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  1. Formalizing Kant’s Rules.Richard Evans, Andrew Stephenson & Marek Sergot - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48:1-68.
    This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These (...)
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  2. Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - manuscript
    In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
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  3. Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.
    In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate (...)
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  4. Perception and Reflection.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):131-152.
    What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can avoid (...)
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  5. Kant, Neo‐Kantians, and Transcendental Subjectivity.Charlotte Baumann - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):595-616.
    This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment. The second part explicates transcendental (...)
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  6. La noción kantiana de verdad trascendental.Stéfano Straulino - 2016 - Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1 (2):126-145.
    Kant's Notion of "Transcendental Truth". [English] The aim of this work is to elucidate the notion of “transcendental truth” and to show its role in the Kantian system. I will argue that this notion is in line with the traditional definition of truth, i.e., that it consists in the correspondence between knowledge and object. I will also argue that criteria of transcendental truth are provided by transcendental logic, and that it is this notion of truth what makes it possible to (...)
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  7. Discourse on the Method Versus Orientation in Thinking.Francoise Monnoyeur - 2008 - In Anita Leifall & Thor Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i mangfold: Festskrift til Johan Arnt Myrstad i anledning 60-årsdagen. Unipub. pp. 367-375.
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Kant: Judgment of Perception vs Judgment of Experience
  1. Juicios subjetivos y juicios sobre sujetos. Una distinción a propósito de los juicios de percepción.Stéfano Straulino - 2018 - In Gustavo Leyva, Álvaro Peláez & Pedro Stepanenko (eds.), Los rostros de la razón: Immanuel Kant desde Hispanoamérica. I. Filosofía Teórica. Ciudad de México, CDMX, México: pp. 72-86.
    Subjective judgments and judgments about subjects. A distinction regarding judgments of perception [English] It is well known the number of problems that arise from the distinction between "judgments of perception" and "judgments of experience" delivered in the Prolegomena. This article focuses on the impossibility of assigning truth value to judgments of perception since it seems counterintuitive to indicate that judgments such as "I am cold" or "sugar tastes sweet" cannot be true. To solve this difficulty, it is proposed here to (...)
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  2. Kant on Perception, Experience and Judgements Thereof.Banafsheh Beizaei - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):347-371.
    It is commonly thought that the distinction between subjectively valid judgements of perception and objectively valid judgements of experience in the Prolegomena is not consistent with the account of judgement Kant offers in the B Deduction, according to which a judgement is ‘nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception’. Contrary to this view, I argue that the Prolegomena distinction maps closely onto that drawn between the mathematical and dynamical principles in the System (...)
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  3. Kant on Truth-Aptness.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
    Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans (...)
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Kant: Reflective vs Determining Judgment
  1. A New Theory of Stupidity.Sacha Golob - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):562-580.
    his article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In section 4, I (...)
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  2. Stanowisko Heinricha Rickerta Wobec Teorii Odbicia.Tomasz Kubalica - 2009 - Folia Philosophica 27:51--66.
    The aim of the paper is to discuss primarily the epistemological theory of reflection as seen by Heinrich Rickert, the main representative of Neo-Kantianism Baden School. The most important arguments put forward by Rickert against taking the cognition as a reflection of the reality are being analysed. Rickert’s standpoint turns out to be moderate. He argues against the transcendental theory of reflection, but does not reject the idea of reflection as a model of cognition and takes the immanent theory of (...)
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Kant: Teleological Judgment
  1. 'Until Art Once More Becomes Nature': Culture and the Unity of Kant's Critique of Judgment.Sabina Vaccarino Bremner - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    Commentators have turned increasing attention to the question of how the two halves of the Critique of Judgment fit together. Yet Kant’s account of culture has so far gone overlooked, despite the role it plays in both parts of the work in answering what Kant situates in the Introduction as the work's guiding concern: how the power of judgment thinks the transition between nature and freedom. Teleological judgment posits culture as the last empirically cognizable telos of nature prior to human (...)
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  2. Hermeneutics and Nature.Dalia Nassar - 2019 - In Michael Förster & Kristin Gjesdal (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hermeneutics. Cambridge: Cambridge. pp. 37-74.
    This paper contributes to the on-going research into the ways in which the humanities transformed the natural sciences in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. By investigating the relationship between hermeneutics -- as developed by Herder -- and natural history, it shows how the methods used for the study of literary and artistic works played a crucial role in the emergence of key natural-scientific fields, including geography and ecology.
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  3. Worin besteht Kants Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft? Anmerkungen zu §§ 69-71 der Kritik der Urteilskraft.Felix Hagenström - 2013 - Incipiens 1:37-61.
    In his Critique of Judgment (1790) Kant develops a teleology of nature. The concept of natural purpose leads him to the problem of the antinomy of teleological judgment. However, some ambiguity about what is said in the paragraphs concerned has frequently caused difficulties for the understanding of one of the core parts of the 3rd Critique. I argue that a coherent reading of §§69-71can nevertheless be achieved. In order to critically review and complete previous research I will primarily be focusing (...)
