Results for 'collective duties'

958 found
Order:
  1. Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  2. Filling Collective Duty Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (11):573-591.
    A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive justification (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  3. So What's My Part? Collective Duties, Individual Contributions, and Distributive Justice.Moritz A. Schulz - 2023 - Historical Social Research 48 (3: Collective Agency):320-349.
    Problems in normative ethics paradigmatically concern what it is obligatory or permissible for an individual to do. Yet sometimes, each of us ought to do something individually in virtue of what we ought to do together. Unfortunately, traversing these two different levels at which a moral obligation can arise – individual and collective – is fraught with difficulties that easily lure us into conclusions muddying our understanding of collective obligations. This paper seeks to clearly lay out a systematic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Duties to Promote Just Institutions and the Citizenry as an Unorganized Group.Niels de Haan & Anne Schwenkenbecher - forthcoming - In Säde Hormio & Bill Wringe (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology. Springer.
    Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Historic Injustice, Collective Agency, and Compensatory Duties.Thomas Carnes - 2019 - Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (1):79-89.
    A challenging question regarding compensation for historic injustices like slavery or colonialism is whether there is anyone to whom it would be just to ascribe duties of compensation given that allegedly all the perpetrators--the guilty parties--are dead. Some answer this question negatively, arguing it is wrong to ascribe to anyone compensatory duties for injustices committed by others who died multiple generations ago. This objection to compensation for historic injustice, which I call the Historical Responsibility Objection (HRO), takes as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2013 - Ratio 26 (3):310-328.
    In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It distinguishes between group agents and groups of people which – while not constituting a collective agent – are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  7. Enforcing the Global Economic Order, Violating the Rights of the Poor, and Breaching Negative Duties? Pogge, Collective Agency, and Global Poverty.Bill Wringe - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (2):334-370.
    Thomas Pogge has argued, famously, that ‘we’ are violating the rights of the global poor insofar as we uphold an unjust international order which provides a legal and economic framework within which individuals and groups can and do deprive such individuals of their lives, liberty and property. I argue here that Pogge’s claim that we are violating a negative duty can only be made good on the basis of a substantive theory of collective action; and that it can only (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Group Duties Without Decision-Making Procedures.Gunnar Björnsson - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):127-139.
    Stephanie Collins’ Group Duties offers interesting new arguments and brings together numerous interconnected issues that have hitherto been treated separately. My critical commentary focuses on two particularly original and central claims of the book: (1) Only groups that are united under a group-level decision-making procedure can bear duties. (2) Attributions of duties to other groups should be understood as attributions of “coordination duties” to each member of the group, duties to take steps responsive to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Joint Moral Duties.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):58-74.
    There are countless circumstances under which random individuals COULD act together to prevent something morally bad from happening or to remedy a morally bad situation. But when OUGHT individuals to act together in order to bring about a morally important outcome? Building on Philip Pettit’s and David Schweikard’s account of joint action, I will put forward the notion of joint duties: duties to perform an action together that individuals in so-called random or unstructured groups can jointly hold. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  10. Imperfect Duties, Group Obligations, and Beneficence.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5):557-584.
    There is virtually no philosophical consensus on what, exactly, imperfect duties are. In this paper, I lay out three criteria which I argue any adequate account of imperfect duties should satisfy. Using beneficence as a leading example, I suggest that existing accounts of imperfect duties will have trouble meeting those criteria. I then propose a new approach: thinking of imperfect duties as duties held by groups, rather than individuals. I show, again using the example of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  11. The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology (1):91-100.
    In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and combinations.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. (1 other version)The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 150-172.
    Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the (...) we typically take states to have come from individuals having passed on certain individual duties? There are complications: states can discharge their duties by contracting fulfilment out to non-members; states seem able to dissolve the duties of non-members; and some of states' duties are not derived in this way. We demonstrate that these complicate, but do not undermine, the general account and its application to states. And the application has an interesting upshot: by asking which individuals robustly participate in this process of duty transfer-and-transformation with a given state, we can begin to get a grip on who counts as a member of that state. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13. Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):1-20.
    Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account of collective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  14. Group Agents, Moral Competence, and Duty-bearers: The Update Argument.Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1691-1715.
