- Does reflective equilibrium help us converge?Andreas Freivogel - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-22.details
|
|
Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being.Atus Mariqueo-Russell - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1975-1994.details
|
|
Subjectivists Should Say Pain Is Bad Because of How It Feels.Jennifer Hawkins - 2022 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46:137-164.details
|
|
Reflective Equilibrium.Kauppinen Antti & Jaakko Hirvelä - forthcoming - In David Copp, Tina Rulli & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Too many cooks.Alex Horne - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
|
|
The Fundamental Divisions in Ethics.Matthew Hammerton - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.details
|
|
The Folk Theory of Well-Being.John Bronsteen, Brian Leiter, Jonathan Masur & Kevin Tobia - 2024 - In Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Harry Frankfurt, love and the good life.Eduardo Fermandois M. - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50:79-99.details
|
|
Expressivism, Moral Fallibility, and the Approved Change Strategy.Michael Bukoski - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):115-129.details
|
|
Varieties of conceptual analysis.Max Kölbel - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (1):20-38.details
|
|
Why some defenders of positive duties serve a bad theoretical cocktail.Jakob Thrane Mainz & Jørn Sønderholm - 2021 - Journal of Global Ethics 17 (3):323-339.details
|
|
Permanent Value.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):356-372.details
|
|
A Defense of Basic Prudential Hedonism.Joe Nelson - 2020 - Dissertation, Duke Universitydetails
|
|
The Greenhouse: A Welfare Assessment and Some Morals.Christoph Lumer - 2002 - Lanham, MD; New York; Oxford: University Press of America.details
|
|
A Theory of Philosophical Arguments.Christoph Lumer - 2020 - Evidence, Persuasion and Diversity. Proceedings of Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation Conference, Vol. 12 (2020).details
|
|
Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism.Dale E. Miller - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):120-140.details
|
|
Kant on Feelings, Sensations and the Gap Between Rationality and Morality.Alexander Rueger - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (1):125-148.details
|
|
Subjective Moral Biases & Fallacies: Developing Scientifically & Practically Adequate Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics & Biases.Mark H. Herman - 2019 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State Universitydetails
|
|
Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.details
|
|
Misinformation, subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire.Jay Jian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):845-866.details
|
|
The badness of pain.Gwen Bradford - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (2):236-252.details
|
|
An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.details
|
|
Love, Reasons, and Desire.Nicholas Drake - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):591-605.details
|
|
Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
|
|
Varieties of epistemic instrumentalism.Daniel Buckley - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9293-9313.details
|
|
Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language By Stephen Finlay.Stephen Finlay - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):99-101.details
|
|
Plaisir (Entrée académique).Antonin Broi - 2020 - L'Encyclopédie Philosophique.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Phenomenal Defense of Reflective Equilibrium.Weston Mudge Ellis & Justin McBrayer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:1-12.details
|
|
Unconscious Motives and Actions – Agency, Freedom and Responsibility.Christoph Lumer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:428144.details
|
|
Reflective blindness, depression and unpleasant experiences.Elizabeth Ventham - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):684-693.details
|
|
The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
|
|
Is Death Bad for a Cow?Ben Bradley - 2015 - In Tatjana Višak & Robert Garner (eds.), The Ethics of Killing Animals. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 51-64.details
|
|
Prudence and past selves.Dale Dorsey - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1901-1925.details
|
|
Evaluative Beliefs First.Ben Bramble - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8.details
|
|
Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2017 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.details
|
|
The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2016 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-28.details
|
|
Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics.N. G. Laskowski & Stephen Finlay - 2016 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 536-551.details
|
|
Values and Harms in Loss and Damage.Katie McShane - 2017 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 20 (2):129-142.details
|
|
Economic Equality: Rawls versus Utilitarianism.Stephen W. Ball - 1986 - Economics and Philosophy 2 (2):225-244.details
|
|
Happiness in prison.Sabrina Intelisano - unknowndetails
|
|
The Passing of Temporal Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2017 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Reflective Equilibrium.Yuri Cath - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 213-230.details
|
|
When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley?Scott Woodcock - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):299-316.details
|
|
Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Self-expression: a deep self theory of moral responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.details
|
|
Children's Well-Being: A Philosophical Analysis.Anthony Skelton - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 366-377.details
|
|
Moral inferentialism and the Frege-Geach problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.details
|
|
How Theories of Well-Being Can Help Us Help.Valerie Tiberius - 2014 - Journal of Practical Ethics 2 (2):1-19.details
|
|
How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of an End-Relational Semantic Hat.Nicholas Laskowski - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):589-607.details
|
|