Results for 'rational hope '

950 found
Order:
  1. Rational Hope, Moral Order, and the Revolution of the Will.Andrew Chignell - 2013 - In Eric Watkins (ed.), The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of Nature: Historical Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 197-218.
    This paper considers Kant's views on how it can be rational to hope for God's assistance in becoming morally good. If I am fully responsible for making myself good and can make myself good, then my moral condition depends entirely on me. However, if my moral condition depends entirely on me, then it cannot depend on God, and it is therefore impossible for God to provide me with any assistance. But if it is impossible for God to provide (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  2. Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action.Andrew Chignell - 2014 - In Gordon E. Michalson (ed.), Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 98-117.
    Commentators typically neglect the distinct nature and role of hope in Kant’s system, and simply lump it together with the sort of Belief that arises from the moral proof. Kant himself is not entirely innocent of the conflation. Here I argue, however, that from a conceptual as well as a textual point of view, hope should be regarded as a different kind of attitude. It is an attitude that we can rationally adopt toward some of the doctrines that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  3. Rational Hope against Hope? A Pragmatic Approach to Hope and the Ethics of Belief.Roe Fremstedal - 2019 - In Gerhard Schreiber (ed.), Interesse am Anderen. Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Religion und Rationalität. Für Heiko Schulz zum 60. Geburtstag (Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, vol. 187). Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 723-743.
    The aim of this paper is to explore a pragmatic approach to hope and the ethics of belief that allows rational hope against hope. Hope against hope is hope that goes beyond what the evidence supports by hoping for something that is both highly unlikely and highly valuable. However, this could take different forms. One could either hope against the evidence or merely go beyond it; the evidence could be inconclusive or conclusive, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):35–57.
    I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, or act as if, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  5. What May I Hope? Why It Can Be Rational to Rely on One’s Hope.Döring Sabine - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):117--129.
    In hoping, what is important to us seems possible, which makes our life appear meaningful and motivates us to do everything within our reach to bring about the things that we hope for. I argue that it can be rational to rely on one’s hope: hope can deceive us, but it can also represent things correctly to us. I start with Philip Pettit’s view that hope is a cognitive resolve. I reject this view and suggest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - Synthese 198:1673-1689.
    Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  7. Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope: An Introduction (The Moral Psychology of the Emotions). Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 135-151.
    Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  8. Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity.Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (3):345–371.
    This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne Martin’s recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  9. Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.
    In this paper, I defend an epistemic requirement on fitting hopes and worries: it is fitting to hope or to worry that p only if one’s epistemic position makes it rational to suspend judgment as to whether p. This view, unlike prominent alternatives, is ecumenical; it retains its plausibility against a variety of different background views of epistemology. It also has other important theoretical virtues: it is illuminating, elegant, and extensionally adequate. Fallibilists about knowledge have special reason to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. (2 other versions)Hope: A Solution to the Puzzle of Difficult Action.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Pursuing difficult long-term goals typically involves encountering substantial evidence of possible future failure. If decisions to pursue such goals are serious only if one believes that one will act as one has decided, then some of our lives’ most important decisions seem to require belief against the evidence. This is the puzzle of difficult action, to which I offer a solution. I argue that serious decisions to φ do not have to give rise to a belief that one will φ, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. (1 other version)Hope, Hate and Indignation: Spinoza on Political Emotion in the Trump Era.Ericka Tucker - 2018 - In M. B. Sable & A. J. Torres (eds.), Trump and Political Philosophy. pp. 131-158.
    Can we ever have politics without the noble lie? Can we have a collective political identity that does not exclude or define ‘us’ as ‘not them’? In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that individual human emotions and imagination shape the social world. This world, he argues, can in turn be shaped by political institutions to be more or less hopeful, more or less rational, or more or less angry and indignant. In his political works, Spinoza offered suggestions for how to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Knowledge, Discipline, System, Hope: The Fate of Metaphysics in the Doctrine of Method.Andrew Chignell - 2019 - In O'Shea James (ed.), Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 259-279.
