The text published below is the translation of a part of this published article: "Il Dio che rischia e che cambia: introduzione all’Open Theism". The issue of omniscience is one of the most debated in contemporary Analytical Philosophy of Religion. However, what is often lacking in this discussion is a deep understanding of the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom within a complete epistemological (what can we really say about the divine and the world), metaphysical and theological framework. For example, (...) it is often forgotten to frame some issues within a clear definition of the notion of mystery. (shrink)

CONTEMPORARY philosophers of religion have devoted much worthy effort to analyzing and reconsidering such important traditional doctrines as those of divine omniscience and simplicity. But the similarly important and traditional doctrine of creation ex nihilo has not been enjoying the same kind of attention. One reason for this may be that its purport seems clearer, and its place in classical theism accordingly less controversial, than those of certain other doctrines, so that neither proponents nor opponents are as much inclined to (...) puzzle over it as over those other doctrines. But in Aquinas's magisterial account, at least one of the doctrine's aspects bears a philosophical interest that is easy to overlook. In this paper I will bring out that aspect by resolving two alleged inconsistencies in Aquinas's account.... (shrink)

There is a problem regarding God and perception right at the heart of Berkeley ’s metaphysics. With respect to this problem, I will argue for : It is intractable. Berkeley has no solution to this problem, and neither can we hope to offer one on his behalf. However, I will also argue for : The truth of need not be seen as threatening the viability of Berkeley ’s metaphysics. In fact, it may even be seen as speaking in its favor.

In the recent debate on Christian theism, the position called Open Theism (OT) tries to solve the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom. In OT, the key word of the human-divine relationship is “risk”: in his relationship with us, God is a risk-taker in that he adapts his plan to human decisions and to the situations that arise from them. “Risk” is the fundamental characteristic of any true love relationship. According to OT, God has no exhaustive knowledge of how humans (...) will use their will, and the divine plan for this world is not seen as fixed for eternity. OT distinguishes between meticulous providence and general providence and denies that the former can exist. After illustrating these positions and a particular view of OT called essential kenosis, I highlight some of their weaknesses and conclude by asking whether the concept of mystery (at least in some of its possible interpretations: I outline four “solutions”) can enable a reconciliation between classical theism and OT. By applying an approach to the notion of mystery usually connected to the Trinity, I show that the dilemma of omniscience, human freedom and providence does not compromise the plausibility of theism. (shrink)

Apparent orthodoxy holds that artistic understanding is finally valuable. Artistic understanding—grasping, as such, the features of an artwork that make it aesthetically or artistically good or bad—is a species of understanding, which is widely taken to be finally valuable. The objection from mystery, by contrast, holds that a lack of artistic understanding is valuable. I distinguish and critically assess two versions of this objection. The first holds that a lack of artistic understanding is finally valuable, because it preserves the (...) pleasure of an artwork’s incomprehensibility; the second holds that a lack of artistic understanding is conditionally valuable, as the enabling condition of a finally valuable relationship with an artwork. I defend orthodoxy by arguing that both versions of the objection fail and that we have no general reason against gaining artistic understanding. (shrink)

John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality and Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital shifted the focus of current thought on capital and economic development to the cultural and conceptual ideas that underpin market economies and that are taken for granted in developed nations. This collection of essays assembles 21 philosophers, economists, and political scientists to help readers understand these exciting new theories.

The ”dark night of the soul’ is a common motif in Christian spiritual writing; and the locus classicus for this motif is the work of John of the Cross, a Spanish Carmelite friar of the sixteenth century. My aim in this paper is to use John’s account of the ”night’ to consider how the themes of mystery, humility and religious practice may be subsumed, and related to one another, within a Christian conception of God and of human life lived (...) out in relation to God. (shrink)

There is a lively debate in contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion about the consistency of the Trinitarian doctrine. In this context, the notion of ‘mystery’ has become crucial. However, although it is currently considered the main challenge of Trinitarian theology, its definition remains rather partial and superficial. After a brief description of today’s Mysterianism, I analyse three ‘emblematic’ positions in light of the current debate: Aquinas, Leibniz and Hegel present three ways to believe in a mysterious Trinity. I will (...) point out a few possible weaknesses in the positions of the first two authors in order to better highlight the usefulness of the Hegelian position, often underestimated in the contemporary analytic debate. I will also analyse the connection between the three positions and their respective metaphysics, showing the epistemological premises (e.g., analogy and univocity) that need to be better investigated in the future. (shrink)

In order to obtain a complete description and understanding of the whole of reality and to include a true description of what a human being is and what the totality of the human experience is, one must integrate science with a particular theology. However, which theology or religion should we use? As done in science, one must choose the theology that has the highest explanatory power—namely, by applying the principle of parsimony, Occam’s razor.

