This book offers a detailed study of the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, focussing on their concept of power as potentia, concrete power, rather than power as potestas, authorised power. The focus on power as potentia generates a new conception of popular power. Radical democrats–whether drawing on Hobbes's 'sleeping sovereign' or on Spinoza's 'multitude'–understand popular power as something that transcends ordinary institutional politics, as for instance popular plebsites or mass movements. However, the book argues that these (...) understandings reflect a residual scholasticism which Hobbes and Spinoza ultimately repudiate. Instead, on the book's revisionist conception, a political phenomenon should be said to express popular power when it is both popular (it eliminates oligarchy and encompasses the whole polity), and also powerful (it robustly determines political and social outcomes). Two possible institutional forms that this popular power might take are distinguished: Hobbesian repressive egalitarianism, or Spinozist civic strengthening. But despite divergent institutional proposals, the book argues that both Hobbes and Spinoza share the conviction that there is nothing spontaneously egalitarian or good about human collective existence. From this point of view, the book accuses radical democrats of pernicious romanticism; the slow, meticulous work of organizational design and maintenance is the true centre of popular power. Three minute video summary available via HPBin3. Extended discussion on The Political Theory Review podcast. First chapter open access available via Oxford Scholarship Online. Videos of book talks at National University of Singapore (Centre for Legal Theory) and Universidad de Buenos Aires (Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani) available via YouTube. (See links below.). (shrink)

The European Hobbes Society Online Colloquium featured my book, Potentia: Hobbes and Spinoza on Power and Popular Politics, with critical commentaries from Alissa MacMillan, Chris Holman, and Justin Steinberg. This is my response to their commentaries.

The European Hobbes Society Online Colloquium featured my book, Potentia: Hobbes and Spinoza on Power and Popular Politics. This is a précis of the book.

Over the past few decades, scholars have reassessed the role of amour-propre in Rousseau’s thought. While it was once believed that he had an entirely negative valuation of the emotion, it is now widely held that he finds it useful and employs it to strengthen moral attachments, conjugal love, civic virtue and moral heroism. At the same time, scholars are divided as to whether this positive amour-propre is an antidote to the negative or dangerous form. Some scholars are confident (...) that ‘inflamed’ amour-propre can be overcome while others adopt a more fatalistic view. While mindful of Rousseau’s pessimism in his most famous works, this essay seeks to identify a middle position. By contending Rousseau’s discussion of amour-propre is largely concerned with the problems surrounding identity construction in commercial, urban societies, it will be argued that amour-propre can be lessened to manageable levels in more rural societies, that is, agrarian provincial life. (shrink)

Citizenship is the right to be a citizen of a social, political, or national community. Aristotle was the philosopher who has been talking about citizenship since ancient times. His thoughts are still historical lessons for the operation of states today. In this article, the author focuses on analyzing basic thoughts on Aristotle's citizenship; which are shown in essential points such as (i) Citizenship is clearly shown in the role of the State, (ii) Right to education, (iii) The right to participate (...) in political affairs, (iv) Citizenship is associated with civic obligations. Thereby, the article draws its historical lesson for the current building of law-governed State in Vietnam in the following aspects: (i) Building a solid-state apparatus with a coherent and unified legal system; (ii) All the State's policies must originate from the Vietnamese practice, ensure the people's mastery and protect the people's legitimate interests; (iii) Consolidating and strengthening the relationship between the State and the people. (shrink)

Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value system suitable for a liberal democracy while facing the need to strengthen mental strength in response to unpredictable security situations. The key to fulfilling these twofold objectives lies in the fact that there is a positive correlation between the enhancement of a soldier’s democratic awareness and intangible force. Therefore, it is of great importance to emphasize the concept of ‘citizen in uniform’ as one of the (...) central military values. However, this concept has one problem before its use in military mental strength in which the orders of the military status and the orders of the civic seem heterogeneous and even conflicting. This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people. A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it. (shrink)

Why Very Few Filipinos Are Interested in a Political Career and the Debate on Political Dynasties -/- Politics in the Philippines is a critical force in shaping the nation’s future. However, few Filipinos actively pursue a political career due to political dynasties, corruption, financial barriers, security risks, and public distrust in government. Additionally, many Filipinos engage in passive criticism—they are quick to complain about bad governance but reluctant to participate in political change. -/- While political dynasties are often blamed for (...) limiting opportunities, some argue they bring stability and governance experience that newcomers lack. Given these challenges, meaningful reforms are necessary to make politics more inclusive, transparent, and accessible to competent and ethical leaders. -/- Reasons Why Few Filipinos Enter Politics -/- 1. Political Dynasties Limit Opportunities for New Leaders -/- Political families monopolize power, making it hard for new candidates to enter the political arena. With dynasties controlling campaign funding, voter influence, and government positions, independent candidates face unfair competition. -/- 2. Filipinos Are Trapped in a “Criticism Mentality” but Avoid Action -/- Many Filipinos frequently criticize politicians on social media but do not: -/- Vote wisely -/- Participate in governance initiatives -/- Consider running for office -/- This passive yet highly critical audience mentality discourages new leaders from emerging, leaving traditional political families unchallenged. -/- 3. Corruption and Patronage Politics Discourage Honest Candidates -/- Many competent individuals avoid politics because they fear they will be forced to engage in corrupt practices or become powerless against established political elites. -/- 4. High Cost of Running for Office -/- Elections in the Philippines require millions of pesos in campaign funds. Political dynasties have vast financial resources, while new candidates struggle to afford advertisements, rallies, and logistics. -/- 5. Work-Life Balance and Security Risks -/- Political careers demand long hours, constant public scrutiny, and expose candidates to political violence and assassination risks. This discourages potential leaders from entering politics. -/- 6. Lack of Trust in Government -/- Many Filipinos believe the system is rigged and that no real change can happen. This disillusionment prevents capable individuals from seeking public office. -/- 7. Bureaucracy and Slow Reforms -/- Even well-intentioned politicians struggle with red tape, partisan gridlock, and resistance from political elites. This slow pace of change discourages new leaders. -/- 8. Fear of Failure and Political Rivalries -/- Losing an election can be financially and socially devastating. Additionally, political rivalries often result in: -/- Character assassinations -/- Legal harassment -/- Physical threats or violence -/- This hostile environment discourages many Filipinos from pursuing politics. -/- The Debate on Political Dynasties: Should They Stay or Go? -/- Why Political Dynasties Should Stay -/- Some argue that political dynasties provide stability and experience, especially because: -/- 1. Governance Knowledge – Long-standing political families understand government operations better than inexperienced newcomers. -/- 2. Continuity in Leadership – Dynasties ensure long-term projects and reforms are completed rather than abandoned after elections. -/- 3. Strong Political Networks – Established families have the connections to efficiently implement policies. -/- 4. Newcomers Are a Risk – Some first-time politicians struggle with decision-making, leading to ineffective governance. -/- Why Political Dynasties Should Be Limited -/- Critics argue that dynasties create an unfair monopoly and prevent new leadership from emerging. -/- 1. Lack of Political Competition – Dynasties dominate elections, leaving little room for independent candidates. -/- 2. Corruption and Self-Interest – Many dynastic politicians prioritize family wealth and power over public service. -/- 3. Poor Performance Goes Unpunished – Many voters elect familiar names instead of choosing the most qualified leaders. -/- 4. Public Disillusionment – When the same families hold power for decades, people feel elections are meaningless. -/- Possible Reforms to Make Politics More Inclusive -/- To encourage competent and ethical leaders to enter politics, the following reforms can be implemented: -/- 1. Implement a Balanced Anti-Dynasty Law -/- Instead of banning dynasties outright, a reasonable anti-dynasty law can be implemented to: -/- Limit how many family members can hold office at the same time. -/- Prevent immediate re-election of relatives in the same position. -/- Ensure fair election funding to give independent candidates a fighting chance. -/- This would help promote merit-based governance while maintaining stability. -/- 2. Publicly Funded Campaigns for Independent Candidates -/- To level the playing field, the government should: -/- Subsidize campaign expenses for qualified independent candidates. -/- Limit private donations to reduce dynastic control over elections. -/- Enforce transparency in campaign financing to prevent corruption. -/- 3. Establish Political Education and Leadership Training -/- Many Filipinos lack political awareness. Schools and universities should: -/- Include political education in the curriculum. -/- Offer leadership training for aspiring politicians. -/- Provide internship programs in government offices. -/- This will help develop a new generation of well-educated and competent leaders. -/- 4. Strengthen Anti-Corruption Laws and Government Transparency -/- To restore public trust, reforms should: -/- Enforce real-time transparency in government spending. -/- Strengthen whistleblower protection to expose corruption. -/- Require full public disclosure of assets for all government officials. -/- 5. Improve Security for Political Candidates -/- To reduce election-related violence, the government should: -/- Provide police protection for independent candidates. -/- Enforce stricter penalties for political violence. -/- Monitor private armies linked to political families. -/- This would create a safer environment for new candidates. -/- 6. Encourage Youth Participation in Governance -/- The government should: -/- Lower the age requirement for some government positions. -/- Establish youth representation in decision-making councils. -/- Offer mentorship programs between experienced leaders and young aspirants. -/- By engaging the youth in governance early, we create future leaders who are prepared for public service. -/- 7. Promote Politics as Public Service, Not Power -/- To shift the perception of politics from a business empire to a duty to serve, the media and educational institutions should: -/- Highlight stories of ethical and effective politicians. -/- Emphasize leadership based on qualifications, not family names. -/- Encourage civic engagement through volunteerism and grassroots participation. -/- 8. Digital Voting and Electoral Reforms -/- To prevent vote-buying and election fraud, the government should: -/- Implement secure digital voting to make elections more accessible and transparent. -/- Strengthen voter education campaigns to promote informed decision-making. -/- Crack down on vote-buying syndicates through stricter penalties. -/- Conclusion -/- Few Filipinos enter politics due to political dynasties, corruption, financial barriers, security risks, and lack of trust in government. Many Filipinos also have a passive criticism mentality, where they complain about politicians but refuse to take action. -/- While some argue that political dynasties bring governance experience and stability, others believe they prevent competition and encourage corruption. The best approach is to introduce balanced reforms that limit dynasty control while allowing experienced politicians to serve effectively. -/- By implementing anti-dynasty laws, campaign finance reforms, political education, and anti-corruption measures, the Philippines can open its political system to fresh, capable, and ethical leaders. -/- If these reforms are enacted, more Filipinos will step up to lead, creating a government that truly represents the people. -/- . (shrink)

