Intuitionistic Propositional Logic is proved to be an infinitely many valued logic by Gödel (Kurt Gödel collected works (Volume I) Publications 1929–1936, Oxford University Press, pp 222–225, 1932), and it is proved by Jaśkowski (Actes du Congrés International de Philosophie Scientifique, VI. Philosophie des Mathématiques, Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles 393:58–61, 1936) to be a countably many valued logic. In this paper, we provide alternative proofs for these theorems by using models of Kripke (J Symbol Logic 24(1):1–14, 1959). Gödel’s proof gave (...) rise to an intermediate propositional logic (between intuitionistic and classical), that is known nowadays as Gödel or the Gödel-Dummett Logic, and is studied by fuzzy logicians as well. We also provide some results on the inter-definability of propositional connectives in this logic. (shrink)

This paper presents an algebraic framework for investigating proposed translations of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, such as the four negative translations introduced by Kolmogorov, Gödel, Gentzen and Glivenko. We view these asvariant semanticsand present a semantic formulation of Troelstra’s syntactic criteria for a satisfactory negative translation. We consider how each of the above-mentioned translation schemes behaves on two generalisations of Heyting algebras: bounded pocrims and bounded hoops. When a translation fails for a particular class of algebras, we demonstrate that (...) failure via specific finite examples. Using these, we prove that the syntactic version of these translations will fail to satisfy Troelstra’s criteria in the corresponding substructural logical setting. (shrink)

This book offers a concise introduction to both proof-theory and algebraic methods, the core of the syntactic and semantic study of logic respectively. The importance of combining these two has been increasingly recognized in recent years. It highlights the contrasts between the deep, concrete results using the former and the general, abstract ones using the latter. Covering modal logics, many-valued logics, superintuitionistic and substructural logics, together with their algebraic semantics, the book also provides an introduction to nonclassical logic for undergraduate (...) or graduate level courses.The book is divided into two parts: Proof Theory in Part I and Algebra in Logic in Part II. Part I presents sequent systems and discusses cut elimination and its applications in detail. It also provides simplified proof of cut elimination, making the topic more accessible. The last chapter of Part I is devoted to clarification of the classes of logics that are discussed in the second part. Part II focuses on algebraic semantics for these logics. At the same time, it is a gentle introduction to the basics of algebraic logic and universal algebra with many examples of their applications in logic. Part II can be read independently of Part I, with only minimum knowledge required, and as such is suitable as a textbook for short introductory courses on algebra in logic. (shrink)

This article introduces, studies, and applies a new system of logic which is called ‘HYPE’. In HYPE, formulas are evaluated at states that may exhibit truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Simple and natural semantic rules for negation and the conditional operator are formulated based on an incompatibility relation and a partial fusion operation on states. The semantics is worked out in formal and philosophical detail, and a sound and complete axiomatization is provided both for the propositional and the (...) predicate logic of the system. The propositional logic of HYPE is shown to contain first-degree entailment, to have the Finite Model Property, to be decidable, to have the Disjunction Property, and to extend intuitionistic propositional logic conservatively when intuitionistic negation is defined appropriately by HYPE’s logical connectives. Furthermore, HYPE’s first-order logic is a conservative extension of intuitionistic logic with the Constant Domain Axiom, when intuitionistic negation is again defined appropriately. The system allows for simple model constructions and intuitive Euler-Venn-like diagrams, and its logical structure matches structures well-known from ordinary mathematics, such as from optimization theory, combinatorics, and graph theory. HYPE may also be used as a general logical framework in which different systems of logic can be studied, compared, and combined. In particular, HYPE is found to relate in interesting ways to classical logic and various systems of relevance and paraconsistent logic, many-valued logic, and truthmaker semantics. On the philosophical side, if used as a logic for theories of type-free truth, HYPE is shown to address semantic paradoxes such as the Liar Paradox by extending non-classical fixed-point interpretations of truth by a conditional as well-behaved as that of intuitionistic logic. Finally, HYPE may be used as a background system for modal operators that create hyperintensional contexts, though the details of this application need to be left to follow-up work. (shrink)