Science is a crowning glory of the human spirit and its applications remain our best hope for social progress. However, there are limitations to existing science and perhaps to any science. The general mind-body problem is known to be currently intractable and mysterious (8). This is one of many deep problems that are generally agreed to be beyond the present purview of Science, including many quantum phenomena, etc. However, all of these famous unsolved problems are either remote from everyday experience (...) (entanglement, dark matter) or are hard to even define sharply (phenomenology, consciousness, etc.). In this note, we will consider some computational problems in vision that arise every time that we open our eyes and yet are demonstrably inconsistent with current theories of neural computation. The focus will be on two famous related phenomena, known as the neural binding problem and the experience of a detailed stable visual world. I, among many others, have struggled with these issues for more than fifty years (1, 2, 3). Somewhat paradoxically, the continuing progress in scientific methods and knowledge reveals that these are both unsolvable within existing neuroscience. By considering some basic facts about how the brain processes image input, we will show that, under the standard theory, there are not nearly enough brain neurons to compute what we experience as vision. Inconsistencies like the ones shown here have had a profound effect on paradigm change in the sciences. More directly, the discussions below suggest possible new theories and experiments. (shrink)

The concept of truthmaking, the idea that when a statement is true, there is typically something about the world in virtue of which it is true, has garnered much interest in recent metaphysics. Often, the motivation has been the thought that truthmaking can provide a new perspective on an important issue. This paper evaluates the claim that truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining an unproblematic notion of emergence. For despite playing an important role in philosophical discourse over the (...) past 100 years, it has often been thought that there is something mysterious about the notion of emergence. It has recently been argued, however, that once emergent properties are characterized as those that, while “ontologically dependent” are yet needed as truthmakers emergence and emergent properties prove unproblematic. In response, I argue that there is reason to doubt that truthmaking can play an important role in formulating an unproblematic yet recognizable notion of emergence. I argue that it is consistent with truthmaking being unable to play a substantive role in emergentism that truthmaking can play a more significant role in characterizing an attractive middle ground between reductive and nonreductive physicalism. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts (...) can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim. (shrink)

During the last two decades, a sharp re-reading of St. Paul’s letters allowed several thinkers to embed a messianic element in their political philosophy. In these readings, the messianic refusal of the world and its laws is understood through the suspensive act of ‘subtraction’ – a movement of withdrawal which nonetheless proved too often ineffective when translated in political practice. -/- After having analysed Agamben’s declension of Subtraction in terms of ‘inoperativity’, this article focuses on the notion of Parousia as (...) a key element to understand his anti-utopian account of messianic time. In contrast with Agamben’s reading, Bloch’s interpretation of the Pauline Parousia envisages the messianic event as infra-historical, but at the same time opened to ultimate (meta-historical) purposes. Bloch’s messianic call – I argue – takes the form of mediation, a correction of subtraction towards the direction of a more committed political engagement. I conclude suggesting that the concrete implementations of this mediation perform their emancipatory function in so far as they assume the character of practical ethics, with the attention directed to the underprivileged and marginalised. (shrink)

