic character of uncertainty and ambiguity in the nature of mental images: once the sensorimotor scheme that dominates the cinematographic montage has been weakened, the characters, unable to act, can imagine, desire, dream, hallucinate, and remember. New (...) types of images appear: recollectionimages, dream-images, and world-images. How do these new types of images make us rethink our usual relationship with the world and with reality? With this article on cinema’s virtual and oneiric dimension, I expect to disseminate one of Gilles Deleuze’s greatest contributions to film philosophy: the distinction between the imaginary and reality. (shrink)

Inspired by Farshad Zahedi’s audiovisual essay The Petrified Object and the Poetics of Time in Cinema, this article briefly presents three philosophical approaches to cinema’s ways of expressing time – as articulated by Bergson, Tarkovsky, and Deleuze – and questions how absolute time and chronological time are brought to a state of crisis by this modern form of art.

Could animals behave morally if they can’t mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at least (...) one type of moral motivation does not require mindreading. This means that, a priori, non-mindreading animals can be moral. (shrink)

It is tempting to assume that being a moral creature requires the capacity to attribute mental states to others, because a creature cannot be moral unless she is capable of comprehending how her actions can have an impact on the well-being of those around her. If this assumption were true, then mere behaviour readers could never qualify as moral, for they are incapable of conceptualising mental states and attributing them to others. In this paper, I argue against such an assumption (...) by discussing the specific case of empathy. I present a characterisation of empathy that would not require an ability to attribute mental states to others, but would nevertheless allow the creature who possessed it to qualify as a moral being. Provided certain conditions are met, a behaviour reader could be motivated to act by this form of empathy, and this means that behaviour readers could be moral. The case for animal morality, I shall argue, is therefore independent of the case for animal mindreading. (shrink)

Twin-earth thought experiments, standardly construed, support the externalist doctrine that the content of propositional attitudes involving natural-kind terms supervenes upon properties external to those who entertain them. But this doctrine in conjunction with a common view of self-knowledge might have the intolerable consequence that substantial propositions concerning the environment could be knowable a priori. Since both doctrines, externalism and privileged self-knowledge, appear independently plausible, there is then a paradox facing the attempt to hold them concurrently. I shall argue, however, that (...) externalist claims about the dependence of content on environmental factors presuppose certain theses about the semantics of natural-kind terms that, if sound, would make those claims eligible for empirical justification instead. In fact, that is the only interpretation of their epistemic status that could square with the standard conclusion from twin-earth cases. Furthermore, it can be shown to solve the paradox of externalism and self-knowledge in a more doxastically conservative way--accommodating precisely each of the well-accepted intuitions about knowledge, closure and the individuation of content given up by available competitors. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse the Wittgensteinian critique of the orthodoxy in animal ethics that has been championed by Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. While Crary frames it as a critique of “moral individualism”, we show that their criticism applies most prominently to certain forms of moral individualism (namely, those that follow hedonistic or preference-satisfaction axiologies), and not to moral individualism in itself. Indeed, there is a concrete sense in which the moral individualistic stance cannot be escaped, and we believe (...) that it is this particular limitation that justified Crary’s later move to a qualified version of moral individualism. At the same time, we also argue that there are significant merits to the Wittgensteinian critique of moral individualism, which pertain to its attack on the rationalism, naturalism, and reductionism that characterise orthodox approaches to animal ethics. We show that there is much of value in the Wittgensteinians’ call for an ethics that is more human; an ethics that fully embraces the capacities we are endowed with and one that pays heed to the richness and complexity of our moral lives. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that scientists working on the animal morality debate have been operating with a narrow view of morality that prematurely limits the variety of moral practices that animals may be capable of. We show how this bias can be partially corrected by paying more attention to the touch behaviours of animals. We argue that a careful examination of the ways in which animals engage in and navigate touch interactions can shed new light on current debates on (...) animal morality, like the study of consolation behaviour, while also revealing further forms that animal morality may take and that have been neglected so far, like capacities of tolerance or trust. This defence is structured as an analysis of the three main functions of touch: the discriminative function, the affiliative function, and the vigilance function. (shrink)

