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Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?Robert Schroer - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):93-110.details
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Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.details
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Is phenomenal force sufficient for immediate perceptual justification?Lu Teng - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):637-656.details
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Self-Ignorance.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2012 - In Consciousness and the Self.details
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Une défense hétérodoxe de la conception inférentialiste de l'introspection.Pascal Ludwig - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):123-144.details
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The problem of common sensibles.Michael Tye - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):287 - 303.details
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The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?Frank Hofmann & Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.details
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Introspective availability.John Kulvicki - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.details
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Rosenthal on mental qualities.Alex Byrne - 2022 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Immediate and Reflective Senses.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. pp. 187-209.details
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Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
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How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117.details
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The Philosophy of Phenomenal Consciousness.Zoe Drayson - 2015 - In Drayson Zoe (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. pp. 273-292.details
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First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Thought Experiments, Epistemology & our Cognitive Capacities.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge.details
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Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.details
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What Constitutes Phenomenal Character?Murat Aydede - manuscriptdetails
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Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners.C. E. Abbate - 2014 - Between the Species 17 (1):1-30.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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El pragmatismo biológico de las creencias.Miguel Cabrera Machado - 2019 - Caracas: Amazon.details
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Personal Identity and Self-Interpretation & Natural Right and Natural Emotions.Gabor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2020 - Budapest: Eötvös University Press.details
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Dalla filosofia dell’azione alla filosofia della mente – Riflessioni in onore di Sandro Nannini.Christoph Lumer & Giacomo Romano (eds.) - 2018 - Roma; Messina (Italy): corisco.details
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Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.details
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Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.details
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Radicalizing numerical cognition.Karim Zahidi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):529-545.details
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Self and other: from pure ego to co-constituted we.Dan Zahavi - 2015 - Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):143-160.details
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Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States.Julie Zahle - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4):493-518.details
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Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debate.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):42-66.details
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Intentionality and Phenomenality: Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):63-92.details
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Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the capgras delusion.Garry Young - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.details
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Projectivist representationalism and color.Wayne Wright - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.details
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Explanation and the hard problem.Wayne Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330.details
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Reconsidering perceptual content.William T. Wojtach - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.details
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What Is Information? Three Concepts.William F. Harms - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (3):230-242.details
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The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Aspectual Shape: Presentational Approach.Konrad Werner - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):427-440.details
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The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention.Assaf Weksler, Hilla Jacobson & Zohar Z. Bronfman - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4709-4730.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
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Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.details
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Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism.Dave Ward - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):650-680.details
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Was evolution the only possible way for God to make autonomous creatures? Examination of an argument in evolutionary theodicy.Mats Wahlberg - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):37-51.details
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Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.details
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Colour hallucination: In defence of externalist representationalism.Elisabeth Lucia Waczek & Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):3-7.details
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Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):237-256.details
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The Sense of Time.Gerardo Viera - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):443-469.details
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