The proof theory of many-valued systems has not been investigated to an extent comparable to the work done on axiomatizatbility of many-valued logics. Proof theory requires appropriate formalisms, such as sequent calculus, natural deduction, and tableaux for classical (and intuitionistic) logic. One particular method for systematically obtaining calculi for all finite-valued logics was invented independently by several researchers, with slight variations in design and presentation. The main aim of this report is to develop the proof theory of finite-valued first order (...) logics in a general way, and to present some of the more important results in this area. In Systems covered are the resolution calculus, sequent calculus, tableaux, and natural deduction. This report is actually a template, from which all results can be specialized to particular logics. (shrink)

We prove several interpolation theorems for many-valued infinitary logic with quantifiers by studying expansions of MV-algebras in the spirit of polyadic and cylindric algebras. We prove for various reducts of polyadic MV-algebras of infinite dimensions that if is the free algebra in the given signature,, is in the subalgebra of generated by, is in the subalgebra of generated by and, then there exists an interpolant in the subalgebra generated by and such that. We call this a varying interpolation property because (...) the integer depends on the inequality. We also address cases where this interpolation property fails, but other weaker ones hold. One such interpolation theorem says that though an interpolant may not be found as above, an interpolant can always be found if finitely many universal quantifiers are applied to making it smaller and the same number of existential quantifiers are applied to making it bigger. This number of quantifiers also varies; it depends on the inequality. Se.. (shrink)

Hilbert’s choice operators τ and ε, when added to intuitionistic logic, strengthen it. In the presence of certain extensionality axioms they produce classical logic, while in the presence of weaker decidability conditions for terms they produce various superintuitionistic intermediate logics. In this thesis, I argue that there are important philosophical lessons to be learned from these results. To make the case, I begin with a historical discussion situating the development of Hilbert’s operators in relation to his evolving program in the (...) foundations of mathematics and in relation to philosophical motivations leading to the development of intuitionistic logic. This sets the stage for a brief description of the relevant part of Dummett’s program to recast debates in metaphysics, and in particular disputes about realism and anti-realism, as closely intertwined with issues in philosophical logic, with the acceptance of classical logic for a domain reflecting a commitment to realism for that domain. Then I review extant results about what is provable and what is not when one adds epsilon to intuitionistic logic, largely due to Bell and DeVidi, and I give several new proofs of intermediate logics from intuitionistic logic+ε without identity. With all this in hand, I turn to a discussion of the philosophical significance of choice operators. Among the conclusions I defend are that these results provide a finer-grained basis for Dummett’s contention that commitment to classically valid but intuitionistically invalid principles reflect metaphysical commitments by showing those principles to be derivable from certain existence assumptions; that Dummett’s framework is improved by these results as they show that questions of realism and anti-realism are not an “all or nothing” matter, but that there are plausibly metaphysical stances between the poles of anti-realism and realism, because different sorts of ontological assumptions yield intermediate rather than classical logic; and that these intermediate positions between classical and intuitionistic logic link up in interesting ways with our intuitions about issues of objectivity and reality, and do so usefully by linking to questions around intriguing everyday concepts such as “is smart,” which I suggest involve a number of distinct dimensions which might themselves be objective, but because of their multivalent structure are themselves intermediate between being objective and not. Finally, I discuss the implications of these results for ongoing debates about the status of arbitrary and ideal objects in the foundations of logic, showing among other things that much of the discussion is flawed because it does not recognize the degree to which the claims being made depend on the presumption that one is working with a very strong logic. (shrink)

