Results for 'moral expertise'

964 found
Order:
  1. Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory.Michael Cholbi - 2018 - In Jamie Carlin Watson & Laura K. Guidry-Grimes (eds.), Moral Expertise: New Essays from Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics. Springer International Publishing. pp. 71-86.
    Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  10
    Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory.Michael Cholbi - 2018 - In Jamie Carlin Watson & Laura K. Guidry-Grimes (eds.), Moral Expertise: New Essays from Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics. Springer International Publishing. pp. 71-86.
    Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Naturalism and Moral Expertise in the Zhuangzi.Christopher Kirby - 2017 - Journal of East-West Thought 7 (3):13-27.
    This essay will examine scholarly attempts at distilling a proto-ethical philosophy from the Daoist classic known as the Zhuangzi. In opposition to interpretations of the text which characterize it as amoralistic, I will identify elements of a natural normativity in the Zhuangzi. My examination features passages from the Zhuangzi – commonly known as the “knack” passages – which are often interpreted through some sort of linguistic, skeptical, or relativistic lens. Contra such readings, I believe the Zhuangzi prescribes an art of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Moral intuitions, moral expertise and moral reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
    In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is needed, but it cannot replace intuitive thinking. Following Robin Hogarth, I argue that intuitive judgements can be improved. The expertise (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  5. Epistemic Authorities and Skilled Agents: A Pluralist Account of Moral Expertise.Federico Bina, Sofia Bonicalzi & Michel Croce - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.
    This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Morality Play: A Model for Developing Games of Moral Expertise.Dan Staines, Paul Formosa & Malcolm Ryan - 2019 - Games and Culture 14 (4):410-429.
    According to cognitive psychologists, moral decision-making is a dual-process phenomenon involving two types of cognitive processes: explicit reasoning and implicit intuition. Moral development involves training and integrating both types of cognitive processes through a mix of instruction, practice, and reflection. Serious games are an ideal platform for this kind of moral training, as they provide safe spaces for exploring difficult moral problems and practicing the skills necessary to resolve them. In this article, we present Morality Play, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7. Expertise, moral subversion, and climate deregulation.Ahmad Elabbar - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-28.
    The weaponizing of scientific expertise to oppose regulation has been extensively studied. However, the relevant studies, belonging to the emerging discipline of agnotology, remain focused on the analysis of empirical corruption: of misinformation, doubt mongering, and other practices that cynically deploy expertise to render audiences ignorant of empirical facts. This paper explores the wrongful deployment of expertise beyond empirical corruption. To do so, I develop a broader framework of morally subversive expertise, building on recent work in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.
    The evidential value of moral intuitions has been challenged by psychological work showing that the intuitions of ordinary people are affected by distorting factors. One reply to this challenge, the expertise defence, claims that training in philosophical thinking confers enhanced reliability on the intuitions of professional philosophers. This defence is often expressed through analogy: since we do not allow doubts about folk judgments in domains like mathematics or physics to undermine the plausibility of judgments by experts in these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  9.  53
    Ethical Expertise and Moral Authority.Keith Dowding - 2024 - Res Publica 30 (1):31-46.
    Whether or not there is such a thing as moral expertise, and, if so, what constitutes it, is much debated. Empirical expertise bestows epistemic authority over propositional content; that is not the case in moral domains, technical expertise notwithstanding. This article identifies three types of agencies with some authority over decisions in moral matters. It shows that the source of the authority wielded by such agencies, while varying across the three forms identified, is based (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Moral Normative Force and Clinical Ethics Expertise.Parker Crutchfield - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (11):89-91.
    Brummett and Salter propose a useful and timely taxonomy of clinical ethics expertise (2019). As the field becomes further “professionalized” this taxonomy is important, and the core of it is right. It needs some refinement around the edges, however. In their conclusion, Brummett and Salter rightly point out that there is a significant difference between the ethicist whose recommendations are procedure- and process-heavy, consensus-driven, and dialogical and the authoritarian ethicist whose recommendations flow from “private moral views” (Brummett and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Artificial moral experts: asking for ethical advice to artificial intelligent assistants.Blanca Rodríguez-López & Jon Rueda - 2023 - AI and Ethics.