The philosophical interest of mystery is that something may well fall under a distinctive ontological concept of mystery. Such a thing would be explicable with reference to intention, but not uniquely determined by its explicans. This is the "properly mysterious," which is essentially mysterious in virtue of what it is, not just of our epistemic limitations. The richer uses of 'mystery', and defects in recent literature, suggest this line of inquiry. ;Part I rebuts the main arguments against (...) the possibility that something is properly mysterious. First, if something's existence is completely explicable it need not thus be exhaustively explicable . Second, event-determinism is not establishable empirically and nothing establishes general determinism a priori . So there is no reason to think every existent is uniquely determined to exist. But there is good reason to think everything is completely explicable in principle. ;Part II shows there is better reason to think the world's existence properly mysterious than not. The world asked about in the question "Why does the world exist?" should be defined as the totality comprising all that really changes and what is ontologically parasitic thereon . The World's existence is both logically contingent and contingent in one or the other of two de re senses , and thus is either inexplicable for any knower or explicable as intentionally produced. The producer would be extramundane, de re necessary, and could not uniquely determine the existence of The World. Defending classical theism against charges of conceptual incoherence, I conclude that the existence of The World is best thought completely explicable as intentionally created, though not exhaustively explicable by the existence of its creator. ;In conclusion, I expound and adopt Aquinas' account of creation, on which God creates for a reason and freely. Thus there is good reason for the world's existence, but no reason why this world exists rather than some other. (shrink)

The cultivation of receptivity to the mystery of reality is a central feature of many religious and philosophical traditions, both Western and Asian. This paper considers two contemporary accounts of receptivity to mystery – those of David E. Cooper and John Cottingham – and considers them in light of the problem of loss of receptivity. I argue that a person may lose their receptivity to mystery by embracing what I call a scientistic stance, and the paper concludes (...) by offering two possible responses to combating that stance and restoring the receptivity to mystery that it occludes. (shrink)

A review of Giorgio Agamben's The Mystery of Evil: Bendict XVI and the End of Days, which attempts to place Agamben's peculiar argument regarding Pope Benedict's abdication in the context of his reading of St. Paul's 2 Thessalonians 2:1-12, and, more generally, in terms of his political-theology in the Homo Sacer series. The questions, 'Who is the Antichrist?' and 'Who (or what) is the katechon?' are also explored, in the attempt to translate Agamben's obscure theology into contemporary political terms.

“What is the structure of thought?” is as central a question as any in cognitive science. A classic answer to this question has appealed to a Language of Thought (LoT). We point to emerging research from disparate branches of the field that supports the LoT hypothesis, but also uncovers diversity in LoTs across cognitive systems, stages of development, and species. Our letter formulates open research questions for cognitive science concerning the varieties of rules and representations that underwrite various LoT-based systems (...) and how these variations can help researchers taxonomize cognitive systems. (shrink)

This paper examines how a person’s life may be shaped by living with a sense of the mystery of reality. What virtues, if any, are encouraged by such a sense? The first section rehearses a radical ”doctrine of mystery’, according to which reality as it anyway is, independently of human perspectives, is ineffable. It is then argued that a sense of mystery may provide ”measure’ for human lives. For it is possible for a life to be ”consonant’ (...) with this sense -- through exercising humility, for example -- and even to emulate mystery. A further section corrects a misunderstanding about the connection between a sense of mystery and the virtues it invites, while a final section considers the relationship between living with mystery and religious faith. (shrink)

This paper questions the idea that theism can function as an explanatory hypothesis to account for the nature and origins of the cosmos. Invoking God cannot dissolve the mystery of existence, and the characteristic religious response here is one of awe and humility. I then address David E. Cooper’s challenge of showing how a ”doctrine of mystery’ can have any discursible content. It is argued that certain aspects of our human experience afford us glimpses of the divine nature (...) -- intimations of the transcendent, which shine through from the ineffable source of our being to the human world we inhabit. (shrink)

The issue of this study is, as noted in the topic, “The Unification Mystery of Christ in Church”. We try to underline the Orthodox specifics from the patristical and apologetical point of view. Therefore, one of our principal point of the analysis is the preparation of priests and believers for the Eucharistic moment in the Orthodox Liturgy. In the apologetical approach of our presentation, we try to offer an actual interpretation of this Holy Sacrament, together with its necessity on (...) the actual society and to offer some theological solution in the actual context. (shrink)

Tim travels back in time and tries to kill his grandfather before his father was born. Tim fails. But why? Lewis's response was to cite "coincidences": Tim is the unlucky subject of gun jammings, banana peels, sudden changes of heart, and so on. A number of challenges have been raised against Lewis's response. The latest of these focuses on explanation. This paper diagnoses the source of this new disgruntlement and offers an alternative explanation for Tim's failure, one that Lewis would (...) not have liked. The explanation is an obvious one but controversial, so it is defended against all the objections that can be mustered. (shrink)

In a hospital, a living body lies between life and death. His remembrance allows a young man to understand his love and himself in a different and disturbing way.