This work studies some problems connected to the role of negation in logic, treating the positive fragments of propositional calculus in order to deal with two main questions: the proof of the completeness theorems in systems lacking negation, and the puzzle raised by positive paradoxes like the well-known argument of Haskel Curry. We study the constructive com- pleteness method proposed by Leon Henkin for classical fragments endowed with implication, and advance some reasons explaining what makes difficult to extend this constructive (...) method to non-classical fragments equipped with weaker implications (that avoid Curry's objection). This is the case, for example, of Jan Lukasiewicz's n-valued logics and Wilhelm Ackermann's logic of restricted implication. Besides such problems, both Henkin's method and the triviality phenomenon enable us to propose a new positive tableau proof system which uses only positive meta-linguistic resources, and to mo- tivate a new discussion concerning the role of negation in logic proposing the concept of paratriviality. In this way, some relations between positive reasoning and infinity, the possibilities to obtain a ¯first-order positive logic as well as the philosophical connection between truth and meaning are dis- cussed from a conceptual point of view. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with infinitary universal Horn logic both with and without equality. First, we obtain a relative Lyndon-style interpolation theorem. Using this result, we prove a non-standard preservation theorem which contains, as a particular case, a Lyndon-style theorem on surjective homomorphisms in its Makkai-style formulation. Another consequence of the preservation theorem is a theorem on bimorphisms, which, in particular, provides a tool for immediate obtaining characterizations of infinitary universal Horn classes without equality from those with equality. From (...) the theorem on surjective homomorphisms we also derive a non-standard Beth-style preservation theorem that yields a non-standard Beth-style definability theorem, according to which implicit definability of a relation symbol in an infinitary universal Horn theory implies its explicit definability by a conjunction of atomic formulas. We also apply our theorem on surjective homomorphisms, theorem on bimorphisms and definability theorem to algebraic logic for general propositional logic. (shrink)

We construct the finitely generated free algebras and determine the free spectra of varieties of linear equivalential algebras and linear equivalential algebras of finite height corresponding. respectively, to the equivalential fragments of intermediate Gödel-Dummett logic and intermediate finite-valued logics of Gödel. Thus we compute the number of purely equivalential propositional formulas in these logics in n variables for an arbitrary n ∈ N.

The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...) and Skolem. Itinerary V surveys the work in logic connected to the Hilbert school, and itinerary V deals specifically with consistency proofs and metamathematics, including the incompleteness theorems. Itinerary VII traces the development of intuitionistic and many-valued logics. Itinerary VIII surveys the development of semantical notions from the early work on axiomatics up to Tarski's work on truth. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that the logic of set theory should be intuitionistic on the grounds that the open-endedness of the set concept demands the adoption of a nonclassical semantics. This paper examines to what extent adopting such a semantics has revisionary consequences for the logic of our set-theoretic reasoning. It is shown that in the context of the axioms of standard set theory, an intuitionistic semantics sanctions a classical logic. A Kripke semantics in the context of a weaker axiomatization (...) is then considered. It is argued that this semantics vindicates an intuitionistic logic only insofar as certain constraints are put on its interpretation. Wider morals are drawn about the restrictions that this places on the shape of arguments for an intuitionistic revision of the logic of set theory. (shrink)

Some of the most important developments of symbolic logic took place in the 1920s. Foremost among them are the distinction between syntax and semantics and the formulation of questions of completeness and decidability of logical systems. David Hilbert and his students played a very important part in these developments. Their contributions can be traced to unpublished lecture notes and other manuscripts by Hilbert and Bernays dating to the period 1917-1923. The aim of this paper is to describe these results, focussing (...) primarily on propositional logic, and to put them in their historical context. It is argued that truth-value semantics, syntactic ("Post-") and semantic completeness, decidability, and other results were first obtained by Hilbert and Bernays in 1918, and that Bernays's role in their discovery and the subsequent development of mathematical logic is much greater than has so far been acknowledged. (shrink)

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)

The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly, to say something about that philosophy of mathematics known as 'intuitionism' and, secondly, to fit these remarks into a more general message for the philosophy of mathematics as a whole. What I have to say on the first score can, without too much inaccuracy, be compressed into two theses. The first is that the intuitionistic critique of classical mathematics can be seen as based primarily on epistemological rather than on meaning-theoretic considerations. The (...) second is that the intuitionist's chief objection to the classical mathematician's use of logic does not center on the use of particular logical principles (in particular, the law of excluded middle and its ilk). Rather on the role the classical mathematician assigns (or at least extends) generally (i.e. regardless of the particular principles used) to the use of logic in the production mathematical proofs. Thus, the intuitionist critique of logic that we shall be presenting is far more radical than that which has commonly been presented. -/- Concerning the second, more general, theme, my claim is this: some restriction of the role of logical inference in mathematical proof such as that mentioned above is necessary if one is to account for the seeming difference in the epistemic conditions of provers whose reasoning is based on genuine insight into the subject-matter being investigated, and would-be provers whose reasoning is based not on such insight, but rather on principles of inference which hold of every subject-matter indifferently. (shrink)

