De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue (...) that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs. (shrink)

What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...) cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Frege’s puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended. (shrink)

Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...) two contrasting accounts – a Lewisian one and a Perrian one – in the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...) the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...) explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)

I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal with the problems I (...) raise for the Simple Account. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the assumed connection between de se attitude ascription and logophoricity in the case of Chinese ziji. It is widely believed that logophors are among the paradigm cases of de se marking, and that long-distance ziji is logophoric. Drawing on a critical examination of a variety of analyses, this chapter argues that long-distance anaphora, de se interpretation, and logophoric marking are overlapping but distinct phenomena. Even if ziji is logophoric, it does not automatically trigger de se requirement. A (...) de se-neutral analysis of ziji is consistent with pragmatic derivations of interpretations that emphasize the self. The findings point to a new approach to long-distance binding, and identify the blocking effect as the key issue for further research. (shrink)

Typical puzzles for de se attitudes by Perry and Lewis are laid out and contrasted with the original version of Jackson's Knowledge Argument. It is argued, from an epistemic perspective, that de se attitudes can be explained by looking at the way internal/introspective knowledge is formed without resorting to acquaintance or making assumptions about the Mind/Body problem.

We develop an approach to the problem of de se belief usually expressed with the question, what does the shopper with the leaky sugar bag have to learn to know that s/he is the one making the mess. Where one might have thought that some special kind of “de se” belief explains the triggering of action, we maintain that this gets the order of explanation wrong. We sketch a very simple cognitive architecture that yields de se-like behavior on which the (...) action-triggering functionality of the belief-state is what counts it as de se rather than some prior property of being “de se” explaining the triggering of action. This functionality shows that action-triggering change in belief-state also undergirds a correlative change in the objective involved in the triggered action. This model is far too simple to have any claim to showing how the de se works for humans, but it shows, by illustration, that nothing mysteriously “subjective”” need be involved in this aspect of self-conception. While our exposition is very different from those of Perry and Recanati, all three of us are developing the same kind of view. (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

Higginbotham argued that certain linguistic items of English, when used in indirect discourse, necessarily trigger first-personal interpretations. They are: the emphatic reflexive pronoun and the controlled understood subject, represented as PRO. PRO is special, in this respect, due to its imposing obligatory control effects between the main clause and its subordinates ). Folescu & Higginbotham, in addition, argued that in Romanian, a language whose grammar doesn’t assign a prominent role to PRO, de se triggers are correlated with the subjunctive mood (...) of certain verbs. That paper, however, didn’t account for the grammatical diversity of the reports that display immunity to error through misidentification in Romanian: some of these reports are expressed by using de se triggers; others are not. Their IEM, moreover, is not systematically lexically controlled by the verbs, via their theta-roles; it is, rather, determined by the meaning of the verbs in question. Given the data from Romanian, I will argue, the phenomenon of IEM cannot be fully explained starting either from the syntactical or the lexical structure of a language. (shrink)

Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960’s and 1970’s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment, and advanced different accounts. In this paper I discuss Ernest Sosa’s approach to these matters. I first present his approach to singular or de re thought in general in the first section. In the second, I introduce the data that need to be explained, Perry’s and Lewis’s proposals, and Sosa’s own account, in relation to Perry’s, Lewis’s, (...) and his own views on de re thought. In the third section I present the account I prefer – a “token-reflexive” version of Perry’s original account that Perry himself came to adopt in reaction to Stalnaker’s criticisms. In the final section I take up Recanati’s recent arguments, from a viewpoint on de se thought very similar to Sosa’s, to the effect that such an account is in a good position to explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I argue there that that is not the case, and I conclude by suggesting that the token-reflexive account fits better both with the data and with Sosa’s Fregean take on de re thought in general. (shrink)

Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism.

The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...) I propose a concrete model of communication as the transmission of information from the speaker’s mental state to the hearer’s. My analysis is couched in Discourse Representation Theory, a formal semantic framework that linguists use for modeling conversational common ground updates, but that can also be applied to describe the individual speech participants’ dynamically changing mental states. (shrink)

Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you've lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles these problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty Puzzle.

