- Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.details
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On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):757-771.details
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Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases.Brandon Yip - 2020 - Erkenntnis (4):1501-1519.details
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Virtues, social roles, and contextualism.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):95-114.details
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Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach.Sarah Wright - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):99-111.details
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P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):328-352.details
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Ambiguous rationality.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):263-274.details
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Assertion and Its Many Norms.John N. Williams - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):39-76.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Luck, knowledge and value.Lee John Whittington - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1615-1633.details
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Norms of assertion.Matthew Weiner - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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A Credibility-Backed Norm for Testimony.Matt Weiner - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):73-85.details
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Tolerating Gluts.Zach Weber, David Ripley, Graham Priest, Dominic Hyde & Mark Colyvan - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):813-828.details
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Epistemic comparative conditionals.Linton Wang - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):133 - 156.details
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Contextualism and Semantic Ascent.Michael Veber - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):261-272.details
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Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.details
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Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.John Turri - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.details
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Prompting challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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Knowledge Guaranteed.John Turri - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):602-612.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology.Briana Toole - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):47-65.details
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Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm.Nicholas Tebben - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-20.details
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Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm.Nicholas Tebben - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11755-11774.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.details
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On a Case for Truth‐Relativism.Jason Stanley - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):179-188.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):126-131.details
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Understanding assertion to understand silencing: Finding an account of assertion that explains silencing arising from testimonial injustice.David Spewak - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):423-440.details
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Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1.Martin Smith - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):791-802.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.Donald Smith - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (2):123-131.details
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The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion.Mona Simion - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):477-488.details
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Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology.Mona Simion - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):891-916.details
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Epistemic norms and ‘he said/she said’ reporting.Mona Simion - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):413-422.details
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Assertion: The context shiftiness dilemma.Mona Simion - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):503-517.details
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A puzzle for epistemic WAMs.Mona Simion - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4679-4689.details
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Assertion: knowledge is enough.Mona Simion - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge.Robert K. Shope - 2008 - Synthese 163 (1):99-118.details
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Epistemological contextualism and the knowledge account of assertion.Joseph Shieber - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):169-181.details
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The Logic of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Julian J. Schlöder - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):49-57.details
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