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  1. The Politics of Envy: Outlaw Emotions in Capitalist Societies.Alfred Archer, Alan Thomas & Bart Engelen - forthcoming - In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy. Rowman and Littlefield.
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  2. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Value of Envy.Jens Lange & Sara Protasi - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    The public and scholars alike largely consider envy to be reprehensible. This judgment of the value of envy commonly results either from a limited understanding of the nature of envy or from a limited understanding of how to determine the value of phenomena. Overcoming this state requires an interdisciplinary collaboration of psychologists and philosophers. That is, broad empirical evidence regarding the nature of envy generated in psychological studies must inform judgments about the value of envy according to sophisticated philosophical standards. (...)
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  3. Warding Off the Evil Eye: Peer Envy in Rawls's Just Society.James S. Pearson - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    This article critically analyzes Rawls’s attitude towards envy. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is predominantly concerned with the threat that class envy – or what he calls general envy – poses to political stability. By contrast, he does not think that particular envy – the type of envy that arises between peers competing for the same objects – would be in any way problematic for his ideal political society. I contest this claim by pointing to the politically deleterious effects (...)
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  4. The Things We Envy: Fitting Envy and Human Goodness.Sara Protasi - forthcoming - In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that fitting envy plays a special role in safeguarding our happiness and flourishing. After presenting my theory of envy and its fittingness conditions, I contrast Kant’s view that envy is always unfitting with D’Arms and Jacobson’s defense of fitting envy as an evolutionarily-shaped response to a deep and wide human concern, that is, relative positioning. However, D’Arms and Jacobson don’t go far enough. First, I expand on their analysis of positional goodness, distinguishing between an epistemic claim, according to (...)
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  5. Envy as a Civic Emotion.Sara Protasi - forthcoming - In Thom Brooks (ed.), Political Emotions: Towards a Decent Public Sphere. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls discusses “the problem of envy”, namely the worry that the well-ordered society could be destabilized by envy. Martha Nussbaum has proposed, in Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, that love, in particular what she calls civic friendship, is the solution to this problem. Nussbaum’s suggestion is in accordance with the long-standing notion that love and envy are incompatible opposites, and that the virtue of love is an antidote to the vice of envy. (...)
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  6. "You're Just Jealous!": On Envious Blame.Neal Tognazzini - forthcoming - In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy.
    One common reaction to criticism is to try to deflect it by calling into question the motivations of the person doing the criticizing. For example, if I feel like you are blaming me for something that you yourself are guilty of having done in the past, I might respond with the retort, "Who are you to blame me for this?", where this retort is meant to serve not as an excuse but rather as a challenge to the standing of the (...)
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  7. Malicious Moral Envy.Vanessa Carbonell - 2022 - In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy. Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 129-146.
    Malicious moral envy is an aversive reaction to a rival’s moral properties or accomplishments, accompanied by a tendency to level-down the target by morally tarnishing or sabotaging them. In this essay I give an account of malicious moral envy, showing how it is a sub-type of envy more generally. I describe Donald Trump’s behaviors toward Barack Obama and Anthony Fauci as a case study of malicious moral envy. I argue that malicious moral envy is puzzling, first because it is self-defeating, (...)
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  8. “I Could Have Been You”: Existential Envy and the Self.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2022 - In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 77-92.
    This paper explores “existential envy” as a kind of envy in which the subject targets the rival’s entire being rather than one of her possessions, achievements or talents. It argues that existential envy is characterized by a weakening of the distinction between good and rival and by a strong focus on the envious self. In existential envy, the subject becomes aware that another person is closer to her ideal self than she is, such that the rival painfully reminds her of (...)
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  9. Envy's Non-Innocent Victims.Iskra Fileva - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):1-22.
    Envy has often been seen as a vice and the envied as its victims. I suggest that this plausible view has an important limitation: the envied sometimes actively try to provoke envy. They may, thus, be non-innocent victims. Having argued for this thesis, I draw some practical implications.
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  10. Happy Self-Surrender and Unhappy Self-Assertion: A Comparison Between Admiration and Emulative Envy.Sara Protasi - 2019 - In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. New York: Rowman & Little International. pp. 45-60.
