- Defending Non-Derived Content.Ken Aizawa & Fred Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.details
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An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith).Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.details
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'X' means X: Fodor/warfield semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.details
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The informational turn in philosophy.Frederick Adams - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.details
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Swampman's revenge: Squabbles among the representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.details
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Rock beats scissors: historicalism fights back.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):273-281.details
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Names, contents, and causes.Fred Adams & Gary Fuller - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.details
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Narrow content: Fodor's folly.Fred Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.details
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Is There a Philosophy of Information?Fred Adams & João Antonio de Moraes - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):161-171.details
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Information and knowledge à la Floridi.Fred Adams - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):331-344.details
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Fodor's modal argument.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.details
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Does a Piagetian description work?Leah E. Adams-Curtis - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):588-588.details
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Teleosemantics without natural selection.Marshall Abrams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):97-116.details
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Niche construction and teleology: organisms as agents and contributors in ecology, development, and evolution.Bendik Hellem Aaby & Hugh Desmond - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (5):1-20.details
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The proximate-ultimate distinction and the active role of the organism in evolution.Bendik Hellem Aaby & Grant Ramsey - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (4):1-20.details
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Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.details
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Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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Is emotion a form of perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2008 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The modularity of emotions. Calgary, Alta., Canada: University of Calgary Press. pp. 137-160.details
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Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Explanatory exclusion and mental explanation.Dwayne Moore - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):390-404.details
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Belief revision in psychotherapy.J. P. Grodniewicz - 2024 - Synthese 203 (4):1-22.details
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Stop and smell the what? Two kinds of olfactory representation.Christopher F. Masciari - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The Weirdness of the World.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2024 - Princeton University Press.details
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Metafizika lica.Miljana Milojevic - 2018details
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Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.Frances Egan - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołrega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Tropes and Other Things.Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - In Stephen Laurence & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Prospects for probabilistic theories of natural information.Ulrich Stegmann - unknowndetails
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Theories of Perceptual Content and Cases of Reliable Spatial Misperception.Andrew Rubner - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):430-455.details
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Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing.Marco Facchin - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (2):305-327.details
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Semantic information and the correctness theory of truth.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):147-175.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.details
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Dretske's intricate behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (May):1-10.details
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Talk and thought.John Heil - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (November):153-170.details
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Darwin's Doubt Defended: Why Evolution Supports Skepticism.Greg Littmann - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (1):81-103.details
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Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):715-738.details
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The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?Frank Hofmann & Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.details
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Perceptual representations: a teleosemantic answer to the breadth-of-application problem.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (1):119-136.details
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Why mental content is not like water: reconsidering the reductive claims of teleosemantics.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2271-2290.details
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Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.details
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Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms.E. Steinhart - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):3-27.details
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Dissolving the Grounding Problem: How the Pen is Mightier than the Sword.Nancy Salay - 2017 - In R. Catrambone & S. Ohlsson (eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.details
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The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Georges Rey - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Philosophy of Neuroscience.Bickle John, Mandik Peter & Anthony Landreth - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Creativity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 262-296.details
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There are no i-beliefs or i-desires at work in fiction consumption and this is why.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-233.details
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