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  1. Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice.Martina Fürst - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1): 1-22..
    Miranda Fricker’s insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I (...)
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  2. Blindsight Is Unconscious Perception.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2023 - In Michal Polák, Tomáš Marvan & Juraj Hvorecký (eds.), Conscious and Unconscious Mentality: Examining Their Nature, Similarities and Differences. Routledge. pp. 31–54.
    The question of whether blindsight is a form of unconscious perception continues to spark fierce debate in philosophy and psychology. One side of the debate holds that while the visual information categorized in blindsight is not access-conscious, it is nonetheless a form of perception, albeit a form of unconscious perception. The opposition, by contrast, holds that blindsight is just a form of degraded conscious perception that makes the categorized information harder to access because it is degraded. In this chapter, we (...)
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  3. Attenuated Representationalism. [REVIEW]Angela Mendelovici - 2023 - Analysis 83 (2):373–393.
    In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for rejecting representationalism. This paper overviews these reasons, arguing that while some of his arguments against some versions of representationalism succeed, there are versions of phenomenal intentionalism that escape his criticisms. Still, once we consider some of the contents of perceptual experiences, such as their perspectival contents, it is clear that perceptual experience does not present us with the world as we take it to be. This leads to (...)
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  4. Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Michelle Liu - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    It is often said that there is no appearance/reality distinction with respect to consciousness. Call this claim ‘NARD’. In contemporary discussions, NARD is closely connected to the thesis of revelation, the claim that the essences of phenomenal properties are revealed in experience, though the connection between the two requires clarification. This paper distinguishes different versions of NARD and homes in on a particular version that is closely connected to revelation. It shows how revelation and the related version of NARD pose (...)
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  5. Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion.Daniel Shabasson - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):427-453.
    According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject (...)
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  6. A Plastic Temporal Code for Conscious State Generation.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2009 - Neural Plasticity 2009 (482696):1-15..
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model (...)
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  7. Consciousness beyond neural fields: Expanding the possibilities of what has not yet happened.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:762349.
    In the field theories in physics, any particular region of the presumed space-time continuum and all interactions between elementary objects therein can be objectively measured and/or accounted for mathematically. Since this does not apply to any of thefield theories, or any other neural theory, of consciousness, their explanatory power is limited. As discussed in detail herein, the matter is complicated further by the facts than any scientifically operational definition of consciousness is inevitably partial, and that the phenomenon has no spatial (...)
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  8. A pluralistic account of degrees of control in addiction.Federico Burdman - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):197-221.
    While some form of loss of control is often assumed to be a common feature of the diverse manifestations of addiction, it is far from clear how loss of control should be understood. In this paper, I put forward a concept of decrease in control in addiction that aims to fill this gap and thus provide a general framework for thinking about addictive behavior. The development of this account involves two main steps. First, I present a view of degrees of (...)
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  9. The Indeterminacy of Plant Consciousness.Chauncey Maher - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):136-154.
    Are plants conscious? Most knowledgeable people say they aren't. A small minority say they are. Others say we don't know. Virtually all assume the predicate '– is conscious' is fully determinate; plants are or aren't in its extension. Appealing to Mark Wilson's work on predicates and concepts, I challenge that assumption, proposing that the predicate isn't determinate for plants. I offer the start of an explanation for why this is so. We tacitly rely on many empirical correlations when we correctly (...)
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  10. The "Ten-Percent Brain Myth" guided with the Fundamentals of Jaina's Theory of Knowledge.Megha Arora - 2020 - International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation 24 (08):5977-5982.
    Great religions to pragmatic capacities sporadically abound in the stories of supernatural phenomena which subsumes telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition. However, unfortunately treated as the topics of spiritualism, witchcraft and edification, not the materials of Scientific Enquiry. Whatsoever, have been deciphered about these queer speculations, the most prevalent sole concept is : namely, that there can be senseexperiences from the realm which is not accessible to human brain and sense organs. Possessor of these senses which are not currently accessible to average (...)
