Romantic psychology is first specified in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed faculty-psychology, whose scientific paradigm is fundamentally materialistic and mechanistic. Romantic psychology is then presented through Fr. Schlegel’s theory and practice of the literary fragment. In the fragment, we discover selfhood that is self-positing, powered by electro-chemical forces and enlivened by the stimulating Other. Romantic psychology determines the self as an ironic system, complete and yet organically open to other selves. It is phenomenological in nature and its contemporary (...) legacy can be found in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical hermeneutics. (shrink)

The article proposes systematisation and development of the discourse of the East European methodological traditions regarding application of the systematic approach as a way of subject localisation in psychological research. In particular, the author’s version of systematic localisation of psychological research subjects by means of structural and ontological visualisations has been developed. The procedure proposed for systematic localisation of the researched subject includes four subsequent stages: 1) fixation of the borders and structure of the ontological field which is being studied; (...) 2) segment analysis of the obtained structure; 3) study of specifics and contents of structural and functional ties; 4) visual mapping of genesis of the core processes. The article describes specifics of application of systematic localisation of the subject of research at the example of such researched object as personal socialisation. (shrink)

A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor.

The problem of resurrection, one of the most important issues in the philosophy and theology. Some of Muslim philosophers and the vast majority of theologians always discussed about this topic. Some of Muslim philosophers accepted this problem and prove it, but, in quality of occurrence of them, they have differ believe from each other. However, some of Muslim theologians except those who believe in transmogrification, they consider the resurrection to be one of the principle of religion, beside monotheism and prophecy. (...) Moreover, they proved the principle of resurrection through reasons, and explanations them elaborates through the Holy Quran and Prophetic saying (Traditions- Hadith). Avicenna and Suhrawardi have been proving resurrection. Of course, for prove of this problem, they adopted of different manner from Muslim Theologians. Both of philosophers according to codify of ordinary psychological system, have proved and explanation this issue. Thus, for understand of Avicenna and Suhrawardi’s eschatology. First of all, we must understand of their psychological system. Furthermore, in this paper, we will discuss about survival of the soul according to immaterial soul and perfecting of soul as two premises for prove of resurrection. (shrink)

What factors affect judicial decision-making? The legal system is of utmost importance because of its impact on our lives. Judges appear to have the most power among any social workers seeing as the precedents set in their decisions are tantamount to written law. Nevertheless, judges may be subject to certain biases, moral and cognitive alike, which influence their rulings. Looking into how morality and cognitive biases affect judges may also reveal how we as individuals handle combining morals with ethics- as (...) well as whether any discrepancies among ourselves are justifiable. An investigation into relevant moral and jurisprudential theories revealed much about the inner workings of a judge’s mindset- whether he or she recognizes it or not. Coupling this with corroborated research on a select few heuristics present specifically for judges sets the foundation for an array of possible solutions in order to ensure the most impartial judicial proceedings. Plausible remedies include conducting premortems, implicit association tests, and a revised ruling procedure. (shrink)

This chapter introduces a research-based conceptual framework for the study of the inner psychosocial reality of business enterprises. It is called the Inner Organizational Ecosystem Approach (IOEA). This model is systemic in nature, and it defines the basic features of small and medium-size enterprises, such as elements, structures, borders, social actors, organizational climate, processes and resources. Further, it also covers the dynamics of psychosocial reality, processes, emergent qualities and the higher-order subsystems of the overall organizational ecosystem, including the global (...) business environment, which is understood as a macro-system where all the individual organizational ecosystems co-exist. In the applied part of the chapter, cognitive changes emerging within systemic leadership training are defined. Participation in systemic training causes changes in the cognitive processing of reality, more specifically improvements in layer-based framing, relativistic contextual orientation, temporality drift and meaning generation. All of these changes are components of the systemic mind, which is a concept newly proposed and defined by the present study. The systemic mind is a living matrix that is extremely open to acquiring new skills and new patterns of thinking, analyzing and meaning generation. It is processual and it can be considered as an ongoing process of continuous absorption of new cognitive patterns. Both the Inner Organizational Ecosystem Approach and the concept of the systemic mind provide a new theoretical background for empirical investigation in the fields of systemic and systems psychology, complexity psychology, organizational psychology, economic anthropology and the social anthropology of work. (shrink)

Philosophers of psychology debate, among other things, which psychological models, if any, are (or provide) mechanistic explanations. This should seem a little strange given that there is rough consensus on the following two claims: 1) a mechanism is an organized collection of entities and activities that produces, underlies, or maintains a phenomenon, and 2) a mechanistic explanation describes, represents, or provides information about the mechanism producing, underlying, or maintaining the phenomenon to be explained (i.e. the explanandum phenomenon) (Bechtel and (...) Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007). If there is a rough consensus on what mechanisms are and that mechanistic explanations describe, represent, or provide information about them, then how is there no consensus on which psychological models are (or provide) mechanistic explanations? Surely the psychological models that are mechanistic explanations are the models that describe, represent, or provide information about mechanisms. That is true, of course; the trouble arises when determining what exactly that involves. Philosophical disagreement over which psychological models are mechanistic explanations is often disagreement about what it means to describe, represent, or provide information about a mechanism, among other things (Hochstein 2016; Levy 2013). In addition, one's position in this debate depends on a host of other seemingly arcane metaphysical issues, such as the nature of mechanisms, computational and functional properties (Piccinini 2016), and realization (Piccinini and Maley 2014), as well as the relation between models, methodologies, and explanations (Craver 2014; Levy 2013; Zednik 2015). Although I inevitably advocate a position, my primary aim in this chapter is to spell out all these relationships and canvas the positions that have been taken (or could be taken) with respect to mechanistic explanation in psychology, using dynamical systems models and cognitive models (or functional analyses) as examples. (shrink)

Psychology of religion tries to understand the cause-effect relationships of religious experiences and religious consciousness so as to be able to predict behaviors. It aims to study the religious consciousness with investigations in religious behavior patterns. -/- The major systems of psychology are: structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt School of Psychology. Obviously, each system has its own way of understanding religious consciousness.

