Research on personal identity often relies on imaginary cases and tends to theorise about our nature from the first-person perspective. In this paper I argue that a problem arises when we combine the two methods and assess imaginary cases from the first-person perspective. The problem is that the link between de se imagination and modality is broken. De se imagination regularly gives rise to de se modal illusions. De se modal illusions come in two varieties: there are de se illusions (...) of possibility and de se illusions of impossibility. I present a systematic account of the two types of illusion. I further make the case that the proposed account is compatible with maintaining a general link between imaginability and possibility. I apply the account to two concrete cases and use it to undercut the motivation behind a central theory of personal ontology, Dualism, and a central account of personal persistence, Lockeanism. (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...) the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content. (shrink)

What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...) cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Frege’s puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended. (shrink)

This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.

ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...) explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)

De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue (...) that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal with the problems I (...) raise for the Simple Account. (shrink)

Moderate skepticism about de se thought accepts that there is a kind of mental state which is about the thinker and is psychologically indispensable for intentional action, but rejects the claim that this kind employs an indexical way of referring. Morgan (2021) has proposed an explanatory argument meant to show that the psychological kind does employ an indexical way of referring to the thinker, on the basis of the special connection between these thoughts and the use of the first-person pronoun (...) (‘I’ in English), which does have an indexical semantics. This paper offers a clear motivation for the moderately skeptical position, shows that Morgan’s argument is based on a mistaken analysis of that special connection, and proposes a more viable alternative. However, on this alternative, the relationship between the psychological role of de se thoughts and the first person in language means Morgan’s explanatory argument cannot go through. (shrink)

Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...) two contrasting accounts – a Lewisian one and a Perrian one – in the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the assumed connection between de se attitude ascription and logophoricity in the case of Chinese ziji. It is widely believed that logophors are among the paradigm cases of de se marking, and that long-distance ziji is logophoric. Drawing on a critical examination of a variety of analyses, this chapter argues that long-distance anaphora, de se interpretation, and logophoric marking are overlapping but distinct phenomena. Even if ziji is logophoric, it does not automatically trigger de se requirement. A (...) de se-neutral analysis of ziji is consistent with pragmatic derivations of interpretations that emphasize the self. The findings point to a new approach to long-distance binding, and identify the blocking effect as the key issue for further research. (shrink)

De se thoughts have traditionally been seen to be exceptional in mandating a departure from orthodox theories of attitudes. Against this, skeptics about the de se have argued that the de se phenomena demand no more of our theories of attitudes than traditional Frege cases. In this camp one view is that the de se can be accounted for by MOPs in the same way that MOPs can account for how it can be rational to believe, for instance, ”Hesperus is (...) shining” while also believing ”Phosphorus is shining.” This paper formulates some minimal conditions that de se MOPs must have in order to explain the relevant de se phenomena. Some potential replies are answered. I conclude that de se MOPs are not exceptional. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

Typical puzzles for de se attitudes by Perry and Lewis are laid out and contrasted with the original version of Jackson's Knowledge Argument. It is argued, from an epistemic perspective, that de se attitudes can be explained by looking at the way internal/introspective knowledge is formed without resorting to acquaintance or making assumptions about the Mind/Body problem.

This essay offers a proposal for how to understand the idea that there is a special connection between de se attitudes and the explanation of action.

We develop an approach to the problem of de se belief usually expressed with the question, what does the shopper with the leaky sugar bag have to learn to know that s/he is the one making the mess. Where one might have thought that some special kind of “de se” belief explains the triggering of action, we maintain that this gets the order of explanation wrong. We sketch a very simple cognitive architecture that yields de se-like behavior on which the (...) action-triggering functionality of the belief-state is what counts it as de se rather than some prior property of being “de se” explaining the triggering of action. This functionality shows that action-triggering change in belief-state also undergirds a correlative change in the objective involved in the triggered action. This model is far too simple to have any claim to showing how the de se works for humans, but it shows, by illustration, that nothing mysteriously “subjective”” need be involved in this aspect of self-conception. While our exposition is very different from those of Perry and Recanati, all three of us are developing the same kind of view. (shrink)