In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, (...) some insects count as more than an individual and, in another sense, they sometimes count as less than an individual. (shrink)

More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute ethical naturalism by offering the so-called open question argument (OQA), also charging that all varieties of ethical naturalism commit the naturalistic fallacy. Although there is consensus that OQA and the naturalistic-fallacy charge both fail, OQA is sometimes vindicated, but only as an argument against naturalistic semantic analyses. The naturalistic-fallacy charge, by contrast, usually finds no takers at all. This paper provides new grounds for an OQA thus restricted. But (...) it aims chiefly at vindicating a version of the naturalistic fallacy, „the semantic-naturalist fallacy‟ (SNF), that we think defensible. We first argue that the openness of the question OQA raises against such analyses hinges on self-ascriptive, comparative judgments of content, which may be considered a priori warranted. We then provide independent reasons for the claim that the sort of mistake committed by naturalistic analyses in fact amounts to a pragmatic fallacy of a kind familiar in petitio principii and other forms of viciously circular inference. Of interest here are naturalistic analyses of ethical terms or concepts, not of properties. Our OQA (OQA*) raises an objection to the former. For no such semantic analyses can get off the ground unless moral terms are content-equivalent to purely descriptive terms, which amounts to saying that they must instantiate the same semantic types. Suppose „good‟ is the analysandum and „pleasure maximizing‟ the analysans (whichever purely descriptive term or terms would turn out to be the correct descriptive analysis of the target analysandum) of a certain semantic analysis. The claim that such terms are content-equivalent appears to be open to doubt on a priori grounds. After 1 all, whether one‟s own tokens of „good‟ and „pleasure maximizing‟ have/don‟t have the same content is a first-person, comparative judgment of content. Evaluating the proposed analysis requires, then, a self-ascriptive, comparative judgment of content.1 Judgments of this sort are thought to have a special epistemic status, since they seem grounded in neither evidence nor inference.. (shrink)

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We (...) argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. (shrink)

Humans interact with animals in numerous ways and on numerous levels. We are indeed living in an “animal”s world,’ in the sense that our lives are very much intertwined with the lives of animals. This also means that animals, like those dogs we commonly refer to as our pets, are living in a “human’s world” in the sense that it is us, not them, who, to a large degree, define and manage the interactions we have with them. In this sense, (...) the human-animal relationship is nothing we should romanticize: it comes with clear power relations and thus with a set of responsibilities on the side of those who exercise this power. This holds, despite the fact that we like to think about our dogs as human’s best friend. Dogs have been part of human societies for longer than any other domestic species. Like no other species they exemplify the role of companion animals. Relationships with pet dogs are both very widespread and very intense, often leading to strong attachments between owners or caregivers and animals and to a treatment of these dogs as family members or even children. But how does this relationship look from the dogs’ perspective? How do they perceive the humans they engage with? What responsibilities and duties arise from the kind of mutual understanding, attachment, and the supposedly “special” bonds we form with them? Are there ethical implications, maybe even ethical implications beyond animal welfare? The past decades have seen an upsurge of research from comparative cognition on pet dogs’ cognitive and social skills, especially in comparison with and reference to humans. We will therefore set our discussion about the nature and ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship against the background of the current empirical knowledge on dog (social) cognition. This allows us to analyze the human–dog relationship by applying an interdisciplinary approach that starts from the perspective of the dog to ultimately inform the perspective of humans. It is our aim to thereby identify ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship that have been overlooked so far. (shrink)

We admire Heyes's attempt to develop a mechanistic account of norm cognition. Nonetheless, her account leaves us unsure of whom Heyes counts as normative agents, and on what grounds. Therefore we ask a series of questions designed to clarify which features of Heyes's account she thinks are necessary and sufficient for norm cognition.