Preventing Election Manipulation: Safeguards Against Propaganda and Hidden Motives -/- Elections are the foundation of democratic governance, ensuring that leadership reflects the will of the people. However, history has repeatedly shown that candidates can win by manipulating public perception through propaganda, misinformation, and by hiding their true motives. While such elections may be technically valid, they often lack ethical legitimacy, leading to governance that does not truly serve the public interest. To prevent election manipulation, societies must implement strong safeguards, including (...) media literacy education, independent journalism, strict election laws, social media regulation, political funding transparency, civic engagement, and whistleblower protections. By examining real-world examples from different countries, we can better understand how these measures strengthen democracy and protect the integrity of elections. -/- The Role of Media Literacy and Critical Thinking -/- One of the most effective ways to counter propaganda and manipulation is through media literacy education. When voters are equipped with the ability to critically analyze information, they are less likely to fall for deceptive political messaging. -/- Finland has integrated media literacy into its school curriculum, teaching students how to recognize misinformation, propaganda, and biased narratives. As a result, Finland ranks among the most resistant countries to fake news, demonstrating that an informed population is less susceptible to manipulation. -/- In Sweden, government agencies actively work with media organizations to educate citizens about misinformation, especially during election periods. -/- Estonia has taken a technological approach by incorporating digital literacy programs to help citizens distinguish between real and fake online content. -/- By investing in education that enhances critical thinking, societies can create an electorate that makes decisions based on truth rather than deception. -/- The Importance of Independent and Transparent Media -/- A free and independent press is crucial in exposing political deception and ensuring that voters have access to accurate information. Without independent journalism, political leaders can control narratives, suppress inconvenient truths, and mislead the public. -/- In the United States, investigative journalism has played a key role in exposing political corruption. The Watergate scandal, uncovered by journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon, demonstrating how the media can hold leaders accountable. -/- In South Korea, independent journalism was instrumental in exposing the corruption scandal involving former President Park Geun-hye, leading to mass protests and her eventual impeachment in 2017. -/- In India, independent news outlets like The Wire and Scroll continue to challenge misinformation and expose political propaganda, despite facing government pressure. -/- A strong and fearless media ensures that no political leader can manipulate elections without public scrutiny. -/- Strict Election Laws and Fact-Checking Institutions -/- Election laws must regulate campaign messaging, penalize misinformation, and promote transparency. Without strict regulations, candidates can use false narratives to mislead voters. -/- France bans political advertising on TV and radio in the months leading up to elections to prevent mass media manipulation. -/- Germany has strict laws against spreading false information that could influence election outcomes, including heavy fines for politicians or parties caught disseminating fake news. -/- South Africa has established the Electoral Commission, which monitors campaign activities and ensures fair political competition. -/- Additionally, independent fact-checking institutions play a vital role in verifying politicians’ claims. Organizations like PolitiFact in the U.S., Full Fact in the UK, and Africa Check in South Africa actively investigate political statements, providing voters with verified information. -/- Regulating Social Media to Prevent Manipulation -/- Social media has become a powerful tool for both legitimate political campaigns and misinformation. Without regulation, candidates can spread propaganda unchecked, influencing voter perceptions. -/- During Brazil’s elections, misinformation was widely spread through WhatsApp, influencing voter opinions. In response, WhatsApp limited the ability to forward mass messages to curb the spread of fake news. -/- The European Union has implemented strict digital regulations, requiring social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter to label political ads and remove false information that could influence elections. -/- In Indonesia, the government collaborates with technology companies to identify and remove fake news before it spreads during elections. -/- By regulating online political content and holding social media platforms accountable, governments can prevent digital platforms from becoming tools for manipulation. -/- Ensuring Transparency in Political Funding -/- When campaign financing is not transparent, wealthy donors, corporations, or even foreign entities can secretly influence elections to serve their own interests. Transparent funding laws ensure that voters know who is backing a candidate and why. -/- Canada enforces strict donation limits and public disclosure laws, preventing corporate and foreign influence in elections. -/- Mexico has implemented an independent electoral institute that monitors campaign financing to prevent corruption and ensure fair competition. -/- South Korea requires all political donations to be publicly disclosed, ensuring that funding sources are transparent. -/- When political funding is transparent, voters can assess whether a candidate is truly working for the public or for hidden interests. -/- Encouraging Civic Engagement and Public Debates -/- An engaged electorate is essential for a healthy democracy. Public debates allow candidates to present their policies while being questioned on their track records and potential contradictions. -/- Taiwan holds nationally televised public debates where candidates must defend their policies and respond to public concerns. -/- In Nigeria, civil society organizations organize town hall meetings where citizens can directly ask candidates about their plans and policies. -/- France requires presidential candidates to participate in at least one public debate before elections, ensuring that voters hear multiple perspectives. -/- By encouraging open discussion and debate, societies can reduce the effectiveness of propaganda and allow voters to make informed decisions. -/- Protecting Whistleblowers and Investigative Agencies -/- Corrupt and deceptive political campaigns can only be exposed if whistleblowers and investigative agencies are protected. When individuals feel safe to reveal political misconduct, democracy is strengthened. -/- Edward Snowden revealed mass government surveillance programs, sparking global discussions about privacy and state overreach. -/- In Ukraine, anti-corruption agencies and investigative journalists have exposed multiple cases of political fraud, leading to greater government transparency. -/- In Malaysia, whistleblower efforts exposed the 1MDB scandal, which involved billions of dollars in corruption at the highest levels of government, eventually leading to the prosecution of former Prime Minister Najib Razak. -/- Encouraging and protecting whistleblowers ensures that political leaders cannot hide their unethical actions from the public. -/- Conclusion -/- While manipulation, propaganda, and hidden motives remain threats to democracy, societies can take strong measures to prevent these tactics from determining election outcomes. By investing in media literacy, supporting independent journalism, enforcing strict election laws, regulating social media, ensuring financial transparency, encouraging civic engagement, and protecting whistleblowers, democracies can safeguard the integrity of elections. -/- Without these safeguards, democracy becomes vulnerable to manipulation, allowing candidates with hidden agendas to rise to power. However, countries that actively promote transparency, accountability, and critical thinking create an environment where deception is less effective. The fight against election manipulation is an ongoing challenge, but with the right policies and public awareness, fair elections can be preserved for future generations. -/- . (shrink)

