- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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A new story about folk psychology.Leon C. de Bruin - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):263 – 271.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.details
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Indeterminate perception and colour relationism.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):25-34.details
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Information and cognitive agents.Robert Cummins - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):68-69.details
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The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):57-75.details
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Might a tooth ache but there be no toothache?James W. Cornman - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):27-40.details
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First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement.Josep E. Corbí - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.details
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Attention, Perception, and Thought in Aristotle.Phil Corkum - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (2):199-222.details
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Supervenient causation and program explanation: a note on the difference.P. Coppock - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):346-354.details
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Getting It Together: Psychological Unity and Deflationary Accounts of Animal Metacognition.Gary Comstock & William A. Bauer - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):431-451.details
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The Argument from the finer‐grained content of colour experiences A redefinition of its role within the debate between McDowell and non‐conceptual theorists.Annalisa Coliva - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (1):57-70.details
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Self-Knowledge for Humans. [REVIEW]Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):246-252.details
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Précis of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):288-296.details
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Colors, functions, realizers, and roles.Jonathan Cohen - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):117-140.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Content: Semantic and information-theoretic.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):67-68.details
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Reading the περιτρoπη: Theaetetus 170c-171c. Chappell - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (2):109-139.details
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Varieties of Knowledge in Plato and Aristotle.Timothy Chappell - 2012 - Topoi 31 (2):175-190.details
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The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.details
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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No speech, never mind!Monima Chadha - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):641 – 657.details
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Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.details
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The Ockhamization of the event sources of sound.R. Casati, E. Di Bona & J. Dokic - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):462-466.details
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There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.details
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The illusion of conscious will.Peter Carruthers - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):197 - 213.details
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Moderately Massive Modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:67-89.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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The epistemic significance of experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:947-67.details
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Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain.Alex Byrne - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161:489-96.details
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Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.details
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What is a brain state?Richard Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.details
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Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness.Richard Brown, Hakwan Lau & Joseph E. LeDoux - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (9):754-768.details
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Consciousness and content in perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):41-54.details
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Painfulness, Desire, and the Euthyphro Dilemma.Michael S. Brady - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):239-250.details
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Determining what is perceived.Radu J. Bogdan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):66-67.details
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The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.details
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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The sources of self-consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):87-107.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Mental Causation.Karen Bennett - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.details
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Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner.Simon Beck - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):132-140.details
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Transparent introspection of wishes.Wolfgang Barz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1993-2023.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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Occurrent states.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-17.details
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Information and semantics.Jon Barwise - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):65-65.details
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Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe.Wolfgang Barz - 2014 - Theoria 80 (4):350-367.details
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Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):1-20.details
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