This paper examines the following three questions: (1) In The Rose Garden of Mystery (Golshan-e Rāz), how does the prominent 7-8th-century Iranian Sufi, Maḥmūd Shabistarī, distinguish the mystical “contemplation” and “rational reflection” in pursuing divine knowledge? (2) Was Shabistarī an anti-rationalist (strict fideist)? (3) How does Shabistarī’s position fit into the ancient Greek, Neoplatonist, and medieval Islamic and Christian metaphysics? This paper examines Golshan-e Rāz in the context of Shabistarī’s other works, commentaries, secondary sources, and Islamic thought—Sufism and philosophy. (...) Existing literature on Golshan-e Rāz primarily focuses on its literary aspects, neglecting its philosophical and mystical concepts. However, a thorough understanding requires examining these concepts in a broad context, which will inspire further research. The rationale behind this research is rooted in the religious obligation for believers to know God, with “thinking” as the means to acquire such knowledge. This is why the first question Herawī poses to Shabistarī pertains to the nature of thought—justifying this paper’s focus. Contemporary opposition to religion often stems from its perceived incongruity with the rational frameworks offered by positivism, materialism, or scientific inquiry. By differentiating between mystical and rational modes of thought that Shabistarī presents, this study shows the contemporary person that intellectual inquiry extends beyond rationalism and encompasses mysticism. Consequently, rational and mystical perspectives should be pursued in the quest for the divine. Furthermore, this study contends that Shabistarī should not be regarded as a strict fideist; instead, his criticism is directed toward the constraints inherent in rational thinking. (shrink)

This article examines Hegel’s aesthetic judgment of the German romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich, which only first came to light in 1995 with the publication of the separate edition of the Ascheberg transcript of Hegel’s first lecture course on aesthetics, held at the University of Berlin in the winter semester of 1820/21. Firstly, before interpreting Hegel's criticism in more detail, I consider the current state of research on the relationship between Hegel and Caspar David Friedrich. It is striking to note (...) how little resonance Hegel’s judgment has found in the secondary literature. Going beyond some of the more speculative results of earlier scholarship, I show that by consulting a number of overlooked original German sources and documents from the years 1820-1821 it is possible to precisely determine those paintings of Caspar David Friedrich that Hegel would have known about and even viewed in person at that time. By comparing Hegel’s criticism in the Ascheberg transcript with these particular paintings of Friedrich viewed by Hegel in Dresden, and by furthermore reading this criticism in the larger context of Hegel's considerations on style and the topic of mysteriousness in painting, I argue that a number of consequences can be drawn from the philosopher’s two key reproaches of severity and affectation that are significant for both Hegel scholarship and Caspar David Friedrich research. (shrink)

This paper addresses a puzzle some people have about immigration. We are told that the immigrants we are taking in are talented, but then why don’t their own societies keep them?

Schopenhauer bases morality on the concept of compassion, which he assumes to be the “great mystery of ethics”. He sees it and as a spontaneous action that can neither be taught or planned. However, some elements of his theory of human action allow us to conceive of an ethical-moral action (the compassionate act) as something less mysterious or immediate, rather a mediated and planned action in its social or sociability dimension, or even as one which is suggested. In this (...) paper I propose what may be called a “valorization of the empirical apparatus” of Schopenhauerian thinking on human action (vís-a-vis the metaphysical apparatus) by distinguishing between what I call great ethics and small ethics, a differentiation that I believe can be inferred from some of the philosopher’s elaborations. (shrink)