    In this chapter, I argue that a certain kind of envy is not only morally permissible, but also, sometimes, more fitting and productive than admiration. Envy and admiration are part of our emotional palette, our toolbox of evolutionary adaptations, and they play complementary roles. I start by introducing my original taxonomy of envy, which allows me to present emulative envy, a species of envy sometimes confused with admiration. After reviewing how the two emotions differ from a psychological perspective, I focus (...)
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  11. Narrative Fiction as Philosophical Exploration: A Case Study on Self-Envy and Akrasia.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2019 - In Falk Bornmüller, Johannes Franzen & Mathis Lessau (eds.), Literature as Thought Experiment. Wilhelm Fink.
    This paper explores one of Unamuno's most challeng-ing short stories: Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (1918). In this text, Unamuno deals with an experience for which he coins the expression ›self-envy‹. Is ›self-envy‹ conceptually sound? Or is it an unsuitable phrase for an emotional state that has nothing to do with envy? The paper proceeds in three steps in order to answer these questions. After presenting Unamuno’s Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (section 1), the following section considers the notion of self-envy, which I interpret as a (...)
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  12. Jalousie.Frédéric Minner - 2018 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    On conçoit souvent la jalousie comme une émotion ayant pour objet les relations de proximité (amour, amitié, fratrie, etc.). Elle a généralement mauvaise presse et est typiquement envisagée comme une émotion moralement condamnable, voire comme un vice. Or, la jalousie ne porte pas uniquement sur les relations de proximité : elle peut également porter sur divers biens (prestige, richesses, biens matériels, privilèges, etc.). Par ailleurs, certains auteurs soutiennent que des cas de jalousie pourraient être moralement justifiés, voire que la jalousie (...)
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  13. Invideo Et Amo: On Envying the Beloved.Sara Protasi - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1765-1784.
    Can we love and envy the same person at the same time? There is an overwhelming, cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary, consensus that love and envy are deeply incompatible. In this paper, I challenge this consensus, and focus in particular on the normative thesis that true love should be void of envy proper. I first propose an indirect argument. Because love and envy thrive in the same psychological conditions, it is not unlikely to feel envy toward the beloved. If we want ideals (...)
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  14. ‘I'm Not Envious, I'm Just Jealous!’: On the Difference Between Envy and Jealousy.Sara Protasi - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):316-333.
    I argue for the view that envy and jealousy are distinct emotions, whose crucial difference is that envy involves a perception of lack while jealousy involves a perception of loss. I start by noting the common practice of using ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ almost interchangeably, and I contrast it with the empirical evidence that shows that envy and jealousy are distinct, albeit similar and often co-occurring, emotions. I then argue in favor of a specific way of understanding their distinction: the view (...)
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  15. Phenomenological Distinctions: Two Types of Envy and Their Difference From Covetousness.Michael R. Kelly - 2016 - In J. Aaron Simmons & J. Edward Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the Twenty-first Century. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  16. Varieties of Envy.Sara Protasi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):535-549.
    In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The (...)
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  17. The Object and Affects of Envy and Emulation.Michael R. Kelly - 2015 - Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 14 (2):386-401.
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  18. The Moral Value of Envy.Krista K. Thomason - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.
    It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy (...)
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  19. Envy and Its Discontents.Timothy Perrine & Kevin Timpe - 2014 - In Kevin Timpe & Craig Boyd (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-244.
    Envy is, roughly, the disposition to desire that another lose a perceived good so that one can, by comparison, feel better about one’s self. The divisiveness of envy follows not just from one’s willing against the good of the other, but also from the other vices that spring from it. It is for this second reason that envy is a capital vice. This chapter begins by arguing for a definition of envy similar to that given by Aquinas and then considers (...)
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  20. Envy and Self-Worth: Amending Aquinas’s Definition of Envy.Timothy Perrine - 2011 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):433-446.
    In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers an adept account of the vice of envy. Despite the virtues of his account, he nevertheless fails to provide an adequatedefinition of the vice. Instead, he offers two different definitions each of which fails to identify what is common to all cases of envy. Here I supplement Aquinas’saccount by providing what I take to be common to all cases of envy. I argue that what is common is a “perception of inferiority”—when a person perceives (...)
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