The present article is an attempt to give - in the frame of the theory of the organism - environment system - a new interpretation to the role of efferent influences on receptor activity and to the functions of senses in the formation of knowledge. It is argued, on the basis of experimental evidence and theoretical considerations, that the senses are not transmitters of environmental information, but they create a direct connection between the organism and the environment, which makes the (...) development of a dynamic living system, the organism - environment system, possible. In this connection process the efferent influences on receptor activity are of particular significance, because with their help the receptors may be adjusted in relation to the parts of the environment which are most important in the achievement of behavioral results. Perception is the process of joining of new parts of the environment to the organism - environment system ; thus, the formation of knowledge by perception is based on reorganization of the organism - environment system, and not on transmission of information from the environment. With the help of the efferent influences on receptors each organism creates its own peculiar world which is simultaneously subjective and objective. The present considerations have far reaching influences as well on experimental work in neurophysiology and psychology of perception as on philosophical considerations of knowledge formation. (shrink)

A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious (...) will do so for some – perhaps most – of its subsystems, as well as for irrelevantly extended systems (e.g., the original system augmented with physical appendages that contribute nothing to the properties supposedly supporting consciousness), and for aggregates of individually conscious systems (e.g., groups of people). This problem suggests that the properties that are being measured are epiphenomenal to consciousness, or else it implies a bizarre proliferation of minds. We propose that a solution to the boundary problem can be found by identifying properties that are intrinsic or systemic: properties that clearly differentiate between systems whose existence is a matter of fact, as opposed to those whose existence is a matter of interpretation (in the eye of the beholder). We argue that if a putative MoC can be shown to be systemic, this ipso facto resolves any associated boundary issues. As test cases, we analyze two recent theories of consciousness in light of our definitions: the Integrated Information Theory and the Geometric Theory of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, (...) say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory. (shrink)

The present article is an attempt to bring together the development of mental activity and consciousness in the framework of the organism-environment theory (Jarvilehto, 1998a, 1998b, 1999); the main question is how the development of mental activity and consciousness can be formulated if the starting point is not the separation of man and environment as in traditional cognitive psychology, but a unitary organism-environment system. According to the present formulation, mental activity is conceived as activity of the whole organism-environment system (...) and connected to the general development of life as a specific form of an organism-environment system comprising neurons. The advent of consciousness is regarded as a result of co-operation of such organism-environment systems. Consciousness is based on co-operation for the achievement of common results, and shared by the co-operating individuals (general consciousness), although each individual also makes it concrete from the perspective of his/her own body in the act of participation in common results (personal consciousness). Language is the means of formation of the co-operative system in the achievement of common results, and it is suggested that the use of language is related more to the type of co-operative system and intended common results than to any symbolic representation of the world. It is claimed that on this basis it is possible to develop psychology which takes seriously the concepts of mental activity and consciousness in the description of human action, but does not reduce these concepts either to biological or social factors. The present formulation should be regarded more as a conceptual outline than as a full-blown theory. (shrink)

According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account of intentional (...) action? How much of our behavior is intentional according to this view? And what is the role of consciousness? I will propose here a revised account of intentional action within the dual-system framework, and we will see that most of our behavior can qualify as intentional, even if most of it is automatic. An important lesson will be that philosophical accounts of intentional action need to pay more attention to the role of consciousness in action. (shrink)

Review of Hegel’s Introduction to the System: Encyclopaedia Phenomenology and Psychology by Robert E. Wood.

Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations of the mesocorticolimbic (...) system in order to demonstrate why preclusion/extinction claims are dubious. (shrink)

Psychological construction represents an important new approach to psychological phenomena, one that has the promise to help us reconceptualize the mind both as a behavioral and as a biological system. It has so far been developed in the greatest detail for emotion, but it has important implications for how researchers approach other mental phenomena such as reasoning, memory, and language use. Its key contention is that phenomena that are characterized in (folk) psychological vocabulary are not themselves basic features of the (...) mind, but are constructed from more basic psychological operations. The framework of mechanistic explanation, currently under development in philosophy of science, can provide a useful perspective on the psychological construction approach. A central insight of the mechanistic account of explanation is that biological and psychological phenomena result from mechanisms in which component parts and operations do not individually exhibit the phenomena of interest but function together in an orchestrated and sometimes in a complex dynamical manner to generate it. While at times acknowledging the compatibility of the mechanist approach with constructionist approach (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), proponents of the constructionist approach have at other times pitched their approach as anti-mechanist. For example, Barrett (2009) claims that the psychological constructionist approach rejects machines as the primary metaphor for understanding the mind, instead favoring a recipe metaphor; constructionism also purportedly rejects the “mechanistic” picture of causation, which it portrays as linear or sequential in nature (see also Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press). While some mechanistic accounts do fit this description, we will see that the mechanisms generating phenomena can be complex and dynamic, producing phenomena far less stereotypic and more adaptive than people often associate with machines. Our goal, however, is not just to render constructionism and mechanism compatible. Philosophers of science have been examining the nature of mechanistic explanation in biology with the goal of gaining new insights into the operation of science. We will identify some of the places where the mechanistic account can shed new light on the constructionist project. (shrink)

Enactivism and ecological psychology converge on the relevance of the environment in understanding perception and action. On both views, perceiving organisms are not merely passive receivers of environmental stimuli, but rather form a dynamic relationship with their environments in such a way that shapes how they interact with the world. In this paper, I suggest that while enactivism and ecological psychology enjoy a shared specification of the environment as the cognitive domain, on both accounts, the structure of the (...) environment, itself, is unspecified beyond that of contingent relations with the species-typical sensorimotor capacities of perceiving organisms. This lack of specification creates a considerable gap in theory regarding the organization of organisms as coupled with their environments. I argue that this gap can be filled by drawing from resources in developmental systems theory, namely, specifying the environmental state-space as a developmental niche that shapes and is shaped by individual organisms over developmental and, on a population scale, evolutionary time. Defining the environment as an organism’s developmental niche makes it clearer how and why certain contingencies have arisen, in turn, strengthening a joint appeal to both enactivism and ecological psychology as theories asserting complementarity between organisms and their environments. (shrink)

The article considers the problem of the system model of family counseling, in particular, the analysis of the family as a social system, as a complex of elements and their properties, which are in dynamic connections and relationships. The analysis of the theory of systems and the description of the principles of family counseling is carried out. Particular attention is paid to highlighting the main provisions of the individual (“adlerian”) psychology in counseling the family. -/- Currently among specialists there (...) is a high interest in the provision of psychological assistance to a family in crisis. This is largely due to the fact that over the past decades, the institution of the family in this country is experiencing an increase in destructive tendencies. This is evidenced by an increase in the number of appeals to school psychologists, psychological counseling, psychological services and centers from both the individual members of the family and families in general. -/- The psychological help to the family is positioned as a relatively new field of practice for a psychologist. The practice of counseling, including family, is largely determined by the theoretical skills of the counselor, primarily as (s)he understands the personality, determination of behavior, the source of family problems, and the possibility of change. Today, practitioners prefer the integrative method, which is a system approach. -/- The purpose of this article is to analyze the theory of systems as the basis of family counseling. The system model of family counseling is considered to be one of the youngest and most widespread models that received their recognition at the end of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Unlike human soldiers, autonomous weapons systems are unaffected by psychological factors that would cause them to act outside the chain of command. This is a compelling moral justification for their development and eventual deployment in war. To achieve this level of sophistication, the software that runs AWS will have to first solve two problems: the frame problem and the representation problem. Solutions to these problems will inevitably involve complex software. Complex software will create security risks and will make AWS critically (...) vulnerable to hacking. I claim that the political and tactical consequences of hacked AWS far outweigh the purported advantages of AWS not being affected by psychological factors and always following orders. Therefore, one of the moral justifications for the deployment of AWS is undermined. (shrink)

