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  1. Socrates on Cookery and Rhetoric.Freya Möbus - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    Socrates believes that living well is primarily an intellectual undertaking: we live well if we think correctly. To intellectualists, one might think, the body and activities related to it are of little interest. Yet Socrates has much to say about food, eating, and cookery. This paper examines Socrates’ criticism of ‘feeding on opson’ (opsophagia) in Xenophon’s Memorabilia and of opson cookery (opsopoiia) in Plato’s Gorgias. I argue that if we consider the specific cultural meaning of eating opson, we can see (...)
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  2. Socrates and Coherent Desire (Gorgias 466a-468e).Eric Brown & Clerk Shaw - 2024 - In J. Clerk Shaw (ed.), Plato's Gorgias: a critical guide. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 68-86.
    Polus admires orators for the tyrannical power they have. However, Socrates argues that orators and tyrants lack power worth having: the ability to satisfy one's wishes or wants (boulēseis). He distinguishes wanting from thinking best, and grants that orators and tyrants do what they think best while denying that they do what they want. His account is often thought to involve two conflicting requirements: wants must be attributable to the wanter from their own perspective (to count as their desires), but (...)
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  3. Socratic Motivational Intellectualism.Freya Mobus - 2024 - In Russell E. Jones, Ravi Sharma & Nicholas D. Smith (eds.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Socrates. Bloomsbury Handbooks. pp. 205-228.
    Socrates’ view about human motivation in Plato’s early dialogues has often been called ‘intellectualist’ because, in his account, the motivation for any given intentional action is tied to the intellect, specifically to beliefs. Socratic motivational intellectualism is the view that we always do what we believe is the best (most beneficial) thing we can do for ourselves, given all available options. Motivational intellectualism is often considered to be at the centre of Socrates’ intellectualist account of actions, according to which: (1) (...)
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  4. Can Flogging Make Us Less Ignorant?Freya Möbus - 2023 - Ancient Philosophy 43 (1):51-68.
    In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that painful bodily punishment like flogging can improve certain wrongdoers. I argue that we can take Socrates’ endorsement seriously, even on the standard interpretation of Socratic motivational intellectualism, according to which there are no non-rational desires. I propose that flogging can epistemically improve certain wrongdoers by communicating that wrongdoing is bad for oneself. In certain cases, this belief cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.
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  5. Nicholas D. Smith: Socrates on Self-Improvement. Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness. [REVIEW]Freya Mobus - 2023 - Ancient Philosophy 43:277-282.
    In this book review, I discuss Smith’s new interpretation of Socrates' epistemology of virtue, according to which (a) Socratic virtue knowledge is craft knowledge (knowing how to live well), and such knowledge comes in degrees; and (b) Socrates has a certain degree of virtue knowledge, and one does not have to be an inerrant expert to have any virtue knowledge at all. I argue that Smith succeeds in presenting Socratic philosophy in a new light, while also pointing to remaining questions (...)
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  6. Correlación cosmológica y ética de los conceptos de límite y medida en la filosofía platónica.Estiven Valencia Marín - 2022 - Universitas Philosophica 39 (78):83-104.
    Los objetos sensibles y el hombre, que constituyen el mundo sometido a alteración o cambios, poseen una estructura, organización y dinámicas propias por las cuales se intuye la presencia de causas o principios que dotan a ambos de tales atributos. De aquí que el límite y la medida representen condiciones de orden establecidas por el mundo ideal, un orden que actúa como causa de la armonía y la proporción que conforman todo el mundo visible. El orden ontológico y cósmico que (...)
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  7. The philosopher’s Reward: Contemplation and Immortality in Plato’s Dialogues.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2021 - In Alex Long (ed.), Immortality in Ancient Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In dialogues ranging from the Symposium to the Timaeus, Plato appears to propose that the philosopher’s grasp of the forms may confer immortality upon him. Whatever can Plato mean in making such a claim? What does he take immortality to consist in, such that it could constitute a reward for philosophical enlightenment? And how is this proposal compatible with Plato’s insistence throughout his corpus that all soul, not just philosophical soul, is immortal? In this chapter, I pursue these questions by (...)
