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  1. added 2018-06-14
    "Socratic Moral Psychology". By Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. Vii + 276. $85.00 (Hardback). ISBN 978-0-521-19843-1. [REVIEW]J. Clerk Shaw - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (1):181-185.
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  2. added 2018-06-06
    Socrates on Why We Should Inquire.David Ebrey - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):1-17.
    This paper examines whether Socrates provides his interlocutors with good reasons to seek knowledge of what virtue is, reasons that they are in a position to appreciate. I argue that in the Laches he does provide such reasons, but they are not the reasons that are most commonly identified as Socratic. Socrates thinks his interlocutors should be motivated not by the idea that virtue is knowledge nor by the idea that knowledge is good for its own sake, but rather by (...)
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  3. added 2017-11-06
    On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws.Nicholas Baima - 2017 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 20:65-81.
    Plato's attitude towards drunkenness is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance, while in the Laws, Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance. This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and if he did, why? Ultimately, this paper answers affirmatively and argues that his marks a substantive shift in Plato's attitude towards anti-rational desires.
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  4. added 2016-07-08
    Pleasure, Pain, and the Unity of Soul in Plato's Protagoras.Vanessa de Harven & Wolfgang-Rainer Mann - 2018 - In William V. Harris (ed.), Pleasure and Pain in Classical Times. pp. 111-138.
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  5. added 2016-04-22
    Philosopher Rulers and False Beliefs.Nicholas R. Baima - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):19-37.
    Many scholars have viewed the noble lie as fundamentally a device for educating the non-philosophers in the Kallipolis. On this reading, the elite and sophisticated philosopher rulers lie to the non-philosophers, who are unable to fully grasp the truth; such lies help motivate the non-philosophers towards virtuous activity and the promotion of the common good. Hence, according to many scholars, the falsehoods of the noble lie play no role in motivating fully accomplished adult philosophers towards virtue. The motivation for this (...)
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  6. added 2015-11-17
    Republic 382a-D: On the Dangers and Benefits of Falsehood.Nicholas R. Baima - 2017 - Classical Philology 112 (1):1-19.
    Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell us (...)
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  7. added 2015-02-05
    Sokrates: Tugend ist Wissen.Rafael Ferber - 1991 - Elenchos 12:39-66.
    The article examines the Socratic principle that (1) virtue is knowledge and its corollary that (2) nobody errs voluntarily (nemo sua sponte peccat). It tries to show (I) that both principles are paradoxa, i.e. from a phenomenological point of view, they seem to be false; (II) that nevertheless the platonic Socrates accepts both principles as true; and finally (III) that these principles are analytical truths a priori which can only be understood if a person (soul) finds them in him- or (...)
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  8. added 2014-11-29
    Socrates Vs. Callicles: Examination and Ridicule in Plato's Gorgias.David Levy - 2013 - Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society 13:27-36.
    The Callicles colloquy of Plato’s Gorgias features both examination and ridicule. Insofar as Socrates’ examination of Callicles proceeds via the elenchus, the presence of ridicule requires explanation. This essay seeks to provide that explanation by placing the effort to ridicule within the effort to examine; that is, the judgment/pronouncement that something/someone is worthy of ridicule is a proper part of the elenchic examination. Standard accounts of the Socratic elenchus do not include this component. Hence, the argument of this essay suggests (...)
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