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  1. added 2018-09-17
    Are Emotions Psychological Constructions?Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Philosophy of Science.
    According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015, Russell 2004). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not (...)
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  2. added 2017-10-24
    Modeling Semantic Emotion Space Using a 3D Hypercube-Projection: An Innovative Analytical Approach for the Psychology of Emotions.Radek Trnka, Alek Lačev, Karel Balcar, Martin Kuška & Peter Tavel - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    The widely accepted two-dimensional circumplex model of emotions posits that most instances of human emotional experience can be understood within the two general dimensions of valence and activation. Currently, this model is facing some criticism, because complex emotions in particular are hard to define within only these two general dimensions. The present theory-driven study introduces an innovative analytical approach working in a way other than the conventional, two-dimensional paradigm. The main goal was to map and project semantic emotion space in (...)
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  3. added 2016-12-08
    Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions.Kelly D. Sorensen - 2002 - Kantian Review 6:109-128.
    If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant (...)
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  4. added 2016-06-26
    On the Definition of Jealousy and Other Emotions in Anarchy, State and Utopia.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2017 - Philosophical Pathways (209):1-3.
    This paper responds to an ingenious footnote from Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State and Utopia. Using a table of four possible situations, Nozick defines what it is to be jealous, envious, begrudging, spiteful and competitive. I deny a claim that Nozick makes for his table, a claim needed for these definitions. I also point out that Nozick fails to capture what he has in mind by jealousy.
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  5. added 2015-04-28
    The Difference Between Emotion and Affect.Tom Cochrane - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    In this brief comment on a target article by Koelsch et al., I argue that emotions are more sensitive to context than other affective states.
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  6. added 2014-03-28
    Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
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  7. added 2014-03-06
    Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account.Alexandra Zinck & Albert Newen - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):1 - 25.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...)
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  8. added 2013-12-21
    Review of Elena Pulcini, Invidia. La passione triste. [REVIEW]Marco Solinas - 2012 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica (65):200-201.
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