Recent discussions among lawyers, philosophers, policy researchers and athletes have focused on the potential threat to privacy posed by the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) whereabouts requirements. These requirements demand, among other things, that all elite athletes file their whereabouts information for the subsequent quarter on a quarterly basis and comprise data for one hour of each day when the athlete will be available and accessible for no advance notice testing at a specified location of their choosing. Failure to file one’s (...) whereabouts, or the non-availability for testing at said location on three occasions within any 18-month period constitutes an anti-doping rule violation that is equivalent to testing positive to a banned substance, and may lead to a suspension of the athlete for a time period of between one and two years. We critically explore the extent to which WADA’s whereabouts requirements are in tension with existing legislation on privacy, with respect to UK athletes, who are simultaneously protected by UK domestic and EU law. Both UK domestic and EU law are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 8, which establishes a right to “respect for private and family life, home and correspondence”. We critically discuss the centrality of the whereabouts requirements in relation to WADA’s aims, and the adoption and implementation of its whereabouts rules. We conclude that as WADA’s whereabouts requirements appear to be in breach of an elite athlete’s rights under European workers’ rights, health & safety and data protection law they are also, therefore, in conflict with Article 8 of the ECHR and the UK Human Rights Act 1998. We call for specific amendments that cater for the exceptional case of elite sports labour if the WADA requirements are to be considered legitimate. (shrink)

A collection of articles on the the principles of social justice from an Australian Catholic perspective. Contents: Forward (Archbishop Philip Wilson), Introduction (James Franklin), The right to life (James Franklin), The right to serve and worship God in public and private (John Sharpe), The right to religious formation (Richard Rymarz), The right to personal liberty under just law (Michael Casey), The right to equal protection of just law regardless of sex, nationality, colour or creed (...) (Sam Gregg), The right to freedom of expression (Damian Grace), The right to choose and freely maintain a state of life, married or single, lay or religious (Marita Winters), The right to education (Anthony Cleary), The right to petition government for the redress of grievances (Paul Russell), The right to a nationality (Andrew Hamilton), The right to have access to the means of livelihood, by migration when necessary (Brenda Hubber), The right of association and peaceful assembly (Michael Hogan), The right to work and choose one's occupation (Ian Blandthorn), The right to personal ownership, use and disposal of property subject to the right of others (Brian Coman), The right to a living wage (Garrick Small), The right to collective bargaining (Keith Harvey), The right to associate by industries and professions to obtain economic justice (Henrik Jurisevic), The right to assistance from society, if necessary from the State, in distress of persons and family (Catherine Althaus), Afterword (James Franklin). (shrink)

Is the family subject to principles of justice? In "A Theory of Justice", John Rawls includes the (monogamous) family along with the market and the government as among the, "basic institutions of society", to which principles of justice apply. Justice, he famously insists, is primary in politics as truth is in science: the only excuse for tolerating injustice is that no lesser injustice is possible. The point of the present paper is that Rawls doesn't actually mean this. When (...) it comes to the family, and in particular its impact on fair equal opportunity, (the first part of the Difference Principle, Rawls' second principle of justice), he abandons the priority of justice. I also argue that he is right to do so. -/- The central argument is simple. As Rawls admits, what family one is raised by profoundly affects one's life chances: a child raised by a family has far greater life chances on every dimension than one raised in a poorer family that may lack books, education, and time to give the child attention. But the prevailing family arrangements in the industrialized West, assigning children to be raised by their biological parents, is guaranteed to perpetuate this injustice. While Rawls says an unjust institution in the basic structure of society, in which he includes the family, must be, "reformed or abolished," he refrains from calling for the reform or abolition of the family. We must simply work around it to compensate for the injustices he admits it involves. And this despite the fact that alternative arrangements involving communal child-rearing (Plato) or assigning children to those best qualified to raise them (Rousseau) are common in the philosophical literature. Moreover, the practice of having children raised by their biological parents is a relatively recent one, at least in the West, where, before the late 18th century, fostering-out or apprenticeship arrangements were normal and expected for both rich and poor for centuries. -/- Much of the paper is devoted to fine-grained textual analysis of Rawls' attempts to avoid the devastating implications of this argument for his theory of justice -- much of which are stated only in the original edition of "A Theory of Justice" and simply deleted, without substitution by anything better, in the second edition. In the end, Rawls has no way out. He cannot keep the priority of justice, fair equality of opportunity, and the monogamous family in which children are raised by their biological parents. As he admits, these are mutually inconsistent. -/- In the final part of the paper, I argue that Rawls should give up on the priority of justice. While child-rearing by the biological parents is a historical anomaly, in the real modern world it would be politically unfeasible to institute Platonic, Rousseauean, or similar legislation that purportedly assigned children to those best able to raise them, regardless of biological relationship. Since Rawls is committed to principles of political stability and feasibility, as he should be, and since ought implies can, such proposals are off the table. I concur with Rawls that we must work around this injustice, even those there are more just arrangements available in principle. But the cost of this -- less high than Rawls suggests -- is abandoning the principle of the priority of justice. Justice is one of a number of considerations that we must or may balance in deciding on the best attainable social relations. It is not a trump. However, this comes a great cost for Rawls: he must also abandon the lexical ordering of principles of justice or, in general, right or good principles of social order, in favor of the messy intuitionist balancing that his theory is designed to avoid. -/- One feature of the paper that is worth independent attention is a discussion of Marx's rejection of justice in the Critique of the Gotha Program, which I explicate, and urge, without adopting it, that it has a great deal more force than is widely understood. (shrink)

In this chapter I focus on two problems facing immigration systems around the world, and Australia in particular. The topics addressed are chosen because each one involves important fundamental rights and because significant improvement in these areas is possible even if each state acts alone, without significant coordination with others. First, I examine refugee programmes, focussing specifically on the ‘two- tier’ refugee programmes pioneered by Australia with the introduction of Temporary Protection Visas by the Howard Government in 1999. Next, I (...) look at recent declines in refugee resettlement schemes from already stingy levels and, in relation to Australia in particular, I show how the tying of resettlement numbers to the number of affirmative asylum claims granted is both wrong- headed and counterproductive. The second area of immigration policy explored is family migration, another area where immigration systems around the world have been moving in the wrong direction, often via less than transparent administrative processes. Australia is no exception. While Australia’s family migration system is reasonably good on its face, in practice there are several factors which make the programme significantly less than satisfactory from the perspective of protecting the basic rights of migrants and, arguably more importantly, citizens. These problems can and should be fixed in straightforward ways, and since doing so would be more just, would have few— if any— significant negative consequences, and in fact would have a number of clear benefits, those changes should be made. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers are right to criticize Hegel’s prejudices against women. In many of his works, Hegel reduces women to their physiology as means of explaining why they occupy a subordinate role in nature and in society. Such treatment seems arbitrary at best, for the gendering of roles disrupts Hegel’s dialectical approach to spirit without any meaningful gain. Despite this defect in Hegel’s work, what is positive in Hegelian social and political philosophy remains intact. In this paper I argue that (...) the sexist claims that Hegel makes about women are irrelevant to his theory of the family in the Philosophy of Right. Therein, Hegel outlines three components that are necessary for the completion of the family: marriage, property and assets, and the raising of children. Hegel also includes a description of the different roles occupied by family members and divides these roles along gender lines. Given the three components that are essential to the family, I argue that there is no necessary basis for familial roles to be divided by gender. (shrink)

