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  1. Drinking in the Last Chance Saloon: Luck Egalitarianism, Alcohol Consumption, and the Organ Transplant Waiting List.Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 19 (2):325-338.
    The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive (...)
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  • ‘Personal Health Surveillance’: The Use of mHealth in Healthcare Responsibilisation.Ben Davies - forthcoming - Public Health Ethics.
    There is an ongoing increase in the use of mobile health technologies that patients can use to monitor health-related outcomes and behaviours. While the dominant narrative around mHealth focuses on patient empowerment, there is potential for mHealth to fit into a growing push for patients to take personal responsibility for their health. I call the first of these uses ‘medical monitoring’, and the second ‘personal health surveillance’. After outlining two problems which the use of mHealth might seem to enable us (...)
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  • How the Past Matters for the Future: A Luck Egalitarian Sustainability Principle for Healthcare Resource Allocation.Andreas Albertsen - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (2):102-103.
    Christian Munthe, David Fumagalli and Erik Malmqvist argue that well-known healthcare resource allocation principles, such as need, prognosis, equal treatment and cost-effectiveness, should be supplemented with a principle of sustainability.1 Employing such a principle would entail that the allocation of healthcare resources should take into account whether a specific allocation causes negative dynamics, which would limit the amount of resources available in the future. As examples of allocation decisions, which may have such negative dynamics, they mention those who cause a (...)
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  • Taking Responsibility for Health in an Epistemically Polluted Environment.Neil Levy - 2018 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 39 (2):123-141.
    Proposals for regulating or nudging healthy choices are controversial. Opponents often argue that individuals should take responsibility for their own health, rather than be paternalistically manipulated for their own good. In this paper, I argue that people can take responsibility for their own health only if they satisfy certain epistemic conditions, but we live in an epistemic environment in which these conditions are not satisfied. Satisfying the epistemic conditions for taking responsibility, I argue, requires regulation of this environment. I describe (...)
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  • What Is the Point of the Harshness Objection?Andreas Albertsen & Lasse Nielsen - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (4):427-443.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. The most common criticism of luck egalitarianism is the ‘harshness objection’, which states that luck egalitarianism allows for too harsh consequences, as it fails to provide justification for why those responsible for their bad fate can be entitled to society's assistance. It has largely gone unnoticed that the harshness objection is open to a number of very different interpretations. (...)
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  • Chronic Disease as Risk Multiplier for Disadvantage.Francisca Stutzin Donoso - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (6):371-375.
    This paper starts by establishing a prima facie case that disadvantaged groups or individuals are more likely to get a chronic disease and are in a disadvantaged position to adhere to chronic treatment despite access through Universal Health Coverage. However, the main aim of this paper is to explore the normative implications of this claim by examining two different but intertwined argumentative lines that might contribute to a better understanding of the ethical challenges faced by chronic disease health policy. The (...)
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  • Distributive Justice and the Harm to Medical Professionals Fighting Epidemics.Andreas Albertsen & Jens Damgaard Thaysen - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (12):861-864.
    The exposure of doctors, nurses and other medical professionals to risks in the context of epidemics is significant. While traditional medical ethics offers the thought that these dangers may limit the extent to which a duty to care is applicable in such situations, it has less to say about what we might owe to medical professionals who are disadvantaged in these contexts. Luck egalitarianism, a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice, appears to fare particularly badly in that regard. If we want (...)
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  • Phase-Dependent Justification: The Role of Personal Responsibility in Fair Healthcare.Kristine Bærøe & Cornelius Cappelen - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (10):836-840.
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  • Tough Luck and Tough Choices: Applying Luck Egalitarianism to Oral Health.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):342-362.
    Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which the attribution of (...)
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  • Luck Egalitarianism, Social Determinants and Public Health Initiatives.A. Albertsen - 2015 - Public Health Ethics 8 (1):42-49.
    People’s health is hugely affected by where they live, their occupational status and their socio-economic position. It has been widely argued that the presence of such social determinants in health provides good reasons to reject luck egalitarianism as a theory of distributive justice in health. The literature provides different reasons why this responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice should not be applied to health. The critiques submit that the social circumstances undermine or remove people’s responsibility for their health; responsibility sensitive health (...)
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  • ‘Justice in Health or Justice (and Health)?’—How (Not) to Apply a Theory of Justice to Health.Adina Preda - 2018 - Public Health Ethics 11 (3):336-345.
    Some theorists, especially egalitarians, seek to ‘apply’ theories of justice to a specific area or good, such as health, and assess the distribution of that good at the bar of justice. On the one hand, this is understandable, given that egalitarians are often interested in making policy recommendations and these would have to be area-specific. On the other hand, it is surprising in light of the fact that theories of justice normally envisage the ‘total package of goods’ or an overall (...)
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  • Fresh Starts for Poor Health Choices: Should We Provide Them and Who Should Pay?Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Public Health Ethics 9 (1):55-64.
    Should we grant a fresh start to those who come to regret their past lifestyle choices? A negative response to this question can be located in the luck egalitarian literature. As a responsibility-sensitive theory of justice, luck egalitarianism considers it just that people’s relative positions reflect their past choices, including those they regret. In a recent article, Vansteenkiste, Devooght and Schokkaert argue against the luck egalitarian view, maintaining instead that those who regret their past choices in health are disadvantaged in (...)
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  • Rawlsian Justice and Palliative Care.Carl Knight & Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (8):536-542.
    Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in (...)
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