Why Governments Become Corrupt: The Role of Power, Education, and Moral Values -/- Corruption is one of the most persistent problems in governance, affecting societies across different political and economic systems. It undermines democracy, weakens institutions, and diverts resources meant for public welfare into private hands. While corruption is often associated with greed and abuse of power, its roots go much deeper, extending to failures in the educational system and the erosion of family moral values. This essay explores the reasons (...) behind government corruption and how systemic failures in education and morality contribute to its persistence. -/- 1. Power Without Accountability -/- One of the primary reasons governments become corrupt is the unchecked power held by officials. When political leaders and bureaucrats operate without sufficient oversight, they are more likely to misuse public funds, manipulate policies, and engage in bribery or favoritism. In many countries, weak democratic institutions fail to impose consequences on corrupt individuals, allowing them to act with impunity. The absence of transparency in decision-making processes further enables corruption to thrive, as citizens are kept in the dark about how their governments operate. -/- 2. Weak Legal and Political Institutions -/- Corruption flourishes in environments where legal frameworks exist but are not enforced. Many countries have anti-corruption laws, yet enforcement is selective or non-existent. This failure is often due to political interference in the judiciary, where corrupt leaders appoint judges who will protect them from prosecution. Furthermore, when law enforcement agencies themselves are corrupt, they fail to investigate and punish those in power. This creates a vicious cycle where corruption becomes the norm rather than the exception. -/- 3. The Role of Greed and Self-Interest -/- Human nature, particularly the pursuit of wealth and status, plays a significant role in government corruption. Many officials prioritize their personal and political interests over the welfare of the people they serve. Bribery, embezzlement, and fraud become tempting options for those seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of society. Additionally, political patronage—where politicians use their power to reward loyal supporters with government positions or contracts—further entrenches corruption. -/- 4. The Failure of the Educational System -/- One of the overlooked causes of corruption is the failure of the educational system to instill ethical values and critical thinking. Education is supposed to shape responsible citizens, but in many countries, the system is focused on rote learning rather than teaching morality, civic responsibility, and ethical leadership. Schools and universities often do not provide students with the tools to question authority, recognize corruption, or demand transparency from their leaders. -/- Moreover, when the education system itself is corrupt—through bribery in admissions, fake diplomas, or unqualified teachers—it sets a dangerous precedent. Students grow up believing that success can be achieved through dishonest means, reinforcing the idea that corruption is an acceptable part of life. Without a strong moral foundation in education, future generations are more likely to participate in or tolerate corrupt practices. -/- 5. The Decline of Family Moral Values -/- Family plays a crucial role in shaping an individual’s ethical beliefs and behaviors. However, in many societies, traditional moral values that emphasize honesty, integrity, and accountability are declining. Parents, preoccupied with economic survival, may fail to teach their children the importance of moral principles. In some cases, families themselves engage in corrupt behaviors—such as paying bribes to secure jobs or influencing government officials for personal gain—sending the message that corruption is a necessary survival strategy. -/- Religious and cultural institutions, which once played a significant role in promoting ethical behavior, have also lost influence in many societies. As materialism and individualism grow stronger, the collective responsibility for upholding moral values weakens. When individuals lack strong moral guidance from their families and communities, they are more likely to justify corrupt actions when they gain positions of power. -/- 6. Economic Pressures and Low Salaries -/- Economic hardship can also drive corruption, especially in developing nations where government employees are underpaid. When officials struggle to meet their basic needs, they may resort to accepting bribes, embezzling funds, or engaging in illicit activities to supplement their income. In such environments, corruption becomes a survival mechanism rather than just a moral failure. -/- 7. Corporate Influence and Political Lobbying -/- The influence of powerful corporations over government policies is another major driver of corruption. Large businesses often fund political campaigns, expecting favorable policies in return. This results in leaders prioritizing corporate interests over public welfare. When governments are captured by private interests, policies that should benefit the majority are distorted to serve a wealthy elite. -/- 8. The Lack of Civic Engagement and Public Awareness -/- When citizens do not actively participate in governance or demand accountability, corrupt leaders face little resistance. A disengaged population allows corruption to thrive because there is no pressure for change. In many cases, people feel powerless or fear retaliation for speaking out against corrupt officials. Strengthening civic awareness through education, media, and public activism is essential in the fight against corruption. -/- Solutions: Restoring Integrity Through Education and Morality -/- To combat corruption effectively, reforms must address not only political and legal structures but also educational and moral foundations: -/- Strengthening the Educational System: Schools must incorporate ethics, civic responsibility, and critical thinking into their curriculum. Teachers should emphasize honesty and accountability, ensuring that students understand the long-term consequences of corruption. -/- Rebuilding Family Moral Values: Families must take a more active role in teaching children about integrity and social responsibility. Parents should set examples by refusing to participate in corrupt practices. -/- Enforcing Strong Anti-Corruption Laws: Governments must ensure that laws against corruption are applied equally, regardless of political or economic status. Independent judicial bodies should oversee investigations and prosecutions. -/- Improving Transparency in Governance: Public access to government transactions and decision-making processes must be expanded to reduce opportunities for corruption. Digital tools, such as open data platforms, can help track government spending and prevent misuse of funds. -/- Encouraging Citizen Participation: People must be empowered to hold their leaders accountable. This includes supporting investigative journalism, encouraging whistleblowers, and engaging in peaceful protests or advocacy movements. -/- Conclusion -/- Government corruption is a complex issue rooted in systemic failures, economic pressures, and ethical erosion. While power, greed, and weak institutions contribute to corruption, the failure of the educational system and the decline of moral values play an equally significant role. Addressing corruption requires a multi-faceted approach that not only strengthens laws and institutions but also reforms education and restores ethical foundations within families. Only through a collective effort to instill integrity at all levels of society can corruption be effectively minimized, paving the way for just and accountable governance. -/- . (shrink)