Sikhism is the world's fifth-largest religion. It was founded during the late 15th century in the Punjab region of the Indian subcontinent. Its adherents are known as Sikhs. Currently, there are about 30 million Sikhs worldwide. Most of them live in the Indian state of Punjab. As per Sikh tradition, Sikhism was established by Guru Nanak (1469–1539) and subsequently led by a succession of nine other Gurus. Before his death, the tenth SikhGuru, Guru Gobind Singh (1666–1708), bestowed the status of (...) Guru to the sacred scripture of Sikhs, Adi Granth, which is presently known as Sri Guru Granth Sahib (SGGS) [1]. The Adi Granth was first compiled by Guru Arjan Dev, the fifth Sikh Guru, in 1604. Its second and final version has been the handiwork of Guru Gobind Singh, who added the hymns of his father, Guru Teg Bahadur, the ninth Sikh Guru [2], at Damdama Sahib, Talwandi Sabo, Punjab, in 1705. The holy Sikh scripture, SGGS, contains 1430 pages of text in poetry form. In addition to the hymns of the six Sikh Gurus and four Sikhs, it includes hymns composed by fifteen saints (Bhagats) and eleven poet laureates (Bhats) of the Guru's court. Muslims and Hindus, Brahmins, and "untouchables" all come together in one congregation to create a universal scripture. It is a compendium of mystic, metaphysical and religious poetry written or recited between the 12th and 17th centuries in the Indian sub-continent [3]. Sri Guru Granth Sahib, through its comprehensive worldview, offers a perfect set of values and an applicable code of conduct. Its cardinal message is addressed to the welfare of all humans irrespective of their caste, color, creed, culture, gender and religion. SGGS emphasizes love, respect, empathy, and acceptance of others' existence. It prohibits us from infringing on the freedom and rights of others. The life and works of the Sikh Gurus exemplify the practicability of these ideas. Their inter-faith dialogues highlighted that human unity and oneness could be achieved through tolerance, communication, and respect for others [4]. Besides a matchless elaboration of spirituality, Sri Guru Granth Sahib enshrines a powerful expression of the message of revolutionary ideals of social welfare, human rights, multicultural distinctness, and religious freedom. In the present era, when the threats and fear of interfaith conflicts, military aggression, terrorism etc., have overpowered human sentiments, the teachings of Sri Guru Granth Sahib are even more relevant to resolving all these problems. (shrink)

It may be tempting for breastfeeding advocates to respond to challenges to breastfeeding older children or breastfeeding in public by pointing out the nutritional or developmental benefits of breastfeeding or by noting that breastfeeding is often extremely discreet. Such responses may concede more than they should: by focusing on rebutting the empirical claim, breastfeeding supporters may end up implicitly accepting two presuppositions about breastfeeding: first, the presupposition that breastfeeding requires justification in terms of health or developmental benefits to the child; (...) second, the presupposition that breastfeeding in public is only acceptable if assumed standards of discretion are met. -/- This paper aims to use the methods of analytic philosophy to: (a) show how, if left unchallenged, these implicit assumptions can become part of the pragmatic presuppositions of the conversation, so that the discussion proceeds taking their acceptance for granted; (b) argue that we can expect these presuppositions to have negative effects on all mothers, no matter how they feed their babies, and on the tenor of public discussion of infant feeding; (c) reconstruct the reasoning that might underlie these presuppositions and show that this reasoning is mistaken; (d) show that recognising breastfeeding as a family way of life and a loving interaction between parent and child gives rise to a moral right to breastfeed in public without social sanction, whether one is able to breastfeed discreetly or not. (shrink)

Some provisions of the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are clearly important from the perspective of business ethics, particularly those calling for equal rights for women to employment and financial security. Some other provisions of CEDAW are equally as important for ethical business practices and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), but are frequently overlooked because of the presumption that they are not strictly business concerns: the rights of women to participation in public life, marriage, and (...) family rights; the rights of rural women to adequate living conditions; and general rights to equality. This chapter will discuss the conceptual commitments that underlie the assumption of a clear demarcation between work and life concerns, and examine the criticisms of this assumption made by feminism. It will, in particular, be interested in: -/- • The public/private distinction • The meaning of “work” or “labor” • The relationship between CSR and care ethics • Fostering a broader understanding of the family or familial relations • Examining the connection between fair wages and work/life integration -/- These discussions suggest that the ability for businesses worldwide to uphold the tenets of CEDAW is dependent upon a reconsideration of the character of the Ideal Worker and a nuanced understanding of the effects of workplace policies on the wider communities in which businesses operate. In particular, though work/life integration is not strictly speaking a “women’s issue,” the ethical and policy considerations addressed herein currently have disproportionately negative effects for women; thus, addressing them is crucial for achieving the aims of gender equality. (shrink)