I develop a distinction between two types of psychological hedonism. Inferential hedonism (or “I-hedonism”) holds that each person only has ultimate desires regarding his or her own hedonic states (pleasure and pain). Reinforcement hedonism (or “R–hedonism”) holds that each person's ultimate desires, whatever their contents are, are differentially reinforced in that person’s cognitive system only by virtue of their association with hedonic states. I’ll argue that accepting R-hedonism and rejecting I-hedonism provides a conciliatory position on the traditional altruism debate, and (...) that it coheres well with the neuroscientist Anthony Dickinson’s theory about the evolutionary function of hedonic states, the “hedonic interface theory.” Finally, I’ll defend R-hedonism from potential objections. (shrink)

A psychology-informed view of human rights has been taken into account by many scholars while examining the short-term and long-term effects of human rights violations on individuals and communities. In Trauma and Human Rights: Integrating Approaches to Address Human Suffering, for instance, the authors discuss the trauma-informed approach in the context of human rights violations, namely domestic violence, racial and other forms of discrimination, etc. In the paper on Trauma among children and legal implications, the authors advance a trauma-informed (...) approach to human rights. The approach considers the experiences of trauma associated with physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, psychological/emotional abuse, community violence, natural disasters, serious accidents, parental death/grief, medical procedures and conditions, and terrorism. In the case of violations including rape and torture, the paper Torture by means of Rape concerns the psychological suffering of victims of rape, abuse, and torture in light of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. As for the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies, the advancement of a psychology-informed view of human rights is noticeable. Take the example of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment on Biopsychosocial factors conducive to torture and ill-treatment. The Report explores the root causes of the current worldwide complacency concerning torture and ill-treatment and recommends the urgent and proactive incorporation of science-based conclusions into ongoing, policy-based global governance reform processes. Further, the report provides that the root cause of the systemic governance failure is attributed to the generic biopsychosocial factors that have shaped human decision-making throughout history, irrespective of national, cultural, religious, or other distinctive influences. Since the two fields are creating a landscape of new concepts and perspectives, one may study this interface broadly under three headings; (a) Psychology in Human Rights. (b) Rights-Based Approach to Psychological Science and Research. (c) Psychology and Human Rights in Law and Policy. (shrink)

In the last 20 years, a stream of research emerged under the label of „complex problem solving“ (CPS). This research was intended to describe the way people deal with complex, dynamic, and intransparent situations. Complex computer-simulated scenarios were as stimulus material in psychological experiments. This line of research lead to subtle insights into the way how people deal with complexity and uncertainty. Besides these knowledge-rich, realistic, intransparent, complex, dynamic scenarios with many variables, a second line of research used more simple, (...) knowledge-lean scenarios with a low number of variables („minimal complex systems“, MCS) that have been proposed recently in problem-solving research for the purpose of educational assessment. In both cases, the idea behind the use of microworlds is to increase validity of problem solving tasks by presenting interactive environments that can be explored and controlled by participants while pursuing certain action goals. The main argument presented here is: both types of systems - CPS and MCS – can only be dealt with successfully if causal dependencies between input and output variables are identified and used for system control. System knowledge is necessary for control and intervention. But CPS and MCS differ in their way of how causal dependencies are identified and how the mental model is constructed; therefore, they cannot be compared directly to each other with respect to the cognitive processes that are necessary for solving the tasks. Knowledge-poor MCS tasks address only a small fraction of the cognitive processes and structures needed for knowledge-rich CPS situations. (shrink)

The purpose of cultural competence education for medical professionals is to ensure respectful care and reduce health disparities. Yet as Berger and Miller (2021) show, the cultural competence framework is dated, confused, and self-defeating. They argue that the framework ignores the primary driver of health disparities—systemic racism—and is apt to exacerbate rather than mitigate bias and ethnocentrism. They propose replacing cultural competence with a framework that attends to two social aspects of structural inequality: health and social policy, and institutional-system (...) activity; and two psychological aspects of structural inequality: the clinical encounter, and the epistemic. -/- We agree with the structural approach. To that end, we think it would be fruitful to include attention to physical contributors to structural inequality, namely the material artifacts used in medicine. Devices, tools, and technologies can materialize biases, perpetuate oppression, and contribute to health disparities. Granted, not everything that interests philosophers can be squeezed into medical education. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for including the study of material artifacts in education designed to reduce health disparities. First, devices and tools often carry forward biases from the past, and keep biases hidden from plain sight. Second, by studying these artifacts, future clinicians can begin to see themselves as part of a larger sociotechnical system. Finally, as medicine becomes increasingly tech-laden, it’s important for clinicians to see how material artifacts (including algorithms) connect individuals to structures. This will help to undermine oversimplified narratives according to which objective tools and technologies can correct for the bias and subjectivity of flawed human beings. (shrink)

This essay presents the conditional probability of co-contribution account of the individuation of cognitive systems (CPC) and argues that CPC provides an attractive basis for a theory of the cognitive self. The argument proceeds in a largely indirect way, by emphasizing empirical challenges faced by an approach that relies entirely on predictive processing (PP) mechanisms to ground a theory of the cognitive self. Given the challenges faced by PP-based approaches, we should prefer a theory of the cognitive self of the (...) sort CPC offers, one that accommodates variety in the kinds of mechanism that, when integrated, constitute a cognitive system (and thus the cognitive self), to a theory according to which the cognitive self is composed of essentially one kind of thing, for instance, prediction-error minimization mechanisms. The final section focuses on one of the central functions of the cognitive self: to engage in conscious reasoning. It is argued that the phenomenon of conscious, deliberate reasoning poses an apparently insoluble problem for a PP-based view, one that seems to rest on a structural limitation of predictive-processing models. In a nutshell, conscious reasoning is a single-stream phenomenon, but, in order for PP to apply, two streams of activity must be involved, a prediction stream and an input stream. Thus, with regard to the question of the nature of the self, PP-based views must yield to an alternative approach, regardless of whether proponents of the predictive processing, as a comprehensive theory of cognition, can handle the various empirical challenges canvassed in the preceding section. (shrink)