Abstract: Giorgio Agamben's recent works have been preoccupied with a certain obscure passage from St. Paul's 'Second Epistle to the Thessalonians,' which describes the portentous events that must occur before the Second Coming of Jesus Christ can take place---specifically, the appearance of a 'man of lawlessness' (the Antichrist?) and the exposure of who or what is currently restraining the 'man of lawlessness' from being exposed as the Antichrist: a mysterious agency called the 'katechon.' In 'The Mystery of Evil: Benedict (...) XVI and the End of Days,' this obscure passage is connected with the abdication of Pope Benedict XVI through certain equally obscure references to the fourth century theologian, Tyconius, although the precise connection between these apocalyptic events and their mysterious agents remains obscure. This review attempts to shed some critical light upon this cryptic subject, both by considering the world-historical context of St. Paul's epistle, and by asking what role these apocalyptic figures play in Agamben's political theology. But, to begin with, the review also asks: Who, really, is the Antichrist? a scarcely rhetorical question that demands a sardonic answer. Although various candidates from contemporary politics are proposed, the review finally argues that the Antichrist and the katechon are not specific individuals or worldly institutions, but rather refer to world-historical trends within Western European Christian civilization itself that have resulted in what Friedrich Nietzsche called 'the devaluation of all higher values' and 'the desecration of the Christian moral world-view': an apocalyptic turn of events which Nietzsche equally sardonically referred to in 'The Antichrist.'. (shrink)

A compositional semantics for anankastic conditionals (‘If you want p, you must φ’) has been elusive. Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) decisively object to all semantics that precede their own. CL's view rests on a response to *the problem of conflicting goals*; CL use an interpretation of 'want' on which an agent's desires don't conflict with her beliefs. But a proper response requires lack of conflict with the facts. CL's view fails. Anankastic conditionals are still a mystery.

Peter van Inwagen contends that free will is a mystery. Here I present an argument in the spirit of van Inwagen's. According to the Assimilation Argument, libertarians cannot plausibly distinguish causally undetermined actions, the ones they take to be exercises of free will, from overtly randomized outcomes of the sort nobody would count as exercises of free will. I contend that the Assimilation Argument improves on related arguments in locating the crucial issues between van Inwagen and libertarians who hope (...) to demystify free will, while avoiding objections these arguments have faced. (shrink)

Going beyond Nagel and his ‘like a bat’: an exercise in primordial ontology, involving both conceptual clarification and observational drilling down.

The economic crisis in Europe exposes the European Union’s political fragility. How a polity made of very different states can live up to the motto “Europe united in diversity” is difficult to envisage in practice. In this paper I attempt an “exegesis”—a critical explanation or interpretation of a series of published pieces (“the Series”) which explores, first, if European unity is desirable at all. Second, it presents a new methodology—analogical hermeneutics—used throughout the Series to approach the problem of unity. Third, (...) it conceptualises the source of unity as political identity. Fourth, it advances that the vehicle to share such identity is an analogical language: the political culture of human rights. Fifth, it submits the conditions under which such political culture could ground political identity through an open public sphere. Finally, it presents a way in which solidarity can grow as the increasingly diverse citizens of the European Union interact with each other. Even though the economic crisis can be solved by means of sound economic strategy (which is not the main object of my work), any successful economic strategy requires—as a precondition—a certain degree of political unity (the central concern of my research). (shrink)

A study in the ontology of perceptual ‘meaning’, especially with regard to the fact that any particular meaning is always potentially replaceable by its polar opposite. -/- We’re picking up a thread here from where we left off in the previous article (Spiritual metaphysics #1) and taking another look at an aspect of the features of any basic perception. Disregarding (for now) the fact that all perceptions (of whatever kind; mental or sense perceptual) are always, as it were, ‘illumined’ by (...) their knowability, there is another remarkable (not to say astonishing!) ability inherent to perception which, though we are all well aware of it, yet we strangely refuse to entertain and explore its implications seriously. This prevents us from reaching a stage (in our thinking) where a kind of ‘transformative insight’ might occur. We seem to prefer instead to remain in a blinkered ‘mode of thought’ — a way of thinking and conceiving — which condemns us to remain in a type of straightened normality and ordinariness which, with a bit of sustained exploration and inquiry and intellectual analysis, we can actually ‘transcend’. Whether or not this is something we would want to do, is a question for each individual. It should be stressed again and again, however, that this supposed ‘transcendence’ has nothing whatsoever to do with meditation, mindfulness or any altered state of consciousness: it is wholly and purely a matter of coming to a ‘mental’ (meaning intellectual) insight. (shrink)

