- Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.details
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Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements.Dunja Šešelja - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6143-6158.details
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Autonomy as an Ideal for Neuro-Atypical Agency: Lessons from Bipolar Disorder.Elliot Porter - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Kentdetails
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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Epistemic Self-Doubt.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Modesty and Humility.Nicolas Bommarito - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Learning from Scientific Disagreement.Bruno Borge & Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2021 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 36 (3):375-398.details
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The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence.Marco Tiozzo - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.details
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Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Bayesian Epistemology and Having Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
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Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (11):1-39.details
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When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Angles, New Arguments. Routledge.details
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Disagreeing about disagreement.Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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A defence of the evolutionary debunking argument.Man Him Ip - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Reasons Against Belief: A Theory of Epistemic Defeat.Tim Loughrist - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska - Lincolndetails
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The Problem of Respecting Higher-Order Doubt.David J. Alexander - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case.David Christensen - 2018 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 93 (1):207-235.details
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Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.details
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Rationality for the Self-Aware (Ernest Sosa Lecture).David Christensen - 2021 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 95:215-236.details
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Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Om betydelsen av evidens av högre ordning.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 39 (1).details
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Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.details
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A defense of liberalism in the epistemology of perception.Megan Feeney - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers Universitydetails
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Rational Uniqueness and Religious Disagreement.Christopher Willard-Kyle - manuscriptdetails
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A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitatdetails
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How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7.details
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Contagious Blindspots: Formal Ignorance Spreads to Peers.Roy Sorensen - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):335-344.details
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Hierarchies of evidence in evidence-based medicine.Christopher Blunt - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup.details
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On Divorcing the Rational and the Justified in Epistemology.Kurt Sylvan - manuscriptdetails
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