The Psychology of Juvenile Delinquency: Understanding Causes and Solutions -/- Juvenile delinquency is a major societal concern, as it involves young individuals engaging in criminal or antisocial behavior. The study of its psychology seeks to understand why adolescents commit crimes, what factors influence their actions, and how society can prevent and rehabilitate them. This essay explores the psychological theories behind juvenile delinquency, the causes that contribute to it, and the possible interventions to reduce its occurrence. -/- Psychological Theories (...) of Juvenile Delinquency -/- Psychologists have developed various theories to explain why some juveniles engage in delinquent behavior. These theories provide insight into the mental and social processes that lead to criminal tendencies. -/- 1. Psychodynamic Theory (Freud) -/- Sigmund Freud proposed that early childhood experiences shape personality and behavior. If a child experiences neglect, abuse, or trauma, unresolved conflicts in the unconscious mind can lead to delinquent actions. -/- A weak superego (the moral part of the mind) may result in impulsive and criminal behavior due to a lack of guilt or moral reasoning. -/- 2. Behavioral Theory (Skinner) -/- B.F. Skinner’s behavioral theory suggests that actions are learned through reinforcement and punishment. -/- If a juvenile receives rewards (such as money, respect, or approval) from criminal behavior, they are likely to repeat it. -/- If punishment is inconsistent or absent, delinquency may continue. -/- 3. Social Learning Theory (Bandura) -/- Albert Bandura’s theory states that children learn by observing others. If they grow up in environments where crime is normalized, they may imitate criminal behavior. -/- Role models, such as parents, peers, or media figures, significantly influence a child’s behavior. -/- 4. Cognitive Theories -/- These theories focus on how juveniles process information and make decisions. -/- Some youth develop faulty thinking patterns, such as blaming others for their mistakes or justifying criminal actions. -/- Poor problem-solving skills and impulsivity also contribute to delinquency. -/- Causes of Juvenile Delinquency -/- Understanding the causes of juvenile delinquency is crucial in addressing and preventing it. Multiple factors contribute to criminal behavior among young individuals. -/- 1. Family Factors -/- A broken home, neglect, or abusive parenting can push children toward delinquency. -/- Children who experience harsh discipline, lack of supervision, or parental criminal behavior may develop antisocial tendencies. -/- 2. Peer Influence -/- Adolescents are highly influenced by their peers. If they associate with delinquent peers, they are more likely to engage in criminal behavior. -/- Gangs provide a sense of identity and belonging, but they also promote illegal activities. -/- 3. Socioeconomic Factors -/- Poverty, unemployment, and lack of educational opportunities can push juveniles toward crime. -/- In disadvantaged neighborhoods, exposure to drugs, violence, and criminal role models increases the likelihood of delinquency. -/- 4. Psychological and Biological Factors -/- Some juveniles have low self-control, high aggression, or mental health disorders (such as ADHD or conduct disorder), which increase the risk of delinquency. -/- Studies suggest that genetics and brain development also play a role in impulsive and violent behavior. -/- 5. School and Community Factors -/- Academic failure, dropping out of school, and negative school experiences can contribute to delinquency. -/- Weak social institutions and a lack of recreational activities lead to boredom, making crime an appealing alternative. -/- Prevention and Rehabilitation -/- To reduce juvenile delinquency, a combination of early intervention, education, family support, and rehabilitation is necessary. -/- 1. Family Interventions -/- Parents should receive training on effective discipline, supervision, and communication skills. -/- Family counseling can help resolve conflicts and strengthen relationships. -/- 2. School-Based Programs -/- Early education programs can improve academic skills and social behavior, reducing the risk of delinquency. -/- Schools should implement anti-bullying programs and mentorship initiatives to create a positive environment. -/- 3. Community Programs -/- After-school activities, sports, and vocational training can provide alternatives to crime. -/- Rehabilitation centers should focus on therapy, skill development, and reintegration into society. -/- 4. Legal and Social Policies -/- The justice system should prioritize rehabilitation over punishment for juvenile offenders. -/- Policies that address poverty, inequality, and access to education can reduce crime incentives. -/- Conclusion -/- Juvenile delinquency is a complex issue influenced by psychological, social, and environmental factors. Understanding the psychological roots of delinquent behavior can help in creating effective prevention and rehabilitation programs. By strengthening families, improving education, and providing positive social influences, society can reduce juvenile crime and help young individuals develop into responsible citizens. Addressing juvenile delinquency is not just about punishing offenders but also about addressing the underlying causes and guiding youth toward a better future. -/- . (shrink)

