- A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164.details
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A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.details
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Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content.Tadeusz Szubka - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):491-503.details
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What Do Deviant Logians Show About the Epistemology of Logic?Arthur Sullivan - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):179-191.details
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REVIEW: James R. Brown, Laboratory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Michael T. Stuart - 2012 - Spontaneous Generations 6 (1):237-241.details
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Conditions of Cognitive Sanity and the Internalist Credo.Andrew D. Spear - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):300-321.details
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The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Quine's Naturalized Epistemology and the Third Dogma of Empiricism.Robert Sinclair - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):455-472.details
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A partial defense of intuition on naturalist grounds.Joseph Shieber - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):321-341.details
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What is wrong with epistemic circularity?Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):379–402.details
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The limits of conceptual analysis.Laura Schroeter - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):425-453.details
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Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge.Andrea Sauchelli - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):345-359.details
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Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge.Andrea Sauchelli - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):345-359.details
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Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology.Pierre Saint-Germier - 2016 - Synthese 195 (11):4785-4816.details
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Contingent a priori truths and performatives.Marco Ruffino - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S22):5593-5613.details
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The myth of 'scientific method' in contemporary educational research.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom & Sarah Jane Aiston - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (2):137–156.details
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Demystifying threshold concepts.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (2):263–270.details
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Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):687-702.details
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The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.details
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Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.details
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Why we should prefer knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):79-93.details
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The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism.Georges Rey - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):227-258.details
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Fodor's ingratitude and change of heart?Georges Rey - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):70-84.details
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Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):66-92.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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On explaining knowledge of necessity.Joel Pust - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):71–87.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Hyper-reliability and apriority.James Pryor - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.details
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The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357-376.details
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Van Fraassen on the nature of empiricism.Pierre Cruse - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (4):489-508.details
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Intuition as a Capacity for a Priori Knowledge.Henry W. Pickford - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 13 (28):147-169.details
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The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357 - 376.details
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Entitlement and Epistemic Upgrading.Alexander C. R. Oldemeier - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):436-446.details
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Why Intuition?Jennifer Nado - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):15-41.details
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Saving epistemology from the epistemologists: recent work in the theory of knowledge.Adam Morton - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):685-704.details
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Pragmatic Reflexivity in Self-defeating and Self-justifying Expressions.Jeremy Morris - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (2):205-216.details
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Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.details
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New Arguments that Philosophers don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence.Bernard Molyneux - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (3):441-461.details
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Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.details
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Intuition as a second window.Nenad Miscevic - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):87-112.details
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Kant's Radicalization of Cartesian Foundationalism: Thought Experiments, Transcendental Arguments, and Level Circularity in the Paralogisms.Murray Miles - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (3):493-518.details
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Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke’s Referential Turn and its Challenges.Nenad Miščević - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):233-256.details
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Underdetermination and Realism.Michael Devitt - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):26 - 50.details
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Kitcher, Mathematical Intuition, and Experience.Mark McEvoy - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):227-237.details
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Rational intuition and understanding.Peter J. Markie - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):271-290.details
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Identifying logical evidence.Ben Martin - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9069-9095.details
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Anti-exceptionalism about logic as tradition rejection.Ben Martin & Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.details
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Varieties of Inference?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.details
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Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge.Antonella Mallozzi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1315-1337.details
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