    In this chapter I highlight the apparent tensions between Kant’s very stringent critique of metaphysical speculation in the “Discipline of Pure Reason” chapter and his endorsement of Belief (Glaube) and hope (Hoffnung) regarding metaphysical theses in the subsequent “Canon of Pure Reason.” In the process I will examine his distinction between the theoretical and the practical bases for holding a “theoretical” conclusion (i.e. a conclusion about “what exists” rather than “what ought to be”) and argue that the position is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. rational self-commitment.Bruno Verbeek - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter (ed.), rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press USA.
    Abstract: The standard picture of rationality requires that the agent acts so as to realize her most preferred alternative in the light of her own desires and beliefs. However, there are circumstances where such an agent can predict that she will act against her preferences. The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is the paradigmatic example of such cases. In those circumstances the orthodoxy requires the agent to be ‘sophisticated’. That is to say, she should take into account her expected (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  14. Some Hope for Kant's Groundwork III.Joe Saunders - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: -/- 1. A rational will is a free will 2. A free will stands under the moral law 3. Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law -/- In this paper, I attempt to defuse two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Contextual Reason and Rationality.Afroogh Saleh - 2019 - Dissertation, Texas a&M University
    In Internal and External Reasons, Bernard Williams proposes a speculative argument for the idea that internal reasons are the only kind of normative reason, and that his counterfactual internal interpretation is the only truth condition for both kinds of reason-statements, H and S (H: “A has a reason to φ” and S: “There is a reason for A to φ”). He takes for granted, however, that internal and external reasons are the only possible kinds of normative reasons at work: his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  16. No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.
    Conciliationism is the family of views that rationality requires agents to reduce confidence or suspend belief in p when acknowledged epistemic peers (i.e. agents who are (approximately) equally well-informed and intellectually capable) disagree about p. While Conciliationism is prima facie plausible, some have argued that Conciliationism is not an adequate theory of peer disagreement because it is self-undermining. Responses to this challenge can be put into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: the Solution Responses which deny Conciliationism is self-undermining and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. (1 other version)HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović.Boran Berčić, Aleksandra Golubović & Majda Trobok (eds.) - 2022 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.
    This collection of articles is a tribute to Nenad Smokrović, our friend and colleague from the Philosophy Department. He has been working on human rationality for over 25 years. Consequently, articles in this collection are either directly or indirectly related to this subject matter. In this volume, 19 authors from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Italy, Israel, USA, and GB write about human rationality. What human rationality consists in? What is the relationship between its normative aspect (logic) and its descriptive aspect (psychology)? (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Human bounds: rationality for our species.Adam Morton - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):5 - 21.
    Is there such a thing as bounded rationality? I first try to make sense of the question, and then to suggest which of the disambiguated versions might have answers. We need an account of bounded rationality that takes account of detailed contingent facts about the ways in which human beings fail to perform as we might ideally want to. But we should not think in terms of rules or norms which define good responses to an individual's limitations, but rather in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. The Epistemology of Faith and Hope.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    This paper surveys the epistemology of two attitudes: faith and hope. First, I examine descriptive questions about faith and hope. Faith and hope are resilient attitudes with unique cognitive and conative components; while related, they are also distinct, notably in that hope’s cognitive component is weaker than faith’s. I then turn to faith and hope's epistemic (ir)rationality, and discuss various ways that faith and hope can be rational and irrational. Finally, I discuss the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Action-Centered Faith, Doubt, and Rationality.Daniel J. McKaughan - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):71-90.
    Popular discussions of faith often assume that having faith is a form of believing on insufficient evidence and that having faith is therefore in some way rationally defective. Here I offer a characterization of action-centered faith and show that action-centered faith can be both epistemically and practically rational even under a wide variety of subpar evidential circumstances.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  21. Holm Tetens on the Moral-Existential Argument for Theism: Reasonable Hope and Wishful Thinking.Georg Gasser - 2017 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 59 (4):495-513.