The Psychology of Gossip Obsession -/- Gossip is a universal human behavior, deeply ingrained in social interactions. While it can serve useful purposes—such as reinforcing social norms and strengthening group bonds—an obsession with gossip can lead to negative consequences, including invasion of privacy, misinformation, and social toxicity. Understanding the psychology behind gossip obsession helps explain why people are so drawn to it and how it can be managed. -/- Why Do People Gossip? -/- 1. Evolutionary Psychology: Survival (...) and Social Bonding -/- In early human societies, gossip helped individuals navigate social hierarchies and avoid potential threats. -/- Sharing information about others’ behaviors allowed groups to regulate social norms and enforce cooperation. -/- People who stayed informed about their peers had an advantage in forming alliances and avoiding deception. -/- 2. Dopamine and the Pleasure of Gossiping -/- Gossip activates the brain’s reward system, releasing dopamine, the same neurotransmitter involved in pleasure and addiction. -/- People feel a sense of excitement or satisfaction when sharing or hearing juicy information, reinforcing the habit. -/- 3. Social Status and Power -/- Gossiping about others can create a sense of social superiority. -/- Those who spread insider knowledge may feel more influential within their social circles. -/- Negative gossip can sometimes be used to diminish the status of others and elevate one’s own standing. -/- 4. Emotional Regulation and Catharsis -/- Talking about others can serve as an emotional outlet, helping people vent frustrations. -/- Sharing experiences of betrayal, unfairness, or scandal can provide a sense of validation and solidarity. -/- 5. Curiosity and the Desire for Novelty -/- Humans are naturally curious, and gossip often involves unpredictable or surprising information. -/- The brain is wired to pay attention to unusual or dramatic events, making gossip irresistible. -/- 6. Fear of Exclusion and the Need for Belonging -/- Staying informed about social dynamics helps people feel included and avoid being left out. -/- Gossiping together strengthens social bonds by creating shared knowledge and experiences. -/- 7. Projection and Psychological Defense Mechanisms -/- Some people gossip to project their insecurities onto others. -/- By focusing on someone else’s flaws, they distract themselves from their own weaknesses. -/- Why Some People Become Obsessed with Gossip -/- 1. Low Self-Esteem and Insecurity -/- Those who lack self-confidence may gossip to shift attention away from themselves. -/- Engaging in gossip can provide a temporary boost in self-worth by making others look worse. -/- 2. Addiction to Drama and Sensationalism -/- Some individuals develop a dependency on the emotional high of gossip. -/- This can be linked to a need for excitement, distraction from boredom, or avoidance of personal issues. -/- 3. Lack of Personal Fulfillment -/- People who are not satisfied with their own lives may focus excessively on the lives of others. -/- Celebrity gossip and social media drama can serve as an escape from their own problems. -/- 4. Peer Pressure and Social Conformity -/- In environments where gossip is a norm, individuals may feel compelled to participate to fit in. -/- Workplace gossip, school cliques, and online communities often encourage this behavior. -/- 5. Media Influence and the Digital Age -/- The internet has made gossip more accessible, encouraging an endless cycle of speculation and commentary. -/- Social media algorithms prioritize sensational and controversial content, reinforcing gossip obsession. -/- Consequences of Gossip Obsession -/- 1. Psychological and Emotional Impact -/- Increased anxiety and paranoia about how one is perceived by others. -/- Reduced trust and deeper insecurities due to constant comparison. -/- 2. Relationship Damage -/- Gossip can ruin friendships, workplace dynamics, and reputations. -/- People who gossip excessively may lose credibility and respect. -/- 3. Ethical and Moral Consequences -/- Spreading false or harmful information can contribute to bullying, defamation, and social division. -/- Unethical gossip can destroy lives and create unnecessary conflict. -/- How to Manage Gossip Obsession -/- 1. Develop Self-Awareness -/- Recognize when gossip is becoming a habit and ask yourself why you are engaging in it. -/- Reflect on whether it serves a meaningful purpose or just fuels negativity. -/- 2. Build Self-Confidence -/- Strengthen your self-worth so you don’t need to elevate yourself by putting others down. -/- Focus on personal growth and meaningful achievements. -/- 3. Seek Positive Social Interactions -/- Surround yourself with people who engage in constructive conversations rather than gossip. -/- Build relationships based on mutual respect and support. -/- 4. Limit Exposure to Toxic Media -/- Avoid celebrity gossip websites, clickbait news, and negative social media feeds. -/- Follow content that promotes personal development, knowledge, and meaningful discussions. -/- 5. Shift the Conversation -/- If a conversation turns into gossip, redirect it to a more positive or neutral topic. -/- Encourage discussions about ideas, experiences, and shared goals instead of personal rumors. -/- 6. Practice Empathy and Compassion -/- Before spreading gossip, consider how it would feel if someone gossiped about you. -/- Recognize that everyone has struggles and flaws, and kindness is more valuable than judgment. -/- 7. Cultivate a Growth Mindset -/- Invest your energy in self-improvement, learning new skills, and pursuing hobbies. -/- The more fulfilled you feel in your own life, the less interest you will have in gossiping about others. -/- Conclusion -/- Gossip obsession is rooted in human psychology, from evolutionary survival instincts to modern social pressures. While gossip can serve as a social tool, excessive engagement in it can be harmful to both individuals and society. By developing self-awareness, practicing empathy, and shifting focus toward meaningful interactions, people can break free from gossip obsession and cultivate a healthier, more positive mindset. -/- . (shrink)

The article analyzes methodological and practical approaches of psychological counseling for adult clients. General psychological problems of this age group are generalized; the concept of restoration of balance between the image of the world and the image of the “I” of clients as the main internal mechanism of mental equilibrium is substantiated; the aspects of professional training of a psychologist to advisory practice with adults are considered. -/- The urgent problem of psychological counseling for adult clients is to help them (...) to solve such problems as negative behaviors, disadaptation, loss of the meaning of life, addictive behavior, depression, etc. Psychological help should be carried out in the direction of qualitative transformations of the image of the world and the image of “I”, which envisage the expansion of knowledge about the world, its positive emotional experience, the realism of ideological beliefs. The general trend in the development of the worldview is the lack of realism in the image of the world, which affects the formation of a false system of values, the development of distorted moral ideas, and as a consequence, problems of health, self-realization, professional adaptation, and behavior deviations. -/- The purpose of the article is to substantiate the methodology and methods of psychological counseling for clients of the adult age group. Specialization of practical activity of a psychologist with this age category requires special knowledge, skills, and skills from a specialist that qualitatively differ from the provision of psychological services to other age groups (children, adolescents, etc.). The success of solving the psychological problems of clients entirely depends on the introduction of the correct, in other words, “more objective”, realistic methodology of counseling. The task of the article is to describe specific aspects of advisory psychological counseling for adults. -/- Summarizing the issue of adult counseling, we note that this type of activity requires from a psychologist to continuously improve the theoretical knowledge and practical skills, as well as to rethink the life experience. The presence of only one of the components of this activity provokes unprofessionality – it often manifests as the behavior in the style of a teacher, a teacher of higher education, in which there is a somewhat superficial, authoritarian attitude to students. Consequently, effective counseling for adult clients is stimulated by professional introspection and qualification in order to avoid professional deviation. Therefore, it is advisable for a psychologist to gain experience with clients (patients) of the adult age group to practice in a counseling center under the guidance of a specialist, and if this is a medical institution – a doctor or therapist. (shrink)

A widely cited roadblock to bridging ecological psychology and enactivism is that the former identifies with realism and the latter identifies with constructivism, which critics charge is subjectivist. A pragmatic reading, however, suggests non-mental forms of constructivism that simultaneously fit core tenets of enactivism and ecological realism. After advancing a pragmatic version of enactive constructivism that does not obviate realism, I reinforce the position with an empirical illustration: Physarum polycephalum (a slime mold), a communal unicellular organism that leaves slime (...) trails that form chemical barriers that it avoids in foraging explorations. Here, environmental building and sensorimotor engagement are part of the same process with P. polycephalum coordinating around self-created, affordance-bearing geographies, which nonetheless exist independently in ways described by ecological realists. For ecological psychologists, affordances are values, meaning values are external to the perceiver. I argue that agent-enacted values have the same status and thus do not obviate ecological realism or generate subjectivism. The constructivist-realist debate organizes around the emphasis that enactivists and ecological theorists respectively place on the inner constitution of organisms vs. the structure of environments. Building on alimentary themes introduced in the P. polycephalum example and also in Gibson’s work, I go on to consider how environment, brain, visceral systems, and even bacteria within them enter perceptual loops. This highlights almost unfathomable degrees of mutually modulating internal and external synchronization. It also shows instances in which internal conditions alter worldly configurations and invert values, in Gibson’s sense of the term, albeit without implying subjectivism. My aim is to cut across the somatic focus of enactive constructivism and the external environment-oriented emphasis of ecological realism and show that enactivism can enrich ecological accounts of value. (shrink)

The theory of the organism-environment system starts with the proposition that in any functional sense organism and environment are inseparable and form only one unitary system. The organism cannot exist without the environment and the environment has descriptive properties only if it is connected to the organism. Although for practical purposes we do separate organism and environment, this common-sense starting point leads in psychological theory to problems which cannot be solved. Therefore, separation of organism and environment cannot be the basis (...) of any scientific explanation of human behavior. The theory leads to a reinterpretation of basic problems in many fields of inquiry and makes possible the definition of mental phenomena without their reduction either to neural or biological activity or to separate mental functions. According to the theory, mental activity is activity of the whole organism-environment system, and the traditional psychological concepts describe only different aspects of organisation of this system. Therefore, mental activity cannot be separated from the nervous system, but the nervous system is only one part of the organism­environment system. This problem will be dealt with in detail in the second part of the article. (shrink)

This paper offers and account of the "system" of probable reasoning presented in Hume's Treatise and first Enquiry. The system is sceptical because it takes our beliefs to be the product of naturally occurring psychological mechanisms rather than logically sound judgment, and because it declares those beliefs to be ultimately unjustifiable. This paper explains how Hume was nonetheless able to provide for a logic of probable reasoning, grounded on natural, but unjustifiable beliefs.