The Role of Power Transitions in Government Collapse: Historical Lessons and Solutions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. When power is transferred smoothly, institutions remain strong, and societies continue to function. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or poorly structured, they often lead to political instability, civil wars, or the complete breakdown of government structures. This essay explores the importance of power transitions in maintaining political stability by (...) examining historical examples where such transitions led to the collapse of governments. Additionally, it proposes solutions to prevent such collapses in the future. -/- The Critical Nature of Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. Several factors determine whether a transition is successful or leads to instability: -/- 1. Legitimacy of Succession – If the public and political elites accept the process of succession, transitions occur peacefully. However, when legitimacy is questioned, power struggles emerge. -/- 2. Institutional Strength – Strong political institutions ensure smooth power transitions, while weak institutions make governments dependent on individual rulers. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – When ruling elites agree on a transition, it is more likely to be peaceful. Divisions among elites can result in coups or civil wars. -/- 4. Public Support and Social Stability – If the population supports the transition, the government remains stable. Mass protests or revolts can destabilize regimes. -/- 5. Military and Security Forces’ Role – A neutral or loyal military ensures a peaceful transition, but if the military intervenes, coups or armed conflicts may occur. -/- 6. Economic Conditions – Economic crises can accelerate government collapse during power transitions by weakening public trust. -/- 7. External Influences – Foreign intervention, diplomatic pressure, or economic sanctions can shape whether a transition succeeds or leads to chaos. -/- Historical Examples of Power Transitions Leading to Collapse -/- 1. The Fall of the Roman Republic (1st Century BCE) -/- The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE triggered a power vacuum and civil war. The Republic collapsed as Augustus (Octavian) seized power and established the Roman Empire. The failure to create a smooth transition from the Republic to an alternative stable government structure led to one-man rule. -/- 2. The French Revolution (1789-1799) -/- The monarchy collapsed due to economic crises and public discontent. The power vacuum led to the Reign of Terror and multiple regime changes before Napoleon took control. The lack of a stable transition plan from monarchy to democracy resulted in violent political struggles. -/- 3. The Russian Revolution (1917) -/- Czar Nicholas II abdicated amid economic and military crises. The weak Provisional Government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, leading to decades of political purges. The failure to establish a strong democratic system allowed radical elements to seize power. -/- 4. The Weimar Republic and Hitler’s Rise (1933) -/- Germany’s economic crisis and political instability enabled Adolf Hitler to rise to power legally, leading to the collapse of democracy and the Nazi dictatorship. The failure of democratic institutions to resist authoritarian takeovers contributed to this transition failure. -/- 5. The Iranian Revolution (1979) -/- The Shah of Iran lost legitimacy due to repression and economic struggles. His departure created a power vacuum, allowing the Islamic Revolution to establish a theocratic regime. The lack of a democratic transition framework led to a total political shift. -/- 6. The Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) -/- Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms weakened the centralized government, leading to nationalist movements and economic collapse, resulting in the dissolution of the USSR. The sudden transition from communism to multiple independent states was mismanaged, leading to political chaos. -/- 7. The Arab Spring (2010-2012) -/- Mass protests led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. However, weak institutions and power vacuums resulted in ongoing instability and civil wars. The absence of structured political succession made these transitions chaotic. -/- 8. The Fall of the Afghan Government (2021) -/- The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 led to the rapid collapse of the Afghan government, allowing the Taliban to take power without resistance. The lack of a well-planned transition left a power vacuum that extremist groups exploited. -/- Solutions for Preventing Government Collapse During Power Transitions -/- 1. Establishing Strong Political Institutions -/- Governments should build independent institutions that can function regardless of leadership changes. -/- A clear legal framework for succession should be established, ensuring stability. -/- Example: United States Presidential Transition – Despite political disagreements, strong institutions ensure smooth transitions of power every four years. -/- 2. Promoting a Culture of Democratic Succession -/- Political education should emphasize peaceful transitions of power. -/- Leaders should prepare successors and ensure a stable transition process. -/- Example: South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid (1994) – Nelson Mandela ensured a peaceful transfer of power through negotiations, preventing civil war. -/- 3. Ensuring Economic Stability -/- Economic policies should focus on long-term growth and stability to prevent crises that weaken governments. -/- Governments should maintain financial reserves to manage economic downturns during transitions. -/- Example: China’s Economic Reforms (1978-Present) – Transition from Maoist policies to a market economy was gradual, preventing instability. -/- 4. Strengthening Public Trust in Government -/- Transparency and accountability should be prioritized to gain public confidence. -/- Civic engagement and public participation in governance should be encouraged. -/- Example: Post-World War II Japan – Japan rebuilt trust in democratic institutions, leading to long-term political stability. -/- 5. Avoiding Military Interventions in Politics -/- The military should remain neutral in political transitions and serve as a stabilizing force, not a political actor. -/- Civilian oversight of the military should be strengthened to prevent coups. -/- Example: Turkey’s Democratic Reforms – Despite past military coups, recent reforms have reduced military interference in politics. -/- 6. International Mediation and Support -/- International organizations (e.g., the UN) should assist in ensuring peaceful transitions in unstable regions. -/- Diplomatic pressure can prevent violent takeovers and encourage legitimate transitions. -/- Example: East Timor’s Independence (2002) – The UN helped facilitate a peaceful transition to democracy after Indonesian rule. -/- 7. Managing Internal and External Political Conflicts -/- Governments should ensure national unity by addressing ethnic and political divisions. -/- Foreign influence should be managed to prevent external powers from exploiting transitions. -/- Example: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Rebuilding – After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda implemented reconciliation policies to prevent future power struggles. -/- Conclusion -/- The transition of power is one of the most critical and dangerous moments for any government. If managed well, it can lead to stable governance and progress. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or forced, they can result in political collapse, violence, and societal breakdown. -/- The historical examples discussed demonstrate the importance of legitimacy, institutional strength, elite consensus, public support, and military neutrality in ensuring successful power transitions. By implementing solutions such as strong institutions, economic stability, democratic culture, and international mediation, governments can prevent collapse and ensure smooth transitions of power. -/- The fate of nations often depends not only on who rules, but on how power is transferred from one leader or system to the next. Learning from history and implementing practical solutions can help safeguard governments from the chaos of failed transitions. -/- . (shrink)

