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  1. added 2018-01-08
    Response to 'Fear of Death and the Symmetry Argument'.Deng Natalja - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (4):297-304.
    ABSTRACT This article is a response to 'Fear of death and the symmetry argument', in this issue. In that article, the author discusses the above Lucretian symmetry argument, and proposes a view that justifies the existing asymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and death. I begin by distinguishing this symmetry argument from a different one, also loosely inspired by Lucretius, which also plays a role in the article. I then describe what I take to be the author's solution to the (...)
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  2. added 2016-08-19
    Review of Lucretius and the Early Modern.Charles T. Wolfe - forthcoming - The Classical Review.
    long version of review forthcoming in much shorter version in Classical Review.
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  3. added 2016-01-14
    How A-Theoretic Deprivationists Should Respond to Lucretius.Natalja Deng - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):417-432.
    What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second (...)
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  4. added 2015-06-15
    Did Epicurus Discover the Free-Will Problem?Susanne Bobzien - 2000 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19:287-337.
    ABSTRACT: I argue that there is no evidence that Epicurus dealt with the kind of free-will problem he is traditionally associated with; i.e. that he discussed free choice or moral responsibility grounded on free choice, or that the "swerve" was involved in decision processes. Rather, for Epicurus, actions are fully determined by the agent's mental disposition at the outset of the action. Moral responsibility presupposes not free choice but that the person is unforced and causally responsible for the action. This (...)
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  5. added 2015-04-29
    Death is Nothing to Us: A Critical Analysis of the Epicurean Views Concerning the Dread of Death.Evangelos D. Protopapadakis - 2014 - In Ksenija Maricki Gadzanski (ed.), Antiquity and Modern World: Interpretations of Antiquity. The Serbian Society for Ancient Studies. pp. 316-323.
    To the mind of humans death is an impossible riddle, the ultimate of mysteries; therefore it has always been considered a task of paramount importance for philosophers to provide a satisfactory account for death. Among the numerous efforts to deal with the riddle of death, Epicurus’ one stands out not only for its unsurpassed simplicity and lucidness, but also for the innovative manner in which it approaches the issue: Epicurus denounces the fear of death as a profoundly unfruitful, unreasonable and (...)
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  6. added 2015-04-07
    Lucretius and the Fears of Death.Peter Aronoff - 1997 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The Epicureans argued that death was nothing to us and that we should not fear death, and this thesis takes up these arguments as they appear in our fullest extant source, the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius. After an initial look at the general Epicurean theory of emotions, the thesis narrows in on the fears of death. Lucretius starts from a popular dichotomy concerning death: death is either the utter destruction of the person who dies, or the person survives in (...)
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  7. added 2013-09-04
    Lucretius and the History of Science.Monte Ransome Johnson & Catherine Wilson - 2007 - In Stuart Gillespie & Philip R. Hardie (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius. Cambridge University Press.
    An overview of the influence of Lucretius poem On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura) on the renaissance and scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and an examination of its continuing influence over physical atomism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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  8. added 2013-08-11
    Nature, Spontaneity, and Voluntary Action in Lucretius.Monte Ransome Johnson - 2013 - In Daryn Lehoux, A. D. Morrison & Alison Sharrock (eds.), Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science. Oxford University Press.
    In twenty important passages located throughout De rerum natura, Lucretius refers to natural things happening spontaneously (sponte sua; the Greek term is automaton). The most important of these uses include his discussion of the causes of: nature, matter, and the cosmos in general; the generation and adaptation of plants and animals; the formation of images and thoughts; and the behavior of human beings and the development of human culture. In this paper I examine the way spontaneity functions as a cause (...)
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  9. added 2013-08-08
    Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 2006 - In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    ABSTRACT: 1. This paper argues that Epicurus had a notion of moral responsibility based on the agent’s causal responsibility, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise; that Epicurus considered it a necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that brought the action about. Thus, the central question of moral responsibility was whether the agent was the, or a, cause of the action, or whether (...)
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