In a development that has still been hardly noticed by philosophers, a conception of ontology has been advanced in recent years in a series of extra-philosophical disciplines as researchers in linguistics, psychology, geography and anthropology have sought to elicit the ontological commitments (‘ontologies’, in the plural) of different cultures or disciplines. Exploiting the terminology of Quine, researchers in psychology and anthropology have sought to establish what individual human subjects, or entire human cultures, are committed to, ontologically, in their (...) everyday cognition, in much the same way in which philosophers of science have attempted to elicit the ontological commitments of the natural sciences. Thus they have engaged in inquiries designed to establish how folk ontologies (or folk biologies, folk theories of physics, folk psychologies, and so on) develop through infancy and childhood, or to establish the degree to which given elements of folk ontologies reflect universal features of the human cognitive system. In a parallel development, researchers in biomedicine developed what they called 'ontologies' as controlled vocabularies to ensure interoperability of the way in which, for example, genomic data is described in different biological disciplines. We describe in what follows some of the relations between these efforts and the more traditional concerns of philosophers. (shrink)

Coordinating competing interests can be difficult. Because law regulates human behavior, it is a candidate mechanism for creating coordination in the face of societal disagreement. We argue that findings from moral psy- chology are necessary to understand why law can effectively resolve co- occurring conflicts related to punishment and group membership. First, we discuss heterogeneity in punitive thought, focusing on punishment within the United States legal system. Though the law exerts a weak influence on punitive ideologies before punishment occurs, we (...) argue that it effectively coordinates perceptions of individuals who have already been punished. Next, we discuss intergroup conflict, which often co-occurs with disagree- ments related to punishment and represents a related domain where coor- dination can be difficult to achieve. Here, we underscore how insights from moral psychology can promote equality via the law. These examples demonstrate how contributions from moral psychology are necessary to understand the connection between social cognition and law. (shrink)

Papers, Please, by Lucas Pope (2013), explores the story of a customs inspector in the fictional political regime of Arstotzka. In this paper we explore the stories, systems and moral themes of Papers, Please in order to illustrate the systemic approach to designing videogames for moral engagement. Next, drawing on the Four Component model of ethical expertise from moral psychology, we contrast this systemic approach with the more common scripted approach. We conclude by demonstrating the different strengths (...) and weaknesses that these two approaches have when it comes to designing videogames that engage the different aspects of a player’s moral expertise. (shrink)

I develop a distinction between two types of psychological hedonism. Inferential hedonism (or “I-hedonism”) holds that each person only has ultimate desires regarding his or her own hedonic states (pleasure and pain). Reinforcement hedonism (or “R–hedonism”) holds that each person's ultimate desires, whatever their contents are, are differentially reinforced in that person’s cognitive system only by virtue of their association with hedonic states. I’ll argue that accepting R-hedonism and rejecting I-hedonism provides a conciliatory position on the traditional altruism debate, and (...) that it coheres well with the neuroscientist Anthony Dickinson’s theory about the evolutionary function of hedonic states, the “hedonic interface theory.” Finally, I’ll defend R-hedonism from potential objections. (shrink)

The early Stoics diagnose vicious agents with various psychological diseases, e.g. love of money and love of wine. Such diseases are characterized as false evaluative opinions that lead the agent to form emotional impulses for certain objects, e.g. money and wine. Scholars have therefore analyzed psychological diseases simply as dispositions for assent. This interpretation is incomplete, I argue, and should be augmented with the claim that psychological disease also affects what kind of action-guiding impressions are created prior to giving assent. (...) This proposal respects the Stoic insistence that impression-formation, no less than assent, is an activity of reason. In so far as the wine-lover’s reason is corrupted in a different way from the money-lover’s, the two vicious agents will form different action-guiding impressions when faced with similar stimuli. Here I juxtapose the Stoic account of expertise, according to which experts form more precise action-guiding impressions compared to the amateur, in virtue of possessing a system of grasps (katalēpseis). So expertise enhances, whereas psychological disease degrades, the representational fidelity of the impressions that prefigure action. With these commitments, the Stoics can be seen to offer a nuanced and principled theory of cognitive penetration and to anticipate some recent proposals in epistemology and cognitive science. (shrink)

A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern framework for philosophy(the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy as it was the first to describe (...) the two systems of thought and shows how our unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1 and how this interacts with System 2. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

With the rise and public accessibility of AI-enabled decision-support systems, individuals outsource increasingly more of their decisions, even those that carry ethical dimensions. Considering this trend, scholars have highlighted that uncritical deference to these systems would be problematic and consequently called for investigations of the impact of pertinent technology on humans’ ethical decision-making. To this end, this article conducts a systematic review of existing scholarship and derives an integrated framework that demonstrates how intelligent decision-support systems (IDSSs) shape humans’ ethical decision-making. (...) In particular, we identify resulting consequences on an individual level (i.e., deliberation enhancement, motivation enhancement, autonomy enhancement and action enhancement) and on a societal level (i.e., moral deskilling, restricted moral progress and moral responsibility gaps). We carve out two distinct methods/operation types (i.e., processoriented and outcome-oriented navigation) that decision-support systems can deploy and postulate that these determine to what extent the previously stated consequences materialize. Overall, this study holds important theoretical and practical implications by establishing clarity in the conceptions, underlying mechanisms and (directions of) influences that can be expected when using particular IDSSs for ethical decisions. (shrink)

The relation between mental processes and brain activity is studied from the point of view of the theory of the organism-environment system. It is argued that the systemic point of view leads to a new kind of definition of the primary tasks of neurophysiology and to a new understanding of the traditional neurophysiological concepts. Neurophysiology is restored to its place as a part of biology: its task is the study of neurons as living units, not as computer chips. Neurons (...) are living units which are organised as metabolic systems in connection with other neurons; they are not units which would carry out some psychological functions or maintain states which are typical only of the whole organism-environment system. Psychological processes, on the other hand, are processes always comprising the whole organism-environment system. (shrink)