Higginbotham argued that certain linguistic items of English, when used in indirect discourse, necessarily trigger first-personal interpretations. They are: the emphatic reflexive pronoun and the controlled understood subject, represented as PRO. PRO is special, in this respect, due to its imposing obligatory control effects between the main clause and its subordinates ). Folescu & Higginbotham, in addition, argued that in Romanian, a language whose grammar doesn’t assign a prominent role to PRO, de se triggers are correlated with the subjunctive mood (...) of certain verbs. That paper, however, didn’t account for the grammatical diversity of the reports that display immunity to error through misidentification in Romanian: some of these reports are expressed by using de se triggers; others are not. Their IEM, moreover, is not systematically lexically controlled by the verbs, via their theta-roles; it is, rather, determined by the meaning of the verbs in question. Given the data from Romanian, I will argue, the phenomenon of IEM cannot be fully explained starting either from the syntactical or the lexical structure of a language. (shrink)

It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...) to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of “centre” that hasn’t yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power. (shrink)

_(MA thesis)_ Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) describes a sort of immunity against such a situation that the thinker wrongly identifies something as other things. Philosophers consider it as being especially relevant to first-person or de se judgments. Many philosophers seem to advance IEM as an alternative to a Cartesian method of defining first-person privilege and of circumscribing the first-person perspective. However, as more and more representative instances are substantiated as being vulnerable to error through misidentification, it is thus (...) necessary to offer an account sufficient to explain IEM. Then, there are roughly two approaches in the literature: the identification-freedom approach and the metasemantic approach. The former is characterised by the claim that the presence of IEM is always explained by the absence of an identificatory-component in the thought's grounds. The latter is more heterogeneous than the former. Nevertheless, it can be roughly described by their focus on explaining the IEM of de se thoughts based on an account of how the reference of de se thoughts is fixed, rather than just on the grounds of particular de se thoughts. However, there are still some problems with the existing accounts. More specifically, some problems from the indexical thoughts put at risk Recanati's appeal, which is viewed as a representative of the metasematic approach. Nonetheless, I think these problems can be resolved competently by pointing out the fact that there are three levels of reflection in introspection. Thoughts produced by the first level of reflection (first-level thoughts, hereafter) correspond to Recanati's implicit thoughts; Third-level thoughts are Recanati's explicit thoughts (whether it is made explicit by an extra reflective act, as Recanati puts it). However, second-level thoughts, which include a sort of aboutness in their content, could explain the subject appearing in indexical statements with IEM, guaranteeing IEM of these thoughts in the meanwhile. (shrink)

Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.

A presente investigação tem por objetivo responder à questão título considerando os argumentos apresentados, de um lado, pelos desenvolvimentistas e, de outro, pelos ambientalistas. Entendemos que os argumentos apresentados refletem um conflito de valores mais profundo que, se abordado por uma metodologia de solução de conflitos adequada, pode contribuir para elucidação da questão. A metodologia proposta é o personalismo ético de Scheler. A hierarquia de valores a ser aplicada na solução de conflitos traz (i) o valor pessoa como o mais (...) elevado, seguido dos (ii) valores espirituais, como a justiça, (iii) os vitais, como o bem estar e o útil, e (iv) os sensíveis. Através das ações de preferir e postergar, é possível encontrar pontos de equilíbrio numa permanente atitude crítica. O objetivo é contribuir para que as ações ocorram com a devida diligência para com os direitos humanos. A hipótese inicial é que, identificando os valores em conflito e aplicando a metodologia descrita, a solução de conflitos neste caso concreto permite pensar numa transição energética que concilie o desenvolvimento e o meio ambiente. Compreendemos que ambos têm como fim proteger o valor pessoa. Portanto, o que está em conflito de fato, sem com isso assumir uma postura ingênua, são os valores espirituais e vitais de cada uma das partes. Neste sentido, defendemos que, diante da inevitável demanda por energia da sociedade contemporânea e do alto custo da transição energética, é preciso conciliar o desenvolvimento com o meio ambiente a partir de uma programada transição energética financiada pela exploração do petróleo e gás, mas com metas definidas comprometidas com a neutralidade da emissão de GEE em 2050. Para tanto, é necessário regulamentação, monitoramento e fiscalização por parte do Estado e do governo federal com a finalidade de garantir a substituição dos combustíveis fósseis por fontes energéticas limpas. (shrink)

