- The Quality of Life: Aristotle Revised, by Richard Kraut.Daniel M. Haybron - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):947-956.details
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Art and Achievement.James Grant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2517-2539.details
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No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):43-64.details
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Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
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Two Visions of Welfare.Fred Feldman - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):99-118.details
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The Experience Machine and the Experience Requirement.Jennifer Hawkins - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 355-365.details
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Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Reflective blindness, depression and unpleasant experiences.Elizabeth Ventham - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):684-693.details
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Is Rawls Really a Kantian Contractarian?Baldwin Wong - 2016 - Public Reason 8 (1-2).details
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It's All in the Brain : A Theory of the Qualities of Perception.Jesper Östman - 2013 - Umeå Studies in Philosophy 11:168.details
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Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2013 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Demandingness Objections in Ethics.Brian McElwee - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):84-105.details
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Children and Well-Being.Anthony Skelton - 2018 - In Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder & Jurgen de Wispelaere (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children. New York: Routledge. pp. 90-100.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.details
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II—Simon Kirchin: Evaluation, Normativity and Grounding.Simon Kirchin - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):179-198.details
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Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.Sorin Baiasu - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1185-1208.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Andreas Lech Mogensen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Compassion and Beyond.Roger Crisp - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):233-246.details
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Debunking Arguments: Mathematics, Logic, and Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Michael Ruse & Robert J. Richards (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.details
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A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 239-266.details
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Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2018 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 27-59.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Emotions and Wellbeing.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):461-474.details
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How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.details
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Is it Better to Love Better Things?Aaron Smuts - 2014 - In Christian Maurer, Tony Milligan & Kamila Pacovská (eds.), Love and Its Objects: What Can We Care For? Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.details
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Classifying theories of welfare.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):787-803.details
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Rule Consequentialism and Scope.Leonard Kahn - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):631-646.details
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The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.details
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Duties of Minimal Wellbeing and Their role in Global Justice.Ambrose Y. K. Lee - unknowndetails
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Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.details
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In Defense of the No-Reasons View of Love.Aaron Smuts - details
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Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
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The rights and wrongs of consequentialism.Brian McElwee - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):393 - 412.details
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What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?Sharon Hewitt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):331 - 349.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.details
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The feels good theory of pleasure.Aaron Smuts - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.details
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A defense of intuitions.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.details
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Action always involves attention.Wayne Wu - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):693-703.details
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Utilitarianism about animals and the moral significance of use.David Killoren & Robert Streiffer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1043-1063.details
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Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):510-524.details
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The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.details
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The Misfortunes of Moral Enhancement.Marco Antonio Azevedo - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5):461-479.details
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Pluralism about Well‐Being.Eden Lin - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):127-154.details
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Pleasure and Its Contraries.Olivier Massin - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.details
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