    According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update Argument. An agent is morally competent only if the agent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Positive Duties to Wild Animals: Introduction.Kyle Johannsen - 2023 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 26 (2):153-158.
    This paper is the introduction to a collection I guest-edited called Positive Duties to Wild Animals. The collection contains single-authored contributions from Catia Faria, Josh Milburn, Eze Paez, and Jeff Sebo; and co-authored contributions from Mara-Daria Cojocaru and Alasdair Cochrane, and Oscar Horta and Dayrón Terán. It was published as a special issue of Ethics, Policy and Environment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Moral Duty to Buy Health Insurance.Tina Rulli, Ezekiel Emanuel & David Wendler - 2012 - Journal of the American Medical Association 308 (2):137-138.
    The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was designed to increase health insurance coverage in the United States. Its most controversial feature is the requirement that US residents purchase health insurance. Opponents of the mandate argue that requiring people to contribute to the collective good is inconsistent with respect for individual liberty. Rather than appeal to the collective good, this Viewpoint argues for a duty to buy health insurance based on the moral duty individuals have to reduce (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  17. (1 other version)Distributing States' Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2015 - Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (3):344-366.
    In order for states to fulfil (many of) their moral obligations, costs must be passed to individuals. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  18. Is There a Duty to Militarily Intervene to Stop a Genocide?Uwe Steinhoff - 2017 - In Christian Neuhäuser & Christoph Schuck (eds.), Military Interventions: Considerations From Philosophy and Political Science. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
    Is there is a moral obligation to militarily intervene in another state to stop a genocide from happening (if this can be done with proportionate force)? My answer is that under exceptional circumstances a state or even a non-state actor might have a duty to stop a genocide (for example if these actors have promised to do so), but under most circumstances there is no such obligation. To wit, “humanity,” states, collectives, and individuals do not have an obligation to make (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Directed Duty, Practical Intimacy, and Legal Wronging.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2021 - In Teresa Marques & Chiara Valentini (eds.), Collective Action, Philosophy and Law. London: Routledge. pp. 152-174.
    What is it for a duty or obligation to be directed? Thinking about paradigmatic cases such as the obligations generated by promises will take us only so far in answering this question. This paper starts by surveying several approaches for understanding directed duties, as well as the challenges they face. It turns out that shared agency features something similar to the directedness of duties. This suggests an account of directedness in terms of shared agency – specifically, in terms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Do We Have a Duty to Mitigate the Deterioration of Democratic Communication?Corrado Fumagalli - forthcoming - Journal of Politics.
    Starting from the observation that the deterioration of democratic communication is a political problem that requires individual and collective, private and public, actions, I first defend a baseline duty to avoid using expressions that conventionally show a disrespectful attitude toward targeted groups. Then, I develop a set of guidelines that can guide political theorists in distributing additional duties that respect the situated agency of different individuals. I propose two normative constraints (capacity-to-act and influence) that should influence how theorists (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Global Warming and Our Natural Duties of Justice.Aaron Maltais - 2008 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    Compelling research in international relations and international political economy on global warming suggests that one part of any meaningful effort to radically reverse current trends of increasing green house gas (GHG) emissions is shared policies among states that generate costs for such emissions in many if not most of the world’s regions. Effectively employing such policies involves gaining much more extensive global commitments and developing much stronger compliance mechanism than those currently found in the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, global (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. How to Punish Collective Agents.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2011 - Ethics and International Affairs.
    Assuming that states can hold moral duties, it can easily be seen that states—just like any other moral agent—can sometimes fail to discharge those moral duties. In the context of climate change examples of states that do not meet their emission reduction targets abound. If individual moral agents do wrong they usually deserve and are liable to some kind of punishment. But how can states be punished for failing to comply with moral duties without therewith also punishing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. The Invention of Duty: Stoicism as Deontology. By Jack Visnjic. [REVIEW]William O. Stephens - 2022 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 60 (4):690-692.