There is a growing focus on public health initiatives that prioritise well-being. The main question of our study is whether this, in its current form, can really represent a new response to the challenges of previous strategies, or whether there is a greater chance that it will essentially reproduce the problems associated with the paradoxical situation of public health. Based on a review, analysis and evaluation of the literature on well-being in public health, we outlined the foundations of a new (...) meta-theory of well-being and a possibility for its social application. In our view, well-being is seen as a social representation of a combination of positive and negative freedom of choice concerning the quality of everyday life, used in a positioning process involving both individual and collective aspects. Health is a particular aspect of the social representation and positioning of well-being, which encompasses aspects of the physical, psychological, social and spiritual functioning of individuals. The well-being meta-theory also opens up the possibility for more effective solutions to the social challenges related to well-being and salutogenetic health. It underscores the importance of the need for a dedicated social subsystem where the goals and organizational culture of the organizations involved are focused on well-being and health promotion. In our study, we consider this to be the Public Well-being System (PWS). (shrink)

Efforts to bridge emotion theory with neurobiology can be facilitated by dynamic systems (DS) modeling. DS principles stipulate higher-order wholes emerging from lower-order constituents through bidirectional causal processes cognition relations. I then present a psychological model based on this reconceptualization, identifying trigger, self-amplification, and self-stabilization phases of emotion-appraisal states, leading to consolidating traits. The article goes on to describe neural structures and functions involved in appraisal and emotion, as well as DS mechanisms of integration by which they interact. These mechanisms (...) include nested feedback interactions, global effects of neuromodulation, vertical integration, action-monitoring, and synaptic plasticity, and they are modeled in terms of both functional integration and temporal synchronization. I end by elaborating the psychological model of emotion–appraisal states with reference to neural processes. (shrink)

Social norms are commonly understood as rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community. Many researchers have sought to explain the ubiquity of social norms in human life in terms of the psychological mechanisms underlying their acquisition, conformity, and enforcement. Existing theories of the psychology of social norms appeal to a variety of constructs, from prediction-error minimization, to reinforcement learning, to shared intentionality, to domain-specific adaptations for norm acquisition. (...) In this paper, we propose a novel methodological and conceptual framework for the cognitive science of social norms that we call normative pluralism. We begin with an analysis of the explanatory aims of the cognitive science of social norms. From this analysis, we derive a recommendation for a reformed conception of its explanandum: a minimally psychological construct that we call normative regularities. Our central empirical proposal is that the psychological underpinnings of social norms are most likely realized by a heterogeneous set of cognitive, motivational, and ecological mechanisms that vary between norms and between individuals, rather than by a single type of process or distinctive norm system. This pluralistic approach, we suggest, offers a methodologically sound point of departure for a fruitful and rigorous science of social norms. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to introduce, into the English scientific-philosophical literature of Genetic Epistemology, a model called the Model of the System of Schemes of Actions and Operations on Symbols and Signs (MoSSAOSS), and summarize its results, so far. MoSSAOSS articulates some of the principal theoretical and experimental results obtained by Piaget and his coworkers, in a systemic, systematic and synthetic view. Here, the term model means a schematic representation of experience, in which the relation of elements (...) can be explored by means of logic and mathematics in order to deduce properties that correspond to direct observable empirical properties, in a sufficiently accurate form. Through explicit definitions and hypotheses, MoSSAOSS intends to reveal, in an abstract and simplified form, the general structure and functioning of the System of Schemes of Actions and Operations on Symbols and Signs. This system makes explicit the necessary elements for the acquisition of knowledge by the epistemic subject (the knower subject), allowing for the explanation of its developmental stages, as well as the attribution of meaning to objects and situations, and to the subject’s actions and operations. Conceived in 1992 and introduced in Portuguese scientific-philosophical literature in 2014, MoSSAOSS has been used in a research program to study the necessary structures for knowledge acquisition, particularly scientific-philosophical knowledge. Its main results are summarized here. (shrink)

As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ (which can only be about how the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is (...) classic Searle—superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. As in his previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses and he does not grasp that the issues are always about language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. After providing a framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the two systems of thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the book. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences (...) are neither straightforward nor consistent, and are complicated by commercial interests and tensions around compulsive overuse. This multi-layered reality requires an analysis that is itself multidimensional and that takes into account human experience at various levels of resolution. We borrow from HCI and psychological research to apply a model (“METUX”) that identifies six distinct spheres of technology experience. We demonstrate the value of the model for understanding human autonomy in a technology ethics context at multiple levels by applying it to the real-world case study of an AI-enhanced video recommender system. In the process we argue for the following three claims: 1) There are autonomy-related consequences to algorithms representing the interests of third parties, and they are not impartial and rational extensions of the self, as is often perceived; 2) Designing for autonomy is an ethical imperative critical to the future design of responsible AI; and 3) Autonomy-support must be analysed from at least six spheres of experience in order to approriately capture contradictory and downstream effects. (shrink)

Justice for human rights violations involves taking into account psychological harm caused to individuals and communities. Justice for psychological harm is specifically grounded in four considerations: (1) that harm to human persons can be both physical and psychological (2) that even in the absence of physical injuries, psychological harm can constitute a human rights violation (3) that those causing psychological harm ought to be accountable, and (4) that claims for justice for harm are supported by human rights principles. One finds (...) that across legal systems, laws align and support these considerations while making justice for psychological harms a matter of rights, well-being, and state responsibility. Human rights practice, literature, and studies highlight the contribution of law and psychology toward justice for psychological harms. Questions of interest to both are whether there is a universal theory on psychological harms to inform matters of justice; whether psychological harm can have a cultural context; whether psychological suffering can have an empirical measure; and whether newer threats like climate anxiety and technology-based harm are being addressed. (shrink)

This three part paper explores how the approaches of cybernetics (a field investigating how complex systems- brains, individuals, societies and machines navigate their realities) have influenced education and psychology over time. The first part recounts the establishment of first-order cybernetics, and the emergence of an observer driven approach to understanding the adaptation of living systems at the Macy Conferences. I suggest that psychology adopted the computational aspects of cybernetics models, paying attention to figure-ground relationships rather than emergent, integrated (...) relationalities in human learning and adaptation, leading to the popularization of neuropsychological and information processing approaches in the 50s and 60s. The second part outlines emergence and sudden decline of second-order cybernetics through research efforts at the Biological Computer Laboratory, and suggests psychology and education bifurcated from this approach during the Cognitive Revolution, producing social cognitive and cognitivist approaches, direct instruction, and prescribed outcomes for learning and mental models. The third part suggests the aftereffects of the Cognitive Revolution led to (re)interpretation of constructivist approaches through a cognitivist lens by scholars like Jerome Bruner, and outlines current efforts to embrace the ethos of second-order cybernetics in educational and psychological research and treat learners as historical actors constantly evolving in a complex social world. (shrink)

