- Concepts and conceptual analysis.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):253-282.details
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A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):897-912.details
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The topological realization.Daniel Kostić - 2018 - Synthese (1).details
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Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Kostić - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):119-125.details
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Physicalism and strict implication.Robert Kirk - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):523-536.details
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The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.Jaegwon Kim - 2017 - In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 445–457.details
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Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation.Brendan Kenessey - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):204-232.details
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Explanation by status as empty-base explanation.Yannic Kappes - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2575-2595.details
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The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.details
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Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.details
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Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory.Jesper Kallestrup - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.details
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Physicalism, conceivability and strong necessities.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):273-295.details
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Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Predication.Bruno Jacinto - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):471-499.details
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Conceivability, higher order patterns, and physicalism.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz & Amir Horowitz - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):349-366.details
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Conceptual reductions, truthmaker reductive explanations, and ontological reductions.Savvas Ioannou - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-26.details
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The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism vs. A Priori Physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):905-913.details
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Turning the zombie on its head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.details
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Lowe on Modal Knowledge.Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):208-217.details
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Mind–brain identity and evidential insulation.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):377-395.details
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Of brains and planets: on a causal criterion for mind-brain identities.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.details
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What Is a Priori and What Is It Good For?David Henderson - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):51-86.details
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The Frontloading Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2583-2608.details
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Language, Politics, and “The Folk”: Looking for “The Meaning” of ‘Race’.Sally Haslanger - 2010 - The Monist 93 (2):169-187.details
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Physics, logic and the phenomenal.Philip P. Hanson - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (3):391-400.details
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The epistemology of ‘just is’-statements.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2599-2607.details
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Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.details
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When is a brain like the planet?Clark Glymour - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (3):330-347.details
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Qualia that it is right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Qualia that It Is Right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
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The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia.Jeff Foss - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):479.details
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Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.details
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Hypothetical identities: Explanatory problems for the explanatory argument.Markus I. Eronen - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):571-582.details
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Blocking the A Priori Passage.Andreas Elpidorou - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):285-307.details
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Introduction: The Character of Physicalism.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):435-455.details
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Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism.Billy Dunaway - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):627-655.details
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Serious metaphysics and the vindication of reductions.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91-110.details
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Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):19-46.details
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Does Nagel's footnote eleven solve the mind-body problem?Tyler Doggett & Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143.details
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Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.details
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Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?E. Diaz-Leon - 2013 - Ratio 27 (1):1-16.details
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Two-dimensional semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What We Can Learn about Phenomenal Concepts from Wittgenstein’s Private Language.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2016 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2):125-152.details
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Is functional reduction logical reduction?Max Kistler - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):219-234.details
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Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2015 - In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wüthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 251-306.details
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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.details
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Scientific Reduction.Raphael van Riel & Robert Van Gulick - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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