The Future of Human Reproduction and Family Structure -/- Introduction -/- The future of human reproduction and family structure is set to undergo profound transformations due to advancements in science, technology, and shifting societal values. Breakthroughs in artificial reproduction, gene editing, AI-assisted parenting, and new family models are poised to redefine what it means to conceive, raise children, and form families. As these changes unfold, they will challenge traditional concepts of marriage, parenthood, and biological reproduction. This essay (...) explores the potential future of human reproduction and family structure, examining the scientific, ethical, and social implications. -/- 1. The Future of Human Reproduction -/- A. Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) and Genetic Engineering -/- Scientific advancements are making reproduction more accessible and customizable, allowing individuals to control fertility and genetic traits like never before. -/- 1. Artificial Wombs (Ectogenesis) -/- Artificial wombs, or ectogenesis, could enable embryos to develop outside the human body. This technology would: -/- Help individuals unable to carry pregnancies. -/- Reduce health risks associated with childbirth. -/- Offer reproductive freedom to same-sex couples and single individuals. -/- However, artificial wombs may raise ethical concerns about the emotional and psychological impact on maternal bonding and child development. Additionally, they may lead to commercialized pregnancy, where companies provide “womb services” for those who can afford them. -/- 2. Gene Editing & Designer Babies -/- Gene-editing tools like CRISPR allow parents to modify embryos to: -/- Eliminate genetic diseases. -/- Enhance intelligence, physical abilities, and even personality traits. -/- While this technology offers great potential for eradicating inherited disorders, it could also create genetic inequality between those who can afford enhancements and those who cannot, leading to the emergence of a genetic upper class. Governments may implement strict regulations, but underground markets for genetic enhancements could emerge. -/- 3. Lab-Grown Gametes -/- Scientists are developing methods to create sperm and eggs from stem cells, which could enable: -/- Infertile individuals to have biological children. -/- Single individuals to conceive without a partner. -/- While this could redefine reproduction by making parenthood accessible to all, it also raises ethical questions about whether parenthood should be solely based on biological connection or expanded to include other forms of caregiving. -/- B. Cloning and Synthetic Biology -/- 1. Human Cloning -/- While human cloning is currently illegal in most countries, advances in genetic engineering may eventually make it possible. Cloning could: -/- Allow individuals to reproduce without a partner. -/- Be used for medical purposes, such as replacing lost children. -/- Raise existential concerns about individuality and identity. -/- However, human cloning raises profound ethical concerns, including human rights, consent, and the potential exploitation of cloned individuals for labor or military purposes. -/- 2. Synthetic Embryos & Artificial Life -/- Scientists are developing synthetic embryos without using sperm or eggs, which could: -/- Enable reproduction without biological parents. -/- Help infertile individuals conceive. -/- Lead to new ethical dilemmas regarding the moral status of artificially created life forms. -/- If synthetic embryos become a reality, society may need to redefine what it means to be “human” and whether artificial life forms deserve legal rights. -/- C. Population & Environmental Considerations -/- 1. Controlled Population Growth -/- As overpopulation threatens global resources, some governments may: -/- Regulate reproduction using artificial reproductive technologies. -/- Implement birth quotas to maintain ecological balance. -/- Encourage reproduction in aging societies facing workforce decline. -/- These policies would raise ethical questions about personal freedom versus societal needs. -/- 2. Reproduction in Space -/- If humans colonize planets like Mars, reproduction in space will require: -/- Artificial wombs to protect embryos from cosmic radiation. -/- Genetic modifications to help humans adapt to low gravity. -/- New family structures, as space-born humans may develop unique physical traits. -/- This could lead to divergent human evolution, with space-born individuals differing from Earth-born humans over generations. -/- 3. The Future of Family Structure -/- A. Non-Traditional Family Models -/- 1. Multi-Parent Families -/- Technologies like three-parent IVF already exist, and in the future, more than two people may be able to contribute genetic material to a child. This could: -/- Redefine legal parenthood. -/- Enable new forms of family structures. -/- Challenge traditional parenting norms. -/- Laws will need to adapt to recognize multi-parent families and their rights. -/- 2. Single-Parent by Choice -/- With advanced reproductive technologies, more individuals will choose to have children without a partner. This will: -/- Normalize single parenthood. -/- Reduce societal pressure to marry for reproductive purposes. -/- Create new legal structures for co-parenting agreements. -/- B. Changes in Marriage & Parenting Norms -/- 1. Declining Marriage Rates -/- With reproduction becoming independent of relationships, marriage may decline, as people prioritize: -/- Career advancement. -/- Personal fulfillment. -/- Alternative forms of companionship. -/- 2. Co-Parenting Arrangements -/- People may legally agree to co-parent a child without being romantically involved. This would: -/- Offer a stable upbringing without traditional marriage. -/- Encourage partnership-based parenting. -/- Reduce legal disputes over custody. -/- 3. Extended Family Networks -/- Due to economic pressures, multi-generational households may become more common, with grandparents playing a bigger role in raising children. -/- C. AI & Robotics in Parenting -/- 1. AI Parenting Assistants -/- AI-driven robots may assist in: -/- Childcare and education. -/- Emotional development and mentorship. -/- Reducing parental stress. -/- However, heavy reliance on AI could impact traditional parent-child bonding. -/- 2. AI-Generated Children (Digital Offspring) -/- In the future, some people may choose to raise AI-based virtual children in digital environments instead of having biological kids. These “children” could: -/- Simulate real human relationships. -/- Reduce the need for biological reproduction. -/- Raise ethical questions: If AI children learn and grow, are they “alive”? -/- 3. Key Ethical and Social Questions -/- As these technologies reshape reproduction and family life, several ethical concerns arise: -/- 1. Genetic Inequality: Will access to genetic enhancements create a class divide? -/- 2. State vs. Individual Rights: Should governments regulate reproduction? -/- 3. Redefining Parenthood: Who qualifies as a parent in multi-parent or AI-assisted families? -/- 4. Traditional vs. Technological Families: Will humans still value biological reproduction, or will artificial and digital life forms become part of the family? -/- Conclusion -/- The future of human reproduction and family structure will be radically transformed by scientific advancements, shifting social norms, and ethical dilemmas. While artificial wombs, gene editing, and AI parenting promise greater reproductive freedom and inclusivity, they also pose existential challenges about human identity, societal structures, and the ethics of life creation. As these technologies advance, societies must carefully navigate their implications to ensure that progress benefits all of humanity while safeguarding fundamental rights and values. -/- . (shrink)

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique (...) of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide. (shrink)

The spread of liberal individualism to the family is often portrayed as deeply inimical to the welfare of children and young people. In this view, the family is the bastion of the private and the antithesis of the contractual, rights-oriented model that underpins public life. This chapter examines that proposition critically.

This article focuses on the interrelationship of law and life in human rights. It does this in order to theorize the normative status of contemporary biopower. To do this, the case law of Article 2 on the right to life of the European Convention on Human Rights is analysed. It argues that the juridical interpretation and application of the right to life produces a differentiated governmental management of life. It is established that: 1) Article (...) 2 orients governmental techniques to lives in order to ensure that both deprivation and protection of lives is lawful; 2) A proper application of Article 2 grounds itself on a proper discrimination of lives which causes Article 2 to be applied universally but not uniformly to all juridical subjects; 3) The jurisprudence of Article 2 is theoretically appreciable only in a ‘politics of life’. Finally, the article ends with a plea to analyse other fundamental human rights in the context of ‘biopolitical governmentality’. (shrink)

One prominent argument in international law and religious thought for abolishing capital punishment is that it violates individuals’ right to life. Notably, this _right-to-life argument_ emerged from normative and legal frameworks that recognize deadly force against aggressors as justified when necessary to stop their unjust threat of grave harm. Can capital punishment be necessary in this sense—and thus justified defensive killing? If so, the right-to-life argument would have to admit certain exceptions where executions are justified. (...) Drawing on work by Hugo Bedau, I identify a thought experiment where executions are justified defensive killing but explain why they cannot be in our world. A state’s obligations to its prisoners include the _obligation to use nonlethal incapacitation_ (ONI), which applies as long as prisoners pose no imminent threat. ONI precludes executions for reasons of future dangerousness. By subjecting the right-to-life argument to closer scrutiny, this article ultimately places it on firmer ground. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the interrelationship of regulation and private life in human rights. It argues three main points. (1) Article 8 connects the question of protection of private lives and privacies with the question of their management. Thus, Article 8 orients regulatory practices to private lives and privacies. (2) Article 8’s holders are autonomous to the extent that laws respect their private lives and privacies. They are not autonomous in a ‘pre-political’ sense, where we might expect legal rules (...) to protect an already autonomous private life or privacy. (3) Article 8 does not simply prohibit or permit acts. In certain cases, it also ‘enables’ acts. Then, this essay introduces the idea of oikopolitics. This idea allows us to capture these three points in a useful manner. By this idea, this essay means the context (a) where the interpretation of privacy reaches out to broader social practices and norms and (b) where the status of rights-holders living their private lives makes them objects of attention. (shrink)

