- The unexpected value of the future.Hayden Wilkinson - manuscriptdetails
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Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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“Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches.Shyam Nair - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):38-88.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.details
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Deontic Modals and Probability: One Theory to Rule Them All?Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press.details
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Pascalian Expectations and Explorations.Alan Hajek & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Roger Ariew & Yuval Avnur (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Pascal. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
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Accuracy and ur-prior conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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On behalf of controversial view agnosticism.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1358-1370.details
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The Ineffability of Induction.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):129-149.details
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A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.details
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Infinite Lotteries, Spinners, Applicability of Hyperreals†.Emanuele Bottazzi & Mikhail G. Katz - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (1):88-109.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Infinitesimal Probabilities.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):509-552.details
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Gravity and Grace.Gordon Belot - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1).details
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Non-Propositionalism and The Suppositional Rule.Tom Beevers - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Cauchy’s Infinitesimals, His Sum Theorem, and Foundational Paradigms.Tiziana Bascelli, Piotr Błaszczyk, Alexandre Borovik, Vladimir Kanovei, Karin U. Katz, Mikhail G. Katz, Semen S. Kutateladze, Thomas McGaffey, David M. Schaps & David Sherry - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (2):267-296.details
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Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1205-1230.details
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Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Uniform probability in cosmology.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 101 (C):48-60.details
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Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach–Tarski Paradox.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3525-3540.details
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Popper Functions, Uniform Distributions and Infinite Sequences of Heads.Alexander R. Pruss - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3):259-271.details
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Underdetermination of infinitesimal probabilities.Alexander R. Pruss - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):777-799.details
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Finite additivity, another lottery paradox and conditionalisation.Colin Howson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-24.details
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Rational Illogicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141.details
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Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.details
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An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
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Open-Minded Orthodox Bayesianism by Epsilon-Conditionalization.Eric Raidl - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (1):139-176.details
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Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):196-215.details
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Weintraub’s response to Williamson’s coin flip argument.Matthew W. Parker - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.details
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Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):8.details
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An Infinite Lottery Paradox.John D. Norton & Matthew W. Parker - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (1):1-6.details
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The strength of de Finetti’s coherence theorem.Michael Nielsen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11713-11724.details
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Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.details
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Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.details
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You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence.Alexander Meehan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3319-3351.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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Probability Modals and Infinite Domains.Adam Marushak - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1041-1055.details
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Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1.William MacAskill & Toby Ord - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):327-353.details
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People with Common Priors Can Agree to Disagree.Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):11-45.details
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Infinite lotteries, large and small sets.Luc Lauwers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2203-2209.details
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Does Chance Undermine Would?Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):747-785.details
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Literal self-deception.Maiya Jordan - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):248-256.details
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Consequentialism in infinite worlds.Adam Jonsson & Martin Peterson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):240-248.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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A Better Way of Framing Williamson’s Coin-Tossing Argument, but It Still Does Not Work.Colin Howson - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (2):366-374.details
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