- Knowledge and implicatures.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.details
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‘Knowledge’ ascriptions, social roles and semantics.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):335-350.details
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The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment.Matt Lutz - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1-24.details
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Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Shifty talk: knowledge and causation.Jessica Brown - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):183-199.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach.Robin Mckenna - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.details
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On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic.Jennifer Cole Wright - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):491-503.details
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Elusive 'knowledge'.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):130-138.details
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Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-119.details
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Surveys, intuitions, knowledge attributions: Comments on Keith DeRose’s “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys”.Patrick Rysiew - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):111-120.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
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(1 other version)The analysis of knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Implicature.Wayne Davis - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Are Folks Purists or Pragmatic Encroachers? New Discoveries of Relation between Knowledge and Action from Experimental Philosophy.Su Wu - forthcoming - Episteme:1-29.details
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Knowledge and Asymmetric Loss.Alexander Dinges - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1055-1076.details
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Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism.Mark Satta - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (3):202-224.details
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Resolving Bank-Type Puzzles via Action-Directed Pragmatics.Igal Kvart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-58.details
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"Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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The Concept of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Much at stake in knowledge.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):729-749.details
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Replies to Henderson, Elgin and Lawlor.Michael Hannon - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):114-129.details
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Précis of "What’s the Point of Knowledge?".Michael Hannon - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):85-87.details
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Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards.Nikola Anna Kompa - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4673-4693.details
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A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Robin McKenna - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 154-171.details
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Moderate pragmatic invariantism and contextual implicature cancellation.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):3-8.details
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Scorekeeping trolls.William Tuckwell & Kai Tanter - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):215-224.details
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Epistemic Contextualism and the Sociality of Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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Knowledge and cancelability.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):397-405.details
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Knowledge embedded.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Synthese (5):4035-4055.details
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Refined Invariantism.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.details
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Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism.Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman & Nat Hansen - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:427--487.details
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How to Argue for Pragmatic Encroachment.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Synthese (6):2649-2664.details
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Three things to do with knowledge ascriptions.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):99-110.details
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Contextualism and the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’.Mark Satta - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):209-229.details
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The cancellability test for conversational implicatures.Julia Zakkou - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (12):e12552.details
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Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.details
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Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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Knowledge and availability.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573.details
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Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias.Paul Dimmock - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3409-3432.details
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(1 other version)Two purposes of knowledge-attribution and the contextualism debate.Matthew McGrath - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Anti-intellectualism, egocentrism and bank case intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2841-2857.details
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Taking Skepticism Seriously: How the Zhuang-Zi Can Inform Contemporary Epistemology.Chung Julianne - 2017 - Comparative Philosophy 8 (2):3-29.details
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(1 other version)Pluralism about Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171-198.details
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Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.details
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The Ambiguity Theory of “Knows”.Mark Satta - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):69-83.details
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A linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1163-1182.details
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