In this discussion note on Michal Pruski and Richard C. Playford’s “Artificial Wombs, Thomson and Abortion – What Might Change?,” I consider whether the prospect of ectogenesis technology would make abortion impermissible. I argue that a Thomson-style defense may not become inapplicable due to the right to life being conceived as a negative right. Further, if Thomson-style defenses do become inapplicable, those who claim that ectogenesis would be an obligatory alternative to abortion cannot do so without first (...) showing that fetuses have a right to life, something that Thomson assumed rather than argued for. I also include a discussion on ethical problems concerning what to do about children born from artificial wombs put there by those who looked to terminate their pregnancies because they sought to avoid parenthood. (shrink)

This article presents the problem of the family from the Christian perspective and its role in the postmodern society, but also the most serious problems affecting its functionality. As social form, the family is the environment of existence and training ordained by God for man. It has been instituted since the beginning of the creation of the first people, yet by Christ, by the Holy Mystery of Marriage, has been sanctified the union of love between a man and (...) a woman. As time has gone by, under the impulse of the fundamental freedoms and rights specific of man, recognized especially by the modern society, serious abnormalities have appeared, affecting the integrity of the family, such as: sexual immorality as plague of the matrimonial life, divorce, abortion, the so-called “families” of same-sex people. The contemporary man adheres without due consideration to all these, without taking into account their consequences. Certainly, the Christian Orthodox norms bring along with their application the remedy as well, namely life in Christ, which means full humanization. (shrink)

The elderly face very challenging situations due to their mental and physical conditions. Like the other country in the world, Bangladesh Government has enacted laws to protect the elderly rights. However, the law does not seem to represent what the elderly actually needs. Therefore, 385 elderly people, aged between 60 and 90 years were surveyed to understand their expectations from family, society, and government. There were 57.1% men and 42.9% women. Most of the elderly (80%) were educated. Just over (...) half (53.5%) had ordinary mental and physical health, while a quarter (31.4%) had good status. More than half (53%) of the participants required 2000–5000 BDTK (Bangladeshi Taka) equivalent to $20-50 to cover monthly treatment expenditures. The majority (67.3%) felt government Old Age Allowance should be increased to BDT 5,000 ($50). Of 13.8% of individuals experienced harsh discourse from family because of the cost of therapy. However, 16.9% of people choose not to respond to this question. More than half (57.4%) of the respondents’ thought caregivers were insufficient. One-third felt that legislation should be changed to take care of parents (33.5%) and One-third felt that children should take care of more (33.5%). Some (3.6%) thought that children should act as they did in their childhood respectively. Almost half (44.2%) of respondents did not know that the elderly should receive a separate senior citizen card for preferential treatment, yet 51.9% thought this. Some (44.7%) felt the elderly should get priority in any queue and discounts in Bus/Uber/Rickshaw. Results also showed that expectation is more than the service provided. Further, a one-stop elderly care clinic is required to provide integrated care and support for the quality of life of the elderly. (shrink)

Presupposing that our consideration of ethical issues can be enriched by examining literary works, this paper focuses on Marsha Norman's play ‘night, Mother. The play describes the last hour and a half in the life of Jessie, a young woman who decides to die by suicide. Before ending her life, Jessie explains to her mother her reasons for her suicide. In the context of the play, these are presented as quite weighty and as, perhaps, justifying her decision. Scholarly (...) research on the play has also treated Jessie's suicide favorably. In this paper I argue that Jessie, and people in similar conditions, are wrong to die by suicide. Among other points, I criticize Jessie's arguments from the impossibility to improve life; the assured termination of suffering; the badness of the world; and the right for suicide. I also criticize arguments in the scholarly literature that view Jessie's suicide favorably, such as the arguments from independence, heroism, authenticity, and emotional closeness. (shrink)

Several philosophers argue that individuals have an interest-protecting right to parent; specifically, the interest is in rearing children whom one can parent adequately. If such a right exists it can provide a solution to scepticism about duties of justice concerning distant future generations and bypass the challenge provided by the non-identity problem. Current children - whose identity is independent from environment-affecting decisions of current adults - will have, in due course, a right to parent. Adequate parenting requires (...) resources. We owe duties of justice to current children, including the satisfaction of their interest-protecting rights; therefore we owe them the conditions for rearing children adequately in the future. But to engage in permissible parenting they, too, will need sufficient resources to ensure their own children's future ability to bring up children under adequate conditions. Because this reasoning goes on ad infinitum it entails that each generation of adults owes its contemporary generation of children at least those resources that are necessary for sustaining human life indefinitely at an adequate level of wellbeing. (shrink)

An idea salient in the African and East Asian philosophical traditions is that the right sort of socio-political interaction would be similar to the intuitive ways that family members ought to relate to each other. Applying this perspective to economic and ecological inequalities, I articulate some principles implicit in healthy familial relationships, show what they entail for certain aspects of distributive justice at the national level, and contend that the implications are plausible relative to competing theories such as (...) utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, and the Capabilities Approach. Specifically, I maintain that reflection on familial norms suggests that an array of objective goods, particularly ones pertaining to relationality, the development of talents, and life, should be central to what the state distributes, an account that rivals subjective well-being, primary goods, or democratically chosen capabilities. When it comes to how much the state should ideally ensure each citizen has, reflection on familial norms supports a new, balancing approach, according to which all have a comparable share of resources needed for objective goodness, but more go to those with great ability or great disability, an approach that differs, and plausibly so, from maximizing, prioritizing the worst off, equalizing, or providing a sufficient minimum. (shrink)

In this short paper I will discuss the ambiguous and, even, controversial term ‘right to die’ in the context of the euthanasia debate and, in particular, in the case of passive euthanasia. First I will present the major objections towards the moral legitimacy of a right to die, most of which I also endorse myself; then I will investigate whether the right to die could acquire adequate moral justification in the case of passive euthanasia. In the light (...) of the Kantian tradition I will argue that since rights are understood as based upon duties, the right to die should also presuppose a corresponding duty, which to me could be either an imperfect, solidarity-related duty, or an autonomy-related one, at least as far as the unwanted prolongation of life is concerned. I will conclude with the view that the right to die could actually be considered a legitimate one in the case of passive euthanasia, when the application of life-supporting techniques is against the wishes and the best interests of the patient. (shrink)

Is the Right to the City (RTTC) still a useful framework for a transformative urban politics? Given recent scholarly criticism of its real-world applications and appropriations, in this paper, we argue that the transformative promise in the RTTC lies beyond its role as a framework for oppositional struggle, and in its normative ends. Building upon Henri Lefebvre's original writing on the subject, we develop a “radical-cooperative” conception of the RTTC. Such a view, which is grounded in the lived experiences (...) of the current city, envisions an urban society in which inhabitants can pursue their material and social needs through self-governed cooperation across social difference. Growing and diversifying spaces and sectors of urban life that are decoupled from global capitalism are, we argue, necessary to create space for this inclusionary politics. While grassroots action is essential to this process, so is multi-scalar support from the state. (shrink)