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  11. A Key Hidden in Plain View.Nir Aides - manuscript
    Philosophers have been contemplating the nature of the mind for centuries and have produced mountains of intricate jargon, thought experiments, and views, that map a landscape of interminable disputes. One such dispute is between philosophers who believe that the mind can be explained as a mechanism and philosophers who insist it cannot. In this paper I take a look at this dispute and argue that it is unique in philosophy and a key to the nature of the mind.
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  12. Inner privacy of conscious experiences and quantum information.Danko D. Georgiev - 2020 - Biosystems 187:104051.
    The human mind is constituted by inner, subjective, private, first-person conscious experiences that cannot be measured with physical devices or observed from an external, objective, public, third-person perspective. The qualitative, phenomenal nature of conscious experiences also cannot be communicated to others in the form of a message composed of classical bits of information. Because in a classical world everything physical is observable and communicable, it is a daunting task to explain how an empirically unobservable, incommunicable consciousness could have any physical (...)
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  13. The Mystic and the Metaphysician: Clarifying the Role of Meditation in the Search for Ultimate Reality.M. Albahari - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (7-8):12-36.
    To seek fundamental truths, analytic metaphysicians generally start with observed phenomena. From here they typically move outwards, using discursive thought to posit scientifically informed theories about the ultimate reality behind appearances. Mystics, too, seek to uncover the reality behind appearances. However, their meditative methods typically start with experience and go inwards to a fundamental reality sometimes described as a pure conscious unity. Analytic metaphysicians may be tempted to dismiss the mystical approach as unworthy of investigation. In this paper I will (...)
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  14. The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
    I can be aware of myself, and thereby come to know things about myself, in a variety of different ways. But is there some special way in which I—and only I—can learn about myself? Can I become aware of myself by introspecting? Do I somehow show up in my own conscious experiences? David Hume and most contemporary philosophers say no. They deny that the self shows up in experience. However, in this paper I appeal to research on schizophrenia—on thought insertion, (...)
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  15. Are There Degreess of Self-Consciousness?R. Milliere - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):252-282.
    It is widely assumed that ordinary conscious experience involves some form of sense of self or consciousness of oneself. Moreover, this claim is often restricted to a 'thin' or 'minimal' notion of self-consciousness, or even 'the simplest form of self-consciousness', as opposed to more sophisticated forms of self-consciousness which are not deemed ubiquitous in ordinary experience. These formulations suggest that self-consciousness comes in degrees, and that individual subjects may differ with respect to the degree of self-consciousness they exhibit at a (...)
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Consciousness of Action
  1. Trying without fail.Ben Holguín & Harvey Lederman - manuscript
    An action is agentially perfect if and only if, if a person tries to perform it, they succeed, and, if a person performs it, they try to. We argue that trying itself is agentially perfect: if a person tries to try to do something, they try to do it; and, if a person tries to do something, they try to try to do it. We show how this claim sheds new light on the logical structure of intentional action, on the (...)
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  2. Unconscious Intelligence in the Skilled Control of Expert Action.Spencer Ivy - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (3):59-83.
    What occurs in the mind of an expert who is performing at their very best? In this paper, I survey the history of debate concerning this question. I suggest that expertise is neither solely a mastery of the automatic nor solely a mastery of intelligence in skilled action control. Experts are also capable of performing automatic actions intelligently. Following this, I argue that unconscious-thought theory (UTT) is a powerful tool in coming to understand the role of executive, intelligent action control (...)
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  3. Inferential Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    There is a felt difference between following an argument to its conclusion and keeping up with an argument in your judgments while failing to see how its conclusion follows from its premises. In the first case there’s what I’m calling an inferential seeming, in the second case there isn’t. Inferential seemings exhibit a cluster of functional and normative characteristics whose integration in one mental state is puzzling. Several recent accounts of inferring suggest inferential seemings play a significant role in the (...)
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  4. Dal corpo oggetto alla mente incarnata - From the object body to the embodied mind.Francesca Brencio - 2021 - InCircolo – Rivista di Filosofia E Culture 11.
    F. Brencio (2021) [in Italian and English] (ed.), Dal corpo oggetto alla mente incarnata - From the object body to the embodied mind, in “InCircolo – Rivista di Filosofia e Culture”, 11, ISSN 2531-4092.