1. A. Heyting (1930) introduced an intermediate logic whose semantics is based on a pair of states (‘here’ and ‘there’). This logic was axiomatized by Hosoi (1966), using the sequence of intermedia...

We present nested sequent systems for propositional Gödel-Dummett logic and its first-order extensions with non-constant and constant domains, built atop nested calculi for intuitionistic logics. To obtain nested systems for these Gödel-Dummett logics, we introduce a new structural rule, called the linearity rule, which (bottom-up) operates by linearising branching structure in a given nested sequent. In addition, an interesting feature of our calculi is the inclusion of reachability rules, which are special logical rules that operate by propagating data and/or checking (...) if data exists along certain paths within a nested sequent. Such rules require us to generalise our nested sequents to include signatures (i.e. finite collections of variables) in the first-order cases, thus giving rise to a generalisation of the usual nested sequent formalism. Our calculi exhibit favourable properties, admitting the height-preserving invertibility of every logical rule and the (height-preserving) admissibility of a large collection of structural and reachability rules. We prove all of our systems sound and cut-free complete, and show that syntactic cut-elimination obtains for the intuitionistic systems. We conclude the paper by discussing possible extensions and modifications, putting forth an array of structural rules that could be used to provide a sizable class of intermediate logics with cut-free nested sequent systems. (shrink)

The main research goal of the work is to study the notion of co-topos, its correctness, properties and relations with toposes. In particular, the dualization process proposed by proponents of co-toposes has been analyzed, which transforms certain Heyting algebras of toposes into co-Heyting ones, by which a kind of paraconsistent logic may appear in place of intuitionistic logic. It has been shown that if certain two definitions of topos are to be equivalent, then in one of them, in the context (...) of a subobject classifier, there should be a neutral label for the generic subobject, or if the label "true" appears instead, it carries no additional properties or assumptions. It has been shown that a natural isomorphism occurring in one of the definitions of topos need not be an isomorphism of the corresponding algebraic structures on the sets, so that a co-Heyting algebraic structure can be defined on the set of characteristic morphisms, which moreover will also be natural. The analyzes suggest that the notion of co-topos may be considered correct. However, it should be strongly emphasized that although the possibility of defining the notion of co-topos has been shown, its further full consequences should be very carefully examined, which can severely limit its logical applications. (shrink)

Relevant logics infamously have the property that they only validate a conditional when some propositional variable is shared between its antecedent and consequent. This property has been strengthened in a variety of ways over the last half-century. Two of the more famous of these strengthenings are the strong variable sharing property and the depth relevance property. In this paper I demonstrate that an appropriate class of relevant logics has a property that might naturally be characterized as the supremum of these (...) two properties. I also show how to use this fact to demonstrate that these logics seem to be constructive in previously unknown ways. (shrink)

Let MK3 I and MK3 II be Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix with only one and two designated values, respectively. Next, let MK3 G be defined exactly as MK3 I, except th...

Pretabularity is the attribute of logics that are not characterised by finite matrices, but all of whose proper extensions are. Two of the first-known pretabular logics were Dummett’s famous super-...

B. Kooi and A. Tamminga present a correspondence analysis for extensions of G. Priest’s logic of paradox. Each unary or binary extension is characterizable by a special operator and analyzable via a sound and complete natural deduction system. The present paper develops a sound and complete proof searching technique for the binary extensions of the logic of paradox.

