- A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention.Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):346-378.details
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Reliabilism Defended.Jeffrey Tolly - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):619-635.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan H.\'aje & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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Knowledge by constraint.Ben Holguín - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):1-28.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Understanding and Testimony.Allan Hazlett - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Propositionalism and Questions that do not have Correct Answers.Giulia Felappi - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1-19.details
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(1 other version)An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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A modal theory of discrimination.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10661-10684.details
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Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐wh.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):252-275.details
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Better virtuous than safe.Haicheng Zhao - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):6969-6991.details
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Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - 2025 - In Peter van Elswyk, Dirk Kindermann, Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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What the metasemantics of "know" is not.Peter van Elswyk - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):69-82.details
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A Corpus Study of "Know": On the Verification of Philosophers' Frequency Claims about Language.Nat Hansen, J. D. Porter & Kathryn Francis - 2019 - Episteme 18 (2):242-268.details
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Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
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Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1619-1638.details
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Know-how and non-propositional intentionality.Katalin Farkas - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-113.details
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Philosophy, Drama and Literature.Rick Benitez - 2010 - In Graham Robert Oppy, Nick Trakakis, Lynda Burns, Steven Gardner & Fiona Leigh (eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University Publishing. pp. 371-372.details
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The generality problem for intellectualism.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):242-262.details
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Three Arguments for Humility.David Yates - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):461-481.details
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Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.details
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Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1167-1186.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):759-775.details
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In defense of subject-sensitive invariantism.Brian Kim - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):233-251.details
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Practical Know‐Wh.Katalin Farkas - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):855-870.details
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Inexpressible Ignorance.Shamik Dasgupta - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (4):441-480.details
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Substantivalism vs Relationalism About Space in Classical Physics.Shamik Dasgupta - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):601-624.details
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Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.details
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Know-wh does not reduce to know that.Katalin Farkas - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):109-122.details
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Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.details
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Knowing how and pragmatic intrusion.Alessandro Capone - 2011 - Intercultural Pragmatics 8 (4):543-570.details
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Unreliable Knowledge.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.details
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Knowing‐Wh and Embedded Questions.Ted Parent - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):81-95.details
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Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.details
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Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.details
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Rule Following and Metaontology.T. Parent - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):247-265.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):341-355.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-160.details
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Recent work on propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.details
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Knowledge-the and propositional attitude ascriptions.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.details
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Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic.van Remmen Maximilian - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-28.details
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Idle Questions.Jens Kipper, Alexander W. Kocurek & Zeynep Soysal - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy.details
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