-/- Populism: A Double-Edged Sword in Modern Democracy -/- Populism is one of the most frequently used yet often misunderstood terms in contemporary political discourse. It has influenced elections, swayed public opinion, and reshaped national policies across the globe. At its core, populism is a political strategy or approach that aims to represent the interests and voice of the “common people” in opposition to a perceived corrupt elite or establishment. While it can reinvigorate democracy and bring neglected issues to the (...) forefront, populism also poses significant risks to democratic institutions and social cohesion. -/- Defining Populism -/- Populism does not function as a comprehensive ideology like conservatism or socialism. Rather, it operates as a political logic or style, often characterized by a dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Populist leaders claim to embody the general will of the people and typically frame their opposition as illegitimate or morally inferior. This approach often involves direct appeals to the masses, with disdain for traditional institutions like the judiciary, media, or political parties. -/- Populism can manifest across the ideological spectrum. Left-wing populism tends to focus on economic justice, inequality, and class struggle, while right-wing populism often emphasizes nationalism, cultural identity, and skepticism toward immigration or globalism. Regardless of political leaning, populism fundamentally seeks to mobilize people against established centers of power. -/- Historical Origins and Global Spread -/- The term “populism” originated from the U.S. People’s Party in the late 19th century. This movement represented the grievances of rural farmers against banks, railroads, and industrial monopolies (Kazin, 1995). Populism later gained prominence in Latin America through leaders like Juan Perón in Argentina and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, who blended charismatic leadership with policies aimed at empowering the poor and working class. -/- In the 21st century, populism has reemerged as a powerful force globally. In Europe, populist parties have capitalized on discontent stemming from economic crises, refugee influxes, and dissatisfaction with the European Union. In Asia and Africa, populist leaders have gained popularity by challenging colonial legacies, elite corruption, and foreign influence, often promising national revival and self-sufficiency. Populist movements have also gained traction in North America, where distrust in traditional political systems continues to grow. -/- The Appeal of Populism -/- Populism thrives in environments of crisis, inequality, and mistrust. Economic instability, unemployment, cultural change, and political disillusionment create fertile ground for populist narratives (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Populist leaders offer clear, emotionally resonant messages that speak directly to people’s fears, frustrations, and hopes. -/- The modern media landscape, particularly the rise of social media, has intensified the populist surge. Populist figures often bypass traditional media outlets to communicate directly with their supporters, spreading simple, relatable messages that may resonate more than complex policy debates (Moffitt, 2016). This direct connection fosters a sense of authenticity and responsiveness, further building trust among followers. -/- Criticisms and Dangers -/- Despite its potential to increase democratic engagement, populism carries several risks. First, by dividing society into binary opposites—good versus evil, people versus elite—it tends to polarize the political landscape. This can lead to the erosion of democratic dialogue, compromise, and mutual respect. -/- Second, populist leaders often challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions. By attacking the press, judiciary, or electoral processes, they may consolidate power and undermine checks and balances (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Some populist regimes have curtailed civil liberties, weakened the rule of law, or manipulated elections under the guise of fulfilling the people’s will. -/- Third, populism can result in unrealistic promises and short-term policies. Leaders may appeal to emotional grievances without addressing underlying structural problems. When results fail to materialize, disillusionment can set in, potentially fostering instability or extremism. -/- Feasible Solutions -/- To mitigate the dangers of populism while addressing its root causes, a multi-pronged approach is essential: -/- 1. Strengthen Democratic Institutions: Governments should reinforce the independence and credibility of democratic institutions—such as courts, electoral commissions, and public broadcasters. Transparent, accountable institutions build public trust and can resist manipulation by populist actors. -/- 2. Promote Inclusive Economic Policies: Economic inequality fuels populist discontent. Policymakers should implement inclusive policies that promote equitable access to jobs, education, and healthcare. Investment in rural areas and marginalized communities can reduce the perception of systemic neglect. -/- 3. Improve Political Communication and Civic Education: Citizens need to understand how democracy functions and how their participation matters. Educational systems should promote critical thinking, media literacy, and awareness of democratic norms to make citizens more resistant to demagoguery and misinformation. -/- 4. Address Legitimate Grievances Responsibly: Rather than dismissing populist concerns outright, mainstream parties and institutions should listen to citizens’ real frustrations—whether they stem from globalization, immigration, or corruption—and address them through practical and evidence-based policy solutions. -/- 5. Encourage Transparent and Ethical Leadership: Ethical governance, anti-corruption measures, and public accountability are key to countering the appeal of populists who promise to “clean up the system.” Leaders must lead by example to restore faith in politics. -/- 6. Foster Social Dialogue and Unity: Building platforms for dialogue between different social, ethnic, and political groups can reduce polarization. Promoting mutual understanding and cooperation, especially at the local level, fosters social cohesion and resilience against divisive rhetoric. -/- Conclusion -/- Populism is a complex and dynamic force in modern democracy. It reflects genuine grievances and has the capacity to rejuvenate political engagement. However, it also poses serious risks if it erodes democratic norms, institutions, and societal unity. The challenge for democratic societies is to respond constructively: by listening, reforming, and educating—rather than by repressing or ignoring. -/- If the root causes of populism are addressed with empathy, transparency, and sound policy, its energy can be redirected into positive democratic renewal rather than destructive division. Only through this balanced approach can democracies survive and thrive in an age of uncertainty and change. -/- References -/- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. Harvard Kennedy School. -/- Kazin, M. (1995). The Populist Persuasion: An American History. Cornell University Press. -/- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown Publishing. -/- Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation. Stanford University Press. -/- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. -/- . (shrink)

Globalization is seen positively by those to whose societies it brings measurable benefits. Claude Ake, one of the most outstanding African thinkers of the second half of the 20th century and a great advocate for constructing democracy in Africa, primarily viewed the progress of globalization in terms of its numerous dangers. In Ake's opinion, globalization negatively affects the condition of contemporary societies, whose members place increasing importance on market values and principles. He thought that when consumer identity finally triumphs over (...) civic identity, the culture of democracy will be at an end. Democracy, after all, is connected with the common good and consumption with particularism and egoism. Consumerism kills the sense of civic duty and political engagement. Even though the members of poorer societies, including African ones, are not significant consumers, the global consumer culture has an effect on their lives as well, destroying traditional ties of solidarity and transforming local cultures. In many such societies, this state of affairs produces a rise in frustration and stress, and often a desire to return to the society's origins and a strengthening of antipathy towards outsiders or 'others'. Although Ake's works contain finely-wrought arguments, his theories raise important questions and are very debatable in their trend. In this article, I consider the main underlying assumptions of Ake's ideas and analyze selected aspects. (shrink)

This study investigated the effects of internal and demographic variables on civic development in late adolescence using the construct civic purpose. We conducted surveys on civic engagement with 480 high school seniors, and surveyed them again two years later. Using multivariate regression and linear mixed models, we tested the main effects of civic purpose dimensions (beyond-the-self motivation, future civic intention), ethnicity, and education on civic development from Time 1 to Time 2. Results showed that (...) while there is an overall decrease in civic engagement in the transition out of high school, both internal and social factors protected participants from steep civic decline. Interaction effects varied. Ethnicity and education interacted in different ways with the dimensions of civic purpose to predict change in traditional and expressive political engagement, and community service engagement. (shrink)

Public reason views hold that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. A growing number of philosophers argue that this reasonable acceptability principle (RAP) can be justified by appealing to the value of civic friendship. They claim that a valuable form of political community can only be achieved among the citizens of pluralistic societies if they refrain from appealing to controversial ideals and values when justifying the exercise of political power to one another. This (...) paper argues against such accounts. In order to justify RAP, one must explain and defend a conception of reasonableness. Civic friendship is unfit to perform this task, rendering it unable to ground public reason alone. Meanwhile, pluralist views that combine civic friendship with other considerations in order to specify RAP either fail or make civic friendship a spare wheel in the argument for public reason. (shrink)

Many democratic theorists hold that when a decision is collectively made in the right kind of way, in accordance with the right procedure, it is permissible to enforce it. They deny that there are further requirements on the type of reasons that can permissibly be used to justify laws and policies. In this paper, I argue that democratic theorists are mistaken about this. So-called public reason requirements follow from commitments that most of them already hold. Drawing on the democratic ideal (...) of civic equality, I show that it can successfully explain why political decision-making must have the right sort of procedure-independent justification. However, contra standard accounts of public reason, I argue that laws and policies need to be justified with convergence accessible, not shared, reasons. Public reasons are those that are accessible in light of evaluative standards shared by all, or in light of every citizen’s private evaluative standards. Since this will make the set of public reasons wider, it makes the theory more palatable to sceptics while retaining the framework’s justificatory potential. (shrink)

This article develops a civic republican approach to medical ethics. It outlines civic republican concerns about the domination that arises from subjection to an arbitrary power of interference, while suggesting republican remedies to such domination in healthcare. These include proposals for greater review, challenge and pre-authorisation of medical power. It extends this analysis by providing a civic republican account of assistive arbitrary power, showing how it can create similar problems within both formal and informal relationships of care, (...) and offering strategies for tackling it. Two important objections to civic republican medical ethics—that it overvalues independence and political participation in healthcare—are also considered and rebutted. (shrink)