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  4. O Pensamento Teleológico de Immanuel Kant.Maria Célia dos Santos - 2008 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal Do Ceará, Brazil
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  5. Kant's Antinomy of Teleology: In Defense of a Traditional Interpretation.Nabeel Hamid - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 12th Kant Congress. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 1641-1648.
    Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment is unique in offering two pairs of oppositions, one of regulative maxims, and the other of constitutive principles. Here I defend a traditional interpretation of the antinomy— as proposed, for example, by Stadler (1874), Adickes (1925), and Cassirer (1921)—that the antinomy consists in an opposition between constitutive principles, and is resolved by pointing out their legitimate status as merely regulative maxims. I argue against recent interpretations—for example, in McLaughlin (1990), Allison (1991), and Watkins (2009)—which treat (...)
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  6. Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Routledge.
    In this book, Toby Svoboda develops and defends a Kantian environmental virtue ethic, challenging the widely-held view that Kant's moral philosophy takes an instrumental view toward nature and animals and has little to offer environmental ethics. On the contrary, Svoboda posits that there is good moral reason to care about non-human organisms in their own right and to value their flourishing independently of human interests, since doing so is constitutive of certain virtues. Svoboda argues that Kant’s account of indirect duties (...)
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Kant: Theoretical Judgment
  1. On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  2. Kant’s Analytic-Geometric Revolution.Scott Heftler - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin
    In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defends the mathematically deterministic world of physics by arguing that its essential features arise necessarily from innate forms of intuition and rules of understanding through combinatory acts of imagination. Knowing is active: it constructs the unity of nature by combining appearances in certain mandatory ways. What is mandated is that sensible awareness provide objects that conform to the structure of ostensive judgment: “This (S) is P.” -/- Sensibility alone provides no such objects, so (...)
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  3. The Case for Absolute Spontaneity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.Addison Ellis - 2017 - Con-Textos Kantianos (6):138-164.
    Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity. What this means is that our capacity to judge what is true is responsible for its own exercises, which is to say that we issue our judgments for ourselves. To issue our judgments for ourselves is to be self-conscious – i.e., conscious of the grounds upon which we judge. To grasp the spontaneity of the understanding, then, we must grasp the self-consciousness of the understanding. I argue that what Kant requires for (...)
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  4. Intuition and Concrete Particularity in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic.Adrian Margaret Smith Piper - 2006 - In Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen & Tony O'Connor (eds.), Rediscovering Aesthetics: Transdisciplinary Voices from Art History, Philosophy, and Art Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. pp. 193-212.
    By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...)
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  5. Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement.Nicholas F. Stang - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1117-1139.
    In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as (...)
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  6. Kant’s Conception of Analytic Judgment.Ian Proops - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):588–612.
    In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of “containment,” a second time in terms of “identity,” a third time in terms of the explicative–ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of “cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction.” The paper asks: Which of these characterizations—or apparent characterizations—best captures Kant’s conception of analyticity in the first Critique? It suggests: “the second.” It argues, further, that (...)
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Kant: Judgment, Misc
  1. The Priority of Judging: Kant on Wolff's General Logic.Corey W. Dyck - 2016 - Estudos Kantianos 4 (2):99-118.
    In this paper, I consider the basis for Kant's praise of Wolff's general logic as "the best we have." I argue that Wolff's logic was highly esteemed by Kant on account of its novel analysis of the three operations of the mind (tres operationes mentis), in the course of which Wolff formulates an argument for the priority of the understanding's activity of judging.
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  2. Kant on Existential Import.Alberto Vanzo - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (2):207-232.
    This article reconstructs Kant's view on the existential import of categorical sentences. Kant is widely taken to have held that affirmative sentences (the A and I sentences of the traditional square of opposition) have existential import, whereas negative sentences (E and O) lack existential import. The article challenges this standard interpretation. It is argued that Kant ascribes existential import only to some affirmative synthetic sentences. However, the reasons for this do not fall within the remit of Kant's formal logic. Unlike (...)
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  3. The Objects and the Formal Truth of Kantian Analytic Judgments.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (2):177-93.
    I defend the thesis that Kantian analytic judgments are about objects (as opposed to concepts) against two challenges raised by recent scholars. First, can it accommodate cases like “A two-sided polygon is two-sided”, where no object really falls under the subject-concept as Kant sees it? Second, is it compatible with Kant’s view that analytic judgments make no claims about objects in the world and that we can know them to be true without going beyond the given concepts? I address these (...)
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  4. Judgment, Extension, Logical Form.Luciano Codato - 2008 - In Kant-Gesellschaft E. V. Walter de Gruyter (ed.), Law and Peace in Kant’s Philosophy / Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 1--139.
    In Kant’s logical texts the reference of the form S is P to an “unknown = x” is well known, but its understanding still remains controversial. Due to the universality of all concepts, the subject as much as the predicate is regarded as predicate of the x, which, in turn, is regarded as the subject of the judgment. In the CPR, this Kantian interpretation of the S-P relationship leads to the question about the relations between intuition and concept in judgment. (...)
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