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The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.details
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Conceptual Engineering, Metasemantic Externalism and Speaker-Meaning.Mark Pinder - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):141–163.details
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“Putting the linguistic method in its place”: Mackie’s distinction between conceptual and factual analysis.Tammo Lossau - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):92-105.details
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(1 other version)Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis.Olav B. Vassend - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1079-1095.details
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What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments.Nick Byrd - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-29.details
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(1 other version)Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.details
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(1 other version)A comprehensive theory of induction and abstraction, part II.Cael Hasse - manuscriptdetails
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Designing Epistemic Concepts.Luke E. Elwonger - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Nebraskadetails
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A new view of scientific rationality.John Watkins - 1987 - Revue de Synthèse 108 (3-4):455-473.details
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(1 other version)Explicating objectual understanding: taking degrees seriously.Christoph Baumberger - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 1 (3):367-388.details
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(1 other version)Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):8.details
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A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses.Samuel Schindler - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 67:54-64.details
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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.details
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Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology? A Response to Horgan.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2017 - Res Philosophica 95 (1):189-197.details
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Explanation, confirmation, and Hempel's paradox.William Roche - 2017 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 219-241.details
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Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.details
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On the justification of deduction and induction.Franz Huber - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3):507-534.details
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O Problema da Indução.Eduardo Castro & Diogo Fernandes - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
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The biological basis of speech: What to infer from talking to the animals.J. D. Trout - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (3):523-549.details
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Estándares múltiples de prueba en medicina y derecho.Andrés Páez - 2015 - In Andrés Páez (ed.), Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes. pp. 123-152.details
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Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem.José Zalabardo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):615-627.details
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Dwindling Confirmation.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):114-137.details
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(1 other version)A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.details
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On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.details
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Dialectics, Evaluation, and Argument.Maurice A. Finocchiaro - 2003 - Informal Logic 23 (1).details
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(1 other version)Emotion, Argumentation and Informal Logic.Michael A. Gilbert - 2004 - Informal Logic 24 (3):245-264.details
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(1 other version)Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy.Kevin Korb - 2004 - Informal Logic 24 (1):41-70.details
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Evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off.William Roche - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):119-124.details
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(1 other version)Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 525-535.details
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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.details
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Toward a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Carlo Buttasi - 2009 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 73--93.details
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Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.details
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Carnap’s dream: Gödel, Wittgenstein, and Logical, Syntax.S. Awodey & A. W. Carus - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):23-45.details
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Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.details
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(2 other versions)How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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Demystifying the Influential IS Legends of Positivism.Mikko Siponen & Aggeliki Tsohou - 2018 - Journal of the Association for Information Systems 19 (7):600-617.details
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Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Crupi Vincenzo, Fitelson Branden & Tentori Katya - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182-199.details
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Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?Jonah N. Schupbach - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):13-27.details
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What Is the Point of Confirmation?Franz Huber - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.details
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(2 other versions)How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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A bayesian way to make stopping rules matter.Daniel Steel - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):213--227.details
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(1 other version)Why coherence is not truth-conducive.Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):236–241.details
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Analogy and inductive logic.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (1):1 - 34.details
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Knowledge as evidence.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):1-25.details
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Autonomy, Freedom & Embodiment: Hegel's Critique of Contemporary Biologism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2014 - Hegel Bulletin 35 (1):56-83.details
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The hole in the ground of induction.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):423 – 432.details
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The relevance criterion of confirmation.J. L. Mackie - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):27-40.details
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The Logic of Theory Assessment.Franz Huber - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):511-538.details
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