This chapter investigates older people’s needs in contemporary Ghana using the analyses of quantitative and qualitative data sets. The findings identified eight distinct patterns of needs, namely basic needs, care, and domestic help; sociability, emotional and affective support; information; counseling; spiritual needs, free bus rides, and rights. These needs highlight older adults’ social and personal requirements regarding daily living and healthcare in their desire to age with dignity. Their provision may avert problems related to population ageing, including old-age dependency. These (...) needs can be addressed through the following measures. First, the facilitation of the informational needs of older people is attainable through the introduction of initiation for adults and/or older people into the social structure and/or life course. Second, the provision of houses through the mediation of government on behalf of pension contributors, payable in installments. These may ensure appropriate adjustment to life in old age, albeit longevity. The life-sustaining needs of older people have existed since time immemorial. However, these needs are now taking a new dimension in the era of population ageing and increased life expectancy, economic hardships, and weakening extended family support system. We, therefore, argue that these require interventions at both the family and institutional or state levels or formal and informal levels, particularly needs satisfying programs and policies should be instituted by the government in addition to the existing ones. (shrink)

In this article I present a characterization of the right to mental integrity (RMI), expanding and refining the definition proposed by Ienca and Andorno’s (Life Science Society Policy 13 5, 2017) and clarifying how the scope of this right should be shaped in cases of cognitive extension (EXT). In doing so, I will first critically survey the different formulations of the RMI presented in the literature. I will then argue that the RMI protects from i) nonconsensual interferences (...) that ii) bypass reasoning and iii) produce mental harm. Contrary to other definitions proposed in the literature, my formulation disentangles the RMI from the right to cognitive liberty (RCL) (Lavazza in Frontiers Neuroscience 12 82, 2018), the right to mental privacy (RMP) (Lavazza and Giorgi in Neuroethics 16 (1): 1-13, 2023), and the right to psychological continuity (RPC) (Zohny et al. in Neuroethics 16: 20, 2023), thus enabling a fine-grained assessment of their simultaneous or individual violation. Finally, I analyse how the extended mind thesis (EXT) reshapes the scope of the RMI, proposing a layered protection of extended mental integrity, which grants stronger protection to the organism-bound cognitive system and self in case of manipulative influences of the mind-extending device. To conclude, I present a variety of neurorights violations and mental harms inflicted to organism-bound and cognitively extended agents. (shrink)

If Martin Heidegger was a philosopher who poetized, Wallace Stevens was a poet who philosophized. In "The Sail of Ulysses," one of his later poems, Stevens speaks enigmatically of a "right to be." The phrase is straightforward, if taken to indicate the right to life. But Stevens is rarely, if ever, straightforward. The poem is much more understandable if we take "being" in a Heideggerian sense, as an understanding of what it means to be.

Sometimes it is not us but those to whom we stand in special relations that face transformative choices: our friends, family, or beloved. A focus upon first-personal rational choice and agency has left crucial ethical questions regarding what we owe to those who face transformative choices largely unexplored. In this paper, I ask: under what conditions, if any, is it morally permissible to interfere with to try to prevent another from making a transformative choice? Some seemingly plausible answers to (...) this question fail precisely because they concern transformative experiences. I argue that we have a distinctive moral right to revelatory autonomy grounded in the value of autonomous self-making. If this right is outweighed then, I argue, interfering to prevent another making a transformative choice is permissible. This conditional answer lays the groundwork for a promising ethics of transformative experience. (shrink)

In this chapter, I describe my “post-diagnosis” experiences as the parent of an autistic child, those years in which I tried, but failed, to make sense of the overwhelming and often nonsensical information I received about autism. I argue that immediately after being given an autism diagnosis, parents are pressured into making what amounts to a life-long commitment to a therapy program that (they are told) will not only dramatically change their child, but their family’s financial situation and (...) even their entire mode of existence. Moreover, despite information overload, many treatment programs for autism rely on empty jargon and make completely unrealistic promises, so parents are left feeling overwhelmed and panicked. Even well respected therapy programs encourage parents to spend liberally. Indeed, autistic therapists, who help construct what I refer to as the Culture of Autism, advise parents to commit to a minimum of 35 to 45 hours of intensive therapy every week. The implications are clear: for a parent who works full-time, their autistic child becomes a second full-time job. Autism is big business right now, and therapists are pushing parents to the brink of desperation. So it is not too surprising that there is a desperate cry for a more permanent solution—which is why researchers seek to cure autism. But there are two ways to conceptualize cure. A Therapeutic Cure model (TC) conceives of a cure as a beneficial treatment for the patient that eliminates or ameliorates the harms of the disease or condition. But the notion of a therapeutic cure for autism is highly implausible, given the complexities of autism. Indeed, at this point, the vast majority of researchers have come to the conclusion that the idea of a therapeutic cure for autism is simply a non-starter. Therefore the bulk of research seeking a cure for autism focuses instead on a second approach, which I refer to as the Negative Eugenics Cure model (NEC). With this model, the intention is to eliminate the disease or condition without regard for the health or well-being of the organism carrying the disease or condition. So, with regard to autism, researchers are focusing on identifying genetic markers for autism that can be detected in utero, or in embryos, so that autistic fetuses can be eliminated and autism eradicated by preventing the existence of autistic individuals. I review both models and argue that both fail to provide convincing arguments that the “solution” either offers is desirable. Both rest on the assumption that autism renders a life not worth living which, all things considered, is false. Instead of pushing to cure autism, an idea pervasive in this Culture of Autism, I contend that autistics are individuals with lives worth living. Moreover, rather than expend millions on research to search for the means to eliminate autism, we should instead expend our resources to ensure autistic individuals have access to support they may need. If the phenomenology of autism were better understood and appreciated, the panicked demand for a cure for autism might abate and perhaps autism could be seen as having value in and of its own right. (shrink)

Many people believe that the abortion debate will end when at some point in the future it will be possible for fetuses to develop outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, would make possible to reconcile pro-life and pro-choice positions. That is because it is commonly believed that there is no right to the death of the fetus if it can be detached alive and gestated in an artificial womb. Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis defended (...) this position, by arguing against three common arguments for a right to the death of the fetus. I claim that their arguments are mistaken. I argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus because gestating a fetus in an artificial womb when genetic parents refuse it violates their rights not to become a biological parent, their rights to genetic privacy and their property rights. The right to the death of the fetus, however, is not a woman's right but genetic parents’ collective right which only can be used together. (shrink)

Under the UDHR, all persons have the right to "seek and to enjoy . . . asylum from persecution." From this designation as fundamental followed codification of the right in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating (collectively 'the Convention'), the "centrepiece" of treaties and customary norms that make up international refugee law. It defines and regulates the status and rights of refugees; its purpose is to safeguard the basic rights of (...) persons "outside their country of origin," who have fled due to a legitimate fear of persecution. Fundamentally, it guarantees that asylees and refugees enjoy rights without discrimination; without penalization for illegal territorial entry; and, without expulsion or return to "territories where . . . life or freedom would be threatened on account of . . . race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion," —or 'non-refoulement'. What follows is background on development of the principle of non-refoulement, evasive US Asylum Cooperative Agreements ('ACAs') and implementing legislation, and the resulting erosion to the right to asylum. (shrink)