In the present study, we tested whether civic identity consisting of moral and political identity via the bifactor model of civic identity with the Stanford Civic Purpose dataset. Previous research in youth development proposed that civic identity consists of two closely related identity constructs, i.e., moral and political identity. Given the bifactor model in factor analysis assumes the presence of both the general and specific factors, we hypothesized that the bifactor model would better fit the data (...) than conventional alternative models. Thus, we compared the candidate models, including the bifactor model, with confirmatory factor analysis. To address the concern about the potential overfitting of the bifactor model, we additionally conducted cross-validation and measurement invariance tests across different gender groups and time points. The analysis results supported our hypothesis that the bifactor model better fitted the data. Both the cross-validation and measurement invariance test results suggested that the overfitting issue was not a significant concern. In the present study, we empirically demonstrated that the bifactor model of civic identity consisting of moral and political identity, which was supposed to be more consistent with the theoretical and conceptual framework of civic identity, better fitted the data than conventional alternative models. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the problem children, conceived of as future citizens, pose to understanding the scope and limits of Rawls’s Political Liberalism by focusing on the civic education of children. Can a politically liberal state provide all children the opportunity to become reasonable citizens? Or does the cultivation of reasonableness require comprehensive liberalism? I show that educating children to become reasonable in the way Rawls outlines imposes a demanding requirement that conflicts with Rawls’s aim of including a (...) wide constituency in the scope of political liberalism. Rawls’s aim of making reasonableness broadly inclusive for political purposes is in tension with his goal of using reasonableness as the standard that delineates the scope of liberal legitimacy. I argue that political liberalism can and should try to cultivate the reasonableness of its future citizens through the civic education of children. However, a defensible version of political liberal civic education requires introducing a bifurcation within Rawls’s conception of reasonableness. A political liberal form of civic education should aim towards the inclusive scope of reasonableness by cultivating reasonableness in only two of what appear to be three senses that Rawls emphasizes. Teaching children that legitimacy requires embracing public reason demands more than may be justifiably required by a state that seeks to be broadly inclusive. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe certain constraints against mistreating people, where a constraint is (...) a moral principle that we should not violate, even when that is the only way to prevent further, similar violations or other, greater evils. But, despite its intuitive appeal, the view that there are constraints has drawn considerable criticism, and attempts to provide a rationale for constraints have been, at best, substantially incomplete. In this paper, I develop a novel rationale for constraints that fills important gaps left by views in the literature. The account helps make sense of constraints by identifying a morally significant relation that we bear to people when, and only when, we observe certain constraints against mistreating them. Put roughly, observing these constraints is a condition for being worthy of a form of trust that I call civic trust, and being worthy of such trust is an essential part of living with others in the sort of harmony that characterizes morally permissible interaction. By focusing, in ways other accounts do not, on the role that observing constraints plays in our psychological lives, this approach not only makes the structure of constraints more intelligible, but also helps us better appreciate the force of our reason to observe constraints, and better understand the kind of moral community to which we should aspire. (shrink)

Perry Hendricks’ impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is based on two premises: first, impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and second, if impairing an organism to some degree is immoral, then ceteris paribus, impairing it to a higher degree is also immoral. He calls this the impairment principle. Since abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree than FAS, it follows from these two premises that abortion is immoral. Critics have focussed on the ceteris paribus (...) clause of TIP, which requires that the relevant details surrounding each impairment be sufficiently similar. In this article, we show that the ceteris paribus clause is superfluous, and by replacing it with a more restrictive condition, the impairment argument is considerably strengthened. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

This article draws upon the civic republican tradition to offer new conceptual resources for the normative assessment of mental capacity law. The republican conception of liberty as non-domination is used to identify ways in which such laws generate arbitrary power that can underpin relationships of servility and insecurity. It also shows how non-domination provides a basis for critiquing legal tests of decision-making that rely upon ‘diagnostic’ rather than ‘functional’ criteria. In response, two main civic republican strategies are recommended (...) for securing freedom in the context of the legal regulation of psychological disability: self-authorisation techniques and participatory shaping of power. The result is a series of proposals for the reform of decisional capacity law, including a transition towards purely functional assessment of decisional capacity, surer legal footing for advanced care planning, and greater control over the design and administration of decision-making capacity laws by those with psychological disabilities. (shrink)

Is the civic duty to report crime and corruption a genuine moral duty? After clarifying the nature of the duty, I consider a couple of negative answers to the question, and turn to an attractive and commonly held view, according to which this civic duty is a genuine moral duty. On this view, crime and corruption threaten political stability, and citizens have a moral duty to report crime and corruption to the government in order to help the government’s (...) law enforcement efforts. The resulting duty is triply general in that it applies to everyone, everywhere, and covers all criminal and corrupt activity. In this paper, I challenge the general scope of this argument. I argue that that the civic duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities is much narrower than the government claims and people might think, for it only arises when the state (i) condemns genuine wrongdoing and serious ethical offenses as “crime” and “corruption,” and (ii) constitutes a dependable “disclosure recipient,” showing the will and power to hold wrongdoers accountable. I further defend a robust duty to directly report to the public—one that is weightier and wider than people usually assume. When condition (ii) fails to obtain, I submit, citizens are released of the duty to report crime and corruption to the authorities, but are bound to report to the public, even when the denunciation targets the government and is risky or illegal. (shrink)

According to the commonsense view of civic virtue, the places to exercise civic virtue are largely restricted to politics. In this article, I argue for a more expansive view of civic virtue, and argue that one can exercise civic virtue equally well through working for or running a for-profit business. I argue that this conclusion follows from four relatively uncontroversial premises: (1) the consensus definition of “civic virtue”, (2) the standard, most popular theory of virtuous (...) activity, (3) a conception of the common good widely shared by liberal political philosophers, and (4) the mainstream economic theory of for-profit business. (shrink)

The years since the world-wide demonstrations in the wake of George Floyd’s murder in 2020 have seen a significant embrace of antiracist education as part of moral education, followed by conservative rollback of such efforts. The article discusses both, and is applicable to the further retrenchment in the second Trump administration (in 2025). Antiracist moral and civic education should educate about both interpersonal racism (racism of individuals toward other individuals) and institutional racism (systemic racial injustices). Each of those areas (...) involves both “negative” values—avoiding racial wrongs—and “positive” values—promoting race-related goods. Negative interpersonal values include stereotyping, antipathy, and demeaning the other. Positive interpersonal values include respecting racial others as equals, recognizing positive racial differences, respecting cultures associated with racial groups. Negative institutional values are the most familiar—ending, mitigating, repairing systemic racial injustices. Positive institutional values include promoting racial justice, understanding, harmony, and a culture of respect throughout society represented in its institutions. Institutional racism requires civic education, in order to recognize patterns of injustice, to analyze their causes, and to be able to measure them against both morally sound and nationally salient ideals (such as equality, liberty, and justice). Antiracist education must be sensitive to students’ particular racial identities, and to asymmetries between the way white and non-white identities function morally and civicly. -/- Although sometimes it is important to ignore someone’s racial identity in interacting with them, “color-blindness,” promoted as an overarching principle by the Trump administration and the retrenchment legislation, cannot play that role. Antiracist education requires that we often take account of people’s race, and the issue is how to do that properly, not to ignore it entirely. (shrink)