What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable through: (...) (1) genuinely finite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (2) no finite-valued but only an infinite-valued truthtabular semantics; (3) no truth-tabular semantics at all. Any of those logics, however, can in principle be characterized through non-truth-functional valuation semantics, at least as soon as their associated consequence relations respect the usual tarskian postulates. So, paradoxical as that might seem at first, it turns out that truth-functional logics may be adequately characterized by non-truth-functional semantics . Now, what feature of a given logic would guarantee it to dwell in class (1) or in class (2), irrespective of its circumstantial semantic characterization? (shrink)

Refutation systems are formal systems for inferring the falsity of formulae. These systems can, in particular, be used to syntactically characterise logics. In this paper, we explore the close connection between refutation systems and admissible rules. We develop technical machinery to construct refutation systems, employing techniques from the study of admissible rules. Concretely, we provide a refutation system for the intermediate logics of bounded branching, known as the Gabbay–de Jongh logics. We show that this gives a characterisation of these logics (...) in terms of their admissible rules. To illustrate the technique, we also provide a refutation system for Medvedev’s logic. (shrink)

There are several three-valued logical systems that form a scattered landscape, even if all reasonable connectives in three-valued logics can be derived from a few of them. Most papers on this subject neglect the issue of the relevance of such logics in relation with the intended meaning of the third truth-value. Here, we focus on the case where the third truth-value means unknown, as suggested by Kleene. Under such an understanding, we show that any truth-qualified formula in a large range (...) of three-valued logics can be translated into KD as a modal formula of depth 1, with modalities in front of literals only, while preserving all tautologies and inference rules of the original three-valued logic. This simple information logic is a two-tiered classical propositional logic with simple semantics in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of classical interpretations. We study in particular the translations of Kleene, Gödel, ᴌukasiewicz and Nelson logics. We show that Priest’s logic of paradox, closely connected to Kleene’s, can also be translated into our modal setting, simply by exchanging the modalities possible and necessary. Our work enables the precise expressive power of three-valued logics to be laid bare for the purpose of uncertainty management. (shrink)

This paper collects and presents unpublished notes of Kurt Gödel concerning the field of many-valued logic. In order to get a picture as complete as possible, both formal and philosophical notes, transcribed from the Gabelsberger shorthand system, are included.

The paper argues that cognitive states of biological systems are inherently temporal. Three adequacy conditions for neuronal models of representation are vindicated: the compositionality of meaning, the compositionality of content, and the co-variation with content. Classicist and connectionist approaches are discussed and rejected. Based on recent neurobiological data, oscillatory networks are introduced as a third alternative. A mathematical description in a Hilbert space framework is developed. The states of this structure can be regarded as conceptual representations satisfying the three conditions.

The book presents a thoroughly elaborated logical theory of generalized truth-values understood as subsets of some established set of truth values. After elucidating the importance of the very notion of a truth value in logic and philosophy, we examine some possible ways of generalizing this notion. The useful four-valued logic of first-degree entailment by Nuel Belnap and the notion of a bilattice constitute the basis for further generalizations. By doing so we elaborate the idea of a multilattice, and most notably, (...) a trilattice of truth values – a specific algebraic structure with information ordering and two distinct logical orderings, one for truth and another for falsity. Each logical order not only induces its own logical vocabulary, but determines also its own entailment relation. We consider both semantic and syntactic ways of formalizing these relations and construct various logical calculi. (shrink)

After recalling the distinction between logic as reasoning and logic as theory of reasoning, we first examine the question of relativity of logic arguing that the theory of reasoning as any other science is relative. In a second part we discuss the emergence of universal logic as a general theory of logical systems, making comparison with universal algebra and the project of mathesis universalis. In a third part we critically present three lines of research connected to universal logic: logical pluralism, (...) non-classical logics and cognitive science. (shrink)

1. There are two distinct lines of research that aim at modelling belief and knowledge: modal logic and uncertainty theories. Modal logic extends classical logic by introducing knowledge or belief...