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  5. A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.Chiara Brozzo - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):683-697.
    Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of (...)
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  6. Eine Rezension von "Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert" (Philosophy in a New Century) von John Searle (2008) (Überprüfung überarbeitet 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden: Babys, Klimawandel, Bitcoin, Kartelle, China, Demokratie, Vielfalt, Dysgenie, Gleichheit, Hacker, Menschenrechte, Islam, Liberalismus, Wohlstand, Internet, Chaos, Hunger, Krankheit, Gewalt, Künstliche Intelligenz, Krieg. Reality Press. pp. 33-52.
    Bevor ich das Buch kommentiere, möchte ich Kommentare zu Wittgenstein und Searle und der logischen Struktur der Rationalität abgeben. Die Essays hier sind meistens bereits während des letzten Jahrzehnts veröffentlicht (obwohl einige aktualisiert wurden), zusammen mit einem unveröffentlichten Artikel, und nichts hier wird für diejenigen, die mit seiner Arbeit mithalten können, nicht überraschen. Wie W gilt er als der beste Standup-Philosoph seiner Zeit und sein schriftliches Werk ist solide als Fels und bahnbrechender durchweg. SeinVersäumnis, das spätere W so ernst zu (...)
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  7. Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1205-1225.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical knowledge characteristic (...)
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  8. Review of Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. By Neil Levy. [REVIEW]Lantz Fleming Miller - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12):201-206.
    One purpose for the field of consciousness studies may be to increase general understanding about consciousness and its place in human life, thereby possibly aiding us in living in better harmony within our societies and with our fellow humans. Neil Levy’s new work is a candidate for this latter purpose for the field. Consciousness studies may help us better understand how we function as conscious agents—or what role consciousness plays in our agency—and aid in our more just construction of laws, (...)
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  9. The Logical Structure of Consciousness.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press.
    It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, consciousness, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated (...)
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  10. Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 5th Edition.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    e first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...)
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  11. Self‐awareness and self‐understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
    In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s (...)
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  12. Introduction: Toward a Theory of Attention that Includes Effortless Attention.Brian Bruya - 2010 - In Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    In this Introduction, I identify seven discrete aspects of attention brought to the fore by by considering the phenomenon of effortless attention: effort, decision-making, action syntax, agency, automaticity, expertise, and mental training. For each, I provide an overview of recent research, identify challenges to or gaps in current attention theory with respect to it, consider how attention theory can be advanced by including current research, and explain how relevant chapters of this volume offer such advances.
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  13. La Mettrie's Objection: Humans Act like Animals.Gary Comstock - 2016 - In Mylan Engel & Gary Lynn Comstock (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals. Lanham, MD: Lexington. pp. 175-198.
    A common view of nonhuman animals is that they lack rights because they lack conscious control over themselves. Two thoughts put pressure on this view. First, we recognize the rights of radically cognitively limited humans even though they lack conscious control over themselves. So it would seem mere prejudice to deny rights to nonhuman mammals on the grounds that animals lack autonomy. Tom Regan has been the most eloquent, powerful, and resolute defender of this thought. Second, evidence is growing that (...)
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  14. The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):422-448.
    I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she (...)
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  15. What Is Self-Consciousness?Bruya Brian - 2012 - In Labirinti della mente: Visioni del mondo. Siena, Italy: Società bibliografica toscana. pp. 223-233.
    In this article, I delineate seven aspects of the process of self-consciousness in order to demonstrate that when any of the aspects is compromised, self-consciousness goes away while consciousness persists. I then suggest that the psychological phenomenon of flow is characterized by a loss of self-consciousness. The seven aspects are: 1) implicit awareness that the person and the self are identical; 2) awareness of an event or circumstance in the world internal or external to the person; 3) awareness that this (...)
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  16. Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):264-272.
    : I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property. I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component (...)
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  17. Precis of The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):240-246.
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  18. Agentive phenomenology.Myrto Mylopoulos & Joshua Shepherd - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical (...)
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  19. The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window onto Agentive Self-Awareness.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...)