    SummaryHolm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Waiting for Godot: The Fragmentation of Hope.Benjamin Randolph - forthcoming - Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities.
    Waiting for Godot’s many commentators have emphasized the absurdity of hope in the play, but there has not been an account of how the play reprises hope’s historical transformation and weakening in modernity. This essay provides that account, arguing that Beckett’s Waiting for Godot sponsors a form of hope appropriate to the predicaments of modern societies. Godot stages the blockage of hope by reflecting the obsolescence and fragmentation of the religious and progressive legitimations for the concept (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Between Wolffianism and Pietism: Baumgarten's Rational Psychology.Corey W. Dyck - 2018 - In Courtney D. Fugate & John Hymers (eds.), Baumgarten and Kant on Metaphysics. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 78-93.
    In this paper, I consider Baumgarten’s views on the soul in the context of the Pietist critique of Wolff’s rational psychology. My primary aim is to account for the largely unacknowledged differences between Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s rational psychology, though I also hope to show that, in some cases, the Pietists were rather more perceptive in their reading of Wolff than they are typically given credit for as their criticisms frequently succeed in drawing attention to significant omissions in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24. Kant and Moral Motivation: The Value of Free Rational Willing.Jennifer K. Uleman - 2016 - In Iakovos Vasiliou (ed.), Moral Motivation: A History. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 202-226.
    Kant is the philosophical tradition's arch-anti-consequentialist – if anyone insists that intentions alone make an action what it is, it is Kant. This chapter takes up Kant's account of the relation between intention and action, aiming both to lay it out and to understand why it might appeal. The chapter first maps out the motivational architecture that Kant attributes to us. We have wills that are organized to action by two parallel and sometimes competing motivational systems. One determines us by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Glaube, Wissen und rationales Hoffen.Christoph Jäger - 2016 - In Christoph Jäger (ed.), Geschichte - Gesellschaft - Geltung: XXIII Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, 28. September -- 2. Oktober 2014 an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Kolloquienbeiträge, ed. Michael Quante, Hamburg, Felix Meiner: 2016. pp. 501-517.
    I discuss two accounts of rational religious faith that have recently been proposed by Peter Rohs and Volker Gerhardt, respectively, and critically explore the relations between (i) faith and knowledge and (ii) faith and hope. I argue that, if faith essentially involves some form of eschatological hope, then a theory of rational faith will have to include an analysis of rational hope.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Love in the Time of Antibiotic Resistance: How Altruism Might Be Our Best Hope.Dien Ho - 2017 - In Philosophical Issues in Pharmaceutics: Development, Dispensing, and Use. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Antibiotic-resistant bacteria pose a serious threat to our health. Our ability to destroy deadly bacteria by using antibiotics have not only improved our lives by curing infections, it also allows us to undertake otherwise dangerous treatments from chemotherapies to invasive surgeries. The emergence of antibiotic resistance, I argue, is a consequence of various iterations of prisoner’s dilemmas. To wit, each participant (from patients to nations) has rational self-interest to pursue a course of action that is suboptimal for all of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Must Science Make Cosmological Assumptions if it is to be Rational?Nicholas Maxwell - 1997 - In T. Kelly (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Irish Philosophical Society Spring Conference. Irish Philosophical Society.
    Cosmological speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe, being necessary for science to be possible at all, must be regarded as a part of scientific knowledge itself, however epistemologically unsound it may be in other respects. The best such speculation available is that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, in the light of the immense apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically comprehensible. But both these speculations may be false; in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  28. The Categorical Imperative and Kant’s Conception of Practical Rationality.Andrews Reath - 1989 - The Monist 72 (3):384-410.
    The primary concern of this paper is to outline an explanation of how Kant derives morality from reason. We all know that Kant thought that morality comprises a set of demands that are unconditionally and universally valid. In addition, he thought that to support this understanding of moral principles, one must show that they originate in reason a priori, rather than in contingent facts about human psychology, or the circumstances of human life. But do we really understand how he tries (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.