This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed (...) account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account. (shrink)

Principles of expert deference say that you should align your credences with those of an expert. This expert could be your doctor, the objective chances, or your future self, after you've learnt something new. These kinds of principles face difficulties in cases in which you are uncertain of the truth-conditions of the thoughts in which you invest credence, as well as cases in which the thoughts have different truth-conditions for you and the expert. For instance, you shouldn't defer to your (...) doctor by aligning your credence in the de se thought 'I am sick' with the doctor's credence in that same de se thought. Here, I generalise principles of expert deference to handle these kinds of problem cases. (shrink)

It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...) to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of “centre” that hasn’t yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power. (shrink)

Le scientisme a plus de notoriété que l’histoire proprement dite, car il a été identifié avec le « positivisme », le « réductionnisme », le « matérialisme » ou le « marxisme », ou même tenu responsable de la domination de la science sur leur autres activités humaines. L’idée que la recherche scientifique produit les meilleures connaissances possible réside dans la définition même du « scientisme ». Cependant, alors même que la science peut se prévaloir d’un nombre considérable de succès (...) théoriques et pratiques, une confiance rationnelle envers elle comme moyen de résoudre tout problème factuel a été dénoncée comme illégitime, discutable ou dogmatique. Ainsi, après avoir passé en revue les diverses conceptions du scientisme, je défends une position raisonnable du scientisme contre certaines de ses critiques dominantes. Ainsi, on soutiendra que la science est l’approche la plus fiable pour acquérir des connaissances sans nuire à d’autres activités importantes dans la mesure où celles-ci ne traitent pas de questions factuelles ou cognitives ni ne sont en contradiction avec une vision du monde scientifique. (shrink)

A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christian theists (...) are discussed, including rejecting traditional theism in favour of some version of pantheism or panentheism. (shrink)

Cette thèse porte sur la question du fini et de l’infini dans la philosophie de Hegel. L’objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à retracer l’influence exercée par la philosophie antique (principalement Platon et Aristote) et par la philosophie moderne (pour l’essentiel Kant et certains postkantiens) sur l’élaboration hégélienne des catégories de la finité et de l’infinité. En second lieu, elle étudie le développement systématique de la logique de l’infinité hégélienne à la lumière de cette influence. Il s’agit d’étudier, (...) à travers une approche historique et critique, comment Hegel résout l’opposition traditionnelle du fini et de l’infini par sa théorie des deux infinis. A l’aune des conceptions de l’infinité-finie (la mauvaise infinité) et de l’infinité véritablement infinie (la véritable infinité), Hegel montre que le processus de la détermination du fini est un processus d’idéalisation qui supprime la contradiction du fini et de l’infini. Ainsi, l’enquête sur des concepts de finité et d’infinité permet de découvrir que l’idéalité spéculative est pour Hegel une réponse non seulement au problème traditionnel de leur articulation, mais aussi, plus généralement, aux problèmes soulevés par la caractérisation des idéalismes antiques et modernes. (shrink)

This paper introduces a framework for direct surface composition by online update. The surface string is interpreted as is, with each morpheme in turn updating the input state of information and attention. A formal representation language, Logic of Centering, is defined and some crosslinguistic constraints on lexical meanings and compositional operations are formulated.

Este artigo visa mapear como Marcel Mauss (no que concerne às questões da Dádiva e da Teoria da Reciprocidade) foi absorvido por Paul Veyne no que circunda dois estudos de casos: o primeiro deles sendo a noção de “Evergetismo”, trabalhada em “Le pain et le cirque: sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique”; e o segundo deles a noção de “Imagem de si”, construída por Veyne para fazer uma “crítica”(conceito agora reformulado de modo positivo e não vingativo) à leitura do “cuidado de (...) si” na antiguidade trabalhada por Michel Foucault. O texto base para esse movimento de dádiva entre Veyne e Foucault é a conferência proferida alguns anos após sua morte do arqueólogo:" L'individu atteint au coeur par la puissance publique”. (shrink)

Las teorías que usamos para representar el mundo pueden ser extremadamente complejas. Abordan temas tales como electrones, campos cuánticos, estrellas de neutrones, materia oscura, redes neuronales, mercados económicos, la atmósfera y muchas otras entidades que suponemos existen en el universo. Al formular nuestras teorías, recurrimos a lenguajes exactos que nos permiten minimizar la vaguedad y expresarnos lo más precisa y cuantitativamente posible. Recurrimos a la matemática. Cuando formulamos nuestras teorías fácticas en lenguaje matemático, estas se refieren no solamente a objetos (...) que nosotros interpretamos como materiales, tales como partículas o personas, sino también a entidades más raras de un mundo abstracto: conjuntos, números, funciones, espacios algebraicos, variedades, topologías, y otras entidades similares. Estos objetos no son materiales en el sentido en que nosotros decimos que una manzana es material. Ellos no existen en el espacio-tiempo, no interactúan, no cambian o evolucionan. Sin embargo, allí están, profundamente arraigados en nuestras teorías más apreciadas acerca del mundo. (shrink)