“Better Economics for the Earth: A Lesson from Quantum and Information Theories” is a synthesis of ideas that promise to revolutionize our understanding of economics. Authors Quan-Hoang Vuong and Minh-Hoang Nguyen nurture a refreshing perspective by intertwining complex scientific theories with the intricate dance of economic systems. Their exploration goes beyond the traditional frameworks, engaging readers in a journey that teases the intellect while whispering secrets of the universe that are intimately tied to our everyday lives. The book earns a (...) glowing 5 out of 5 stars for its audacious approach to expanding economic thought, its emotional resonance, and its ability to captivate the intellect. Vuong and Nguyen have crafted a narrative that is not only timely but also timeless, as it invites readers to be part of a dialogue that could transform our world. This book is essential reading for anyone eager to explore the nexus of science and economics, pushing boundaries while maintaining an engaging and humane touch. (shrink)

Hortense Spillers asserts the imperative for black writers to reconfigure the languages they inherit. One way of doing so is to craft counter-myths against dominative mythologies. Spillers casts myth as an integration of form and concept which overdetermines the significance of what it is used to talk about. One crucial effect of America’s racialising mythos has been to deny black women the ability to determine that significance. She then describes how this mythos is crafted through a double wounding that creates (...) at least two ‘interstices’—first between home and market, then between blackness and humanity—which are covered up by mythological terms. Finally, Spillers shows how counter-mythologies can be crafted by speaking from within these interstices to reconfigure the conditions of possibility governing meaningful speech, taking the 19th- century African-American preaching tradition as her example. The article concludes by reflecting on what it might mean to practice Christian theology as counter-mythology in light of Spillers’ work through a reading of Edwidge Danticat’s The Dew Breaker. (shrink)

This study explores the distinguished Persian Sufi mystic Shaykh Maḥmūd Shabestarī’s Golshan-e Rāz, or The Rose Garden of Mystery. Adopting a hermeneutic approach, it scrutinizes the intricate spiritual journey towards divine realization delineated in Shabestarī’s poetry, utilizing qualitative content analysis of original texts and interpretations by scholars such as Lāhījī and Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī. The main question the paper addresses is this: “How can the spiritual journeyer overcome obstacles—particularly ‘otherness’—and achieve unity with the divine Essence within the framework of (...) Islamic mysticism, as interpreted through Shabestarī’s teachings in Golshan-e Rāz?” To answer this inquiry, the paper addresses pivotal questions concerning Shabestarī’s depiction of the spiritual journeyer’s path, its stages and challenges, and the critical role of the human form in divine manifestation. The study underscores the necessity of overcoming duality and distinction, alluding to the transformative nature of the journey that necessitates self-purification and the cessation of otherness. Findings from this study provide an enriched understanding of Shabestarī’s thought, contributing to the discourse on Islamic metaphysics. It presents valuable insights into the spiritual journeyer’s path, offering a comprehensive interpretation of the challenges, practices, and transformative experiences leading to divine realization and unity. (shrink)

This extensive review explores the nature of human individuality through a broad spectrum of themes which all relate in an unwavering manner back to the fundamental question of “Who Am I?” The paradox of being fully human is that it depends on transcending the human condition itself. Integral individuality exists at the intersection between the horizontal and the vertical or the human and the Divine. Modern psychology, especially humanistic and transpersonal psychology has, much to its credit, done a great deal (...) to facilitate the rightful place of the human within the spiritual dimension; yet, to date, it has been unable to situate what human individuality is. In fact, modern psychology has grossly overlooked that each of the spiritual traditions of the world has its own corresponding and complete psychology or rather pneumatology (“science of the Spirit”). It is by turning to the integral psychology of the perennial philosophy that human identity can be recovered. (shrink)

I put forward a micro realistic, probabilistic version of quantum theory, which specifies the precise nature of quantum entities thus solving the quantum wave/particle dilemma, and which both reproduces the empirical success of orthodox quantum theory, and yields predictions that differ from orthodox quantum theory for as yet unperformed experiments.