    This provocative study presents philological, philosophical, and historical arguments that with the Greek term καθῆκον and its Latin equivalent officium the ancient Stoics invented a new concept that anticipated the modern notion of moral duty, for example, Pflicht in Kant. Scholars began to shift from translating kathēkon as "duty" to translating it as "appropriate or fitting action" in the late 1800s, according to Visnjic. The usage of the verb kathēkein in Greek literature prior to the Stoics suggests to him that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Could There Ever Be a Duty to Have Children?Anca Gheaus - 2015 - In Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan & Richard Vernon (eds.), Permissible Progeny?: The Morality of Procreation and Parenting. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 87-106.
    This chapter argues that there is a collective responsibility to have enough children in order to ensure that people will not, in the future, suffer great harm due to depopulation. Moreover, if people stopped having children voluntarily, it could be legitimate for states to incentivize and maybe even coerce individuals to bear and rear children. Various arguments against the enforceability of an individual duty to bear and rear children are examined. Coercing people to have children would come at significant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  25. Book Review - Happiness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: Morality, Indirect Duties, and Welfare Rights by Alice Pinheiro Walla. [REVIEW]Paula Satne - 2023 - Studia Kantiana 21 (2):177-183.
    Kant is probably one of the most misunderstood philosophers in the history of Western thought. Some of the most well-known and pervasive objections to Kant’s practical philosophy often rest on considerable misunderstandings of his central theses or a poor and superficial reading of his work. A common misconception is that in Kant’s practical philosophy there is no place or role for human happiness. In Happiness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: Morality, Indirect Duties, and Welfare Rights, Alice Pinheiro Walla dispels this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. The argument from normative autonomy for collective agents.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (3):410–427.
    This paper is concerned with a recent, clever, and novel argument for the need for genuine collectives in our ontology of agents to accommodate the kinds of normative judgments we make about them. The argument appears in a new paper by David Copp, "On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from 'Normative Autonomy'" (Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, XXX, 2006, pp. 194-221; henceforth ‘ACE’), and is developed in Copp’s paper for this special (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  27. Marginal participation, complicity, and agnotology: What climate change can teach us about individual and collective responsibility.Säde Hormio - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    The topic of my thesis is individual and collective responsibility for collectively caused systemic harms, with climate change as the case study. Can an individual be responsible for these harms, and if so, how? Furthermore, what does it mean to say that a collective is responsible? A related question, and the second main theme, is how ignorance and knowledge affect our responsibility. -/- My aim is to show that despite the various complexities involved, an individual can have responsibility (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Is There a Duty to Speak Your Mind?Michael Hannon - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (3):274-289.
    In Why It's OK to Speak Your Mind, Hrishikesh Joshi argues that the open exchange of ideas is essential for the flourishing of individuals and society. He provides two arguments for this claim. First, speaking your mind is essential for the common good: we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth if we share evidence and offer different perspectives. Second, speaking your mind is good for your own sake: it is necessary to develop your rational faculties and exercise (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Is there an obligation to reduce one’s individual carbon footprint?Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2014 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (2):168-188.
    Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gases. This paper focuses on the question of whether individuals in industrialized countries (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  30. Parental Obligations and Bioethics: The Duties of a Creator, Bernard G. Prusak, Routledge, 2013. [REVIEW]Jake Earl - 2014 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 24 (4):E1-E5.
    Parental Obligations and Bioethics: The Duties of a Creator collects and supplements Bernard G. Prusak’s work on the ethics of procreation and parenthood, and applies his unique theoretical approach to related issues in bioethics and social philosophy. In this review, I’ll first summarize what I take to be the argumentative core of the book, and then offer a brief critical assessment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. (1 other version)Institutional Evils, Culpable Complicity, and Duties to Engage in Moral Repair.Eliana Peck & Ellen K. Feder - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):203-226.
    Apology is arguably the central act of the reparative work required after wrongdoing. The analysis by Claudia Card of complicity in collectively perpetrated evils moves one to ask whether apology ought to be requested of persons culpably complicit in institutional evils. To better appreciate the benefits of and barriers to apologies offered by culpably complicit wrongdoers, this article examines doctors’ complicity in a practice that meets Card's definition of an evil, namely, the non-medically necessary, nonconsensual “normalizing” interventions performed on babies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Commentary for NASSP Award Symposium on 'Getting Our Act Together'.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2023 - Social Philosophy Today 39:215-226.