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  20. Conscious Control over Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):320-344.
    The extensive involvement of nonconscious processes in human behaviour has led some to suggest that consciousness is much less important for the control of action than we might think. In this article I push against this trend, developing an understanding of conscious control that is sensitive to our best models of overt action control. Further, I assess the cogency of various zombie challenges—challenges that seek to demote the importance of conscious control for human agency. I argue that though nonconscious contributions (...)
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  21. The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Kourken Michaelian - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):349-351.
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  22. Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: the (...)
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  23. Is agentive experience compatible with determinism?Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.
    Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids these (...)
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  24. Conscious Action/Zombie Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):419-444.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying . I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience (...)
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  25. Improvisational Artistry in Live Dance Performance as Embodied and Extended Agency.Aili Bresnahan - 2014 - Dance Research Journal 46 (1):84-94.
    This paper provides an account of improvisational artistry in live dance performance that construes the contribution of the dance performer as a kind of agency. Andy Clark’s theory of the embodied and extended mind is used in order to consider how this account is supported by research on how a thinking-while-doing person navigates the world. I claim here that while a dance performer’s improvisational artistry does include embodied and extended features that occur outside of the brain and nervous system that (...)
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  26. Forward models.D. M. Wolpert & J. R. Flanagan - 2009 - In Bayne Tim, Cleeremans Axel & Wilken Patrick (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 294--296.
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  27. Understanding conative phenomenology: lessons from Ricœur.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):537-557.
    I discuss Ricoeur's intriguing account of the phenomenology of the will, which focuses on deciding rather than desiring as the experientially paradigmatic exercise of the will.
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  28. Embodied Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu.Christopher Mole - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):231-239.
    Although Wayne Wu correctly identifies a flaw in the way in which my 2009 article frames the debate about ‘zombie action’, he fails in his attempts to strengthen the case for thinking that our actions are under less conscious control than we usually imagine. His argument, like the arguments that my earlier paper addressed, can be blocked by allowing that an embodied demonstrative concept can contribute contents to a visual experience.
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  29. The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
    Recent work in cognitive science suggests that conscious thought plays a much less central role in the production of human behavior than most think. Partially on the basis of this work, Peter Carruthers has advanced the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. This claim is of independent interest for action theory, and its potential truth poses a problem for theories of free will and autonomy, which often take our capacity to consciously decide to be of central importance. In (...)
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  30. The Sense of Agency and the Naturalization of the Mental.Costas Pagondiotis & Spyros Petrounakos - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:139-143.
    In this paper we examine whether the sense of agency represents an obstacle to the project of naturalizing the mental. On the basis of a thought experiment we suggest that the sense of agency is not an epiphenomenon. We also examine Frith's attempt to explain in functionalist terms the sense of agency through the comparator and metarepresentational mechanisms. Through a variety of arguments we try to show that explanation by recourse to these mechanisms is inadequate. We conclude by suggesting that (...)
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  31. Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and (...)
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  32. Space and Self-Awareness.John Louis Schwenkler - 2009 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    How should we think about the role of visual spatial awareness in perception and perceptual knowledge? A common view, which finds a characteristic expression in Kant but has an intellectual heritage reaching back farther than that, is that an account of spatial awareness is fundamental to a theory of experience because spatiality is the defining characteristic of “outer sense”, of our perceptual awareness of how things are in the parts of the world that surround us. A natural counterpart to this (...)
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  33. Perception and Practical Knowledge.John Schwenkler - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
    According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge (...)
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  34. Attention as Selection for Action.Wayne Wu - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 97--116.
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  35. An experiential account of creativity.Bence Nanay - 2014 - In Elliot Samuel Paul & Scott Barry Kaufman (eds.), The Philosophy of Creativity. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The aim of the paper is to argue that the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes is not a functional/computational, but an experiential one. In other words, what is distinctive about creative mental processes is not the functional/computational mechanism that leads to the emergence of a creative idea, be it the recombination of old ideas or the transformation of one’s conceptual space, but the way in which this mental process is experienced. The explanatory power of the functional/computational theories and (...)
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