The increasingly pluralistic character of modern societies has led to questions, not only about the proper use of ethnic-group terms, but also about the correct semantic analysis of them. Here I argue that ethnic-group terms are analogous to other linguistic expressions whose extension is fixed in the way suggested by a causal theory of reference. My view accommodates precisely those scenarios of communication involving ethnic-group terms that will be seen puzzling to Fregeans. At the same time, it undermines the plausibility (...) of skepticism about those terms. (shrink)

En este capítulo se analiza la figura de la obtención vegetal: su alcance, dimensión, requisitos y caracterización frente a otros derechos de propiedad intelectual, para así abordar su ámbito de protección y su tratamiento en el ámbito internacional. Se pretende en este sentido plantear que la tendencia regulatoria en materia de obtenciones vegetales en Colombia no sólo va en contravía de los intereses de los pueblos indígenas, sino además de su patrimonio colectivo que les ha garantizado una gran diversidad que (...) hoy por hoy es sustento de su alimentación. Con lo anterior se lleva a cabo un singular esfuerzo para tratar de forma comprensiva este asunto, buscando la primacía del consentimiento libre, previo e informado de las comunidades potencialmente afectadas. (shrink)

In recent years, some ethicists have defended that we should genetically engineer farmed animals to diminish or eliminate their capacity to experience negative affective states, a process known as disenhancement that would, according to these authors, result in a situation that is better than the status quo. While we agree with this overall assessment, we believe that it is a mistake to defend disenhancement as a good solution to farmed animals’ plight. This is because disenhancement entails some generally unseen harms (...) that arise from the fact that negative affective states, despite feeling bad, support the access to a number of intrinsic goods, such as individuality, social relationships, meaning, and political participation. Though farmed animals currently have few opportunities to enjoy these goods, we argue that this is a reason to change the environment in which they are kept, not the animals. If we truly care about improving farmed animals’ lives, we should aim to enrich their environment, rather than impoverish their mental lives. (shrink)

l'occasion de son passage à Lisbonne, à la Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, pour la conférence "Peuples Exposés", intégrée dans le cycle de conférences A Républica por vir – arte, política e pensamento para o século XXI 1 (La République à venir – art, politique et pensée pour le XXIème siècle), nous avons rencontré Georges Didi-Huberman pour l'entretien qui suit, autour de son livre Remontages du temps Subi. L'oeil de l'histoire, 2 (Éditions de Minuit, 2010).

Chapman & Huffman argue that humans are neither unique nor superior to other animals. I believe they are right in claiming that we are no more unique than any other species, but wrong in assuming that this means we cannot be ranked as superior. I show how this need not undermine the central aim of their target article, for superiority can only be measured with respect to a certain standard, and it’s only by using anthropocentric standards that we can be (...) plausibly regarded as superior. Other — perhaps more neutral — standards yield different results. (shrink)

In some ways that have been largely ignored, ethnic-group names might be similar to names of other kinds. If they are, for instance, analogous to proper names, then a correct semantic account of the latter could throw some light on how the meaning of ethnic-group names should be construed. Of course, proper names, together with definite descriptions, belong to the class of singular terms, and an influential view on the semantics of such terms was developed, at the turn of the (...) nineteenth century, from discussion of a puzzle about some differences in the cognitive value of certain statements of identity. Clearly, that a = a (e.g., that Mark Twain was Mark Twain) is trivial, and its truth could be known a priori, just by thinking. On the other hand, that a = b (e.g., that Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens) is of course informative and knowable only by empirical investigation. To solve this puzzle, Frege famously proposed that those variations in the cognitive value of statements of identity “can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated.” On his view, although in the above statements of identity, the singular terms, ‘a,’ and, ‘b,’ may designate the same thing, they do so with different senses, or under different modes of presentation of that object. When the puzzling statements involving ‘a’ and ‘b’ are true, they may then be said to have exactly the same reference. But since those singular terms pick out the object of reference differently (i.e., under different senses or modes of presentation), therefore the cognitive value of these statements also varies significantly. On this account, then, the reference of a non-vacuous proper name is secured by the name’s sense, or mode of presentation, which constitutes its semantic content. And given that Fregeans (here under the influence of Russell) cash out that sense as consisting in whatever concept (or cluster of concepts) could be uniquely associated with that name, they might hold, for example, that the property of being the author of Huckleberry Finn, and that of being an American who lived his early life in Hannibal, Missouri, and later became a famous writer, amount to the senses of ‘Mark Twain,’ and ‘Samuel Clemens,’ respectively.. (shrink)