    This commentary is part of a symposium on my book 'Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations' (Routledge, 2021). Here, I respond to the members of the North American Society for Social Philosophy’s 2022 Book Award Committee. I discuss whether most moral theory is individualistic, arguing that “traditional ethical theories” - meaning the traditions of Virtue Ethics, Kantian ethics as well as consequentialist ethics - certainly are. All of these focus on what individual agents ought to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations (Routledge) by Schwenkenbecher, Anne. [REVIEW]Maike Albertzart - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. The Primacy of Intention and the Duty to Truth: A Gandhi-Inspired Argument for Retranslating Hiṃsā and Ahiṃsā, with Connections to History, Ethics, and Civil Resistance.Todd Davies - 2021 - SSRN Non-Western Philosophy eJournal.
    The words "violence" and "nonviolence" are increasingly misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā -- which were used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for re-reading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words – associated with religiously contextualized discourse of the past -- capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles, better than “violence” and “nonviolence” do. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Applied Ethics Series.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2011 - Centre for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University.
    It is widely accepted that industrialized or wealthy countries in particular have moral obligations or duties of justice to combat world poverty or to shoulder burdens of climate change. But what does it actually mean to say that a state has moral obligations or duties of justice? In this paper I discuss Toni Erskine’s account of moral agency of states. With her, I argue that collectives such as states can hold (collective) moral duties. However, Erskine’s approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Gemeinsame Hilfspflichten, Weltarmut und kumulative Handlungen.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 4 (1):123-150.
    Duties to reduce global poverty are often portrayed as collective duties to assist. At first glance this seems to make sense: since global poverty is a problem that can only be solved by a joint effort, the duty to do so should be considered a collective duty. But what exactly is meant by a ‚joint‘ or ‚collective‘ duty? This paper introduces a distinction between genuinely cooperative and cumulative collective actions. Genuinely cooperative actions require mutually (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Why "We" Are Not Harming the Global Poor: A Critique of Pogge's Leap from State to Individual Responsibility.Uwe Steinhoff - 2012 - Public Reason 4 (1-2):119-138.
    Thomas Pogge claims "that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor ... or, to put it more descriptively, we are active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed." In other words, he claims that by upholding certain international arrangements we are violating our strong negative duties not to harm, and not just some positive duties to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  38. Drowning the Shallow Pond Analogy: A Critique of Garrett Cullity's Attempt to Rescue It.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    Garrett Cullity concedes that saving a drowning child from a shallow pond at little cost to oneself is not actually analogous to giving money to a poverty relief organization like Oxfam. The question then arises whether this objection is fatal to Peters Singer's argument for a duty of assistance or whether it can be saved anyway. Cullity argues that not saving the drowning child and not giving money to organizations like Oxfam are still morally analogous, that is, not giving money (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Personal Merit and the Politics of Gratitude.Julen Ibarrondo - 2017 - Telos: Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas 21:39-63.
    Most philosophers recognize that sometimes particular individuals have to be grateful to others who have benefited them in a way that provides reasons for treating them in a differential way. In the same way, I argue, there are cases in which society as such benefits from the actions of a person, which gives rise to collective duties of gratitude that must be expressed at the political and socio-economic levels. The political concern about merit should not be merely instrumental, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. When Should Universities Take a Stand?Shannon Dea - manuscript
    In this chapter, against the backdrop of campus responses to Israel and Gaza, I consider the mission of the university and whether that mission is served by institutional neutrality. On my view, it is not so easy (and may be impossible) to prise apart universities’ core functions and “public matters.” I argue that institutional neutrality is at best a useful fiction and at worst a way of concealing universities’ commitments and reinscribing the status quo. Along the way, I offer a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Protecting Future Generations by Enhancing Current Generations.Parker Crutchfield - 2023 - In Fabrice Jotterand & Marcello Ienca (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Human Enhancement. Routledge.
    It is plausible that current generations owe something to future generations. One possibility is that we have a duty to not harm them. Another possibility is that we have a duty to protect them. In either case, however, to satisfy the duties to future generations from environmental or political degradation, we need to engage in widespread collective action. But, as we are, we have a limited ability to do so, in part because we lack the self-discipline necessary for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1):19-51.