Este ensaio celebra as cinco décadas da publicação do livro A ordem do discurso de Michel Foucault, realizando uma reflexão acerca de sua repercussão entre as ciências sociais e sobre seus usos, principalmente, no campo da linguagem na parte relacionada à análise do discurso de linha francesa. Portanto, trata-se de uma retrospectiva crítica cuja análise começa com a entrevista que Foucault concedeu algumas semanas antes de proferir esta aula aos brasileiros Sergio Paulo Rouanet e José Guilherme Merquior. Em seguida, o (...) presente trabalho faz uma breve história da entrada de Foucault ao Collège de France e, por fim, lida com a microfísica do discurso que se encontra nesta aula, sobretudo, da rarefação do sujeito, além dos seus usos nas ciências humanas e sociais mais o campo da linguagem em torno da pragmática e das análises de discurso. (shrink)

Este estudio se ocupa del control social del cuerpo y de la reconfiguración de la memoria popular en películas de horror a través de la perspectiva genealógica de Foucault, presentada en su libro Vigilar y Castigar, publicado hace 40 años. Por lo tanto, tomaremos, À l’interieur e Frontière (s), dos producciones de horror cinematográfico hechas por directores franceses, ambos publicados en 2007. La hipótesis principal es que las películas de terror se muestran como una nueva forma de vigilancia y control (...) social del cuerpo. Por otro lado, también puede recodificar la memoria popular apropiándose de acontecimientos polítcos y/o revolucionarios como en las películas comentadas por Foucault en la revista Cahiers de Cinéma en 1974 políticas, aunque no sean las películas de terror. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta algumas considerações a respeito da Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC), no referente às questões ligadas ao ensino da língua portuguesa no Brasil, à territorialidade e ao pertencimento racial, processos históricos, que envolvem, no campo da educação, a formação docente e a construção da cidadania dos educandos e das educandas nestes tempos de reafirmação do Estado democrático de direito e da vaga decolonial. Portanto, trata-se de uma abordagem política em termos do pensamento de Paulo Freire, patrono da educação (...) brasileira, que considerava político o ato de educar (FREIRE, 1980; 1983; 1989; 1996). É com base nesta perspectiva que a BNCC será abordada, mas sob o aporte teórico da análise pragmática do discurso, tributária da análise discursivo-desconstrutiva (cf. ARAÚJO, 2020). (shrink)

Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you've lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles these problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty Puzzle.

The problem of communication in de se thoughts is the problem of communication of first-person or self-locating thoughts across the speakers of a conversation. The problem mainly stems from the lack of a proper account of attitude and content — an account that is supposed to explain whether or how the context of linguistic utterances is related to the semantic content of a sentence, assertion and belief. In this paper, after introducing two new semantic items, namely, almost-impossible and almost-necessary propositions, (...) that could be taken as theoretically primitive entities in the semantic framework I wish to draw, I propose an account of modified Lewisian-centered content and attitude based on the metaphysical framework of the Lewisian counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic to the extent that the modification relies on those new semantic items. I then show that we can solve the problem by using our modified account. (shrink)

This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed (...) account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account. (shrink)

The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...) I propose a concrete model of communication as the transmission of information from the speaker’s mental state to the hearer’s. My analysis is couched in Discourse Representation Theory, a formal semantic framework that linguists use for modeling conversational common ground updates, but that can also be applied to describe the individual speech participants’ dynamically changing mental states. (shrink)

Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism.

Este trabalho trata do conceito Exu Diaspórico, o qual foi forjado para lidar com as pesquisas empíricas situadas dentro do quadro teórico da vaga decolonial. Sua concepção está ligada às tradições iorubanas diaspóricas nessa parte do Atlântico Sul onde emergiram outros sistemas resultantes, quer seja de fragmentos e vestígios de narrativas em gestos de memória e resistência, quer seja da tradução realizada pelo outro, muitas vezes, por meio de um processo de carnavalização cultural, que, por sua vez, se deu pela (...) convivência com os bantu, com os povos autóctones e com o colonizador europeu. Este conceito se articula com o conceito de língua-linguagem como encruzilhada apresentado por Araújo (2021a), mas pode ser tomado, ainda, de forma independente. Portanto, trata-se de uma discussão conceitual que visa contribuir com as reflexões e pesquisas decoloniais. O conceito também está a cargo de noções como negritude e Baianidade. Contudo, ele aparece para reunir todas as representações de Exu que resultaram da diáspora negra em meio a um processo de carnavalização das tradições iorubanas em contato com outras culturas e cosmologias. (shrink)