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  8. Beber ou não beber? Qual é a questão? Duas leituras de República IV, 439c2-d8.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2019 - Dissertatio 49:45-63.
    In this paper, I explore two possible readings of Republic IV, 439c2-d8, and of Plato’s claim that the just soul is governed by its rational element. My aim is to argue against a “desiderative” interpretation of the passage, according to which the motivational strength of rational desires depends on a set of desires given in advance and produced independently of reason. As an alternative, I advance a “cognitivist” reading according to which the rational desires of the just soul have as (...)
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  9. Pleasure, Pain, and the Unity of Soul in Plato's Protagoras.Vanessa de Harven & Wolfgang-Rainer Mann - 2018 - In William V. Harris (ed.), Pleasure and Pain in Classical Antiquity. pp. 111-138.
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  10. Sex, Wealth, and Courage: Kinds of Goods and the Power of Appearance in Plato's Protagoras.Damien Storey - 2018 - Ancient Philosophy 38 (2):241-263.
    I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a (...)
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  11. On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws.Nicholas Baima - 2017 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 20 (1):65-81.
    Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness (μέθη) is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance (3.398e-399e, 3.403e, and 9.571c-573b), while in the Laws, Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance (1.635b, 1.645d-650a, and 2.665c-672d). This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and if he did, why? Ultimately, this paper answers affirmatively and argues that this marks a substantive (...)
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  12. Republic 382a-d: On the Dangers and Benefits of Falsehood.Nicholas R. Baima - 2017 - Classical Philology 112 (1):1-19.
    Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell us (...)
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  13. Socrates on Why We Should Inquire.David Ebrey - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):1-17.
    This paper examines whether Socrates provides his interlocutors with good reasons to seek knowledge of what virtue is, reasons that they are in a position to appreciate. I argue that in the Laches he does provide such reasons, but they are not the reasons that are most commonly identified as Socratic. Socrates thinks his interlocutors should be motivated not by the idea that virtue is knowledge nor by the idea that knowledge is good for its own sake, but rather by (...)
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  14. Aristophanic Tragedy.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2017 - In Z. Giannopoulou & P. Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Critical Guide to Plato’s Symposium. Cambridge University Press. pp. 70-87.
    In this paper, I offer a new interpretation of Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium. Though Plato deliberately draws attention to the significance of Aristophanes’ speech in relation to Diotima’s (205d-206a, 211d), it has received relatively little philosophical attention. Critics who discuss it typically treat it as a comic fable, of little philosophical merit (e.g. Guthrie 1975, Rowe 1998), or uncover in it an appealing and even romantic treatment of love that emphasizes the significance of human individuals as love-objects to be (...)
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  15. Persuasion, Falsehood, and Motivating Reason in Plato’s Laws.Nicholas R. Baima - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2).
    In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion (πειθώ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Persuasion can be achieved by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια), which make the citizens more eager to obey the laws. Although scholars disagree on how to interpret the preludes’ persuasion, they agree that the preludes instill true beliefs and give citizens good reasons for obeying the laws. In this paper I refine this account of the preludes by (...)
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  16. Das Monster in uns.Gianluigi Segalerba - 2016 - Philosophical Inquiry 40 (1-2):38-57.
    The essay consists in the analysis of the problem of the evil in the man and in the analysis of the remedies which the man can find against the evil. Plato affirms the presence of an active principle of evil in the soul of every man, which coincides with some instincts of the appetitive soul; the opposite principle to the evil is the reason, which needs, though, a correct education in order to be able to fight efficiently against the evil (...)
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  17. Socrates vs. Callicles: examination & ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias.David Levy - 2013 - Plato Journal 13:27-36.
    The Callicles colloquy of Plato’s Gorgias features both examination and ridicule. Insofar as Socrates’ examination of Callicles proceeds via the elenchus, the presence of ridicule requires explanation. This essay seeks to provide that explanation by placing the effort to ridicule within the effort to examine; that is, the judgment/pronouncement that something/ someone is worthy of ridicule is a proper part of the elenchic examination. Standard accounts of the Socratic elenchus do not include this component. Hence, the argument of this essay (...)