    In most domains of human life, we are willing to accept that there are experts with greater knowledge and competencies that distinguish them from non-experts or laypeople. Despite this fact, the very recognition of expertise curiously becomes more controversial in the case of “moral experts”. Do moral experts exist? And, if they indeed do, are there ethical reasons for us to follow their advice? Likewise, can emerging technological developments broaden our very concept of moral expertise? (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Future Selves and Present Moral Philosophers: Our Epistemic Superiors in Moral Matters.Jakob Lohmar - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (3):436-445.
    Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of Virtue.Matt Stichter - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):183-194.
    Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea that virtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which the intellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefit of this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue. This benefit, though, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  14. (1 other version)Moral Experts, Deference & Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson, Nathan Nobis & Scott McElreath - 2018 - In Jonathan Matheson, Nathan Nobis & Scott McElreath (eds.), Moral Experts, Deference & Disagreement. Springer.
    We sometimes seek expert guidance when we don’t know what to think or do about a problem. In challenging cases concerning medical ethics, we may seek a clinical ethics consultation for guidance. The assumption is that the bioethicist, as an expert on ethical issues, has knowledge and skills that can help us better think about the problem and improve our understanding of what to do regarding the issue. The widespread practice of ethics consultations raises these questions and more: -/- • (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Phronesis as Ethical Expertise: Naturalism of Second Nature and the Unity of Virtue.Mario De Caro, Maria Silvia Vaccarezza & Ariele Niccoli - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (3):287-305.
    This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  16. How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.
    Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the ‘expertise defense’ of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  17. Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable.James Andow - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.
    Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  18. Aristotle and Expertise: Ideas on the Skillfulness of Virtue.Noell Birondo - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):599-609.
    Many philosophers working on virtue theory have resisted the idea that the virtues are practical skills, apparently following Aristotle’s resistance to that idea. Bucking the trend, Matt Stichter defends a strong version of this idea in The Skillfulness of Virtue by marshaling a wide range of conceptual and empirical arguments to argue that the moral virtues are robust skills involving the cognitive-conative unification of Aristotelian phronêsis (‘practical intelligence’). Here I argue that Aristotle overlooks a more delimited kind of practical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169 (C):139-146.
    A coherent practice of mens rea (‘guilty mind’) ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action’s outcome. For instance, an assessment of whether an agent harmed another person intentionally should be unaffected by the severity of harm done. Ascriptions of intentionality made by laypeople, however, are subject to a strong outcome bias. As demonstrated by the Knobe effect, a knowingly incurred negative side effect is standardly judged intentional, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  20. (1 other version)Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Expertise and Experts.Matt Stichter - 2015 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 28:105-128.
    There are many philosophical problems surrounding experts, given the power and status accorded to them in society. We think that what makes someone an expert is having expertise in some skill domain. But what does expertise consist in, and how closely related is expertise to the notion of an expert? Although most of us have acquired several practical skills, few of us have achieved the level of expertise with regard to those skills. So we can be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21. Papers, Please and the systemic approach to engaging ethical expertise in videogames.Formosa Paul, Ryan Malcolm & Staines Dan - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (3):211-225.
    Papers, Please, by Lucas Pope (2013), explores the story of a customs inspector in the fictional political regime of Arstotzka. In this paper we explore the stories, systems and moral themes of Papers, Please in order to illustrate the systemic approach to designing videogames for moral engagement. Next, drawing on the Four Component model of ethical expertise from moral psychology, we contrast this systemic approach with the more common scripted approach. We conclude by demonstrating the different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  22. A Kantian approach to education for moral sensitivity.Paul Formosa - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):1017-1028.
    An important aspect of moral expertise is moral sensitivity, which is the ability to be sensitive to the presence of morally salient features in a context. This requires being able to see and acquire the morally relevant information, as well as organise and interpret it, so that you can undertake the related work of moral judgement, focus (or motivation) and action. As a distinct but interrelated component of ethical expertise, moral sensitivity can and must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. Morality and Aesthetics of Food.Shen-yi Liao & Aaron Meskin - 2017 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 658-679.
    This chapter explores the interaction between the moral value and aesthetic value of food, in part by connecting it to existing discussions of the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of art. Along the way, this chapter considers food as art, the aesthetic value of food, and the role of expertise in uncovering aesthetic value. Ultimately this chapter argues against both food autonomism (the view that food's moral value is unconnected to its aesthetic value) and Carolyn (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24. Elective Modernism and the Politics of (Bio) Ethical Expertise.Nathan Emmerich - 2018 - In Hauke Riesch, Nathan Emmerich & Steven Wainwright (eds.), Philosophies and Sociologies of Bioethics: Crossing the Divides. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 23-40.