Este trabalho reflete sobre o modo como nossos ancestrais negros resistiram à necropolítica colonial mobilizando saberes para recriar no Brasil outros espaços religiosos sob o nome de terreiros de candomblé. Mas o objetivo principal da discussão é tratar sobre as noções de sincretismo religioso, desconstruindo-a teoricamente conforme a decolonialidade aplica tal conceito derridiano. O termo necropolítica é usado aqui conforme Achille Mbembe o emprega. Como uma forma de contribuir com o debate em voga e, ao mesmo tempo, fazer o diagnóstico (...) do presente, a discussão se justifica também porque a questão do sincretismo religioso tem sido alvo de muitos questionamentos por parte dos movimentos negros e por parte dos teóricos da decolonialidade. (shrink)

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960’s and 1970’s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment, and advanced different accounts. In this paper I discuss Ernest Sosa’s approach to these matters. I first present his approach to singular or de re thought in general in the first section. In the second, I introduce the data that need to be explained, Perry’s and Lewis’s proposals, and Sosa’s own account, in relation to Perry’s, Lewis’s, (...) and his own views on de re thought. In the third section I present the account I prefer – a “token-reflexive” version of Perry’s original account that Perry himself came to adopt in reaction to Stalnaker’s criticisms. In the final section I take up Recanati’s recent arguments, from a viewpoint on de se thought very similar to Sosa’s, to the effect that such an account is in a good position to explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I argue there that that is not the case, and I conclude by suggesting that the token-reflexive account fits better both with the data and with Sosa’s Fregean take on de re thought in general. (shrink)

De todos os aspectos do comportamento não-verbal, a face é sem dúvida uma das mais ricas e importantes fontes de informação sobre o estado inter- no do outro. Mas expressões faciais são raramente percebidas de forma isolada. Ao contrário, são tipicamente inseridas em contextos sociais ricos e dinâmicos, que incluem gestos e posturas corporais, conhecimento situacional, etc. Com base nessas observações, podemos nos perguntar se o contexto no qual uma expressão é percebida pode influenciar a percepção de emoções nesta expressão. (...) No caso de uma resposta afirmativa, de que modo se daria essa influência contextual, e quais seriam os seus limites? O propósito desse artigo é explorar algumas possibilidades sobre o papel do contexto na percepção de emoções, desde a teoria das emoções básicas, que defende que categorias discretas de emoções podem ser lidas diretamente da face de forma invariável, a abordagens mais contemporâneas, que atribuem um papel constitutivo para o contexto na percepção de emoções. Embora o debate esteja longe de ser resolvido, as conclusões deste artigo apontam para um novo modo de se pensar sobre fenômenos emocionais, onde a díade de interação torna-se a unidade básica de análise, e onde emoções são concebidas como propriedades emergentes de relações em contextos particulares de interação social. (shrink)

Este roteiro de leitura, que ora apresentamos, tem como objetivo principal tornar mais acessível, ou melhor, mais inteligível A ordem do discurso de Michel Foucault para aqueles que se arriscam a entrar nesta ordem por meio de sua análise do discurso redimensionada nesta sua aula inaugural. É um roteiro simples que procurou atender minimamente aos leitores iniciantes deste texto que se tornou um clássico no campo das Humanidades e das ciências empíricas como o Direito e a própria Medicina, campos que (...) passaram pelo crivo das análises arqueogenealógicas empreendidas por Foucault. (shrink)