First-order Gödel logics are a family of finite- or infinite-valued logics where the sets of truth values V are closed subsets of [0,1] containing both 0 and 1. Different such sets V in general determine different Gödel logics GV (sets of those formulas which evaluate to 1 in every interpretation into V). It is shown that GV is axiomatizable iff V is finite, V is uncountable with 0 isolated in V, or every neighborhood of 0 in V is uncountable. Complete (...) axiomatizations for each of these cases are given. The r.e. prenex, negation-free, and existential fragments of all first-order Gödel logics are also characterized. (shrink)

We study the topic of realization from classical justification logics in the context of the recently introduced Gödel justification logics. We show that the standard Gödel modal logics of Caicedo and Rodriguez are not realized by the Gödel justification logics and moreover, we study possible extensions of the Gödel justification logics, which are strong enough to realize the standard Gödel modal logics. On the other hand, we study the fragments of the standard Gödel modal logics, which are realized by the (...) usual Gödel justification logics. We prove the corresponding realization theorem by using Fitting’s merging of realizations as well as appropriate hypersequent calculi on the modal side, adapting the work by Metcalfe and Olivetti. For these hypersequent calculi, we also show a cut-elimination theorem. We provide natural semantical characterizations for all of these newly introduced logics. (shrink)

Justification logics are special kinds of modal logics which provide a framework for reasoning about epistemic justifications. For this, they extend classical boolean propositional logic by a family of necessity-style modal operators “t : ”, indexed over t by a corresponding set of justification terms, which thus explicitly encode the justification for the necessity assertion in the syntax. With these operators, one can therefore not only reason about modal effects on propositions but also about dynamics inside the justifications themselves. We (...) replace this classical boolean base with Gödel logic, one of the three most prominent fuzzy logics, i.e. special instances of many-valued logics, taking values in the unit interval [0, 1], which are intended to model inference under vagueness. We extend the canonical possible-world semantics for justification logic to this fuzzy realm by considering fuzzy accessibility- and evaluation-functions evaluated over the minimum t-norm and establish strong completeness theorems for various fuzzy analogies of prominent extensions for basic justification logic. (shrink)

There is an ambiguity in the concept of deductive validity that went unnoticed until the middle of the twentieth century. Sometimes an inference rule is called valid because its conclusion is a theorem whenever its premises are. But often something different is meant: The rule's conclusion follows from its premises even in the presence of other assumptions. In many logical environments, these two definitions pick out the same rules. But other environments are context-sensitive, and in these environments the second notion (...) is stronger. Sorting out this ambiguity has led to profound mathematical investigations with applications in complexity theory and computer science. The origins of this ambiguity and the history of its resolution deserve philosophical attention, because our understanding of logic stands to benefit from their details. I am eager to examine together with you, Crito, whether this argument will appear in any way different to me in my present circumstances, or whether it remains the same, whet... (shrink)

We give an account of stable reasoning, a recent and novel approach to problem solving from a formal, logical point of view. We describe the underlying logic of stable reasoning and illustrate how it is used to model different domains and solve practical reasoning problems. We discuss some of the main differences with respect to reasoning in classical logic and we examine an ongoing research programme for the rational reconstruction of human knowledge that may be considered a successor to the (...) logical empiricists’ programme of the mid-twentieth century. (shrink)

Kniha, jako je tato, nemůže být tak docela dílem jediného člověka. Dovést ji do podoby koherentního celku bych nedokázal bez pomoci svých kolegů, kteří po mně text četli a upozornili mě na spoustu chyb a nedůsledností, které se v něm vyskytovaly. Můj dík v tomto směru patří zejména Vojtěchu Kolmanovi, Liboru Běhounkovi a Martě Bílkové. Za připomínky k různým částem rukopisu jsem vděčen i Pavlu Maternovi, Milanu Matouškovi, Prokopu Sousedíkovi, Vladimíru Svobodovi, Petru Hájkovi a Grahamu Priestovi. Kniha vznikla v rámci (...) projektu podpořeného grantem AV ČR číslo A0009001/00. (shrink)