Purpose – A key cybernetics concept, information transmitted in a system, was quantified by Shannon. It quickly gained prominence, inspiring a version by Harvard psychologists Garner and Hake for “absolute identification” experiments. There, human subjects “categorize” sensory stimuli, affording “information transmitted” in perception. The Garner-Hake formulation has been in continuous use for 62 years, exerting enormous influence. But some experienced theorists and reviewers have criticized it as uninformative. They could not explain why, and were ignored. Here, the “why” is answered. (...) The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – A key Shannon data-organizing tool is the confusion matrix. Its columns and rows are, respectively, labeled by “symbol sent” (event) and “symbol received” (outcome), such that matrix entries represent how often outcomes actually corresponded to events. Garner and Hake made their own version of the matrix, which deserves scrutiny, and is minutely examined here. Findings – The Garner-Hake confusion-matrix columns represent “stimulus categories”, ranges of some physical stimulus attribute (usually intensity), and its rows represent “response categories” of the subject’s identification of the attribute. The matrix entries thus show how often an identification empirically corresponds to an intensity, such that “outcomes” and “events” differ in kind (unlike Shannon’s). Obtaining a true “information transmitted” therefore requires stimulus categorizations to be converted to hypothetical evoking stimuli, achievable (in principle) by relating categorization to sensation to intensity. But those relations are actually unknown, perhaps unknowable. Originality/value – The author achieves an important understanding: why “absolute identification” experiments do not illuminate sensory processes. (shrink)

In “Rethinking Norm Psychology,” Cecilia Heyes offers an insightful critique of nativist approaches to the psychology of norms and then proposes a plausible alternative model grounded in the theory of cognitive gadgets. We are broadly sympathetic to both the critique and to the cognitive-gadgets model, though our own pluralistic approach to the psychology of norms (Westra & Andrews, 2022) leads us to think that the range of psychological and ecological processes that contributes to our norm psychology (...) is even more diverse than what Heyes proposes. Here, though, we focus on Heyes’s conceptual critique of the nativist model and its explanatory target—namely, a system for representing and processing rules. Heyes’s criticism of this representational rule-based conception of the psychology of norms is quite sound. However, we will argue that Heyes’s alternative behavioral explanandum for the psychology of norms also fails to escape the gravitational pull of a rule-based approach. (shrink)

Until the late 19th century scientists almost always assumed that the world could be described as a rule-based and hence deterministic system or as a set of such systems. The assumption is maintained in many 20th century theories although it has also been doubted because of the breakthrough of statistical theories in thermodynamics (Boltzmann and Gibbs) and other fields, unsolved questions in quantum mechanics as well as several theories forwarded within the social sciences. Until recently it has furthermore been assumed (...) that a rule-based and deterministic system was also predictable if only the rules were known, but this assumption has now been undermined by modern chaos-theory describing rule-based and deterministic, but unpredictable systems, while catastrophe-theory delivers a set of types describing various kinds of instability and conditions for the stability of a given system. Hence the main trait in the theoretical development in the 20th-century science can be described as a basic modification and limitation of some of the fundamental and strong assumptions forwarded in the previous epochs of modern science. Ironically, the very same process has been a process in which the human capacity to intervene in nature has expanded dramatically and mainly with the help of the very same theories, and not least because they allow nature to be described and made manipulable on a lower level and a more fine-grained scale. While the overall theoretical consistency between the various theories has gone, the reach of human intervention in nature has increased based on quite new dimensions whether in the area of physics (e.g.: energy technologies, chemical technologies, nanotechnologies etc.) or biology (ge¬netic manipulation) or in the area of psychology, sociology and culture (artificial simulations of mental processes, new means of communication, implying changes in the social infrastructure and cultural behaviour etc.). While some of these changes and new conditions can be reflected from within the conceptual framework of rule-based systems, albeit more complex than formerly recognized, others seem to give rise to the question of whether there are »systems« and relations between different systems in the world which are not rule-based? For instance, it seems to be obvious that the notion of instability represents a major conceptual break with former theories of rule-based systems, as the stability of the latter is an axiomatically given property implied in the very notion of rule-based systems, while instability can only be the result of external influence which should be explained as the result of another rule-based sy¬stem. While there are no difficulties implied concerning the stability of rule-based systems, the notion of unstable states of a system raises the question of how there can be a system at all if there are no invariant stabilising principles? This is the first question which I will address. And I shall do so by taking two examples of such systems as my point of departure. The first example will be the computer and the second will be ordinary language. In both cases I will argue that the stability of these systems (which are both defined by the existence/presence of human intentions) are provided by the help of - differently organised - redundancy functions which both allow the maintenance of systems in unstable macro-states, suspension of previous rules, underdetermination and overdetermination and generation/emergence/creation of new rules more or less independent of previous rules by the help of optional recursions to the permanently accessible underlying levels as for instance the level of binary representation in computers. Since the notion of redundancy is both controversial as such and often avoided, the concept is discussed (as defined in Claude Shannon's mathematical theory of information and in the semiotic framework of J. J. Greimas) and leading to a more general definition in which the redundancy functions serve to overcome noisy conditions, but at the cost of rule-based stability, determination, and predictability. A second question will be how the notion of rule-generating systems relates to the notion of anticipatory systems and it will be argued that rule-generating systems share some features with an¬ticipatory systems and that the former from a certain viewpoint can be seen as a subclass of the latter, although anticipative features are not necessarily a part of the definition of rule-generating systems. On the other hand, it will be discussed whether anticipatory systems which are not rule-generating systems can exist and it will be argued that the capacity to anticipate is strongly limited if it is not part of a rule-generating system. Therefore, it is concluded that the most powerful anticipatory systems need to be rule-generating systems. (shrink)

From his earliest work forward, phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new ontology of nature that would avoid the antinomies of realism and idealism by showing that nature has its own intrinsic sense which is prior to reflection. The key to this new ontology was the concept of form, which he appropriated from Gestalt psychology. However, Merleau-Ponty struggled to give a positive characterization of the phenomenon of form which would clarify its ontological status. Evan Thompson has recently taken (...) up Merleau-Ponty’s ontology as the basis for a new, “enactive” approach to cognitive science, synthesizing it with concepts from dynamic systems theory and Francisco Varela’s theory of autopoiesis. However, Thompson does not quite succeed in resolving the ambiguities in Merleau-Ponty’s account of form. This article builds on an indication from Thompson in order to propose a new account of form as asymmetry, and of the genesis of form in nature as symmetry-breaking. These concepts help us to escape the antinomies of Modern thought by showing how nature is the autoproduction of a sense which can only be known by an embodied perceiver. (shrink)