- Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.details
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Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue.Finnur Dellsén & Maria Baghramian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S25):6011-6021.details
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Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
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The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Ratio 36 (1):22-31.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details
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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
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Why are Epistemic Reasons Normative?Laura Frances Callahan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Moral uncertainty.Krister Bykvist - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12408.details
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Disagreement, the Independence Thesis, and the Value of Repeated Reasoning.Ethan Brauer - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):494-510.details
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Bayesianism and self-doubt.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2225-2243.details
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Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account.Anna Boncompagni - 2021 - Episteme 1 (Early view):1-18.details
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The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company.Joshua Blanchard - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):529-541.details
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Self-Favoring Theories and the Bias Argument.Bálint Békefi - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):199-213.details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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From Belief Polarization to Echo Chambers: A Rationalizing Account.Endre Begby - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists.James R. Beebe & Jonathan Matheson - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-24.details
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Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists.James R. Beebe & Jonathan Matheson - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3):426-449.details
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Resolving Turri's Puzzle about Withholding.Sebastian Becker - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):229-243.details
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Discussion of James Pryor's “The Merits of Incoherence”.Ori Beck, Anil Gupta, Adrian Haddock, James Pryor & Declan Smithies - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):142-148.details
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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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Genealogical Defeat and Ontological Sparsity.Jonathan Barker - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:1-23.details
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Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist.Dominik Balg - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):51-78.details
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Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism.Nathan Ballantyne - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):752-765.details
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Conciliationism and Uniqueness.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.details
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Tragic Flaws.Nathan Ballantyne - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):20-40.details
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Epistemic Trespassing.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):367-395.details
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Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.details
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Unicorn agnosticism.Yuval Avnur - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):818-829.details
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How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Arsenault & Zachary C. Irving - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):185-194.details
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“Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote.Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2341-2364.details
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Coherence, evidence, and legal proof.Amalia Amaya - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (1):1-43.details
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Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat.David Alexander - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.details
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Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism.David Alexander - 2017 - Synthese 198 (5):3979-3998.details
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Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Yan Chen & Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge.details
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Dynamic Introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Dissertation, Stanford Universitydetails
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Epistemic Defeaters.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Unity of Evidence and Coherence.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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