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  18. Contemplation and self-mastery in Plato's Phaedrus.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 42:77-107.
    This chapter examines Plato's moral psychology in the Phaedrus. It argues against interpreters such as Burnyeat and Nussbaum that Plato's treatment of the soul is increasingly pessimistic: reason's desire to contemplate is at odds with its obligation to rule the soul, and psychic harmony can only be secured by violently suppressing the lower parts of the soul.
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  19. Erōs Tyrannos: Philosophical Passion and Psychic Ordering in the Republic.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - In Noburo Notomi & Luc Brisson (eds.), Dialogues on Plato's Politeia (Republic): Selected Papers from the IX Symposium Platonicum. pp. 188-193.
    In this paper, I explore parallels between philosophical and tyrannical eros in Plato's Republic. I argue that in arguing that reason experiences eros for the forms, Plato introduces significant tensions into his moral psychology.
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  20. "Socratic Moral Psychology". By Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. vii + 276. $85.00 (hardback). ISBN 978-0-521-19843-1. [REVIEW]J. Clerk Shaw - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (1):181-185.
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  21. Fleeing the Divine: Plato's Rejection of the Ahedonic Ideal in the Philebus.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2010 - In John M. Dillon & Luc Brisson (eds.), Plato's Philebus: selected papers from the Eighth Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia. pp. 209-214.
    Note: "Next to Godliness" (Apeiron) is an expanded version of this paper. -/- According to Plato's successors, assimilation to god (homoiosis theoi) was the end (telos) of the Platonic system. There is ample evidence to support this claim in dialogues ranging from the Symposium through the Timaeus. However, the Philebus poses a puzzle for this conception of the Platonic telos. On the one hand, Plato states that the gods are beings beyond pleasure while, on the other hand, he argues that (...)
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  22. Moral Transformation and the Love of Beauty in Plato’s Symposium.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):415-444.
    This paper defends an intellectualist interpretation of Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium. I argue that Diotima’s purpose, in discussing the lower lovers, is to critique their erōs as aimed at a goal it can never secure, immortality, and as focused on an inferior object, themselves. By contrast, in loving the form of beauty, the philosopher gains a mortal sort of completion; in turning outside of himself, he also ceases to be preoccupied by his own incompleteness.
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  23. Sheffield (F.C.C.) Plato's Symposium: the Ethics of Desire. Pp. x + 252. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Cased, £50. ISBN: 978-0-19-928677-. [REVIEW]Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2008 - The Classical Review 58 (1):62-64.
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  24. Review of Platon: Werke, Ubersetzung und Kommentar, vol. 4: Lysis, by Michael Bordt. [REVIEW]George Rudebusch - 2002 - Ancient Philosophy 22 (1):177-180.
    Praising much, I criticize this commentary on Plato's Lysis on three points: I. The book's dismissal of Socratic intellectualism. II. The book's finding of a Socratic doctrine of symmetrical friendship between good people. III. The book's reading of the final aporia.
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  25. Why Eros?Suzanne Obdrzalek - 1992 - In Richard Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    One of the ways in which Plato has captured the popular imagination is with the claim that the philosopher can feel erôs, passionate love, for the objects of knowledge. Why should Plato make this claim? In this chapter, I explore Plato’s treatment of philosophical erôs along three dimensions. First, I consider the source of philosophical erôs. I argue that it is grounded in our mortality and imperfection, which give rise to a desire for immortality and the immortal. Second, I turn (...)
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  26. Sokrates: Tugend ist Wissen.Rafael Ferber - 1991 - Elenchos 12:39-66.
    The article examines the Socratic principle that (1) virtue is knowledge and its corollary that (2) nobody errs voluntarily (nemo sua sponte peccat). It tries to show (I) that both principles are paradoxa, i.e. from a phenomenological point of view, they seem to be false; (II) that nevertheless the platonic Socrates accepts both principles as true; and finally (III) that these principles are analytical truths a priori which can only be understood if a person (soul) finds them in him- or (...)
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