In this chapter, I explore my affective engagement with Charlotte Wood’s The Weekend (2019). Adopting definitions that reveal the nested hierarchies of feeling, affect, and emotion, I situate emotion as a semantic experience within the framework of thought, arguing that thought itself is an affectual process that carries meaning. Cognition, in other words, is an affective process. Thought’s affectual status is often overlooked, however, with the focus on its semantic content drawing attention from this; yet meaning affects us, and this (...) is the function of thought as affect: it organises experience in ways that are, in turn, affecting. My approach to Wood’s novel aims to emphasise this and find firmer ground on which to perceive emotion as a kind of thought, noting that reading stimulates thinking in terms of grammatically established points of view. (shrink)

Who or what is “I”? Does “I” refer to the soul, body, or something else? This paper aims to clarify the Iranian Sufi Maḥmūd Shabistarī’s metaphysical account of the self in The Rose Garden of Mystery (Gulshan-i Rāz). Some of Shabistarī’s commentators-for example, Lāhījī-argue that the “self is the determined Real” without offering a full account. This paper presents Shabistarī’s self by examining Gulshan in the context of commentaries, secondary sources, and Islamic thought and by presenting opposing interpretations and (...) reasons for the most prominent interpreta￾tions. In Gulshan, the self is neither the soul nor the body. It is the Real’s determination, a face among the eternally manifesting, unrepeated faces of the Real. This paper argues that the self is the human’s fixed entity (quiddity, ʿayn-i thābitah), whose aptitudes are perpetually unfolding; it is an eternal becoming of the Perfect Man. The self is not reified (i.e., it is of no definite content or form) or fully known; it changes every moment; it is the ever-changing “I” of the moment. Shabistarī’s metaphysics helps the modern person realize that her self is divine; it teaches her that because the world-including humans, animals, and the environment-is God’s manifesta￾tion, it deserves care. (shrink)

This is a review of Peter van Inwagen's collection of essays. It corrects a typesetter’s deletion of 75% of the review originally published in _Faith and Philosophy_15, 1998: 397-399.

Although the question of whether, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, sanctifying grace is “created” or “uncreated” has received considerable attention in the last several decades, many of the questions and arguments proposed by those, such as Karl Rahner, Jerome Ebacher, and A.N. Williams, in favor of grace being uncreated have gone unanswered. Among these ancillary questions and arguments are those concerning the proper subject of grace, the categorial classification of grace, and the reason for the mystery and unconsciousness (...) of grace. These questions appear unrelated, but, as this paper argues, they are each logically connected to each other and to the overall thesis that sanctifying grace is created, not uncreated. This paper aims to make Aquinas’s thesis that grace is created more palatable to objectors by addressing each of these previously unaddressed ancillary questions. (shrink)

The Eleusinian Mysteries are religious rituals that include rites of initiation, purification, and revelation. The high point of these Mysteries is the moment when a priest reveals the secret of the Mysteries to the newly initiated. Plato frequently uses language and motifs from the Mysteries in his dialogues, yet Plato scholars have not paid much attention to this usage, and those who have done so have not found much philosophical significance in it. I argue that in explaining his epistemology in (...) three middle and late period dialogues Plato consciously and systematically uses Eleusinian Mystery motifs to convey the idea of a unique kind of knowledge. This immediate, direct, and incorrigible knowledge bursts upon Plato's initiates after they undergo preparatory processes such as purification through elenchus. I examine the Eleusinian Mystery motifs that Plato employs in the Ladder of Eros at Symposium 209e--212a, in the middle books of the Republic, including the Myth of the Cave at Republic 509a--518d, and in the Myth of the Soul at Phaedrus 246a--253c, and I argue that Plato finds these Mystery elements useful for two reasons. First, in many cases before an individual can come to know a form he must go through certain conditioning and transformatory processes to prepare him for it, and motifs from the Mysteries help Plato to describe these processes. Second, knowledge of a form is different from other kinds of knowledge, and the motif of the visual revelation of the epopteia helps him to express the direct, unmediated contact that constitutes knowledge of a form. ;The structure of the dissertation is as follows. In chapter one I present background information concerning the stages and events of the Mysteries. I consider the purpose and effects of initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries, paying special attention to the preparatory rituals. In chapter two I present a general discussion of certain aspects of Plato's epistemology and show how Plato employs the five Mystery motifs of progressing through a sequence of stages, purification, being led by a mystagogos, experiencing the epopteia, and achieving eudaimonia in order to explicate these aspects. In chapter three I consider the specifics of Plato's use of Mystery terminology in the Symposium. And finally, in an Appendix, I argue that Plato has a model of knowledge by acquaintance, since I assert in chapters two and three that Plato uses the Mystery theme of an epopteia to express features of this model. (shrink)