O presente trabalho busca refletir, no sentido derridiano, sobre o ensino do Português Língua Estrangeira (PLE) à luz do Quadro Europeu Comum de Referência para a aprendizagem, ensino e avaliação de línguas (QECR). Tal documento, juntamente com o Portfólio Europeu das Línguas, se apresenta como um instrumento essencialmente linguístico para a harmonização do ensino de línguas vivas europeias e com uma perspectiva intercultural. Dessa forma, o QECR advoga que o ensino de língua deve promover o desenvolvimento do aprendiz, da sua (...) identidade em resposta à experiência enriquecedora da diferença na língua e na cultura. Exige-se do aluno muito mais do que simplesmente imitar ou memorizar. O QECR busca descrever exaustivamente aquilo que o aprendiz de uma língua, no nosso caso o PLE, tem que aprender para ser capaz de comunicar, interagir e quais os conhecimentos e habilidades ele tem de desenvolver para serem eficazes na sua atuação. A descrição abrange também o contexto cultural dessa língua. Sendo assim, o QECR é mais uma alternativa para aqueles que trabalham com o português na modalidade de língua 2 (PLE) no sentido da compreensão das alteridades, da cidadania e da democracia num mundo sem fronteiras em que “Navegar é preciso”, i.e., interagir, dialogar. (shrink)

Resumen: Husserl propone una teoría sobre la intersubjetividad que parte de la conciencia trascendental como inserta en el mundo de la vida donde están los otros y donde la comunidad se construye bajo una estructura de esencias que garantiza la comunalidad. El mundo de la vida es dado y compartido por todas las conciencias intencionales y trascendentales, es condición para intuiciones empíricas y eidéticas, la epoché y las reducciones eidética y trascendental. Cada momento del método fenomenológico se basa en la (...) existencia de un mundo de la vida independiente de la subjetividad. En este mundo, hay objetos reales y, entre estos, los otros, reconocidos por analogía a través de la empatía. Desde una perspectiva metodológico-epistemológico, el yo es anterior al mundo y a los otros yos. El yo constituye, en sentido fenomenológico, la realidad. La conciencia es el lugar de evidenciación de la realidad. No obstante, en la perspectiva ontológica, es lo contrario. El mundo de la vida es anterior a la conciencia individual. El mundo de la vida está ahí, disponible, existente, independiente del sujeto, funcionando con su propio orden, con sus leyes y reglas. Es el yo el que esta insertado en el mundo de la vida y que se esfuerza por desvendarlo. La realidad se impone y el yo es, sobre todo, miembro de una comunidad de otros yos. Aun así, ¿cómo compartir las experiencias? Las vivencias pueden ser diferentes, pero hay un límite en las variaciones, un límite dado por la esencia del objeto vivido y por las leyes que rigen las relaciones de tal objeto. Así, la constitución del mundo y de sus objetos está permanentemente en progreso. Es posible donarles nuevos sentidos, en los límites de su esencia. Para Husserl, la constitución comunal del mundo es la condición de posibilidad para la existencia de sujetos separados unos de los otros, y este entendimiento recíproco solo es posible a través de la constitución trascendental de la objetividad. Así, no hay una separación entre la intersubjetividad y la constitución del mundo, es la comunidad de yos la que dona sentidos a las objetividades. En el mundo de la vida con los otros en comunidad. -/- Abstract: Husserl proposes a theory on intersubjectivity that starts from transcendental consciousness as inserted in the lifeworld where the others and where the community are built under a structure of essences that guarantees communality. The lifeworld is given and shared by all intentional and transcendental consciousnesses, it is a condition for empirical and eidetic intuitions, the epoché and the eidetic and transcendental reductions. Every moment of the phenomenological method is based on the existence of a lifeworld independent of subjectivity. In this world, there are real objects and, among these, the others, recognized by analogy through empathy. From a methodologicalepistemological perspective, the self is prior to the world and the other selves. The self constitutes, in a phenomenological sense, reality. Consciousness is the locus of evidence of reality. However, from the ontological perspective, it is the opposite. The lifeworld is prior to individual consciousness. The lifeworld is there, available, existing, independent of subjectivity, functioning with its own order, with its laws and rules. It is the self that is inserted in the lifeworld and that strives to unveil it. Reality prevails and the self is, above all, a member of a community of other selves. Even so, how to share the experiences? The experiences can be different, but there is a limit in variations, a limit given by the essence of the lived object and by the laws that govern the relation of the object. Thus, the constitution of the world and its objects is permanently in progress. It is possible to give them new meanings, within the limits of their essence. For Husserl, the communal constitution of the world is the condition of possibility for the existence of subjects separated from each other, and this reciprocal understanding is only possible through the transcendental constitution of objectivity. therefore, there is no separation between intersubjectivity and the constitution of the world, it is the community of selves that gives meaning to objectivities. (shrink)