    In this essay I consider whether the political perspective of third wave science studies – ‘elective modernism’ – offers a suitable framework for understanding the policy-making contributions that (bio)ethical experts might make. The question arises as a consequence of the fact that I have taken inspiration from the third wave in order to develop an account of (bio)ethical expertise. I offer a précis of this work and a brief summary of elective modernism before considering their relation. The view I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Does Deep Moral Disagreement Exist in Real Life?Serhiy Kiš - 2023 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (3):255-277.
    The existence of deep moral disagreement is used in support of views ranging from moral relativism to the impossibility of moral expertise. This is done despite the fact that it is not at all clear whether deep moral disagreements actually occur, as the usually given examples are never of real life situations, but of some generalized debates on controversial issues. The paper will try to remedy this, as any strength of arguments appealing to deep (...) disagreement is partly depended on the fact the disagreement exists. This will be done by showing that some real life conflicts that are intractable, i.e. notoriously difficult to resolve, share some important features with deep moral disagreement. The article also deals with the objection that the mere conceptual possibility renders illustrations of actually happening deep moral disagreements unnecessary. The problem with such objection is that it depends on theoretical assumptions (i.e. denial of moral realism) that are not uncontroversial. Instead, the article claims we need not only suppose deep moral disagreements exist because they actually occur when some intractable conflicts occur. Thus, in so far as to the deep moral disagreement’s existence, the arguments appealing to it are safe. But as intractable conflicts can be resolved, by seeing deep moral disagreements as constitutive part of them, we might have to consider whether deep moral disagreements are resolvable too. A brief suggestion of how that might look like is given in the end of the paper. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Moral Identity and the Acquisition of Virtue: A Self-regulation View.Matt Stichter & Tobias Krettenauer - 2023 - Review of General Psychology 27 (4).
    The acquisition of virtue can be conceptualized as a self-regulatory process in which deliberate practice results in increasingly higher levels of skillfulness in leading a virtuous life. This conceptualization resonates with philosophical virtue theories as much as it converges with psychological models about skill development, expertise, goal motivation, and self-regulation. Yet, the conceptualization of virtue as skill acquisition poses the crucial question of motivation: What motivates individuals to self-improvement over time so that they can learn from past experience, correct (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. A philosopher’s guide to discounting.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2021 - In Budolfson Mark, McPherson Tristram & Plunkett David (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press. pp. 90-110.
    This chapter introduces several distinctions relevant to what is called the “discounting problem”, since the issue is how (future) costs and benefits are discounted to make them comparable in present terms. The author defends the claim that there are good reasons to adopt Ramsey-style discounting in the context of climate change: the Ramsey rule is robust, flexible, and well-understood. An important distinction involved in discounting—“descriptivism” and “prescriptivism”—is discussed. It is argued that, even if we adopt prescriptivism, and accept that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  28. Changing Minds and Hearts: Moral Testimony and Hermeneutical Advice.Paulina Sliwa - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. The epistemic value of intuitive moral judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
    In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30. Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 117-135.
    On an optimistic version of realist moral epistemology, a significant range of ordinary moral beliefs, construed in realist terms, constitute knowledge—or at least some weaker positive epistemic status, such as epistemic justification. The “debunking challenge” to this view grants prima facie justification but claims that it is “debunked” (i.e., defeated), yielding the final verdict that moral beliefs are ultima facie unjustified. Notable candidate “debunkers” (i.e., defeaters) include the so-called “evolutionary debunking arguments,” the “Benacerraf-Field Challenge,” and persistent (...) disagreement among epistemic peers. Such defeaters are best treated as higher-order evidence—viz., evidence contesting the merits of the first-order evidence on which moral beliefs are based. This chapter first develops a theory of higher-order defeat in general, which it then applies to debunking in particular. The result: the challenge fails entirely on epistemic grounds—regardless of whether or not its empirical and metaphysical presuppositions are correct. An advantage of this purely epistemic defense over alternative strategies is that the former extends even to laypersons who themselves lack the expertise necessary to formulate an adequate response. However, this leaves open the prospects for non-epistemological interpretations of debunking (e.g., moral or ontological). The chapter therefore concludes with brief suggestions in that direction. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Motivating and Maintaining Ethics, Equity, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Expertise in Peer Review.Adam Craig, Christina Lee, Nithyaa Bala & Carl Taswell - 2022 - Brainiacs Journal 3 (1):I5B147D9D.