    This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  43. Seeking a Variable Standard of Individual Moral Responsibility in Organizations.Michael Skerker - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):209-222.
    Relatively few authors attempt to assess individuals’ moral responsibility for collective action within organizations. I draw on fairly technical recent work by Seamus Miller, Christopher Kutz, and Tracy Isaacs in the field of collective responsibility to see what normative lessons can be prepared for people considering entry into large hierarchical, compartmentalized organizations like businesses or the military. I will defend a view shared by Isaacs that group members’ responsibility for collective action depends on intentions to contribute to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Accessibility, pluralism, and honesty: a defense of the accessibility requirement in public justification.Baldwin Wong - 2022 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 25 (2):235-259.
    Political liberals assume an accessibility requirement, which means that, for ensuring civic respect and non-manipulation, public officials should offer accessible reasons during political advocacy. Recently, critics have offered two arguments to show that the accessibility requirement is unnecessary. The first is the pluralism argument: Given the pluralism in evaluative standards, when officials offer non-accessible reasons, they are not disrespectful because they may merely try to reveal their strongest reason. The second is the honesty argument: As long as officials honestly confess (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  45. (1 other version)Structural Injustice, Shared Obligations, and Global Civil Society.Jelena Belić & Zlata Božac - 2022 - Social Theory and Practice 48 (4):607-628.
    It is frequently argued that to address structural injustice, individuals should participate in collective actions organized by civil society organizations, but the role and the normative status of CSOs are rarely discussed. In this paper, we argue that CSOs semi-perfect our shared obligation to address structural injustice by defining shared goals as well as taking actions to further them. This assigns a special moral status to CSOs, which in turn gives rise to our duty to support them. Thus, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Shared decision-making and maternity care in the deep learning age: Acknowledging and overcoming inherited defeaters.Keith Begley, Cecily Begley & Valerie Smith - 2021 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 27 (3):497–503.
    In recent years there has been an explosion of interest in Artificial Intelligence (AI) both in health care and academic philosophy. This has been due mainly to the rise of effective machine learning and deep learning algorithms, together with increases in data collection and processing power, which have made rapid progress in many areas. However, use of this technology has brought with it philosophical issues and practical problems, in particular, epistemic and ethical. In this paper the authors, with backgrounds in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. (1 other version)Moral obligations of states.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2011 - In Applied Ethics Series. Centre for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University. pp. 86-93.
    The starting point of the paper is the frequent ascription of moral duties to states, especially in the context of problems of global justice. It is widely assumed that industrialized or wealthy countries in particular have a moral obligation or duties of justice to shoulder burdens of poverty reduction or climate change adaptation and mitigation. But can collectives such as states actually hold moral duties? If answering this affirmatively: what does it actually mean to say that a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Nations, Overlapping Generations and Historic Injustice.Daniel Butt - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):357-367.
    This article considers the question of the responsibility that present day generations bear as a result of the actions of their ancestors. Is it morally significant that we share a national identity with those responsible for the perpetration of historic injustice? The article argues that we can be guilty of wrongdoing stemming from past wrongdoing if we are members of nations that are responsible for an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. This rests upon three claims: that the failure (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  49. Limiting Access to Certain Anonymous Information: From the Group Right to Privacy to the Principle of Protecting the Vulnerable.Haleh Asgarinia - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):1-27.
    An issue about the privacy of the clustered groups designed by algorithms arises when attempts are made to access certain pieces of information about those groups that would likely be used to harm them. Therefore, limitations must be imposed regarding accessing such information about clustered groups. In the discourse on group privacy, it is argued that the right to privacy of such groups should be recognised to respect group privacy, protecting clustered groups against discrimination. According to this viewpoint, this right (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View.Julia Nefsky - 2021 - In Budolfson Mark, McPherson Tristram & Plunkett David (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-221.
    This chapter concerns the nature of our obligations as individuals when it comes to our emissions-producing activities and climate change. The first half of the chapter argues that the popular ‘expected utility’ approach to this question faces a problematic dilemma: either it gives skeptical verdicts, saying that there are no such obligations, or it yields implausibly strong verdicts. The second half of the chapter diagnoses the problem. It is argued that the dilemma arises from a very general feature of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 958