Este trabalho trata do conceito Exu Diaspórico, o qual foi forjado para lidar com as pesquisas empíricas situadas dentro do quadro teórico da vaga decolonial. Sua concepção está ligada às tradições iorubanas diaspóricas nessa parte do Atlântico Sul onde emergiram outros sistemas resultantes, quer seja de fragmentos e vestígios de narrativas em gestos de memória e resistência, quer seja da tradução realizada pelo outro, muitas vezes, por meio de um processo de carnavalização cultural, que, por sua vez, se deu pela (...) convivência com os bantu, com os povos autóctones e com o colonizador europeu. Este conceito se articula com o conceito de língua-linguagem como encruzilhada apresentado por Araújo (2021a), mas pode ser tomado, ainda, de forma independente. Portanto, trata-se de uma discussão conceitual que visa contribuir com as reflexões e pesquisas decoloniais. O conceito também está a cargo de noções como negritude e Baianidade. Contudo, ele aparece para reunir todas as representações de Exu que resultaram da diáspora negra em meio a um processo de carnavalização das tradições iorubanas em contato com outras culturas e cosmologias. (shrink)

This paper investigates how regular pronominal typology interfaces with de se and de re interpretations, and highlights a correlation between strong pronouns and de re interpretations, and weak pronouns and de se interpretations. In order to illustrate this correlation, I contrast different pronominal forms within a single language, null versus overt pronouns in Kutchi Gujarati, and clitic versus full pronouns in Austrian Bavarian. I argue that the data presented here provide cross-linguistic comparative support for the idea of a dedicated de (...) se LF as argued for by Percus and Sauerland. (shrink)

I argue that de se attitudes pose a special problem for philosophical theories of attitudes. Attitude contents are supposed to play a role in characterizing agreement and are also supposed to play a role in the explanation of action. De se attitudes reveal that no single type of object can play both roles.

Resumo: neste artigo pretendo estender a evidenciação do encobrimento do mundo da vida formulada por Husserl ao uso das tecnologias disruptivas da 4ª Revolução Industrial, mais precisamente o uso da inteligência artificial (IA) nas plataformas sociais. Primeiro, apresento o conceito de mundo da vida que se mantém consistente ao longo das obras de Husserl; em seguida, apresento seu encobrimento derivado da matematização da natureza e do rompimento com o telos, o que originou a crise da humanidade europeia. Segundo, mais camadas (...) de encobrimento do mundo da vida vão se sobrepondo com a 3ª e 4ª RIs. Em mais detalhe, o encobrimento e o afastamento do mundo da vida provocado pelo uso da IA e seus efeitos negativos, individual e coletivamente. Terceiro, a proposta Husserliana de retorno ao mundo da vida através de uma epoché radical. Concluo que a solução proposta por Husserl para a crise ainda é atual e urgente. Abstract: in this paper I intend to extend the disclosure of the cover-up of the lifeworld formulated by Husserl to the use of disruptive technologies of the 4th Industrial Revolution, more precisely the use of artificial intelligence on social platforms. First, I present the concept of lifeworld that remains consistent throughout Husserl's works; then, I present its cover-up derived from the mathematization of nature and the break with the telos, which originated the crisis of european humanity. Second, more layers of cover-up of the lifeworld overlap with the 3rd and 4th IRs. In more detail, the cover-up and detachment from the lifeworld caused by the use of AI and its negative effects, individually and collectively. Third, the Husserlian proposal of return to the lifeworld through a radical epoché. I conclude that the solution proposed by Husserl to the crisis is still actual and urgent. (shrink)