    Must rational thinkers have consistent sets of beliefs? I shall argue that it can be rational for a thinker to believe a set of propositions known to be inconsistent. If this is right, an important test for a theory of rational belief is that it allows for the right kinds of inconsistency. One problem we face in trying to resolve disagreements about putative rational requirements is that parties to the disagreement might be working with different conceptions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.
    Reasons rationalize beliefs. Reasons, when all goes well, turn true beliefs into knowledge. I am interested in the relationship between these aspects of reasons. Without a proper understanding of their relationship, the theory of knowledge will be less illuminating than it ought to be. I hope to show that previous accounts have failed to account for this relationship. This has resulted in a tendency to focus on justification rather than knowledge. It has also resulted in many becoming skeptical about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Faith: Contemporary Perspectives.Elizabeth Jackson - 2023 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Faith is a trusting commitment to someone or something. Faith helps us meet our goals, keeps our relationships secure, and enables us to retain our commitments over time. Faith is thus a central part of a flourishing life. -/- This article is about the philosophy of faith. There are many philosophical questions about faith, such as: What is faith? What are its main components or features? What are the different kinds of faith? What is the relationship between faith and other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. The Synthetic Unity of Reason and Nature in the Third Critique.Saniye Vatansever - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (5):1-32.
    In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of the argumentative structure of the third Critique, which in turn clarifies the connection between its two apparently unrelated parts. I propose to read the third Critique as a response to Kant’s question of hope, which concerns the satisfaction of reason’s practical and theoretical interests. On this proposal, while the first part on aesthetics describes what we—as possessors of theoretical reason – may hope for, the second part, on teleology, describes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.
    We often get evidence that bears on the reliability of some of our own first-order reasoning. The rational response to such “higher-order” evidence would seem to depend on a rational assessment of how reliable we can expect that reasoning to be, in light of the higher-order evidence. “Independence” principles are intended to constrain this reliability-assessment, so as to prevent question-begging reliance on the very reasoning being assessed. However, extant formulations of Independence principles tend to be vague or ambiguous, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  34. Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):30-62.
    Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. (1 other version)Morality and Art.Philippa Foot - 1970 - Proceedings of the British Academy 56 (131-144).
    Discusses the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of moral judgments, hoping to illuminate it by contrasting moral and aesthetic judgments. In her critical assessment of the nature of moral judgments, Foot concludes that some such judgments (as e.g. that Nazism was evil) are definitely objective. The concept of morality here supplies criteria independent of local standards, which function as fixed starting points in arguments across local boundaries, whereas, by contrast, aesthetic truths can ultimately depend on locally determined criteria. More (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  36. Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reason.Daniel J. McKaughan - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):101-124.
    One challenge to the rationality of religious commitment has it that faith is unreasonable because it involves believing on insufficient evidence. However, this challenge and influential attempts to reply depend on assumptions about what it is to have faith that are open to question. I distinguish between three conceptions of faith each of which can claim some plausible grounding in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Questions about the rationality or justification of religious commitment and the extent of compatibility with doubt look different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  37. What is Scientific Realism?Anjan Chakravartty & Bas C. Van - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):12-25.
    Decades of debate about scientific realism notwithstanding, we find ourselves bemused by what different philosophers appear to think it is, exactly. Does it require any sort of belief in relation to scientific theories and, if so, what sort? Is it rather typified by a certain understanding of the rationality of such beliefs? In the following dialogue we explore these questions in hopes of clarifying some convictions about what scientific realism is, and what it could or should be. En route, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Eros and Anxiety.Vida Yao - 2023 - Synthese 202 (200):1-20.