Childhood looms large in our understanding of human life as it is a phase through which all adults have passed. Childhood is foundational to the development of selfhood, the formation of interests, values and skills and to the lifespan as a whole. Understanding what it is like to be a child, and what differences childhood makes, are essential for any broader understanding of the human condition. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is an outstanding reference (...) source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook is divided into five parts: ¿ Being a child ¿ Childhood and moral status ¿ Parents and children ¿ Children in society ¿ Children and the state. Questions covered include: What is a child? Is childhood a uniquely valuable state, and if so why? Can we generalize about the goods of childhood? What rights do children have, and are they different from adults¿ rights? What gives people a right to parent? What role, if any, ought biology to play in determining who has the right to parent a particular child? What kind of rights can parents legitimately exercise over their children? What roles do relationships with siblings and friends play in the shaping of childhoods? How should we think about sexuality and disabilility in childhood, and about racialised children? How should society manage the education of children, and what values should inform such practices? What is a good school? How are children¿s lives affected by being taken into social care? The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of childhood, political philosophy and ethics as well as those in related disciplines such as education, psychology, sociology, social policy, law, social work, youth work, neuroscience and anthropology. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s views regarding suicide are usually interpreted as a response to Christian, Kantian, and Schopenhauerian ethics. Here, they are defended on the basis of his notion of life as an aesthetic phenomenon in order to provide extramoral responses to such challenges as the following: a) whether the self can deliver the right kind of judgment regarding her life, b) how suicide can be considered an empowerment of the will, and c) whether suicide can be considered an exercise (...) of freedom by the subject who thereby cancels the very grounds and means for will and action. Reconstructed as a response to Hegel’s argument against suicide on the grounds that one is not the master of oneself and that one therefore lacks the proper means to judge one’s life, Nietzsche’s position provides the epistemic footing to ground an alternate notion of self-mastery as well as the necessary insight regarding one’s life. It is shown that this reading of Nietzsche’s argument is in alignment with his non-dualism and expressivist views regarding agency. Finally, a response is formulated to the socially-grounded arguments prohibiting suicide on the basis of this reading of Nietzsche’s position. (shrink)

Hegel’s interpretation of Sophocles’ play Antigone is central to an understanding of woman’s role in the Hegelian system. Hegel is fascinated by this play and uses it in both the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right to demonstrate that familial ethical life is woman’s unique responsibility. Antigone is revealed as the paradigmatic figure of womanhood and family life in both the pagan and modern worlds although there are fundamental differences between these two worlds for Hegel. In (...) order to situate the interpretation of this play within its wider context I shall begin with a brief outline of the pagan world described in the Phenomenology. I will then consider the interpretation of this play within the analysis of the modern world in the Philosophy of Right. Throughout, the focus will be on woman’s role in Hegel’s philosophy. (shrink)

Mental health is a global priority, and states and stakeholders are taking steps toward advancing a human right to mental health for all (APA, 2018). This is evidenced by international studies, initiatives, declarations, and domestic policy interventions. From a right-based perspective, mental health is not the mere absence of a psychiatric condition or psychosocial disability (WHO, 2022). It speaks of an environment in which individuals live a life of dignity. The application of human rights principles to mental (...) health allows us to incorporate novel ideas about the role of all stakeholders in fostering the security, freedom, justice, and dignity of individuals. With this point of view in mind, many states are revisiting their mental health laws and governance practices. (shrink)

A life without liberty and material resources is not a good life. Equally, a life devoid of meaningful social relationships—such as friendships, family attachments, and romances—is not a good life. From this it is tempting to conclude that just as individuals have rights to liberty and material resources, they also have rights to access meaningful social relationships. I argue that this conclusion can be defended only in a narrow set of cases. ‘Pure’ social relationship deprivation—that (...) is, deprivation that is not caused, or accompanied, by deficits in liberties and material resources— mostly generates demands of private beneficence. I suggest that social relationship deprivation is unjust, hence a rights violation, only when it is due to factors—such as one’s race—that are irrelevant to one’s being a good participant in social relationships. I thus conclude that access to meaningful social relationships is not a fundamental concern for theories of justice. (shrink)

Standard human means believing and accepting that there are hundreds of millions and even billions of standards in different religious, political, cultural, racial, individual, etc. fields in the world, and a "standard human" is a truthful and honest person who respects all of those standards; - This is why we call him a standard human, that is, he respects all the standards, and he himself is one of them too - those who do not respect are liars, false, and as (...) a result, 3rd grade ones! By becoming standard humans! All the differences made by some people throughout history in order to dominate others, including the superior race; superior religion and belief, or superior family and social class, etc.; return to creation settings (factory settings); and from now on, only 3 golden principles of humanity: truthfulness, honesty, and respect for all people from different races, cultures and religions... will be the criteria for determining the level of personality of individuals and groups...; "Being the boss" is over; "Being a standard human being and respecting each other" has begun! The importance of standard human thought, and its difference from other beliefs, is that: (Contrary to popular beliefs, which usually consider each other as negation or insignificant...) from a standard human point of view! Every human being on the planet, with every religion and belief, and with every level of understanding ... can be a "standard human being", and be considered equal to others (If Truthfulness, Being honest, & Respect everyone…). The difference between human beings in the real world ... is only in their right or wrong actions, and according to rational standard criteria (Truthfulness, Being honest, & Respect everyone…) and not race, religion, and so on. Beyond Democracy ... which respects all opinions; Standard human, in addition to equal respect, - thru its specific system - provides the conditions for the purification and growth of all beliefs and cultures!!! -/- . (shrink)

Arguments from human dignity feature prominently in the Lethal Autonomous Weapons moral feasibility debate, even though their exists considerable controversy over their role and soundness and the notion of dignity remains under-defined. Drawing on the work of Dieter Birnbacher, I fix the sub-discourse as referring to the essential value of human persons in general, and to postulated moral rights of combatants not covered within the existing paradigm of the International Humanitarian Law in particular. I then review and critique dignity-based arguments (...) against LAWS: argument from faulty targeting process, argument from objectification, argument from underappreciation of the value of human life and the argument from the absence of mercy. I conclude that the argument from the absence of mercy is the only dignity-based argument that is both valid and irreducible to another class of arguments within the debate, and that it offers insufficient justification for a global ban on LAWS. (shrink)