A Crítica de Hume ao Argumento do Desígnio José Oscar de Almeida Marques Dep. de Filosofia – UNICAMP -/- RESUMO: É comum considerar que o chamado “argumento do desígnio” (o argumento a posteriori para provar a existência de Deus a partir da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo) teria sido refutado ou seriamente abalado por Hume. Mas a natureza e o alcance dessa alegada refutação são problemáticos, pois Hume muitas vezes expressou suas críticas através de seus personagens e evitou assumi-las diretamente (...) enquanto autor. Em vez de supor que Hume procedeu dessa forma apenas para disfarçar suas verdadeiras convicções e evitar um conflito com as autoridades eclesiásticas, proponho que sua posição nesse assunto não é tão categórica como às vezes se supõe, e que os famosos argumentos de Filo nos Diálogos mostram apenas que é possível que a ordem e funcionalidade do mundo tenham surgido sem a intervenção de um desígnio consciente, mas não podem por si sós dar a essa hipótese o mínimo grau de plausibilidade necessário para torná-la digna de uma séria consideração. De fato, antes da revolução explicativa operada por Darwin um século depois, ninguém estava realmente em condições de vislumbrar uma alternativa plausível à atuação de algum tipo de inteligência na geração da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo. ------------ Some Remarks on Hume’s Critique of the Argument from Design José Oscar of Almeida Marques Dep. of Philosophy - UNICAMP -/- ABSTRACT: The so-called “argument from design” (the a posteriori argument to prove the existence of God from the order and functionality of the world) is commonly considered to have been refuted or seriously impaired by Hume. But the nature and scope of this alleged refutation is problematic because Hume often expressed his critics through other characters’ mouth and avoided to assume them directly as author. Contrarily to the supposition that Hume proceeded in this way only to disguise his true convictions and to avoid a confrontation with the ecclesiastical authorities, I propose that his stance on the matter is not, in fact, as clear-cut as it is sometimes supposed, and that Philo’s famous arguments in the Dialogues show only that it is possible for the order and functionality of the world to have arisen without the intervention of an intelligent design, but cannot by themselves lend to this hypothesis the least degree of plausibility needed to make it worthy of serious consideration. In fact, before the explanatory revolution inaugurated by Darwin a century later, nobody was in position to envisage a plausible alternative to the operation of some sort or other of intelligence in the generation of the order and functionality of the world. (shrink)

A militância política de Jorge Amado no Partido Comunista é um capítulo à parte na história do comunismo no Brasil, que completou 100 anos no dia 25 de março. Ela também é algo marcante em sua obra, a ponto da crítica literária brasileira, de tradição uspiana, considerá-la uma forma de panfleto partidário da nossa esquerda. Nesta exposição, pretende-se realizar uma breve discussão acerca de suas lutas políticas, das quais se destacam as questões religiosa e racial, que levaram Jorge Amado a (...) criar um projeto de lei, no período que exerceu o mandato de deputado constituinte pelo PCB, em 1946, assegurando a liberdade religiosa no Brasil. Aqui, também se destaca a sua amizade com o povo de candomblé que lhe honrou com títulos, como o de Obá de Xangô e Ogã de Iansã; além da forma como a crítica o rotulava de regionalista e escritor panfletário. Contudo, esta é uma forma de homenagear tanto o mais famoso dos doze Obás de Xangô da Bahia, quanto o Partidão, nesse seu centenário. Em termos metodológicos, trata-se de uma leitura ensaística foucaultiana sobre esses fatos e acontecimentos que marcaram duplamente a vida de Jorge Amado e do Comunismo no Brasil, já que lançamos mão de uma parte da maquinaria teórica do militante comunista do PCF (Partido Comunista Francês), Michel Foucault, como vontade de verdade, comentário, discurso, autoria, obra, descontinuidade (na continuidade) e dispersão. (shrink)

Os corpos no cinema estão sob a ordem de um olhar soberano que nos diz para onde devemos olhar e como devemos fazer isso. É um olhar poderoso que tudo sabe e tudo pode. Um olhar que nos posiciona não como simples espectadores, mas como sujeitos. É a partir daí que buscamos compreender como se arquitetam o medo, ou seja, qual é a ordem do cinema de horror, tecido com a pena do medo? Nessa arquitetura, os corpos aparecem como lugares (...) para vigiar e punir em espaços utópicos e heterotópicos. Espaços de memórias. Espaços de poder vigiar e punir. Espaço onde se impõe uma posição de sujeito, um poder sobre o sujeito. Portanto, os corpos no cinema de horror são artefatos para uma arqueologia do medo, escrita pelo poder do horror sobre estes corpos. Daí nosso interesse por esses lugares. Para demonstrar essa arqueologia, utilizaremos dois filmes franceses, produzidos em 2007, Frontière(s) e À l’interieur como espaços de horror construídos para o medo pelas vias da utopia e heterotopias pensadas por Michel Foucault, filósofo do presente, do nosso presente para compreender como se arquitetam tal medo por meio de sua história arqueológica, prática de um espaço chamado Labedisco/UESB. (shrink)