Computational Functionalism is a subfield of philosophy of mind most relevant to the subject of cognitive science as well as to artificial intelligence (AI). The analysis of this paper focuses on Hilary Putnam’s and Gualtiero Piccinini’s standpoints regarding the molecular understanding of computation. Finally, Putnam’s argument of the functionalism in notion of the mental states is based on the positive definition of those states by their functions, while Piccinini, and on the other hand suggest that an understanding of the mechanism (...) of computation will go a long way to explaining cognition. This research also points out shortcomings of functionalism in their theories especially in regards to connectivity with physicality of AI structures. Therefore, the paper identifies the following gaps: The first gap holds that although both theorists have important insights, the two approaches put forward by the respective theorists are flawed and a better proposal is required, then a new proposal is suggested In identifying these gaps, the paper seeks to contribute to the literature by arguing for the need to develop a composite of the two theorists. The results show that the big ideas are important in present-day AI debate and analysis, which helps to explain the mind as computation. (shrink)

It has long been recognised that great art, whether visual art, literature or music, has a special capacity to “live on” – to endure – long after the moment of its creation. Thus, our world of art today includes, for example, ancient Mesopotamian sculpture, Shakespeare’s plays, and the music of medieval times. How does this capacity to endure operate? Or to ask that question another way: what does “endure” mean in the case of art? The Renaissance concluded that art endures (...) because it is timeless – impervious to change, “eternal”, “immortal” – and this solution, which was ratified without question by Enlightenment philosophers of art such as Hume and Kant, still lingers on in some quarters today. But developments since the nineteenth century have gravely weakened the credibility of the proposition that art is immortal, and the idea is now effectively dead. This leaves us with a major dilemma: if art is not impervious to change, how exactly does it endure? If the time-honoured solution of immortality is no longer viable, what alternative explanation can we find to replace it? -/- This paper explains why immortality is dead, describes our contemporary dilemma, and briefly canvasses a possible solution. (shrink)

In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (...) yet within it stirs the desire to experience that brings forth singularities, like the one that exploded into the Big Bang (experiencing itself through relative and relational spacetime). From the perspective of the eternal now of near-infinite possibilities (if such a sentence can be semantically parsed at all), there is only the timeless creative present, so the Big Bang did not happen some 13 billion years ago. Inasmuch as there is neither time past nor time future nor any time at all at the null point of forever, we must understand the Big Bang (and all other events) as taking place right here and now. In terms of the eternal now, the beginning is happening now and we just appeared (and are always just appearing) to witness it. The rest is all conscious construction; time and experience are so entangled, they need each other to exist. (shrink)

In the seventeenth century, Newton used bis famous prism to found the physics of spectral light, thus revolutionising our thinking about colours; more than a hundred years later, Goethe protested against Newton's theory and discovered a number of new prismatic colour phenomena. Did these episodes in the history of science have any influence on the visual arts? For a decade now my visits to art museums have had an agenda: I have been looking for nineteenth-century paintings with certain spectral colour (...) (which will be described in the first half of this paper). While my search has been unsuccessful in traditional Western art, I found what I was looking for in Japa­nese art: in woodblock prints by Hokusai and Hiroshige. This is surprising; little Western science had reached Japan in their time. The second half of the paper pre­sents this riddle, which I am nowhere near solving. Even without a solution, however, a riddle can be instructive. In this case, it may help to bring into focus the fascinating exchange between two distant cultures. Much has been written on the cultural relativ­ity of colour perception, colour systematisation and colour aesthetics; I want to intro­duce a new and so far unknown case that might contribute to this debate - though the debate itself remains beyond the scope of this paper. (shrink)