We investigate the variety corresponding to a logic, which is the combination of ukasiewicz Logic and Product Logic, and in which Gödel Logic is interpretable. We present an alternative axiomatization of such variety. We also investigate the variety, called the variety of algebras, corresponding to the logic obtained from by the adding of a constant and of a defining axiom for one half. We also connect algebras with structures, called f-semifields, arising from the theory of lattice-ordered rings, and prove that (...) every algebra can be regarded as a structure whose domain is the interval [0, 1] of an f-semifield, and whose operations are the truncations of the operations of to [0, 1]. We prove that such a structure is uniquely determined by up to isomorphism, and we establish an equivalence between the category of algebras and that of f-semifields. (shrink)

This volume is dedicated to Leo Esakia's contributions to the theory of modal and intuitionistic systems. Consisting of 10 chapters, written by leading experts, this volume discusses Esakia’s original contributions and consequent developments that have helped to shape duality theory for modal and intuitionistic logics and to utilize it to obtain some major results in the area. Beginning with a chapter which explores Esakia duality for S4-algebras, the volume goes on to explore Esakia duality for Heyting algebras and its generalizations (...) to weak Heyting algebras and implicative semilattices. The book also dives into the Blok-Esakia theorem and provides an outline of the intuitionistic modal logic KM which is closely related to the Gödel-Löb provability logic GL. One chapter scrutinizes Esakia’s work interpreting modal diamond as the derivative of a topological space within the setting of point-free topology. The final chapter in the volume is dedicated to the derivational semantics of modal logic and other related issues. (shrink)

Epistemicists claim that if it is vague whether p, it is unknowable whether p. Some contest this on epistemic grounds: vague intuitions about vague matters need not fully preclude knowledge, if those intuitions are response-dependent in some special sense of enabling vague knowledge. This paper defends the epistemicist principle that vagueness entails ignorance against such objections. I argue that not only is response-dependence an implausible characterization of actual vague matters, its mere possibility poses no threat to epistemicism and is properly (...) accounted for by the epistemicist’s own principles. (shrink)

Compactness is an important property of classical propositional logic. It can be defined in two equivalent ways. The first one states that simultaneous satisfiability of an infinite set of formulae is equivalent to the satisfiability of all its finite subsets. The second one states that if a set of formulae entails a formula, then there is a finite subset entailing this formula as well. In propositional many-valued logic, we have different degrees of satisfiability and different possible definitions of entailment, hence (...) the questions of compactness is more complex. In this paper we will deal with compactness of Gödel, GödelΔ, and Gödel∼ logics. (shrink)

Intervals in boolean algebras enter into the study of conditional assertions (or events) in two ways: directly, either from intuitive arguments or from Goodman, Nguyen and Walker's representation theorem, as suitable mathematical entities to bear conditional probabilities, or indirectly, via a representation theorem for the family of algebras associated with de Finetti's three-valued logic of conditional assertions/events. Further representation theorems forge a connection with rough sets. The representation theorems and an equivalent of the boolean prime ideal theorem yield an algebraic (...) completeness theorem for the three-valued logic. This in turn leads to a Henkin-style completeness theorem. Adequacy with respect to a family of Kripke models for de Finetti's logic, Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and Priest's Logic of Paradox is demonstrated. The extension to first-order yields a short proof of adequacy for Körner's logic of inexact predicates. (shrink)

In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular ‘justifications’ are demonstrably without epistemic value. Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus non-classical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaning-preserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and quantum logics, (...) can be translated into classical logic by introducing additional intensional operators into the language. Based on this result it is argued that classical logic is representationally optimal. In sec. 6 it is investigated whether non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. The answer is predominantly negative but partially positive. Nevertheless the situation is not symmetric, because classical logic has important ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic. (shrink)

Let \ be a class of formulas. We say that a theory T in classical logic has the \-disjunction property if for any \ sentences \ and \, either \ or \ whenever \. First, we characterize the \-disjunction property in terms of the notion of partial conservativity. Secondly, we prove a model theoretic characterization result for \-disjunction property. Thirdly, we investigate relationships between partial disjunction properties and several other properties of theories containing Peano arithmetic. Finally, we investigate unprovability of (...) formalized partial disjunction properties. (shrink)