    Scientists who engage in science and the scientific endeavor should seek truth with conviction of morals and commitment to ethics. While the number of publications continues to increase, the number of retractions has increased at a faster rate. Journals publish fraudulent research papers despite claims of peer review and adherence to publishing ethics. Nevertheless, appropriate ethical peer review will remain a gatekeeper when selecting research manuscripts in scholarly publishing and approving research applications for grant funding. However, this peer review must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Habituation into Virtue and the Alleged Paradox of Moral Education.Denise Vigani - 2024 - Social Theory and Practice 50 (1):157-178.
    Some philosophers have argued that Aristotle’s view of habituation gives rise to a ‘paradox of moral education.’ The inculcation of habit, they contend, seems antithetical to the cultivation of virtue. I argue that this alleged paradox arises from significant misunderstandings of Aristotle’s view. Habit formation need not be at odds with the development of the kinds of intelligent, reflective capacities required for virtue. Indeed, Aristotle seems right to insist on an important role for habit in the cultivation of virtue. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Tra il dire e il fare. Gli esperti morali alla prova.Michel Croce - 2020 - Sesto San Giovanni (MI): Mimesis.
    Se nell’era della post-verità la competenza degli esperti è oggetto di continui attacchi, la figura dell’esperto morale è da sempre vista con un certo scetticismo. Riconoscerne l’esistenza implica ammettere che alcune persone sono moralmente superiori ad altre e richiede di determinare la natura della loro superiorità. Dobbiamo immaginare l’esperto morale come una persona virtuosa o come uno specialista in fatto di dilemmi etici? E quale contributo possiamo aspettarci dall’esperto morale all’interno delle nostre comunità? Il volume si propone di rispondere a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Razian prophecy rationalized.Hüseyin Güngör - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (3):401-425.
    Abū Bakr Muḥammad bin Zakariyya’ al-Rāzī (865–925) is generally known as a freethinker who argued against prophecy and revealed religion based on arguments from fairness of God and rationality. Recently some scholars argued that Razi was not as radical as the general interpretation takes him to be. Both the freethinker and conservative interpretations seem well supported based on difference bodies of evidence. However, the evidence is based on secondhand reports. In this paper I argue there is an interpretation of prophecy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Carbon capture and storage: where should the world store CO₂? It’s a moral dilemma.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2021 - The Conversation.
    [Newspaper opinion] To give carbon storage sites the greatest chance of success, it makes sense to develop them in places where the geology has been thoroughly explored and where there is lots of relevant expertise. This would imply pumping carbon into underground storage sites in northern Europe, the Middle East and the US, where companies have spent centuries looking for and extracting fossil fuels. On the other hand, it might be important to develop storage sites in economies where the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Thinking the Right Way (at the Right Time) about Virtues and Skills. [REVIEW]Scott Woodcock - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):577-586.
    I discuss three features of Matt Stichter’s new book The Skillfulness of Virtue. The thesis of the book is that virtue is best conceptualized as a type of skill, and the chapters of the book explore the implications of this thesis for our understanding of moral development, social psychology and comparisons of virtuous agents with agents who exhibit familiar types of non-moral expertise. The features of the book that I examine are (1) Stichter’s rejection of an ability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. What We Know and What We Owe.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3.
    Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This paper argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations poses a problem for the view that we are not only free to choose the course of our own lives, including our careers and personal projects, but also free to change our minds and quit at any time to pursue something else. For if our choice of life path has generated knowledge-based (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. How to Discriminate between Experts and Frauds: Some Problems for Socratic Peirastic.Jyl Gentzler - 1995 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (3):227 - 246.
    It has often been noted that Socratic cross-examination is problematic as a method of inquiry, i.e., as a method for 'acquiring' knowledge. Rarely has it been noticed that there are problems with cross-examination when used for the purposes of 'testing' for knowledge. In the 'Charmides', Socrates commits himself to the following principle: In order to discriminate between the person who knows and the person who does not know the subject matter covered by a particular discipline (technê), one must have mastered (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  39. Teaching Ethics in the High Schools.Shane Ralston - 2008 - Teaching Ethics 9 (1):73-86.
    Should ethics be taught in the high schools? Should high school faculty teach it themselves or invite college and university professors (or instructors) into the classroom to share their expertise? In this paper, I argue that the challenge to teach ethics in the high schools has a distinctly Deweyan dimension to it, since (i) Dewey proposed that it be attempted and (ii) he provided many valuable resources with which to proceed. The paper is organized into four sections. In the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. Public Values in the Right Context.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (1):57-62.