The Importance of Urban Planning and Strict Laws on Informal Settlements -/- Introduction -/- Urbanization is a global phenomenon, bringing both opportunities and challenges. Rapid population growth, especially in developing nations, has led to the rise of informal settlements or “squatter areas.” These settlements often lack proper infrastructure, sanitation, and legal recognition, creating social, economic, and environmental issues. Effective urban planning, combined with strict enforcement of land-use laws and inclusive housing policies, is essential to ensuring sustainable and livable cities. This (...) essay explores the importance of urban planning and strict laws against illegal settlements, using successful case studies from Singapore, Brazil, South Korea, the Philippines, and Ethiopia. -/- The Role of Urban Planning in Sustainable Cities -/- Urban planning is the process of designing and regulating the use of land to ensure the orderly development of cities. Proper urban planning provides essential services such as housing, transportation, sanitation, and green spaces, preventing the formation of illegal settlements. -/- Key Aspects of Effective Urban Planning -/- 1. Zoning Regulations – Defining areas for residential, commercial, and industrial use helps prevent uncontrolled development. -/- 2. Infrastructure Development – Roads, drainage, sewage systems, and utilities must be planned in advance to accommodate future growth. -/- 3. Disaster Risk Management – Cities must prevent settlements in flood-prone or hazardous areas to minimize risks to human life. -/- 4. Affordable Housing Programs – Governments should provide legal, affordable alternatives to illegal settlements. -/- Without proper urban planning, cities face overcrowding, pollution, poor sanitation, and increased crime rates. Case studies from different countries demonstrate the effectiveness of strong urban policies in addressing informal settlements. -/- Case Studies: Successful Urban Planning and Settlement Control -/- 1. Singapore: A Model for Integrated Public Housing -/- Singapore transformed from a city with severe housing shortages in the 1960s into one of the most well-planned urban environments in the world. The government’s Housing and Development Board (HDB) played a crucial role in developing affordable, high-quality public housing with integrated amenities such as schools, parks, and public transportation. -/- Key Strategies: ✔ Strict zoning laws prevented unregulated settlements. ✔ Homeownership was promoted through subsidized housing loans. ✔ Government-planned townships provided complete services. -/- Results: ✔ Over 80% of Singaporeans now live in well-planned public housing. ✔ Illegal settlements have been completely eliminated. -/- Singapore’s success demonstrates how strict land-use policies combined with affordable housing programs can prevent informal settlements. -/- 2. Brazil: Upgrading Informal Settlements Instead of Evictions -/- Rio de Janeiro faced a severe problem with favelas—informal settlements that grew due to rapid urban migration. Instead of mass evictions, the government launched the Favela-Bairro program (1994-2008), improving living conditions rather than displacing people. -/- Key Strategies: ✔ Infrastructure improvements (roads, sanitation, electricity). ✔ Community engagement ensured residents’ needs were met. ✔ Legal property rights were granted to residents. -/- Results: ✔ Over 250,000 residents benefited from improved housing conditions. ✔ Crime and poverty rates declined as favelas were integrated into the formal city. -/- Brazil’s approach shows that slum upgrading can be a viable alternative to forced eviction, improving both human welfare and urban order. -/- 3. South Korea: Urban Renewal in Seoul (Cheonggyecheon Project) -/- Seoul’s Cheonggyecheon River was once covered by illegal settlements and highways. The government removed the informal settlements, revitalizing the area into a public green space. -/- Key Strategies: ✔ Slum clearance and restoration of natural spaces. ✔ Improved public transport (bus rapid transit) reduced congestion. ✔ Business relocation incentives prevented economic disruption. -/- Results: ✔ 35% reduction in air pollution, making Seoul more livable. ✔ Increased property values and economic growth. -/- This case highlights how urban renewal projects can enhance sustainability, public health, and economic opportunities while addressing informal settlements. -/- 4. The Philippines: Housing and Resettlement Programs -/- Metro Manila faces a long-standing issue of informal settlers occupying flood-prone and government-owned areas. The Philippine government introduced various strategies, including in-city relocation, socialized housing, and land clearing operations. -/- Key Strategies: ✔ Balik Probinsya, Bagong Pag-asa (BP2) Program: Encouraged migration from overcrowded cities with financial aid. ✔ Vertical housing solutions: High-rise social housing projects maximized limited land. ✔ Land clearing operations: Removed settlements from hazardous areas. -/- Results: ✔ Some success in decongesting Metro Manila, but rapid urban migration remains a challenge. ✔ Affordable housing remains a priority for sustainable urban development. -/- The Philippines’ experience shows that a combination of enforcement and social programs is necessary to manage informal settlements effectively. -/- 5. Ethiopia: Large-Scale Public Housing (Addis Ababa’s Condominium Program) -/- Ethiopia faced a housing crisis, with 70% of Addis Ababa’s population living in informal settlements. The government launched a large-scale condominium housing program to address the issue. -/- Key Strategies: ✔ Government-built high-rise condominiums replaced slums. ✔ Low-interest loans made homeownership possible for low-income families. ✔ Priority was given to families displaced by urban renewal projects. -/- Results: ✔ Significant reduction in slums as many moved into formal housing. ✔ Homeownership increased, improving living conditions. -/- Ethiopia’s approach highlights how government-led mass housing projects can transform urban development. -/- Lessons from Successful Urban Planning -/- 1. Strict Land-Use Laws Prevent Slums from Forming ✔ Clearly defining residential, commercial, and public spaces prevents illegal occupation. -/- 2. Affordable Housing is Essential ✔ Governments must provide low-cost housing as a legal alternative to informal settlements. -/- 3. Upgrading Slums Can Be More Effective Than Evictions ✔ Programs like Favela-Bairro (Brazil) and Ethiopia’s condominium projects show that improving existing settlements works better than forced displacement. -/- 4. Technology Can Help Monitor and Prevent Illegal Settlements ✔ GIS mapping and AI tracking can detect unauthorized land occupation. ✔ E-governance systems can simplify property registration and land-use approvals. -/- 5. Community Engagement is Critical ✔ Urban planning must involve local residents to ensure sustainability and social acceptance. -/- 6. Economic and Livelihood Programs Reduce Informal Settlements ✔ Job creation, microfinance, and small business support help low-income families transition into formal housing. -/- Conclusion -/- Urban planning and strict laws against informal settlements are crucial for creating sustainable, safe, and prosperous cities. Case studies from Singapore, Brazil, South Korea, the Philippines, and Ethiopia demonstrate that a balanced approach—combining strict enforcement, affordable housing, and community-driven solutions—leads to long-term success. Governments worldwide must prioritize sustainable housing, infrastructure development, and urban regulations to ensure that growing populations are accommodated in a way that promotes both human dignity and urban order. -/- By learning from successful models and implementing proactive urban policies, cities can prevent slums, improve living conditions, and build a more sustainable future for all. -/- . (shrink)

The institution of the family and its importance have recently received considerable attention from political theorists. Leading views maintain that the institution’s justification is grounded, at least in part, in the non-instrumental value of the parent-child relationship itself. Such views face the challenge of identifying a specific good in the parent-child relationship that can account for how adults acquire parental rights over a particular child—as opposed to general parental rights, which need not warrant a claim to parent one’s biological (...) progeny. I develop a view that meets this challenge. This Project View identifies the pursuit of a parental project as a distinctive non-instrumentally valuable good that provides a justification for the family and whose pursuit is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of parental rights. This view grounds moral parenthood in a normative relation as opposed to a biological one, supports polyadic forms of parenting, and provides plausible guidance in cases of assisted reproduction. (shrink)

In this article, I explicate Kant’s position on the wide right to abortion. That is, I explore the extent to which, according to Kant’s practical philosophy, abortion is punishable, even if it involves an unjust infringement of the right to life. By focusing on the state’s right to punish, rather than the right to life or the onset of personhood, I use Kant to expose a novel range of issues and questions about the legal (...) status of abortion (and criminal punishment more generally). The article is divided into four sections. In the first, I lay the groundwork for Kant’s theory of rights and briefly canvass some of the literature on Kantian approaches to abortion. In the second, I look at Kant’s discussion of equivocal rights. In the third, I turn to Kant’s discussions of capital punishment and suicide. In the fourth, I examine Kant on honor killings, and I use his position on infanticide in order to extrapolate and explain his ideas about the right to punish in the context of abortion. (shrink)