Introduction / St.L. JAKI (pp. 9-19). Présentation / J.-Fr. STOFFEL (p. 21). – L'œuvre de Pierre Duhem (pp. 25-113). Publications post­humes (pp. 115-129). – IIe partie : Les travaux de ses doc­torands. Fernand Caubet (pp. 133-135). Henry Chevallier (pp. 137-141). Émile Lenoble (pp. 143-144). Lucien Marchis (pp. 145-154). Eugène Monnet (pp. 155-156). Henri Pélabon (pp. 157-168). Paul Saurel (pp. 169-172). Albert Turpain (pp. 173-197). – IIIe partie : La litté­rature secondaire. Thèses et mé­moires (pp. 201-202). Livres (pp. 203-205). Biographies et (...) étu­des générales (pp. 207-209). Duhem en perspective (pp. 211-212). Le philosophe de la physique (pp. 213-234). L'histo­rien des théories physiques (pp. 235-243). Le physicien (pp. 245-251). Le croyant (pp. 253-256). Notices nécrologiques (pp. 257-258). Notices de dictionnaires et d'encyclopédies (pp. 259-260). – IVe partie : Index. (shrink)

Este artigo desenvolve uma leitura do livro de Jacques Derrida, Mal de arquivo, com o objetivo de situar o que se poderia chamar de concepção derridiana de arquivo. Ao desdobrar o potencial de conflito que se arquiva na própria palavra "arquivo", Derrida oferece uma concepção de arquivo que, para além das discussões desenvolvidas no livro em questão, abre a possibilidade de uma nova forma de se pensar o âmbito da política. This article develops a reading of Jacques Derrida's book, Archive (...) Fever, with the aim of circumscribing what could be named the Derridian conception of archive. By unfolding the conflictive power which is archived within the proper word "archive", Derrida comes with a conception of archive that, beyond the discussions developed in the book, opens the possibility of a new way of thinking the political. (shrink)

Nous vivons une crise écologique qui semble être provoquée par l’humain. Elle est la conséquence de la modernité, fondée sur la prééminence d’une humanité rationnelle en opposition à une nature qui serait extérieure à celle-ci. Pour se sortir de ladite crise, le discours sur l’anthropocène propose deux solutions : d’un côté, un techno-optimisme qui propose d’investir davantage dans les sciences et les technologies ; de l’autre, un cynisme éco-apocalyptique qui n’incite pas à l’action, mais paralyse l’être humain. Ces solutions perpétuent (...) l’opposition entre nature et culture qui est à l’origine de la crise. Le présent article décrit une nouvelle ontologie posthumaniste et néomatérialiste qui permet de concevoir des alternatives en soulignant l’interdépendance entre nature et culture. Haraway propose le Chthulucène pour remplacer l’anthropocène : l’opposition entre nature et culture sera effacée et la (sur)vie humaine et non humaine deviendra possible. (shrink)

Une analyse de l'interprétation de la philosophie spinoziste comme philosophie de l'immanence soutenue par G. Deleuze, notamment dans "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?" (Paris: Éd. Minuit, 1991).

