- Parfit über Intuitionismus und die Herausforderung moralischer Uneinigkeit.Kay Hüwelmeyer - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):287-324.details
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Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis.John Turri - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):141-156.details
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Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Inquiry Beyond Knowledge.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.details
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Knowledge and acceptance.Roman Heil - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-17.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):348-367.details
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Sins of Thought.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):273-293.details
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Rational stability under pragmatic encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Friendship and epistemic norms.Jason Kawall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.details
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Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.details
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Giving the Benefit of the Doubt.Paul Faulkner - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):139-155.details
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Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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A Defense of Impurist Permissivism.Jenny Yi-Chen Wu - 2023 - Episteme:1-21.details
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Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach.Sarah Wright - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):99-111.details
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Two Kinds of Stakes.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.details
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Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):77-96.details
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Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.details
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Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Luck, knowledge and value.Lee John Whittington - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1615-1633.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Hierarchical Propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):215-231.details
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Belief, information and reasoning.Bruno Whittle - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Entrepreneurial beleifs and agency under Knightian uncertainty.Randall Westgren & Travis Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 22 (2):199-217.details
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Entrepreneurial Beliefs and Agency under Knightian Uncertainty.Randall E. Westgren & Travis L. Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 21 (2):199-217.details
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Margins and Errors.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):63-76.details
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Interests, evidence and games.Brian Weatherson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):329-344.details
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Defending interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1619-1638.details
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Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence.Caroline von Klemperer - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (7).details
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You always have a reason to check! A new take on the bank cases.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1007-1018.details
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