    [Comment] I am sympathetic to Avner de Shalit’s position that a political philosophy should incorporate public values, but I see their role differently. Philosophers of science standardly distinguish between values being introduced in the context of discovery (inputs into the investigation or arguments) and in the context of justification (acceptance or rejection of substantive claims in light of the arguments or investigation). I argue that de Shalit is wrong to put the public values in the context of discovery; with respect (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. How to Use AI Ethically for Ethical Decision-Making.Joanna Demaree-Cotton, Brian D. Earp & Julian Savulescu - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (7):1-3.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42. Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers: problems for epistemic dependence on experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.
    I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  43. Virtues, Skills, and Right Action.Matt Stichter - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):73-86.
    According to Rosalind Hursthouse’s virtue based account of right action, an act is right if it is what a fully virtuous person would do in that situation. Robert Johnson has criticized the account on the grounds that the actions a non-virtuous person should take are often uncharacteristic of the virtuous person, and thus Hursthouse’s account of right action is too narrow. The non-virtuous need to take steps to improve themselves morally, and the fully virtuous person need not take these steps. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  44. On Henry Sidgwick’s “My Station and Its Duties”.Anthony Skelton - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):586-591.
    This is a retrospective essay on Henry Sidgwick's "My Station and Its Duties" written to mark the 125th anniversary of Ethics. It engages with Sidgwick's remarks on the kind of ethical expertise that the moral philosopher possesses and on his approach to practical ethics generally.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Practical Skills and Practical Wisdom in Virtue.Matt Stichter - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):435-448.
    ABSTRACTThis paper challenges a frequent objection to conceptualizing virtues as skills, which is that skills are merely capacities to act well, while virtues additionally require being properly motivated to act well. I discuss several cases that purport to show the supposed motivational difference by drawing our attention to the differing intuitions we have about virtues and skills. However, this putative difference between virtue and skill disappears when we switch our focus in the skill examples from the performance to the performer. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  46. Constraining condemning.Roger Wertheimer - 1998 - Ethics 108 (3):489-501.
    Our culture is conflicted about morally judging and condemning. We can't avoid it altogether, yet many layfolk today are loathe to do it for reasons neither they nor philosophers well understand. Their resistance is often confused (by themselves and by theorists) with some species of antiobjectivism. But unlike a nonobjectivist, most people think that (a) for us to judge and condemn is generally (objectively) morally wrong , yet (b) for God to do so is (objectively) proper, and (c) so too (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  47. Di chi posso fidarmi. Autorità ed esperti nella filosofia analitica contemporanea.Michel Croce - 2019 - Bologna: Il Mulino.
    Molte questioni aperte che interessano la nostra società e ci fanno preoccupare per il futuro ruotano intorno a un problema fondamentale: capire chi sia davvero esperto in un determinato ambito e, di conseguenza, decidere di chi possiamo fidarci. È inevitabile che ognuno di noi debba riporre la propria fiducia in altri individui quando si tratta di questioni quali il riscaldamento globale e la tutela dell’ambiente, le terapie mediche a cui sottoporsi, la sicurezza informatica e l’istruzione dei propri figli. Ma come (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Learning from Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill.Matt Stichter - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):341-354.
    On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  49.  51
    Virtues as Skills in Virtue Epistemology.Matt Stichter - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:333-348.
    One approach to understanding moral virtues is to compare them with practical skills, since both involve learning how to act well. This paper inquires whether this approach can be extended to intellectual virtues. The relevance of the analogy between virtues and skills for virtue epistemology can be seen in two prominent discussions of intellectual virtues and skills. Linda Zagzebski has argued that intellectual virtues can be modeled on moral virtues, and that a key component of virtue being understood (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  50.  96
    The concept of ὅρος between Aristotle's two Ethics.Jakub Jirsa - 2021 - Listy Filologicke - Folia Philologica 144 (1-2):7 - 41.
    The article shows a difference in Aristotle’s ethical theory between the Protrepticus and Eudemian Ethics on the one hand and the Nicomachean Ethics on the other. The difference is explicated by means of the interpretation of the concept of ὅρος (standard) in these writings. The Protrepticus and Eudemian Ethics present ethical theory as an expertise which – together with other sciences – has a standard for decisions and actions taken from nature and the divine. The ethical theory presented in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 964