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  1. added 2020-01-21
    The Unity of Cognition and the Subjectivist Vs. 'Transformative' Approaches to the B-Deduction, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79).Dennis Schulting - manuscript
    In this article, I discuss one of the most important essays on Kant's Transcendental Deduction recently published, by James Conant, addressing important themes such as the unity of cognition, the guiding thread passage in the Metaphysical Deduction, the two-step procedure of the Transcendental Deduction, the precise nature of a priori synthesis, and the role of transcendental apperception.
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  2. added 2019-11-15
    Kant’s Conception of Analytic Judgment.Ian Proops - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):588–612.
    In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of “containment,” a second time in terms of “identity,” a third time in terms of the explicative–ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of “cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction.” The paper asks: Which of these characterizations—or apparent characterizations—best captures Kant’s conception of analyticity in the first Critique? It suggests: “the second.” It argues, further, that (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-16
    Noumenal Ignorance: Why, For Kant, Can't We Know Things in Themselves?Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval & Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Companion to Kant. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 91-116.
    In this paper we look at a few of the most prominent ways of articulating Kant’s critical argument for Noumenal Ignorance — i.e., the claim that we cannot cognize or have knowledge of any substantive, synthetic truths about things-in-themselves — and then provide two different accounts of our own.
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  4. added 2019-03-23
    Conhecimento racional por conceitos (filosofia) e conhecimento racional por construção de conceitos (matemática).Marcos Seneda - 2018 - Estudos Kantianos 6 (2):45-52.
    A distinção entre filosofia e matemática enquanto modos de operação da razão tem presença marcante nos cursos de Lógica de Kant, mas igualmente articula diversas soluções de problemas no interior do pensamento crítico. No entanto, ela data do período pré-crítico, tendo se tornado bem explícita já na obra Investigação sobre a distinção dos princípios da teologia natural e da moral (1764). Quase duas décadas depois, essa distinção será retomada na “Doutrina transcendental do método”, contida na Crítica da razão pura (1781). (...)
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  5. added 2018-06-12
    La noción kantiana de verdad trascendental.Stéfano Straulino - 2016 - Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1 (2):126-145.
    Kant's Notion of "Transcendental Truth". [English] The aim of this work is to elucidate the notion of “transcendental truth” and to show its role in the Kantian system. I will argue that this notion is in line with the traditional definition of truth, i.e., that it consists in the correspondence between knowledge and object. I will also argue that criteria of transcendental truth are provided by transcendental logic, and that it is this notion of truth what makes it possible to (...)
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  6. added 2015-09-01
    The Motion of the Subject - a Metaphor? Reply to Pollok.Jens Saugstad - manuscript
    In Critique of Pure Reason Kant speaks about motion, as action of the subject in connection with the actions by which we describe a space, such as drawing a line or constructing a circle. In a 1992-paper in Kant-Studien I argued that this is one important piece of textual evidence for the so-called externalist interpretation, according to which the transcendental conditions of experience and indeed all the a priori elements in Kant’s system are public, depending upon overt action. Konstantin Pollok (...)
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  7. added 2015-01-07
    The Question of Apriorism.Barry Smith - 1990 - Austrian Economics Newsletter (1/2):1-5.
    We defend a view according to which Austrian economics rests on what can most properly be called an Aristotelian methodology. This implies a realist perspective, according to which the world exists independently of our thinking and reasoning activities; an essentialist perspective, according to which the world contains certain simple essences or natures which may come together in law-like ways to form more complex static and dynamic wholes, and an apriorist perspective, according to which given essences and essential structures are intelligible, (...)
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  8. added 2014-06-17
    Kant and the Problem of Experience.Hannah Ginsborg - 2006 - Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):59-106.
    As most of its readers are aware, the Critique of Pure Reason is primarily concerned not with empirical, but with a priori knowledge. For the most part, the Kant of the first Critique tends to assume that experience, and the knowledge that is based on it, is unproblematic. The problem with which he is concerned is that of how we can be capable of substantive knowledge independently of experience. At the same time, however, the notion of experience plays a crucial (...)
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  9. added 2014-03-04
    Kant's Argument for the Apperception Principle.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):59-84.
    Abstract: My aim is to reconstruct Kant's argument for the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. I reconstruct Kant's argument in stages, first showing why thinking should be conceived as an activity of synthesis (as opposed to attention), and then showing why the unity or coherence of a subject's representations should depend upon an a priori synthesis. The guiding thread of my account is Kant's conception of enlightenment: as I suggest, the philosophy of mind advanced in the Deduction belongs (...)
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  10. added 2013-05-13
    Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?Colin Marshall - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (3):549-576.
    Kant's philosophy promises to explain various synthetic a priori claims. Yet, as several of his commentators have noted, it is hard to see how these explanations could work unless they themselves rested on unexplained synthetic a priori claims. Since Kant appears to demand explanations for all synthetic a priori claims, it would seem that his project fails on its own terms. I argue, however, that Kant holds that explanations are required only for synthetic a priori claims about (purportedly) experience-independent entities, (...)
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