Cases such as Vinter v United Kingdom (Vinter) and Hutchinson v United Kingdom (Hutchinson) discuss providing life-sentenced prisoners with hope for release. This has become known colloquially as “the right to hope.” But what does it mean to protect this right? The following paper argue that protecting “the right to hope” depends on a practical (as opposed to theoretical) avenue through which to be grated release. After Vinter the “right to life” was practically protected (...) by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) but post Hutchinson, protection has been significantly weakened. Specifically, the power of release granted to the Secretary of State by the “Lifer Manual” is too specific to provide protection for a “right to life.” This leads to the conclusion that as it stands under Hutchinson, the ECHR only protects “the right to life” theoretically. Ultimately, given the forthcoming definition of theoretical protection, under Hutchinson the ECHR does not protect a “right to hope” for life-sentenced prisoners. (shrink)

In the last six decades, work life and family life spheres of employees have undergone various changes. This paper presents an empirical study of major factors which have influenced employee work-life balance and popular work-life balance tools initiated at organisational level to help an employee balance different life segments such as work, family, personal finances, career and health. Current work-life balance approach, tools and programmes at organisational level primarily address those issues of (...) work and personal life which got highlighted between the 1950’s and later years of the 20th century. Current global recession in the 21st century has created an uncertain economic scenario in which employers and employees are facing new challenges and earlier work-life balance research might not be sufficient enough address the new issues. This calls for further research on work-life balance, for a wider applicability of work-life balance programmes at organisational level. (shrink)

A recent attitudinal change towards animals has led many people to recognize their family structures as multispecies families, that is, a family composed of human members and animals of other species, united by affective ties, and solidarity, in a horizontal relationship, and even where there is mutual recognition. This social phenomenon requires that the legal concept of family, which today more than ever accepts the plurality of family structures, also includes multispecies families. The protection of multispecies (...) families is necessary and possible if one considers that in Latin America today, a post-positivist legal system prevails that is aimed at protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. This legal system allows for a broad interpretation of rights such as the right to free development of personality and the right to family integrity, rights that already serve as foundational for the recognition and protection of multispecies families in Latin America. (shrink)

Many participants in debates about the morality of assisted dying maintain that individuals may only turn to assisted dying as a ‘last resort’, i.e., that a patient ought to be eligible for assisted dying only after she has exhausted certain treatment or care options. Here I argue that this last resort condition is unjustified, that it is in fact wrong to require patients to exhaust a prescribed slate of treatment or care options before being eligible for assisted dying. The last (...) resort condition effectively pits one right of patients, their right to refuse medical treatment or interventions, against another patient right acknowledged by advocates of assisted dying, the right to die. Drawing on an analogy with the legal notion of an unconstitutional condition, I argue that the last resort condition unjustly demands that an arguably more fundamental right—the right to refuse medical treatment or intervention—be foregone in order to acquire a less fundamental right—the right to die. I then address three rationales for the last resort condition and find that they subject individuals to arbitrarily stringent standards for exercising the right to die, standards to which those who seek to end their lives by voluntarily ending life-sustaining treatments are not subject. Subjecting those who seek assisted dying to the last resort condition therefore wrongfully infringes on their right to refuse medical treatment or interventions. (shrink)

Despite the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, assimilationist policies continue, whether official or effective. Such policies affect more than the right to group choice. The concern is whether indeed genocide or “only” ethnocide (or culturecide)—the elimination of a traditional culture—is at work. Discussions of the distinction between the two terms have been inconsistent enough that at least one commentator has declared that they cannot be used in analytical contexts. While these terms, I contend, have distinct (...) senses, yet in cases of governmental and other institutional assimilationist policy for indigenous peoples, such ethnocide effectively entails genocide. Insofar as any people’s cultural practices and beliefs are essential for life and health, individuals in groups value, if tacitly, their culture as highly as their language or any artifact: Thus, attempts to eradicate a culture through assimilation in fact eradicate individuals’ lives and health and so are effectively murderous. Acknowledgement by worldwide organizations that assimilationist ethnocide is effectively genocide should affect policy concerning indigenous peoples and thus has significance for international law. (shrink)

This article examines how facial recognition technology reshapes the philosophical debate over the ethics of video surveillance. When video surveillance is augmented with facial recognition, the data collected is no longer anonymous, and the data can be aggregated to produce detailed psychological profiles. I argue that – as this non-anonymous data of people’s mundane activities is collected – unjust risks of harm are imposed upon individuals. In addition, this technology can be used to catalogue all who publicly participate in political, (...) religious, and socially stigmatised activities, and I argue that this would undermine central interests of liberal democracies. I examine the degree to which the interests of individuals and the societal interests of liberal democracies to maintain people’s obscurity while in public coincide with privacy interests, as popularly understood, and conclude that there is a practical need to articulate a novel right to obscurity to protect the interests of liberal democratic societies. (shrink)

The article presents a theory of the basis and nature of parents’ rights that appeals to the goods distinctively produced by intimate-but-authoritative relationships between adults and the children they parent. It explores the implications of that theory for questions about parents’ rights to raise their children as members of a religion, with particular attention to the issue of religious schooling. Even if not obstructing the development of their children’s capacity for autonomy, parents exceed the bounds of their legitimate authority in (...) so far as they aim deliberately to influence their children’s religious views. Healthy familial relationships involve some identification of child with parent and require a sphere of spontaneous interaction between parent and child that are in any case likely to influence those views and constitute a standing threat to autonomy. Correcting over-deferential understandings of parents’ rights enables schools better to promote not only children’s autonomy but also other legitimate civic goals. (shrink)

The child’s right to an open future aims at protecting the autonomy of the mature person into which a child will normally develop. The justification of state interventions into parental decisions which unduly restrict the options of the prospective adult has to address the problem that the value of autonomy is highly contested in modern pluralist societies. The article argues that the modern majority culture provides young adults with many more options than traditionalist religious communities. However, the options that (...) can be chosen in faith groups, such as the Amish, do not constitute a subset of the options available in the wider society. Therefore, state policies which pursue the goal of providing every child with the greatest possible set of options cannot be based on a neutralist version of political liberalism. The advocates of a child’s right to an open future must rely on a perfectionist version of liberalism which draws on the ideal of leading an autonomous life. Since liberal perfectionism has problematic implications, the article defends a neutralist position that largely refrains from state interference with the educational authority of fundamentalist religious communities. (shrink)

What grounds human rights? How do we determine that something is a genuine human right? This chapter offers a new answer: human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. The fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life are certain goods, capacities, and options that human beings qua human beings need whatever else they qua individuals might need in order to pursue a characteristically good human life. This chapter explains how this (...) Fundamental Conditions Approach is better than James Griffin’s Agency Approach as well as Martha Nussbaum’s Central Capabilities Approach. It also shows how it can be compatible with the increasingly popular Political Conceptions of human rights defended by John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. (shrink)