Is epistocracy epistemically superior to democracy? In this paper, I scrutinize some of the arguments for and against the epistemic superiority of epistocracy. Using empirical results from the literature on the epistemic benefits of diversity as well as the epistemic contributions of citizen science, I strengthen the case against epistocracy and for democracy. Disenfranchising, or otherwise discouraging anyone to participate in political life, on the basis of them not possessing a certain body of (social scientific) knowledge, is untenable also from (...) an epistemic point of view. Rather than focussing on individual competence, we should pay attention to the social constellation through which we produce knowledge to make sure we decrease epistemic loss (by ensuring diversity and inclusion) and increase epistemic productivity (by fostering a multiplicity of perspectives interacting fruitfully). Achieving those epistemic benefits requires a more democratic approach that differs significantly from epistocracy. (shrink)

This chapter develops a civic republican approach to disability justice. It begins by articulating a republican account of liberty as nondomination before showing how such domination can shape the relationships of people with disabilities. This leads to a consideration of whether disability justice can be defined in terms of maximizing or sufficient nondomination. Instead, the chapter provides a civic framework within which republican disability justice can be understood, encompassing both the absence of oppressive relationships and the presence of (...) capabilities of special egalitarian concern. It also considers some specific normative implications of a republican account of disability justice—doubting the suitability of contestatory democracy but pointing toward the merits of self-education and universal basic income. Finally, the objection that this republican approach to disability justice unreasonably denigrates dependence is rebutted. (shrink)

I argue that racism is essentially a civic character trait: to be a racist is to have a character that rationally reflects racial supremacist sociopolitical values. As with moral vice accounts of racism, character is my account’s primary evaluative focus: character is directly evaluated as racist, and all other racist things are racist insofar as, and because, they cause, are caused by, express or are otherwise suitably related to racist character. Yet as with political accounts of racism, sociopolitical considerations (...) provide my account’s primary evaluative standard: satisfying the sociopolitical standard of racial supremacy is what makes racist character racist. (shrink)

This paper explores how an institution of higher education in partnership with a local parent-led organization can support authentic and organic Latinx family engagement and advocacy for dual language bilingual, bicultural, biliterate education (DLB3E). We reflect upon how engaging with Spanish-speaking parents helped us reimagine, reinvigorate, and transform local schools and universities by means of new understandings and practices of linguistic and cultural wealth, community assets, and family empowerment. We argue that this form of collaboration can lead to innovative and (...) positive changes in p-16 education. To demonstrate, we share our developing framework for organizing annual parent conferences hosted by the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley’s Center for Bilingual Studies in partnership with RGV PUEDE (Rio Grande Valley Parents United for Excellent Dual Education/Padres Unidos para una Educación Dual de Excelencia). Our framework shows how to build and strengthen grassroots parent and community advocacy for DLB3E from pre-kindergarten through university by strengthening partnerships between parents, public schools, university faculty, and nonprofit organizations to organize conferences and other types of public conversations in Spanish. (shrink)

Scholars are divided on the relationship between cynicism and political life. In this chapter, I describe and endorse what I call 'institutional cynicism' and suggest it can feature within kinds of virtuous civic stances in democratic societies. I accept that some forms of cynicism can be as destructive and as anti-democratic as critics insist. Institutional cynicism, of the sort I describe, can actually make us better citizens. It turns our attention towards sub-optimal aspects of the political institutions of democratic (...) societies, teaching us things about those institutions we need to know, without necessarily leading us into fatalism or despair. (shrink)

Few recent developments in information technology have been as hyped as blockchain, the first implementation of which was the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. Such hype furnishes ample reason to be skeptical about the promise of blockchain implementations, but I contend that there’s something to the hype. In particular, I think that certain blockchain implementations, in the right material, social, and political conditions, constitute excellent bases for common knowledge. As a case study, I focus on trust in election outcomes, where the ledger records (...) not financial transactions but vote tallies. I argue that blockchain implementations could foster warranted trust in vote tallies and thereby trust in the democratic process. Finally, I argue that if the promise of blockchain implementations as democratic infrastructure is to be realized, then democracies first need to ensure that these material, social, and political conditions obtain. (shrink)

From Thomas Hobbes to Steven Pinker, it is often remarked that cultures of honor are destabilizing and especially dangerous to liberal institutions. This essay sharpens that criticism into two objections: one saying honor cultures encourage tyranny, and another accusing them of undermining rule of law. Since these concerns manifest differently in established as opposed to fledgling liberal democracies, I appeal to Western and African examples both to motivate and allay these worries. I contend that a culture of civic honor (...) is perfectly capable of offering those with soaring ambitions all the civic distinction they could hope for—including civic immortality—without tempting them to seize undemocratic levels of power. And as for rule of law and public order, an “irrationally” defiant response to the indignity of state-sanctioned oppression has often animated citizens to resist illiberal regimes despite great peril. Thus, cultures of civic honor are not only compatible with, but sometimes necessary to, founding and maintaining liberal institutions. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophy of tertiary civic education in Hong Kong. It does not only investigate the role of tertiary education that can play in civic education, but also explores the way to achieve the aim of integrating liberal democratic citizenship and collective national identity in the context of persistent conflicts between two different identity politics in Hong Kong: politics of assimilation and politics of difference. As Hong Kong is part of China and is inevitably getting closer (...) cooperation with the mainland in the future, I argue that Hong Kong citizenship should affirm its own distinctiveness while also identifying with Chinese nationality. Thus, tertiary civic education should foster a trans-cultural political vision so that the two different horizons can be synthesized and the political framework and identity can be transformed in order to reduce conflicts between the two peoples. (shrink)

In two studies, we tested how the expression of civic hope in narratives and the perceived authenticity of civic/political actions relate to civic/political engagement. In a cross-sectional study of undergraduates (N = 230), the expression of civic hope predicted the perceived authenticity of civic actions (e.g., voting), which in turn predicted the motivation to engage in them. In a longitudinal on-line study that began 8 weeks prior to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election (N = 308 (...) MTurk workers), overall expressions of civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting and the motivation to vote. In addition, expressions of civic hope positively predicted the perceived authenticity of voting, which in turn positively predicted the likelihood of reporting that one did vote. These findings indicate that a sense of civic hope and the experience of authenticity in political contexts may be important for democratic engagement. (shrink)

As the climate crisis intensifies, coastal ecosystems—such as mangroves, tidal marshes, and seagrass meadows—are gaining recognition for their role in sequestering “blue carbon” (BC)...

This article argues, against the still-prevailing interpretation of Leonardo Bruni’s De militia – that it is a defense of civic militias against the mercenary system – for an alternative view: that it represents an attempt to reform communal knighthood in accordance with ancient Greek political theory and Roman historical models. It thus aimed to make the reform of contemporary knighthood into an aspect of the revival of antiquity.