Resumo Neste artigo, será discutida a noção de “infinitude cardinal” – a qual seria predicada de um “conjunto” – e a noção de “infinitude ordinal” – a qual seria predicada de um “processo”. A partir dessa distinção conceitual, será abordado o principal problema desse artigo, i.e., o problema da possibilidade teórica de uma infinitude de estrelas tratado por Dummett em sua obra Elements of Intuitionism. O filósofo inglês sugere que, mesmo diante dessa possibilidade teórica, deveria ser possível predicar apenas infinitude (...) ordinal. A questão principal surge do fato de que parece ser problemático predicar ordinalmente infinitude de “estrelas”. Mesmo diante dessa possibilidade, Dummett sugere que o intuicionista poderia apenas reinterpretar infinitude cardinal como sendo infinitude ordinal. Ora, iremos mostrar que, se Dummett não fornece razões extras que sustentem essa posição, então será difícil interpretar um caso empírico infinitário como sendo também um caso ordinal ou potencial de infinitude. Para resolver esse problema de Dummett, em Brouwer se encontram alguns pressupostos idealistas necessários para argumentar em favor da ideia de que, mesmo em um contexto empírico, como o de uma infinitude de estrelas, poderíamos predicar infinitude ordinal. Então, depois de discutir as duas noções de “infinitude” e apresentar o problema de Dummett, será apresentada a abordagem idealista de Brouwer – a qual pelo menos explicaria de modo mais plausível as razões que poderiam motivar um intuicionista a predicar infinitude ordinal até mesmo de um caso empírico e espacial. (shrink)

Esta entrevista se hizo a uno de los miembros de la Academia Hondureña de la Lengua, Víctor Manuel Ramos. Entre los aportes que el académico expresó, fue su contribución a la comunidad intelectual a través de estudios lingüísticos y literarios. En concreto, estos se apreciaron en el Diccionario de las Lenguas de Honduras; Literatura y su producción literaria de índole infantil. Para que ello fuera posible, el entrevistado comentó cómo fue su proceso de formación, el cual fue un tanto complejo, (...) ya que tuvo que descartar algunas filiaciones y presuntas voliciones, tales como las que pretendía hallar desde la Medicina. Finalmente, lo que se concluye de esta conversación es el logro que se puede conseguir para la sociedad después de que uno se prepara concienzudamente, sin obviar el aprendizaje que se deriva de la experiencia personal. (shrink)

En este artículo se indaga en las razones ideológicas que estuvieron en la base de la interpretación filosófica que hizo Arthur C. Danto de la obra artística de Andy Warhol, así como de los cambios que en esa trayectoria interpretativa llevaron a que, en el imaginario de Danto, Warhol transitara de ser un artista-filósofo a ser un artista presuntamente obsesionado con ensalzar la vida estadounidense.

Estamos siendo testigos de grandes avances tecnológicos y, a la vez, de grandes desastres naturales y sociales que nos impulsan a plantearnos cuáles son las causas últimas de la degradación natural ecológica. El abuso en el uso de los recursos tal vez pueda tener relación con el abuso en el uso de la tecnología; incluso ser causa de la gran desigualdad social en el acceso a bienes necesarios para llevar una vida digna, raíz de muchos conflictos sociales. La ecología es (...) una disciplina científica, pero cada vez es más habitual ampararse en este término para lanzar opiniones o generar un debate de ideologías de índole catastrofista que no hacen más que generar malestar social sin visos de solución práctica. Las reflexiones sobre la ecología nos parece que deben plantearse de una forma interdisciplinar, pero no de cualquier manera, sino respetando el estatuto epistemológico de cada área del saber. Cuidar el método científico, en el ámbito científico; el filosófico, en el suyo propio; e incluso el teológico. El tema de nuestra relación con la naturaleza nos afecta tan íntimamente que casi todas las áreas del conocimiento pueden decir algo al respecto. En el presente trabajo comenzamos ese diálogo y presentamos las ideas básicas desde las que se podría plantear un modo de actuar humano respetuoso para con los demás hombres y los demás seres de la naturaleza, que mejore nuestro modo de vivir y evite más daños y perjuicios. A esto nos referimos cuando hablamos de “ética ambiental”. La ecología nos toca de cerca porque tiene que ver con el modo de habitar nuestro mundo y las relaciones que tenemos con los demás seres vivos y no vivos. A fin de poder delinear las líneas principales de una ética orientada al medioambiente es preciso, en primer lugar, conocer los datos científicos sobre el tema; en segundo lugar, analizar los problemas graves que se están detectando y comprender que muchas de sus causas todavía son desconocidas y precisan de un estudio más detenido; finalmente, es conveniente revisar las alternativas de solución que nos orienten a llevar una vida mejor, donde se sugieran modos de obrar que no nos cierren el camino hacia ese destino común que tenemos como seres humanos, y que integre al resto de criaturas porque no somos los únicos seres vivientes del planeta. La propuesta de una “ética ambiental” apunta a considerar un verdadero “ecologismo solidario”. (shrink)