    L.A. Paul argues that “transformative experiences” challenge our hopes to live up to an ideal that she believes is upheld within western, wealthy cultures. If these experiences reveal information to us about the world and ourselves that is in principle unavailable to us before we undergo them, it seems that there is no hope for us to be rational, authentic and autonomous masters of our own lives. Supposing that Paul is right about this, how concerned should we be? (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. One decade of universal artificial intelligence.Marcus Hutter - 2012 - In Pei Wang & Ben Goertzel (eds.), Theoretical Foundations of Artificial General Intelligence. Springer. pp. 67--88.
    The first decade of this century has seen the nascency of the first mathematical theory of general artificial intelligence. This theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence (UAI) has made significant contributions to many theoretical, philosophical, and practical AI questions. In a series of papers culminating in book (Hutter, 2005), an exciting sound and complete mathematical model for a super intelligent agent (AIXI) has been developed and rigorously analyzed. While nowadays most AI researchers avoid discussing intelligence, the award-winning PhD thesis (Legg, 2008) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. Tracking Inferences Is not Enough: The Given as Tie-Breaker.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):129-135.
    Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Faith and Reason.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Mark A. Lamport (ed.), The Handbook of Philosophy and Religion. Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 167-177.
    What is faith? How is faith different than belief and hope? Is faith irrational? If not, how can faith go beyond the evidence? This chapter introduces the reader to philosophical questions involving faith and reason. First, we explore a four-part definition of faith. Then, we consider the question of how faith could be rational yet go beyond the evidence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   212 citations  
  43. Unprincipled.Gordon Belot - 2024 - Review of Symbolic Logic 17 (2):435-474.
    It is widely thought that chance should be understood in reductionist terms: claims about chance should be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated. There are many possible reductionist theories of chance, differing as to which possible pattern of events they take to be chance-making. It is also widely taken to be a norm of rationality that credence should defer to chance: special cases aside, rationality requires that one’s credence function, when conditionalized on the chance-making facts, should (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Thinking is overrated: golfers perform best when distracted and under pressure; firefighters make the right calls without a clue as to why; and you are yourself ill advised to look at your steps as you go down the stairs, or to try and remember your pin number before typing it in. Just do it, mindlessly. Both empirical psychologists and the common man have long worked out that thinking is often a bad idea, but philosophers still hang on to an intellectualist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  45. Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may (...) to solve by abduction. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  46. (1 other version)Why there are still no people.Jim Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-192.
    This paper will argue that there are no people. Let me summarize the argument. In part II of what follows, I argue that if identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Psychological connectedness, according to Derek Parfit, is the 'holding of particular direct psychological connections,' for example, when a belief, a desire, or some other psychological feature continues to be had ; psychological connectedness consists in two other relations—resemblance plus a cause that produces it. For (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  47. That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance.Gordon Belot - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Like Lewis, many philosophers hold reductionist accounts of chance (on which claims about chance are to be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated) and maintain that rationality requires that credence should defer to chance (in the sense that under certain circumstances one's credence in an event must coincide with the chance of that event). It is a shortcoming of an account of chance if it implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable by computable agents. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.
    I investigate when we can (rationally) have attitudes, and when we cannot. I argue that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee that one can rationally believe that proposition. Second, such descriptions, etc. do enable individuals to rationally have various non-doxastic attitudes, such as hope and admiration. And third, even for non-doxastic attitudes like that, not just any description (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  49. Forgiveness and Moral Development.Paula Satne - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1029-1055.
    Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  50. Towards a Concept of Embodied Autonomy: In what ways can a Patient’s Body contribute to the Autonomy of Medical Decisions?Jonathan Lewis & Søren Holm - 2023 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 26 (3):451-463.
    “Bodily autonomy” has received significant attention in bioethics, medical ethics, and medical law in terms of the general inviolability of a patient’s bodily sovereignty and the rights of patients to make choices (e.g., reproductive choices) that concern their own body. However, the role of the body in terms of how it can or does contribute to a patient’s capacity for, or exercises of their autonomy in clinical decision-making situations has not been explicitly addressed. The approach to autonomy in this paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 950