Political polarization is on the rise, undermining the shared space of public reason necessary for a thriving democracy and making voters more willing than ever to dismiss the perspectives of their political opponents. This destructive tendency is especially problematic when it comes to issues of race and gender, as informed views on these topics necessarily require engaging with those whose experiences may differ from our own. In order to help our students combat further polarization, we created a course on "The (...) Philosophy of Race, Class, and Gender" that incorporated intergroup dialogues - small, diverse, semester-long discussion groups-that focused on building the civic virtues of toleration, egalitarianism, and solidarity. In this article, we describe our approach, including the evidence that intergroup dialogue can act as a catalyst for democratic dialogue. We hope that the practice of intergroup dialogue can help other instructors cultivate the civic virtues in their philosophy classrooms as well. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls discusses “the problem of envy”, namely the worry that the well-ordered society could be destabilized by envy. Martha Nussbaum has proposed, in Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, that love, in particular what she calls civic friendship, is the solution to this problem. Nussbaum’s suggestion is in accordance with the long-standing notion that love and envy are incompatible opposites, and that the virtue of love is an antidote to the vice of (...) envy. I argue that this idea is misguided, and that love and envy are opposite sides of the same coin: what Kant called “unsociable sociability”. Love and envy arise from the same psychological mechanisms and thrive in the same social and personal conditions; thus, it’s not possible to have one without the other. However, there are other solutions to the problem of envy, including favoring the arousal of emulative envy. -/- . (shrink)

I examine the possibility of civic friendship to solve the problem of over-doing democracy, paying close attention to how it can counter affective polarization and social homogeneity. In Section I, I explore civic friendship as a solution to polarization. In section II, I argue that Talisse’s civic friendship—in the context of nonpolitical collaboration—is akin to Aristotle’s utility and pleasure-friendships. Given the nature of civic friendship, in Section III–VI I make amendments to Talisse’s proposal. I argue that (...) if civic friendship is to address not only desaturation but polarization, and it has these Aristotelian features, then the cultivation of taste, equity, and ethical attentiveness are necessary. (shrink)

This chapter brings together debates in political philosophy and epistemology over what we should do when we disagree. While it might be tempting to think that we can apply one debate to the other, there are significant differences that may threaten this project. The specification of who qualifies as a civic or epistemic peer are not coextensive, utilizing different idealizations in denoting peerhood. In addition, the scope of disagreements that are relevant vary according to whether the methodology chosen falls (...) within ideal theory or nonideal theory. Finally, the two literatures focus on different units of analysis that diverge according to the philosophical purpose behind their investigation of disagreement. Epistemologists analyze the rationality of individuals’ belief states whereas political philosophers focus on the just governance of a diverse society. Despite these differences, political epistemologists can learn valuable lessons by considering these debates side by side in order to provide insights that address a host of different challenges posed by political disagreement. The core lesson to draw from the disanalogies outlined in this paper is that to make progress, careful attention should be paid to specifying the goal of any particular project within political epistemology. (shrink)

Opponents of biomedical enhancement frequently adopt what Allen Buchanan has called the “Personal Goods Assumption.” On this assumption, the benefits of biomedical enhancement will accrue primarily to those individuals who undergo enhancements, not to wider society. Buchanan has argued that biomedical enhancements might in fact have substantial social benefits by increasing productivity. We outline another way in which enhancements might benefit wider society: by augmenting civic virtue and thus improving the functioning of our political communities. We thus directly confront (...) critics of biomedical enhancement who argue that it will lead to a loss of social cohesion and a breakdown in political life. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship to contemporary political discussion by arguing that it can function as a social good. Contrary to some dominant interpretations of the ancient conception of friendship according to which it can only be understood as an obligatory reciprocity, I argue that friendship between fellow citizens is important because it contributes to the unity of both state and community by transmitting feelings of intimacy and (...) solidarity. In that sense, it can be understood as an important relationship predicated on affection and generosity, virtues lacking from both contemporary politics and society that seem to be merely dominated by Post-Enlightenment ideals. For Aristotle, friendship is important for society because it generates concord, articulating thus a basis for social unity and political agreement. (shrink)

Most people tend to be suspicious of the role of emotions in the management of change, given those historical precedents or experiences in political communities, such as in fascist states. In these historical and experiential contexts, emotions are seen as political vectors that encourage an unthinking and uncritical political community. Martha Nussbaum, dubbed as the philosopher of emotions or feelings, has suggested that good political principles or policies are also realizable, if intently worked out to persist and to remain stable (...) or institutionalized, over time. For example, a policy such as the redistribution of wealth requires thinking on how a community could be driven to care for people to whom they were ordinarily indifferent, by a thoughtful and constructive analysis and subsequent re-programming of the inherent emotions which forge citizens together. In this study, the focus is the imperative cultivation of positive emotions as a potential tool for human survival, as communities battle against the Covid-19 pandemic. It is posited that material conditions are waning, and humanity requires compassion; the poor needs help for their survival. Researches, however, have shown that extending alms is not easy. Not too different from other animals, human beings are narrow and shallow in their area of existential concern: caring for those nearer them, and largely indifferent to those farther away. This assumption considered, the policy challenge is to zero in on civic emotions that might cultivate the element of compassion and concern to a larger community radius. This paper also highlights preliminary proposals on how to overcome negative emotions, i.e. fear, disgust, and shame, which the study posits as hindrances antithetical to the formation of constructive civic emotions needed for human survival. (shrink)

A pro-life view can be called harm-theoretic if it claims abortion is impermissible because of the harm caused to the fetus. These positions are important in the abortion discussion because they allow pro-lifers to argue abortion is impermissible without claiming the fetus is a moral person. A major problem with harm-theoretic abortion views is that they fall victim to the contraception reductio. The contraception reductio was originally posed toward the Future like Ours argument for the impermissibility of abortion, but I (...) show it is a problem for harm-theoretic positions in general. I argue that the currently proposed solutions aimed at solving the contraception reductio are unsatisfactory because they commit you to unnecessary controversial metaphysical positions, such as animalism and denying mereological universalism. Then, I give a new solution to the contraception reductio that avoids those metaphysical commitments. The main conclusion is that harm-theoretic views can avoid the contraception reductio by accepting a biological account of the harm of death. (shrink)

In this editorial, we argue that midwives should focus on climate change, a link which has been underexplored.

Darwiche and Pearl’s seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most suggestions have resulted in a form of ‘reductionism’ that identifies belief states with orderings of worlds. However, this position has recently been criticised as being unacceptably strong. Other proposals, such as the popular principle (P), aka ‘Independence’, characteristic of ‘admissible’ operators, remain commendably more modest. In this (...) paper, we supplement the DP postulates and (P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP postulates constrain the relation between a prior and a posterior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We show that operators from the resulting family, which subsumes both lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as relating belief states associated with a ‘proper ordinal interval’ (POI) assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that these operators satisfy iterated versions of many AGM era postulates, including Superexpansion, that are not sound for admissible operators in general. (shrink)

In this essay I defend the following prima facie argument: civic virtue is not dependent on integration and in fact may be best fostered under conditions of segregation. I demonstrate that civic virtue can and does take place under conditions of involuntary segregation, but that voluntary separation—as a response to segregation—is a more effective way to facilitate it. While segregation and disadvantage commonly coexist, spatial concentrations, particularly when there is a strong voluntary aspect present, often aid in fostering (...) civic virtue. Accordingly, so long as separation provides the conditions necessary for the promotion of civic virtue, integration is not an irreducible good. (shrink)

The issue of voting rights for older children has been high on the political and philosophical agenda for quite some time now, and not without reason. Aside from principled moral and philosophical reasons why it is an important matter, many economic, environmental, and political issues are currently being decided—sometimes through indecision—that greatly impact the future of today’s children. Past and current generations of adults have, arguably, mortgaged their children’s future, and this makes the question whether (some) children should be granted (...) the right to vote all the more pressing. Should (some) children be given the right to vote? Moreover, does the answer to this question depend on civic education, on whether children have been deliberately prepared for the exercise of that right? These are the questions that will occupy us in this article. Our answer to the first will be that older children—children roughly between 14 and 16 years of age1—ought to be given the right to vote. (shrink)

Bedau's influential (1997) account analyzes weak emergence in terms of the non-derivability of a system’s macrostates from its microstates except by simulation. I offer an improved version of Bedau’s account of weak emergence in light of insights from information theory. Non-derivability alone does not guarantee that a system’s macrostates are weakly emergent. Rather, it is non-derivability plus the algorithmic compressibility of the system’s macrostates that makes them weakly emergent. I argue that the resulting information-theoretic picture provides a metaphysical account of (...) weak emergence rather than a merely epistemic one. (shrink)