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The relevant alternatives theory and missed clues.T. Black - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):96 – 106.details
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RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.details
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A Moorean response to brain-in-a-vat scepticism.T. Black - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):148 – 163.details
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Knowing the World by Knowing One's Mind.Sven Bernecker - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):1-34.details
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Hyperintensionality and Overfitting.Francesco Berto - 2024 - Synthese 1 (4):1-21.details
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Gravity and Grace.Gordon Belot - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1).details
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The Presidential Address: Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy.Helen Beebee - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (1):1-24.details
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Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention.Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):346-378.details
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Margins for error and sensitivity: What Nozick might have said. [REVIEW]Kelly Becker - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.details
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Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding.Kelly Becker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):145-161.details
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Internalism empowered: how to bolster a theory of justification with a direct realist theory of awareness.Benjamin Bayer - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.details
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A role for abstractionism in a direct realist foundationalism.Benjamin Bayer - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):357-389.details
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What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.details
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Knockdown Arguments.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):525-543.details
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Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.details
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Social externalism and first-person authority.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.details
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Intention, cognitive commitment, and planning.Robert Audi - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):361-378.details
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Foundationalism, epistemic dependence, and defeasibility.Robert Audi - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.details
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Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):321-338.details
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Why safety doesn’t save closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):127-142.details
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Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.details
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The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection: An Interactive Perspective.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.details
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Contextualism and fallibility: pragmatic encroachment, possibility, and strength of epistemic position.Jonathan E. Adler - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):247-272.details
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Towards closure on closure.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):179-196.details
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Husker du?Fred Adams - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94.details
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Externalist responses to skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 504--32.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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How to Know That You’re Not a Zombie.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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Questions in Action.Daniel Hoek - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (3):113-143.details
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
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Belief-Forming Processes, Extended.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.details
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Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.details
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Questions, topics and restricted closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure (and other principles).Yuval Avnur - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Intuitive Closure, Transmission Failure, and Doxastic justification.Matthew Jope - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Putnam on Brains-in-Vats and Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Putnam on Brains in Vats. Cambridge University Press.details
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Safety and Dream Scepticism in Sosa’s Epistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robert Cowan - 2024 - Synthese.details
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Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Wahrheit.Dirk Kindermann - 2015 - In Nikola Kompa (ed.), Handbuch Sprachphilosophie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 91-99.details
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Die Begriffsanalyse im 21. Jahrhundert: Eine Verteidigung gegen zeitgenössische Einwände.Nicole Rathgeb - 2019 - Paderborn: mentis.details
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