The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive (...) thought is required in this pervasive way and holds that supposing that it is derives from a tendency among philosophers and scientists toward overcomplication. Against this tendency, it recommends an aponoian framework, from apó, “away from” and noûs, “intelligence” or “thought,” arguing that seemingly complex psychological abilities are often not as complex as they seem, and do not require the ability to engage in reflexive thought. (shrink)

Este paper busca caracterizar el establecimiento de comercio virtual como un tipo de establecimiento de comercio diseñado para dar respuesta a los desafíos que la sociedad de la información, y a su vez poner de relieve el rol de la propiedad intelectual en los entornos virtuales, así como la necesidad de salvaguardarla en este ámbito.

Se presentan una serie de reflexiones en aras de proponer un escenario de discusión a través de los aportes realizados por sus autores sobre las luchas en los países latinoamericanos; luchas que trascienden de las dos posturas internacionales, dadas las condiciones particulares de la realidad económica, la diversidad étnica y cultural propias de Latinoamérica.

En este capítulo de libro se realiza una aproximación al contrato en el derecho colombiano, a través de una guía de estudio que abarca su conceptualización doctrinal. Ello con el fin de motivar el interés para los estudiosos y estudiantes del derecho comparado iberoamericano, quienes son los destinatarios finales del libro que tiene por título Reflexiones sobre Derecho Privado Patrimonial (Universidad de Salamanca, 2015).

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo destacar la problemática de las prácticas de extensión o prolongación de los derechos de exclusividad sobre los medicamentos, llevadas a cabo por la industria farmacéutica, una vez el término de protección vía patente está por finalizar. A través de tres escenarios se pone de manifiesto las implicaciones de este fenómeno, destacándose la necesidad de involucrar activamente al Estado para garantizar así unas condiciones equitativas de acceso a los medicamentos.

El artículo se centra en abordar la deforestación a través de cuatro enfoques regulatorios: proactivo, preventivo, punitivo y compensatorio. Estos enfoques se aplican en planes, programas y proyectos estratégicos dentro de las políticas ambientales a nivel estatal, regional y local. Además, se utilizan para clasificar los comportamientos y determinar la responsabilidad civil y penal de aquellos individuos o empresas que realizan actividades forestales sin los permisos correspondientes y causan daño ambiental. Como contribución, el artículo propone un quinto enfoque regulatorio a (...) través de un organismo intersectorial para el control de la deforestación. Tomando como referencia la Comisión Intersectorial para el Control de la Deforestación y la Gestión Integral para la Protección de los Bosques Naturales en Colombia, este enfoque busca una colaboración y coordinación entre diferentes agencias gubernamentales, actores interesados y expertos. Al combinar los enfoques regulatorios existentes con el enfoque intersectorial, se argumenta que se puede desarrollar un marco más completo y efectivo para mitigar la deforestación, proteger la biodiversidad y garantizar prácticas sostenibles de uso de la tierra. (shrink)

Los resultados de los procesos de innovación en materia ambiental, además de impulsar una sostenibilidad eficaz y perdurable, contribuyen a reducir el impacto ambiental a través de la optimización en el uso de los recursos. Resulta pues comprensible que las empresas, no siendo ajenas a ello, sepan que este es el mejor momento para intensificar sus esfuerzos, aumentando sus inversiones en un enfoque que, aunque relativamente nuevo, resulta hoy más que nunca esencial para su perdurabilidad empresarial. En este sentido, el (...) presente libro da cuenta de esta realidad, llevando a cabo un análisis de los mecanismos de protección el conjunto de productos, procesos y servicios que, generando un valor compartido entre stakeholders y shareholders. El objetivo perseguido por el autor no es otro distinto al de generar en el lector sensibilización sobre las problemáticas en las cuales las innovaciones ambientales tienen un rol fundamental, de la mano de la economía circular y atendiendo a los nuevos desarrollos que propugnan por una reducción del impacto ambiental y por la sostenibilidad en sus tres dimensiones. (shrink)

Este paper busca aportar elementos para el debate de la pérdida de legitimidad del principio de precaución en el derecho colombiano y ante las autoridades públicas. Para demostrar esta premisa, el autor se vale del análisis de la heurística de la disponibilidad y del descuido de la probabilidad, así como del estudio de caso de la tardía aplicación del principio en el Programa de Erradicación de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito mediante aspersión aérea con Glifosato.