Se efectúa un diagnóstico sobre el estado del Sistema de Museos de la ciudad de Colonia de Sacramento, Uruguay, de forma tal de facilitar a las autoridades competente herramientas que le sean útiles cuando comiencen a utilizar la planificación estratégica. El objetivo se centró entonces en el análisis del entorno en el cual se encuentra inmerso el Sistema de Museos y su gestión actual. En base a dicho análisis se define la Matriz FODA de forma de posibilitar un acercamiento del (...) Sistema a la Planificación estratégica. En cuanto al contenido, el trabajo se divide en dos partes. En la primera parte se realiza una revisión de la literatura. Se comienza con una introducción a la economía de la cultura y luego a los museos; para luego analizar el estado de la cuestión relativa a la gestión de organizaciones y su aplicabilidad a los museos, poniendo énfasis en la misión y visión; planificación estratégica y otras herramientas. La revisión de la literatura culmina con el plan museológico. En la segunda parte se realiza el estudio de un caso concreto, donde se analiza la situación actual del Sistema de Museos en base a diferentes herramientas de gestión. A continuación, se exponen las conclusiones de la investigación y las recomendaciones. (shrink)

Entendendo a identidade como construção ideológica, esta pesquisa busca refletir sobre a identidade dos professores de língua portuguesa construída nos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais e nas Orientações Curriculares Nacionais para o ensino de língua portuguesa, os quais impõem uma nova postura teórica e prática a estes profissionais. Dito de outra forma, pretende-se apresentar e discutir os resultados de uma análise discursiva das representações da (s) identidade (s) e competências atribuídas aos professores, enfatizando as representações sociais da profissão do professor na sociedade (...) contemporânea brasileira, abrindo a possibilidade para questionarmos a identidade unificada e transparente que os documentos oficiais desenham para os professores. (shrink)

Tendo em vista que “todo sistema de educação é uma maneira política de manter ou de modificar a apropriação dos discursos, com os saberes e os poderes que eles trazem consigo”, nossa pesquisa visa refletir sobre a nova identidade docente materializada no discurso dos PCNs de língua Portuguesa. Trata-se de traduzir a política oficial de formação de professor e/ou desconstruí-la (Derrida, 1998), analisando e discutindo a(s) identidade(s) e competências atribuídas aos professores, abrindo a possibilidade para questionarmos a identidade unificada e (...) transparente que os documentos oficiais desenham para os professores em serviço. Esperamos, com esse trabalho, contribuir para a construção de uma política de formação de professores sensível à subjetividade heterogênea dos professores no Brasil. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to display and debate the main interpretive and philosophical claims defended by Simon Robertson in his Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics. Robertson presents innovative and stimulating arguments that might interest primarily readers willing to better understand the Nietzschean moral theory and researchers interested in broader issues of contemporary moral theory, particularly in the analytic tradition. The author covers the main debates in the area, taking sides in disputes going on in normative theory, metaethics, moral (...) psychology and Nietzschean studies. Robertson mobilizes a set of interpretive and (purely) philosophical arguments, which deliver to the reader a final picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionist ideal. It is a theoretically consistent ideal that can be endorsed as a relevant alternative in the contemporary landscape of ethical theories. This alternative involves a powerful critique of the normative authority of morality, a sentimentalist moral psychology, a conception of the good life that combines the goods of excellence and flourishing, a modest conception of normativity that brings together internalist and externalist elements, and, finally, an irrealist metaethics that differs both from realism (which presupposes ontologically robust normative properties)and from reformist views (such as fictionalism and non-cognitivism). The article reconstructs Robertson's main arguments in favour of this set of claims, seeking to assess (1) to what extent they are convincing, both in their philosophical and interpretive ambitions and (2) how capable his methodological choices are to address critical challenges. (shrink)