O presente ensaio pretende apresentar uma série de distanciamentos fundamentais entre o pensamento do italiano Gianni Vattimo, centrado no conceito de pensamento fraco, com a ontologia heideggeriana. A problemática consiste no confesso fato de Vattimo basear seu pensamento na filosofia de Heidegger; contudo, sob forte influência do pensamento de Nietzsche, o filósofo italiano acaba por desvirtuar certos conceitos cruciais da filosofia heideggeriana, conduzindo-a a conclusões diametralmente opostas às suas. Vattimo assevera, assim, que há um elemento niilista que perpassa toda a (...) ontologia heideggeriana, não, contudo, apenas como um sintoma de uma sociedade decadente e indefinida, mas julga esta mesma ausência de sentido como a própria superação da metafísica tão almejada pela filosofia da história de Heidegger. (shrink)

De todos os aspectos do comportamento não-verbal, a face é sem dúvida uma das mais ricas e importantes fontes de informação sobre o estado inter- no do outro. Mas expressões faciais são raramente percebidas de forma isolada. Ao contrário, são tipicamente inseridas em contextos sociais ricos e dinâmicos, que incluem gestos e posturas corporais, conhecimento situacional, etc. Com base nessas observações, podemos nos perguntar se o contexto no qual uma expressão é percebida pode influenciar a percepção de emoções nesta expressão. (...) No caso de uma resposta afirmativa, de que modo se daria essa influência contextual, e quais seriam os seus limites? O propósito desse artigo é explorar algumas possibilidades sobre o papel do contexto na percepção de emoções, desde a teoria das emoções básicas, que defende que categorias discretas de emoções podem ser lidas diretamente da face de forma invariável, a abordagens mais contemporâneas, que atribuem um papel constitutivo para o contexto na percepção de emoções. Embora o debate esteja longe de ser resolvido, as conclusões deste artigo apontam para um novo modo de se pensar sobre fenômenos emocionais, onde a díade de interação torna-se a unidade básica de análise, e onde emoções são concebidas como propriedades emergentes de relações em contextos particulares de interação social. (shrink)

This article discusses the rationality principle, especially in Popper's version, on the occasion of a commentary of Maurice Lagueux's book, Rationality and Explanation in Economics (2010).

RESUMENDesde la teoría postcolonial se han cuestionado los modelos de historia de las ideas impuestos por el africanismo y el orientalismo. Diferentes teóricos africanos –Bachir Diagne, Mundimbe, Wiredu o Kete Asante– han formulado diversas soluciones para superar las dificultades. Este trabajo explora las principales dificultades y las propuestas para elaborar una historia de la Filosofía africana. -/- The postcolonial theory was questioning the patterns of History of Ideas imposed by Orientalism and Africanism. Different African theorists –Bachir Diagne, Mundimbe, Kete Asante (...) or Wiredu– developed various solutions to overcome the dificulties. This paper explores the principal challenges and proposals so as to build a History of African philosophy. (shrink)

Le travail qui suit vise à présenter la distinction des contextes de découverte et de justification telle que proposée par Reichenbach. Nous analysons dans quels termes Reichenbach introduit cette distinction et nous montrons quelles difficultés elle implique. Nous étudions de manière synthétique, sur la base de sources secondaires critiques, la signification de cette distinction. En effet, nous analysons la motivation de cette distinction. Nous insistons sur l’ambiguïté de cette distinction, et nous montrons qu’elle veut distinguer deux éléments inséparables. Nous montrons (...) que les contextes sont inextricablement liés et que la découverte ne peut être exclue d’une étude épistémologique de la science. Néanmoins, nous cherchons à montrer qu’il existe des solutions à ce problème. Nous montrons que nous pouvons conserver la distinction si nous la comprenons dans le sens d’une distinction de perspectives sur la science. Nous montrons que cela permet une collaboration entre l’épistémologie et l’histoire. Enfin, nous montrons que la découverte peut être rationalisée et être l’objet d’une logique à part entière. (shrink)