As a result of the doctoral research developed by the main author (Vargas-Chaves, 2017), it was identified the evolution and perspectives of the pharmaceutical patent in the international trade system, as well as it future legal research needs in this topic, both immediate and long-term. Furthermore, a number of problems of public health were highlighted in which the patent-term-extension mechanisms have produced a lack of access to medicines.

El paper realiza una exposición sobre el concepto y contenido de la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho como medio de control a la luz de la Ley 1437 de 2011; enfocándola en asuntos ambientales a través del estudio de la licencia ambiental.

El presente capítulo analiza las empresas como organizaciones que poseen un clima y una atmósfera propias de acuerdo con su funcionamiento, en las cuales se dinamizan actividades y productos desarrollados en el tiempo. En este orden de ideas, el problema de los impactos del sector empresarial al cambio climático, no es de la industria o de las organizaciones empresariales per se sino de los modelos antrópicos, o de las ontologías dualistas de la sociedad occidental, que solo conciben el mundo como (...) una autorreferencia contenida, en la que la posición y el bienestar de otros actores no se tienen en cuenta, y solo se concibe la oportunidad de producción y consumo para un solo actor. De este modo, la propuesta que realizan los autores, toma en cuenta referentes de equilibrio y bienestar basados en las formas de vida y en las ontologías que representan dichos movimientos sociales desde el sur global. Estos modelos se destacan porque la subsistencia se asume como un proceso de relación antes que uno de dominación y acaparamiento de los recursos disponibles, y es desde este sentido que se convierten en alternativas ecológicas con un profundo énfasis en el reconocimiento de la diversidad y las necesidades del otro. (shrink)

En la generación de daños ambientales los derechos individuales y colectivos pueden verse vulnerados, cuando se trata de comunidades indígenas, tribales y afrocolombianas, por la forma en la que estas conciben la naturaleza y la íntima relación que existe entre el ambiente y sus planes de vida. Por lo tanto, ante la presencia de daños en el ambiente de estas comunidades puede generarse de forma desencadenante un daño cultural, porque estas poblaciones son las que pierden el escenario raigal y ancestral (...) en el que desarrollan sus prácticas de identidad cultural. Precisamente, en el presente texto se pretende discernir si ante la presencia de un conflicto ambiental en el Arroyo de San Basilio de Palenque, que a su vez es centro de las relaciones socioeconómicas, culturales y lúdicas de los miembros de esta comunidad, se logra desencadenar un daño cultural. (shrink)

En el presente capítulo se formulan unos lineamientos teóricos de la innovación ambiental, como forma de concebir aquellas innovaciones que respondan a las expectativas de los dos sectores involucrados en este ámbito. Para lograr lo anterior, el autor se aproxima a la innovación como un proceso mediante el cual se satisfacen necesidades, más allá de introducir mejoras o solucionar problemas a situaciones de deterioro a ambiental o agotamiento de recursos naturales. Adicional a lo anterior, se analiza el concepto de valor (...) compartido que generan las innovaciones ambientales entre stakeholders y shareholders y, por último, se desarrollan las dos dimensiones a las que deben responder este tipo de innovaciones. (shrink)

El presente texto constituye un esfuerzo por llevar a cabo un acercamiento teórico a una de las grandes cuestiones de la justicia global: la pobreza en el mundo. Para lograrlo, analizamos esta problemática desde distintas aproximaciones en las que se intenta reflejar las aspiraciones distributivas de la justicia global mediante tres visiones sobre la pobreza.