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Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
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Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902.details
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The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.details
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Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.details
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Blur and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):254-260.details
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Inexact Knowledge without Improbable Knowing.Jeremy Goodman - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):30-53.details
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Experience and time: Transparency and presence.Christoph Hoerl - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:127-151.details
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Naïve realism and unconscious perception: A reply to Berger and Nanay.Alfonso Anaya & Sam Clarke - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):267-273.details
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Lessons from Blur.Giulia Martina - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3229-3246.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Precision and Perceptual Clarity.Jonna Vance - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):379-395.details
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Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.details
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Blur and interoceptive vision.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3271-3289.details
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Representationalism about Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Idiosyncratic Perception.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):391-399.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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Vague perception.Patrick McKee - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):977-999.details
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*Perception* (2021, preview).Adam Pautz - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co.details
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Visual experience.Pär Sundström - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-65.details
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Transparency, representationalism, and visual noise.Joshua Gert - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6615-6629.details
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Representationalism and the determinacy of visual content.Ben Bronner - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):227-239.details
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Correlative externalism about colour phenomenology.Adam Balmer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Fuzzy-set representation and processing of fuzzy images: non-linguistic vagueness as representation, approximation and scientific practice.Jordi Cat - 2015 - Archives for the Philosophy and History of Soft Computing 2015 (1).details
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