A estrutura argumentativa deste artigo pode ser resumida no seguinte raciocínio: 1) Espinosa foi recorrentemente acusado de eleatismo; 2) há ruptura com o eleatismo quando se admite a multivocidade dos operadores lógicos “é” e “não é”; como se vê, por exemplo, 2.1) na discussão que introduz os Grandes Gêneros no So sta de Platão, e 2.2) em certo uso que Aristóteles faz da doutrina das categorias para exibilizar a versão parmenídica do Princípio de Não-Contradição. 3) Espinosa admite a multivocidade do (...) “é” e do “não-é”. Logo, Espinosa não deve ser colocado entre os eleatas mas sim na irmandade dos suspeitos do chamado parricídio contra Parmênides. Este raciocínio, quase um truísmo, permitirá, não obstante, duas apreciações interessantes: uma acerca de como certa tradição interpretativa da loso a de Espinosa colocou mal o problema da relação da ontologia espinosana com os princípios lógicos; outra acerca do tipo de lógica subjacente à teoria dos modos de percepção ou gêneros de conhecimento. (shrink)

The course delivered by Heidegger during the Summer semester of 1923, and published later under the title of Ontology – The hermeneutics of facticity, is one of the most important loci in which we can have a glimpse of Kierkegaard’s influence on and importance to Heidegger, as well as of some of his interpretations about the thought of the Dane philosopher. One of them, notwithstanding puts forward a very interesting assessment of the relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel – through F. (...) A. Trendelenburg –, one of hottest topics in the Kierkegaardian scholarship, is not usually analyzed by that scholarship. Hence, this paper aims to show and analyze Heidegger’s theses on the relation between Kierkegaard-Hegel in that work in order to evaluate their correctness. As final remarks, this paper presents some metaphilosophical reflections on the very notions of relation and dependence between philosophers. (shrink)

¿Cómo es posible encontrar una constante en una obra que tiene en la ruptura su principal argumento? Una primera línea se puede percibir en el trabajo de Žižek sobre una política del goce cuya trayectoria circula desde el deseo a la pulsión. Desde una investigación muy orientada en el problema del sujeto, en el carácter sintomático del mismo, Žižek se ha desplazado hacia un análisis de la relación entre el objeto a y la pulsión en el marco del capitalismo actual. (...) En conexión con esta problemática se encuentra una segunda línea que tiene como punto central el trabajo crítico sobre las relaciones entre economía y política; frente al desafío que supone hoy en día la circulación espontánea del capital y el abandono del ámbito económico por parte de la teoría política. Por un lado nos encontramos con los dos sentidos del término escatología, el económico y el teológico-político, que convergen en la noción de exceso, sea de la pulsión o sea del objeto a. Al mismo tiempo, Žižek considera que no es posible traducir la atención sobre el exceso capitalista y su propia revolución inmanente en términos de dominación política.Ambas secuencias se encuentran, en definitiva, íntimamente vinculadas en la crítica de la economía política del discurso que Žižek lleva a cabo. La introducción del término paralaje puede servir como alternativa para entender la oscilación permanente que se produce en su obra entre síntoma y escatología. Una opción para leer a Žižek en función de sus incesantes desplazamientos, comenzando por el más fundamental: la paralaje entre lectura y escritura. (shrink)

Cette communication explorera la nature deleuzienne de l'ontologie présupposée par Foucault dans ses cours Sécurité, Territoire, Population et Naissance de la Biopolitique. L'objectif sera d'identifier certaines formules de Foucault qui font écho à un concept clé de Différence et Répétition: l'individuation comme intégration d'une multiplicité. Dans ces textes se trouveront pas mal d'éléments de l'ontologie deleuzienne: par exemple, le couple différentiation / différenciation; l'anti-essentialisme; et le champ différentiel, pré-individuel, problématique, ou virtuel d'où émergent, par l'auto-organisation, des individus actuels. Mais, on (...) verra aussi des difficultés conceptuelles, surtout dans sa notion de "possibilité," que subit Foucault dans quelques-unes de ses réflexions méthodologiques, difficultés qui émergent pour lui en faisant ses propres analyses de "la mise en intelligibilité en histoire" pendant qu'il présuppose l'ontologie deleuzienne. (shrink)

O presente artigo relata a estética de classe de um grupo social que foi chamado de pirangueiro. A partir de uma pesquisa observacional, com amparo referencial nas teorias do habitus e do campo, em Bourdieu, baseada na técnica de flanagem, reconstruiu-se a ideia do subcampo da moda de resistência, que se apresenta como contraposição ao campo da moda dominante. Com essa moda de resistência, o jovem pirangueiro traz um elemento de auto-distinção e, ao mesmo tempo, um critério de preconceito.